President Trump’s most recent remark regarding the tension-loaded Middle East – that a sizeable part of Gaza’s 2.4 million Palestinian inhabitants should be “cleaned out” of the war torn strip and moved to Egypt and/or Jordan, “temporarily or…long term” – has been appreciated by ultra-nationalists within his governing coalition, but definitely not by the governing regimes in these countries, Egypt and Jordan, nor in most or all Arab neighbors.
Nor, incidentally, by most spokespersons for the international community, in view of the irreparable damage any added disruption could do to the already more than fragile state of the two critically important ceasefires in the region, the one between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon and particularly the one between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, both linked in various ways to the escalating situation in the West Bank – the key to any concept of Palestinian statehood and a two-state solution.
It may be useful to remind here that the November 27 ceasefire agreement over southern Lebanon between Israel and Gaza, under US and French strong-arm mediation, significantly represented a breach with Hezbollah’s hitherto policy of linkage between its conflict with Israel and that of Hamas, in spite of the Shia-Sunni divide; the November 27 ceasefire marked the end of that linkage, an important set back för Hamas, obviously, one of several (cf Syria, Iran and related developments), and a corresponding gain for Israel (one of several).
The Lebanon ceasefire
At the time of writing, one (very, very busy) week into Donald Trump’s presidency, Israel has just announced its intention – since supported and confirmed by the US, presumably also by France as co-member of the stipulated implementation mechanism – to not comply with the provisions of the agreement regarding the 60 days first phase; the US and other external actors in the mechanism ruled according to the Israeli requests and extended this first phase by another 3 weeks. Why?
Because under the agreement, as the condition for a decision to move the temporary ceasefire to a next phase of permanent ceasefire, Hezbollah was to have withdrawn completely to north of the Litani river, Israel was to have withdrawn completely to south of the national border (having dismantled Hezbollah’s military facilities and installations in the area south of the Litani, and the national Lebanese army in coordination with UNIFIL, supported by the US and others under the country’s newly installed political leadership, was supposed to have competently replaced both Hezbollah and Israeli IDF as controlling guardians of the Lebanese part of the border area. Clearly these conditions were not fulfilled at the time of expiry of the stipulated 60 days, and in addition there had been several armed incidents during the ceasefire, killing some 22 persons, including Lebanese civilians desperate to get back to their homes in the south after the dramatic exodus to the north in the beginning of the Israeli bombing campaign.
So the temporary ceasefire was extended by three more weeks. Will that be enough, we may incredulously ask, for the parties to agree – albeit under heavy external pressure – that the conditions for a permanent ceasefire (paving the way for a lasting peace agreement) have now been fulfilled? Or will we, rather, see a semblance of Lebanese and Lebanese-Israeli stability emerge as a result of a protracted process of prolonged temporary ceasefires, avoiding difficult issues pertaining to permanent peace, while time is given to both Israel and Lebanon to sort out their messy domestic politics and to find out more clearly what current developments in neighboring Syria might factor in to the strategists in Tel Aviv and Beirut.
Precious little is known as yet as regards the Trump factor in the Lebanese ceasefire and its survivability. But although compared to the Gaza ceasefire the Trump team was relatively less involved in the intense diplomacy preceding the November 27 deal, there was clearly a Trump factor involved as PM Netanyahu was finally persuaded to accept the ceasefire and its staged provisions. After all, Netanyahu did justify his acceptance in terms of both IDF exhaustion, Hezbollah’s dramatic weakening and the need to focus on (finishing in Gaza and) the Iranian threat – hence the need for Trump-American support.
So will the Lebanon ceasefire hold, given the extension, beyond the extension? There are so many steppingstones and stumbling blocks that it is hardly realistic to expect a smooth sail. For the parties, and their sponsors, to be ready within three weeks for a grand bargain and a permanent ceasefire, i.e. a provisional peace (of sorts), seems unlikely in view of the necessarily vague stipulations and provisions in the agreement, so perhaps it is safer to expect a process of re-negotiated temporary ceasefires, as above. But there is an emerging international analytical consensus – with or without the Trump factor – that a resumption of full-scale war is in neither of the parties’ interest, for now. Hezbollah, a now drastically weakened Hezbollah – like Iran in considering its long-awaited revenge for Israel’s autumn attack – knows that Israel is ready and anxious to use any credible aggression or threat as an excuse for a (US supported) devastating onslaught. And Israel, with or without the Trump factor – has little to gain, politically as well as militarily, from a new round of costly full-scale war. For now.
