There is a debate rumbling away in British foreign policy circles about British grand strategy. This discussion is part of the continuing response to Brexit, the Russian war against Ukraine and the deteriorating European security system, as well as the steady erosion of the liberal rules-based international order. More recently, however, it has been given renewed impetus by the unpredictability and impetuosity of the Trump administration, which has repeatedly expressed its distain for Europe’s liberal democracies and, on numerous occasions, threatened their core national and collective interests.
The debate has included discussion of whether the UK needs a grand strategy; whether the UK is indeed capable of doing grand strategy; the status and role of the UK in the international system; and whether it is a ‘declining major power’ or a ‘leading middle power’.[1] Associated with this debate on grand strategy is a discussion on whether British foreign policy needs a more explicit doctrine, and if so, what form should it take?[2] Doctrine consists of a set of core concepts and fundamental principles that distil lessons from the past and assumptions about the present to provide guidelines for pursuing core national interests. Over the years, the UK has had a string of such doctrinal concepts, from Robin Cook’s ‘ethical foreign policy’ and Tony Blair’s ‘a force for good’, to the post-Brexit notion of ‘Global Britain’. Most recently, former Foreign Secretary David Lammy spoke of ‘Progressive realism’, which advocated realist means to achieve progressive ends, and which explicitly drew on the legacy of Ernest Bevin (a strong advocate of NATO, the strategic partnership with the United States and a British nuclear deterrence).[3]
Grand strategy is about how a state uses all the instruments of power and influence at its disposal to achieve its medium and long-term goals. It involves aligning means and ends, and specifying the steps needed to achieve these ends. ‘It is the logical story about how states make themselves safe in an unsafe world’.[4] One of the first steps in formulating a state’s grand strategy is identifying its capabilities, interests and aspirations. Despite the impression given by the declinist narrative that pervades discussions of British politics and society today, the UK remains one of Europe’s ‘middle states’. It has significant capabilities in all four domains of social power: economic, military, political-diplomatic and ‘soft power’. Its economy is the sixth largest in global terms, with the second largest financial sector and a vibrant technological sector; its all-domain military capabilities include an independent nuclear deterrent, sizable Royal Navy, well-respected intelligence services (part of the Five Eyes network) and strong defence technological Industrial base (DTIB); it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a member of the G7, G20, NATO and the Commonwealth; and it has soft power in the shape of the English language, universities, the BBC and its culture (from Shakespeare to Monty Pythons). Whilst no longer a ‘great power’ in global terms, it can perhaps aptly be described as a ‘leading middle power’.
In terms of its interests and identity, the UK defines itself as a ‘European country with global interests’.[5] This reflects its geography and history as an island nation, situated off the northwest coast of continental Europe, which has long-standing global partnerships. The UK’s primary economic, security and political interests lie in Europe, but it also has a network of global interests and partnerships – particularly in the Indo-Pacific region with countries including Australia, New Zealand, India and Japan.
Britain’s status as an island nation with global interests largely explains the post-second world war conception of British grand strategy as consisting of the three overlapping and intersecting circles of interest: Europe, the transatlantic partnership and the Commonwealth. Since the end of the Second World War, the UK has sought to play an influential role in the European security system through NATO and by cultivating a privileged ‘special relationship’ with the United States. After Brexit, it was hoped that ‘Global Britain’ could gain economically from new trading relationships across the globe, whilst remaining engaged in Europe institutionally through NATO. Central to this would be the ‘special relationship’ with Washington, which would enhance the UK’s political and security weight as a critical ‘transatlantic bridge’ between Europe and the United States.[6]
However, the return of geopolitical competition, the intensification of great power rivalry and the gradual unravelling of the rules-based international order have left the UK increasingly vulnerable.[7] After decades of deepening globalisation, the global trading system is being eroded by unfair trading practices, tariffs, ‘weaponised interdependence’, ‘friend-shoring’ and protectionism. Three great trading blocs are emerging – the USA, China and the EU – and as a senior Downing Street official noted in early 2025, ‘Because we are outside these trading blocs, it’s like dancing between three elephants.’[8]
Perhaps the greatest shock to the British foreign and security establishment is the capricious, unpredictable and disruptive behaviour of the Trump administration. Despite Prime Minister Starmer’s somewhat obsequious and flattering attitude to Donald Trump, British concerns about Trump’s ill-conceived and strategically incoherent war against Iran has led to a major breakdown in relations. Trump has insulted Starmer (‘he is no Churchill’), belittled the Royal Navy, made light of British casualties in recent wars and questioned British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.[9] For all intents and purposes, the ‘special relationship’ is now over. King Charles III’s State Visit to America provided a masterclass in diplomacy, but even his poise, dignity and gentle humour cannot restore the trust and mutual respect upon which the ‘special relationship’ was built. As the ‘special relationship’ fades into the shadowlands of nostalgia and longing, Britain’s much cherished foreign policy role as the ‘transatlantic bridge’ is being significantly weakened.
The core problem, which is now the focus of British foreign and security policy discussions, is that – at a time when Europe faces a clear and present danger from Putin’s Russia – the United States is no longer Europe’s ‘indispensable nation’ underpinning and guaranteeing its security. Indeed, the Trump administration has acted in ways that undermine European security, threaten the sovereignty of European nations and denigrate the liberal values and cooperative institutions that are central to Europe’s identity and interests. Like most of its European partners, the British government is now hoping to preserve what it can of the US commitment to NATO whilst preparing for a future in which Europe is able to provide for its own security and deterrence. The United States remains one of the UK’s major trading partners, and the UK armed forces remain dependent on US supply chains, technology and strategic enablers. The US and UK also cooperate closely in intelligence gathering and sharing. However, the ‘special relationship’ was always more than the sum of its parts, and now the bilateral US-UK relationship is less than the sum of its parts. For the foreseeable future it will be pragmatic, transactional and functional.
