Rarely have efforts to arrive at a cease-fire deal in a devastating armed conflict been so protracted, frustrated and elusive as in the current case of Israel versus Hamas (et al) over Gaza. The sense of urgency on the part of most actors, in view of the suffering of hostages and the affected Palestinian civilians combined with current fears of regional conflict proliferation, militates against the interest in stalling on the part of the main contenders, hoping for a better deal in the mutual struggle for survival. Several factors, notably PM Netanyahu’s war aims of “total victory”, contribute to locking the cease-fire, desperately needed for humanitarian reasons, to the larger substantive conflict issues, including those pertaining to “the day after”, rendering compromise between the mortal enemies near-impossible. Even if there is a deal in the near-term – the US and co-mediators are said to plan yet another “final proposal” – the implementation of any deal is likely to be a nightmare, not least for Joe Biden in his final months, and for Kamala Harris should she defeat Donald Trump, if so to Netanyahu’s disappointment.
———————————
Some 11 months after October 7 last year, the dark day of Hamas terror, the desperately needed cease-fire, seen by everyone but Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu and his ultra-conservative government coalition as a – or the – key to any kind of stabilization of the troubled Middle East region, still remains elusive, in spite of intense and protracted efforts by the US and others. A cease-fire, so it was thought, would open the door to both the much-needed humanitarian assistance for the suffering civilian Palestinians trapped in the war-ridden Gaza, and make possible the release of remaining hostages inside Gaza in exchange for an agreed number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel in the West Bank and elsewhere, and at least pave the way for a peaceful settlement of the conflicts between Israel and its Houthi, Hezbollah and pro-Iranian antagonists in the various strategic directions. But the cease-fire has continued to defy all the efforts.
For all the reporting in recent weeks and months on a cease-fire deal being imminent, there are still many unknowns about the current draft, as presented back in May by Joe Biden, as subsequently endorsed by an almost unanimous (Russia abstained) UN Security Council resolution, and as later modified step-by-step in the mediators’ (US, Qatar, Egypt) attempts to help – or compel – the mortal enemies overcome their reluctance. Detailed knowledge of the outline of the current draft – concerning sequencing and timing and international guarantees, among other difficult things – would help us assess the balance between contenders’ ultimate acceptance and the extent to which the cease-fire and the plan has any chance to survive implementation agonies.
What we know, and what we don’t know
We do know that Biden’s “peace plan” (part of the “Biden doctrine” as Thomas Friedman in NYT puts it) tries to bridge the fundamental differences by dividing the cease-fire arrangement into three steps, the first of which is said to last six weeks and to provide the breathing space for large-scale humanitarian rescue, release of a sizeable portion of the hostages in exchange for a certain number of Israel-held Palestinian prisoners and negotiations on the subsequent stages of the process, including a permanent cease-fire. But we essentially do not know about crucial details and figures in the current draft, and it is unknown to what degree these details and figures/numbers/names – and formulations – are in fact agreed text or whether the real situation is a variety of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. As always in negotiations like these, the devil is in the detail.
But we do know that on July 27 – when team Biden was busy circulating the information that finally the two sides had accepted the then arrived-at draft – Israeli PM Netanyahu instructed his negotiating team to add new conditions, certain to be considered by the mediators to be clearly unacceptable for Hamas (and for Egypt!): the demand for unlimited Israeli military presence in the Philadelphi corridor at the border between Gaza and Egypt, and elsewhere.
Chancing a final take-it-or-leave-it cease-fire proposal?
So, with the ever-protracted high-level cease-fire negotiations again stuck, there is, again, talk of the US and co-mediators seeking strength and energy for a “final push”, a final take-it-or-leave-it proposition, or else the parties will be left to sort out their differences by themselves…. But the grim reality is that such US/Egyptian/Qatari threats risk failing to meet basic requirements of credibility; the problems are not going away, risks of regional conflict proliferation will remain looming, as will the suffering of Gaza Palestinians and still surviving hostages and the climate of anger inside Israeli society and politics. To be successful, such a final proposal will have to either persuade Netanyahu to abandon his demand for continued military presence in Gaza – i.e., to have him abandon his “total victory” war objective and hence accept compromise with the mortal enemy – and/or to persuade Hamas, severely weakened by the intense IDF onslaught, to accept Netanyahu’s added demands and thus, essentially, to accept defeat. To bridge the essentially (and existentially) unbridgeable, leverage is badly needed, but the Egyptians and Qataris have precious little leverage over Hamas, and the question of US/team Biden leverage over Netanyahu as the embattled decision-maker in Israel has over the 11 months of bitter struggle proven to be at least highly questionable.
