The British should be encouraged and in practice promised financial support in exchange for extending their nuclear umbrella over their allies in Europe.
President Trump has created international chaos in no time. It is not easy for us to navigate wisely when he feels such great kinship with the world’s worst dictators. ”We have two leaders in two great countries who are very good friends and focused on how we can strengthen our common goals and interests,” said his Russia-friendly new intelligence director Tulsi Gabbard in an interview on 17th March.
Perhaps we will even see Trump participate at Putin’s side in the pompous 80th anniversary celebration of Victory Day in Moscow on May 9. Chinese President Xi will participate, as will Indian Prime Minister Modi. North Korea will field a military unit in the parade.
Trump wants ”peace” at any price in Ukraine, regardless of the consequences for Ukraine as a nation. He was completely played in the conversation with Putin. Ukraine’s position can be compared to Hitler’s and Stalin’s agreement regarding Poland in 1939.
Dividing the world into spheres of interest together with Xi and Putin is not a foreign idea to Trump and it would be a kind of new Yalta deal with Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin’s meeting in February 1945 as a model.
President Stubb has rightly emphasized that Finland prefers diplomacy over the use of force. The Helsinki Final Act from the Helsinki Security Conference in 1975 contains all central elements: respect for the sovereignty and borders of countries, the prohibition of using force or threatening to use force, and respect for the right of each country to choose its own place where they belong among nations. The leaders of the great powers now want to finally cut off this cornerstone of the security order.
The irrational, provocative and hurtful behavior of the USA towards its friends and allies has raised great concern about the country’s reliability as a guarantor of the security of alliance partners. Ultimately, it is also about the nuclear umbrella, does it exist or does it not exist. That discussion has also begun in our country.
Can France and Great Britain compensate for the possible nuclear failure of the United States? President Macron recently opened up the possibility. He also announced that the French Air Force will be equipped with a new ASN4G hypersonic nuclear missile, designed to renew the airborne component of France’s nuclear deterrence by 2035. Greater French commitments reasonably imply a readiness to adjust the long-standing rigid French doctrine to some extent. In Paris, it is certainly expected that the additional costs would be financed by others, primarily Germany.
Hufvudstadsbladet’s interview with American Senator Lindsay Graham (March 18) provided some concrete information. ”I would like Great Britain and France to modernize their nuclear deterrent and place it strategically around Europe, to show Russia that you take your defense seriously,” the influential senator told reporter Juri von Bonsdorff. That view may perhaps not be endorsed by U S Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.
For Great Britain, Senator Graham’s proposal would mean not only a political reorientation but also efforts to strengthen the arsenal. The British potential to play a significant role in European nuclear deterrence should not be underestimated.
After the end of the Cold War, the British also wanted to collect the peace dividend. The number of nuclear weapons was significantly reduced to a level that was considered sufficient for the country’s national needs in the then prevailing situation.
This meant that the Royal Air Force became nuclear-free, but at the same time the UK became more dependent on the United States to maintain its status as one of the five internationally recognized nuclear-weapon states with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
The British strategic submarines received American Trident D5 missiles, but the nuclear warheads themselves were still British. The next generation of submarines will have the same missiles in a modernized form, but now with a warhead that the United States is designing (W93) in cooperation with Britain.
The British clearly have a fairly good opportunity to regain some of their national nuclear autonomy at an affordable price. In concrete terms, it would be to take the WE-177 bomb’s nuclear warhead, which was retired in the late 1990s, restore it for active service in a deterrent role, and preferably mount it on a modern cruise missile like Storm Shadow and later on hypersonic cruise missiles in development. Such dual use cruise missiles are in high demand regardless.
The British manufactured over 300 WE-177 bombs at the time. This can be compared to the USA, which now has about 100 B61 bombs in five NATO countries, with a yield strength equivalent to between 0.3 and 50 kilotons of TNT.
Technically, it should not be particularly difficult to design new nuclear charges, as the warhead in the WE-177 is an old proven design, a robust ”atomic bomb”. The bomb’s yield was selectable, from 0.5 kilotons of TNT (just over three percent of the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb) to over 400 kilotons. Britain had over three tons of weapons-grade plutonium in stock in 2000 and is likely to still have significant amounts.
The road to a refurbished British WE-177 warhead may of course not be straightforward, but the design is well established, and there’s most likely no need for new nuclear tests. New safety features, electronics etc. can be introduced without concern for malfunctions. Keep in mind that the Swedish nuclear weapons scientists were absolutely certain that their bomb would have functioned without full-scale testing more than half a century ago.
Recovery of lost capabilities is therefore the key word in these uncertain times, and it would be a good complement to other policies, especially concerning peace in Ukraine, where Europe’s coalition of the willing must stand its ground. This issue has, however, not yet been debated in the British media. Among British professionals, the matter is certainly being discussed internally. Senator Graham can hardly be ignored.
The British should therefore be encouraged and in effect promised financial support in exchange for extending their umbrella to their allies. An increased British ability to respond to the threat of Russian ”tactical” nuclear weapons would serve the whole of Europe. Could we perhaps offer the British a favorable agreement for re-entry into the EU?