British policy makers are therefore having to plan for world in which the United States is no longer a reliable ally and partner. This is currently the central concern around which the debate on British grand strategy revolves. The UK’s relationship with the United States will remain important, but it is no longer ‘special’. With the fading of the ‘special relationship’ and the weakening of Britain’s historic role as ‘transatlantic bridge’, the UK government is increasingly seeking to strengthen ties with Europe. It has devoted considerable time and diplomatic energy in negotiating a ‘re-set’ with the European Union and has already strengthened its bilateral ties with key European partners – above all France and Germany.[10]
The centre of gravity of UK grand strategy is therefore shifting – away from a Churchillian focus on playing Greece to America’s Rome, and towards an ever-closer partnership with its European neighbours. Europe is now at the heart of British grand strategy. As Prime Minister Keir Starmer declared at the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, ‘We are not the Britain of the Brexit years anymore. … There is no British security without Europe and no European security without Britain. That is the lesson of history – and it is today’s lesson’.[11] The strategic partnership with the United States is still seen as vital to the security of Europe and the UK – and will be for at least the next five to ten years. Britain’s close commercial, political and military relationships with partners in the Indo-Pacific region will also remain important.[12] Nonetheless, as a ‘European country with global interests’, the central focus of UK foreign policy is now deepening engagement with Europe to shape European international relations in ways that serve British interests and strengthen Europe’s security architecture. As Defence Secretary John Healey has said, the government is ‘re-establishing Britain’s proud role in the world and its necessary role within Europe’.[13]
As Europe moves to the heart of British grand strategy, it is Northern Europe and the ‘Wider North’ that are the primary focus of the UK’s security and defence policies.[14] Given the geopolitical location of the British Isles, the UK has a natural interest in the Atlantic, the Arctic and the High North, and the Nordic-Baltic region. In British debates, the concept of the ‘Wider North’ is often used to encompass the North Atlantic, Arctic and High North, and the Nordic-Baltic region.[15] In terms of maritime strategy, the UK has a vested interest in keeping open transatlantic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and ensuring freedom of navigation for the trade upon which the economic welfare of Europe and the UK depend. In the Cold War, the UK had an important strategic role to play in the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap, and British maritime strategy is now being conceptualised in terms of a GIUK-Norway Gap, extending into the Norwegian Sea to the Norwegian coast, and upwards to Svalbard and the Bear Gap.
It is perhaps no surprise therefore that Britain’s closest military and security partner in the Nordic-Baltic region is Norway, with whom it has cultivated close defence-industrial cooperation and ever-closer military integration. Defence cooperation has been deepening since 2024, and in December 2025, this resulted in the Lunna House agreement. This commits the UK and Norway to joint procurement and operation of a fleet of 13 Type 26 frigates; a permanent and extended presence of British forces in Norway, centred on Camp Viking which provides an operating hub for British Royal Marines; and a joint programme of drones and advanced autonomous systems.[16] ‘The United Kingdom’, Norwegian defence minister Tore Sandvik has noted, ‘is Norway’s closest and most important ally in Europe, and our two countries have had close and good security and defence cooperation for many years. We are now facing many of the same security challenges in a time characterised by much uncertainty’.[17]
The UK is increasingly seeking to carve out a role for itself as an indispensable security provider in northern Europe. It has also been a long-standing proponent of strengthening NATO’s eastern posture and leads NATO’s Forward Land Forces in Estonia. It provided additional security guarantees for Finland and Sweden during their NATO application process. It has taken a prominent role in supporting Ukraine, and now co-chairs the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (the UDCG or ‘Ramstein Group’) with Germany. The UK also acts as the Framework Nation for the ten-nation Joint Expeditionary Force (Force), which has come of age since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The JEF now provides a flexible and ad hoc framework for military cooperation in northern Europe, providing a rapid reaction force that can respond to crises events below the NATO article V threshold. This minilateral defence cooperation is further strengthened by a network of bilateral defence and security cooperation agreements across the Nordic-Baltic region, including Poland.[18]
The reorientation of British grand strategy towards Europe and particularly Northern Europe began under the previous Conservative governments but has gathered momentum under the government of Keir Starmer – particularly in terms of the ‘re-set’ with the European Union. However, the obvious question is – how robustly anchored is this evolving grand strategic reorientation towards Europe in UK domestic politics? Will it survive the rise of populist parties on the far right and far left? What will be the impact of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales? What effect will the current leadership struggle within the Labour Government have?
Two tentative reflections can be offered in this regard. The first is that foreign and security policy is to some degree insulated from the daily churn of domestic party politics. Ministries in the security-diplomatic sector usually enjoy an element of ‘relative autonomy’ in defining national security interests – particularly if they enjoy broad support across in parliament and amongst the broader public. Second, this grand strategic shift towards Europe and the Wider North enjoys broad support across the political mainstream (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats). The challenge comes from Reform and the newly resurgent Green Party, but neither are likely to dominate the next government after 2029. But of course, as Harold Macmillan once warned, any plans for, or predictions of, the future face one unforeseeable problem; ‘events, old boy, events.’