Hamas may have their reasons for resisting surrender to Netanyahu’s conditions for acceptance of Bidens plan, including pinning hopes on the Israel-“Resistance axis” conflict escalating into a full regional war and/or the suffering of Palestinians ultimately forcing the US and the West to abandon the hitherto unconditional support for Israel. Outright surrender is hardly a Hamas option, at least not yet. Continued fighting is helped by intensified recruitment.
But as regards Netanyahu and his coalition colleagues, reasons for stalling are clearly discernible. Netanyahu may well stand rather alone in his defiant position; political opponents (including the embattled defense minister Yoav Gallant !), the collective IDF-leadership, mass demonstrators in the streets and a broad international consensus jointly argue that a cease-fire deal is urgently needed not least as the remaining means to save the lives of so far surviving hostages. But, and that is a big but, a defiant “Bibi” can remain in power as long as his governing coalition with ultra-rightists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, based on the Knesset majority achieved in the last of the long series of parliamentary elections, withstands the pressure for new elections, and the Knesset is re-assembling only in early October.
Still time for maneuvering, hoping for a better deal (or no deal at all)
So there is still time, maneuvering time, for Netanyahu to seek political survival – remember the legal and constitutional battles preceding October 7 and the time of reckoning concerning October 7 intelligence failure that is bound to follow once the war is over, somehow – in continued pursuance of the “total victory” war objectives, making it clear in a recent media “lecture” that the demands regarding the Philadelphi corridor are permanent, not a bargaining chip before and during “Biden’s” first 6 week phase. Stalling keeps open, for still some days, or weeks (or months) the option of declaring “total victory” (if it comes to that) by means of hunting down and killing the remaining Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar, Israel’s most wanted target after the assassination in Teheran (of all places) of the former leader, Ismail Haniya.
One of several peculiarities about this crisis (and related management efforts) is that this is a strangely asymmetrical negotiation – via proxies – between mortal enemies, for Hamas with the fate of the hostages and the glaring suffering of Gazan civilians as the trump card, for Israel with its vast military superiority, including the capacity to go after and kill Hamas leaders wherever they are, whether in Gaza, in Beirut or in Teheran, or elsewhere.
A peculiar situation, a strangely asymmetrical negotiation
This gives us this peculiar situation. Most actors and spectators – and hostage families with supporters and sympathizers – would today agree that only a final compromise with Hamas, currently led by Israel’s kill target nr 1, Sinwar, stands a realistic chance to save the lives of surviving hostages; Hamas’ execution recently of six hostages, all listed for early release under a cease-fire deal, and threats of further executions should the IDF try more rescue operations, adding further evidence and dramatization. And defense minister Gallant together with an IDF leadership consensus view add further oil to the street flames by maintaining that a cease-fire is long overdue (and necessary for Israel’s international reputation and legitimacy) and can be handled operationally, without military presence in the corridor. Hence the need for compromise, as demanded by Israel’s friends abroad, even if it takes compromise with the number 1 enemy of Israel and team “Bibi”.
But Bibi apparently still hopes to avoid compromise by catching and killing the Hamas leader and drastically further weakening Hamas militarily, in time for rescuing at least some of the remaining hostages – while continuing to at least pretend to be seriously interested in and committed to a negotiated settlement, this clearly with an eye to the American pre-election scene. Time, and timing, may be of essence, given the Israeli domestic and regional drama, but it would be analytically unwise to disregard the distinct possibility that in this case stalling and playing for time also is a manifestation of an Israeli PM pinning hopes on Donald Trump as the next White House incumbent, more attractive as the US counterpart in dealing with the demanding issues pertaining to “the day after”. Bibi defiance rests on continued Bibi reliance on US support for Israel as a factor of “iron-clad” permanence, regardless.
Varying concepts of urgency: who is in a hurry, and why?
This prospect in turn raises the issue of urgency (of a cease-fire deal) and the involved actors’ varying kind and degree of urgency. Understanding these variations helps analysis of the prospects for stability and peace in the region. And of the anatomy of the cruel tragedy of the Middle East.
The distribution of senses of urgency as between the various involved, relevant actors flows from the foregoing account.
For team Biden the sense of urgency is a mixed bag of prestige-loaded electoral concerns – outgoing president Biden, concerned with his legacy, having publicly declared a Gaza settlement as his highest priority – in combination with genuine concerns for the fate of the hostages and the civilians in Gaza and for regional conflict proliferation risks hanging over the wider region. Urgency is, then, dictated by the overall vulnerability of the state of Israel, its security and international standing, and the rising political costs, domestically before the elections and internationally, of the US’unconditional support for Israel even as it, Israel, is internationally accused of disproportionate and indiscriminate acts of armed retaliation, even war crimes (or worse).
