”Tomorrow I shall see Denktas, the day after I shall see Klerides, and the day after that I shall see a psychiatrist”.
Do you remember that famous statement by Richard Holbrooke, the famous US diplomat-cum-peace negotiator connected with the Dayton accord on Bosnia/Herzegovina in the mid-90s? He was in this case, characteristically humorously but not concealing some frustration, referring to the then dominant figures in the long battle for peace on the divided island of Cyprus, Rauf Denktas (who used to be called the tail that was wagging the dog, Turkey, in view of his leverage) and, on the Greek Cypriot side, Glafkos Klerides.
This was in 1999, towards the end of the Clinton administration, some four years after Dayton that put an end to the Bosnian part of the ex-Yugoslav wars, the lead exemption to the rule of prevailing peace in Europe after WW2, before February 2022. And some four years before the Annan Plan on Cyprus, the proposal for a final, bizonal and bicameral federal, unification solution to the protracted Cyprus crisis after the 1974 Turkish invasion in response to the coup d’etat on the Greek side and preceding years of turbulence. The Annan Plan of 2004, named after the UN secretary general Kofi Annan, was the last serious attempt at unification of the divided island, seeking to square the circle in a federated structure, between the rights and aspirations of the Greek majority and the Turkish minority, was at the time accepted by the Turks but rejected by the Greeks, paving the way for a long, frustrated journey of non-solution. Further prolonging, until this very day, the second oldest UN peace-keeping mission, UNFICYP, keeping military company with the two strategically important UK air bases on the Greek part of the island, Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
The 90’s in Europe brought the end of the Cold War, massively supporting the cause of peace in Europe, although the continent had to suffer as exemptions not only the bitter Yugoslav wars but also the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno Karabach. But other than that, peace in Europe, both during the cold war and then after, displayed a map of peacefulness, however cornered in its north-west and its south-east by two festering, protracted so-called low-intensity conflicts, “the Troubles” in Northern Ireland and, in the other corner, Cyprus.
“The Troubles” were finally, after some 30 years of seemingly insoluble troubles, ended by the “Good Friday” Agreement in 1998. Whereas the Cyprus problem, since long non-violent but still a heavy burden on the International Community, remains unsolved to this day, raising the question of whether this problem can somehow be parked, rendered unsolved but internationally harmless, or whether a solution (by unification) to the Cyprus problem remains – as is often claimed -a sine qua non to the solution to other, gradually growing, conflicts and disputes in the EastMed region.
There are some solid reasons why “parking” the Cyprus problem, i.e., giving in to the seemingly endless negotiating challenges arising from the involved asymmetries of the agenda and resulting incompatibilities of the parties’ positions, has proved and probably will continue to prove to be easier said than done.
Still today no other country than Turkey, not even close allies such as Azerbaijan, has recognized Northern Cyprus, TRNC, as a sovereign state. This has left the people of TRNC in an internationally isolated and exposed position which has proven to be untenably costly in various ways, despite all the efforts by “motherland” Turkey to compensate for these costs, financially and developmentally.
This isolation burden has of course been enhanced by the fact that as a result of a highly controversial EU decision some decades ago Greek Cyprus, but not Turkish Cyprus, is now a member of the EU, including the veto power (to any EU decision affecting Cyprus) that the Republic of Cyprus now commands. And the delay of a unification solution unavoidably means delay of all the concrete, unresolved issues pertaining to property rights that are pending a framework resolution, for instance the case of the ghost town Varosha, formerly a booming tourist center and since 1974 abandoned, to the great frustration of some 12 000 Greek property owners.
And then there is the inherently unstable and asymmetrical geopolitical and military situation with Greeks fearing the presence of some 30 000 Turkish troops permanently on the island and fearing the proximity of the Turkish “motherland” military might, and the Turks fearing the majority might of Greeks on the island and their close cooperation with “motherland” Greece, and the consistent support rendered by fellow EU members and the EU collectively.
And then, furthermore, there is the emerging fact of sovereignty issues being further enhanced by discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean of oil and gas, dramatically increasing the strategic importance of geography, both maritime borders (EEZ) and location and ownership (and defense) of islands. Unresolved disputes on this unavoidably take on broader regional dimensions, connecting the local Cyprus issues to not only those between the two NATO members Turkey and Greece but also involving relations with and between actors such as Israel, Egypt and Libya. Trends in this area, paradoxically, both render resolution more imperative, both from EU and NATO perspectives, and make resolution more difficult.
There is also the established fact of a non-resolution to the Cyprus issues rendering strategically needed cooperation between NATO and the EU more difficult than otherwise necessary, with notorious complications arising from the reality of Turkey and Greece, but not (Greek) Cyprus, being NATO members whereas Greece and (Greek) Cyprus, but not Turkey are both EU members. No wonder, therefore, that it has since the beginning, 1974, been the UN that has had to shoulder the burden of patiently seeking a solution. But since the very last serious attempt, comparable to the 2004 Annan Plan attempt, the 2017 negotiations in Swiss resort Crans-Montana (when things seemed so close), there has been silence and stalemate, with the Turkish side openly giving up on the unification-by-federation line (as insisted on by a combined International Community), instead arguing for a “two-state” solution.
Non-resolution to the Cyprus problem has, thus, proven to be increasing costly, even untenable, for much broader sets of interest than as pertains to the parties on the strategically important island.
Therefore, to the relief of most or all interested parties, recent months have manifested, again, some winds of change, perhaps the (modest) beginning of a process of reform and resolution, at last.
A necessary condition for any process towards resolution/unification has been and remains that both sides on Cyprus have pro-dialogue and pro-solution leaders in office simultaneously, as a result of the very complicated politics of both sides. This rarely happens, and since Crans-Montana there has been a standstill in UN-moderated high-level talks. But now, as a result of October presidential elections in TRNC, this is the case. Both leaders, Tufar Erhurman, whose landslide victory clearly manifested north Cypriots’ acute disaffection with the current status quo, and, since 2023, Nikos Christodoulides on the Greek side. Unlike his predecessor, Ersin Tatar, who kept joining Erdogan in Ankara in promoting the two-states cause in defiance of the international consensus to the contrary, Erhurman has now seen fit to change rhetorics, sufficient for it to contribute to a renewed, UN-led process of talks. Sufficient for the UN Secretary General to have his new special envoy, Maria Angela Holguin, finally convening the two leaders for a relaxed summit. Relaxed, since reportedly they spent their time talking about practical confidence-building matters of mutual interest, rather than quarrelling fruitlessly about sovereignty, partition and existential security.
These are, potentially, rare, good news in a troubled region and a troubled world. A small step, certainly, rather than “one giant leap for mankind”, but still a step. So maybe, just maybe, droves of tourists will be welcome back to Varosha in a not-too-distant future. But for that to happen, peacefully, giant leaps still need to be dared, leaps implying and offering solutions – and hope -to all players involved, TRNC, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and…yes, Turkey.
A tall order.