The Gaza ceasefire
Now moving south to the dramatic, much more dramatic, Gaza arena, with the ceasefire agreement that both the Biden and the Trump teams took credit for, justifiably, for in the final stages, days before Trump’s inauguration on January 20, there was an impressive – and necessary – amount of cooperation and coordination between the outgoing and the incoming teams, the Biden team having run a marathon, and the Trump having won a sprint.
And now, scenes of joy in Israel at the agreement leading to first badges of hostages arriving, alive and seemingly kicking, to safety in Israel, and scenes of joy both in Gaza at the agreement finally sparing them lethal military threat and access to humanitarian aid and to their homeland in northern Gaza, and in the West Bank at the arrival home of scores of Palestinian prisoners. And relief on the part of all concerned observers that the first steps of (the first phase of) this utterly fragile ceasefire agreement, allowing a first round agreed upon exchanges of hostages for Palestinian prisoners, the entry of some 4000 trucks with humanitarian assistance, some elements of Israeli military withdrawal and Gazans’ re-entry to northern Gaza, have been carried out without major jeopardy.
Then comes the big BUT. Is it realistic to expect that the entire ceasefire arrangement with all its controversial intricacies can be implemented as conceived, and as expected by the main stake holders and sponsors?
Is it realistic that even the stipulated first phase of 6 weeks, in which 33 hostages are to be released in exchange for some 1800 Palestinian prisoners and during which Israeli IDF is to essentially abandon Gaza (among other provisions), can be implemented, given in particular the ambiguity of signals from the Netanyahu coalition government, reflecting PM Netanyahu’s squeeze between pledges to Trump and others to fulfil the deal and pledges to coalition colleagues Smotrich and Ben-Gvir not to abandon the stated war aim of “total victory” over Hamas, i.e., not to sell out the option to resume full-scale war until Hamas is crushed and all hostages are freed? This apparent full incompatibility of signaling and objectives is further complicated by the stipulation in the agreement that after some weeks into the first phase, negotiations be initiated with the mediators (US, Egypt, Qatar) concerning the parameters and objectives of the second phase, presupposing the release of all hostages, alive or dead, the release of the stipulated cohort of Palestinian prisoners, and the complete abandonment of IDF from Gaza, among other provisions.
And if the Israeli side, notably Netanyahu’s ultras in the governing coalition, is reluctant to commit to a process in which Israel is increasingly exposed to international (including Trump/US) pressure to end the war and make the ceasefire permanent and therefore reluctant to sell out “total victory”, Hamas has the opposite interest; not to sell out its only trump card, the remaining hostages, without internationally (i.e. US) guaranteed provisions regarding a permanent ceasefire.
The first rounds of first phase implementation gave a strong insight into the controversiality of the exchange exercise, with re-appearing Hamas militants powerfully escorting the exit of released hostages, and large Palestinian crowds triumphantly receiving their prisoners. Observing these scenes, and understanding that even if all the 33 hostages are released as agreed for the first phase, what about the remaining hostages? – the combined impression must be painful for most Israelis.
What does it do to the politics and society of Israel to have a situation where families of hostages not on lists for release see that their own government (or part of it) claims to prioritize hostage release in full but acts in reality in such a way as to de-prioritize hostage liberation in favor of keeping the war going? To have a country the government of which apparently cannot survive unless it dishonors pledges made to fulfil the ceasefire, in all its foreseen phases, i.e., including phase 3 with all the demanding “day after” issues at the table? A country where PM Netanyahu, as claimed by many, has to choose between Trump and Smotrich (and Ben-Gvir)?
The next few weeks, therefore, will be a thriller.