Co-ownership with Netanyahu’s Israel of the highly controversial bombing campaign in Gaza by air and land, leading to some 40 000 deaths and nearly 100 000 wounded, has drawn the US into a problematic co-ownership of the struggle for peaceful resolution, against heavy odds. Struggling diplomatically with the wider cease-fire issues and militarily seeking to deter Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah from escalating their conflict with Israel has taken a heavy toll on the Biden administration’s security policy resources, in parallel with the Russia-Ukraine demands. No wonder, then, the US – frustrated by the intransigence of the warring parties – is in a hurry. Defending Israel in international forums such as the UN General Assembly, the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, is costly, increasingly so, domestically and internationally. But both staying the course, in view of criticisms at home and abroad, and changing the course, in view of strong GOP support for Israel (and its PM Netanyahu), could cost Kamala Harris the White House in the November 5 elections. “Damned if you do, and damned if you don’t”!
What about Yahya Sinwar and his team and cadres? Knowing full well that the Israelis prioritize hunting him and killing him, somewhere down there in the tunnels, what could he hope to achieve after the long months of devastating war? Could he still pin hopes on active, decisive military solidarity from Iran, Hezbollah and others, broadening the conflict, forcing Israel to lessen the pressure in the Gaza direction? Could he still gamble that the near-unique suffering of Gaza civilians – and Palestinians in the West Bank – could provoke sufficient international uproar to force the US to force defiant Netanyahu to settle for compromise? Whatever compromise means at this stage. Or could it be that he, Sinwar, saw – and sees – Biden’s original proposal as Hamas’ best or only chance of survival, political and physical? Given the inbuilt ambiguities as regards the issues of permanence, international guarantees, naming and numbers of hostages/prisoners, etc.? In terms of urgency? Unclear. Probably heavy loads of tactical ambivalence.
And Netanyahu and his team, and supporters, in the Knesset and in the traumatized Israeli society?
It follows from the above that there is a mixed bag in terms of urgency: urgency to achieve a “total victory” as a – or the – means of political survival (for the time being, pending the mountain of uncertainties pertaining to “the day after” issues), urgency therefore, also, as regards making every effort, notably in the West Bank as we have seen, to render obsolete and irrelevant any and all propositions in favor of creating a path towards a two-state solution to the long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the other end of the scale, no urgency at all in agreeing to a cease-fire and in allowing for the needed humanitarian rescue operations in Gaza. And, apparently, no urgency regarding a negotiated release of the remaining hostages, in spite of the furious demands in the streets of Israel, and elsewhere, and the untenable situation inside Gaza.
The cruel gamble and its causes
So, in view of all this, at the time of writing, still no cease-fire deal after all these months of negotiating efforts and with the regional conflict proliferation threat hanging as a Damocles sword over the region. The reasons, or causes, for this sad state of affairs is, fundamentally, that the fundamentally different war aims of the two sides, both seeing the conflict as an existential one of survival, have locked the issue of cease-fire to the broader conflict issues in such a way as to constantly hinder a final break-through, that Israel’s leadership is usurped by Netanyahu and the most rightist government in the history of the country, that he (Bibi) is blocked from any other path than seeking “total victory” and that the Biden administration keeps feeling compelled to unconditionally support this Israel and its embattled leadership, in spite of the costs.
A cruel tragedy for Israelis and Palestinians, a cruel gamble. The basic ingredients, as above, are such that it is perfectly possible that a sudden deal could nevertheless be struck, suddenly, perhaps even before this text has been published (and perhaps as a result of a “total victory” of sorts for the Israelis, against the odds), but also that days, months, even years, could pass without meaningful resolution and stabilization, regardless of who sits in the White House. For regardless of whatever cease-fire deal may in the end be agreed, soon or later, there can – unfortunately – be no doubt that issues pertaining to the “day after”, the process of implementation of whatever is on paper as agreement, probably filled with “constructive ambiguity”, will be a nightmare to implement. A two-state solution – or a liberal-democratic one-state solution – may currently be dismissable as impossible or unrealistic, but a status quo ante October 7 is universally recognized as untenable as a – or the – arrangement to avoid complete chaos. And if there can be no such return to the pre-October arrangement and trends, then what?
And issues pertaining to Gaza, the rehabilitation of its suffering population and the strip’s necessary reconstruction and political status, are staring in the eyes of the international community, regardless. They cannot be ignored, nor contained. Nor “solved” in any near future. The Gaza crisis has seriously wounded political stability in the Middle East.
