Happy news from Lebanon, for its battered people and for regional peace; finally an agreement on ceasefire, or truce, or cessation of hostilities, names vary. Some will sigh with relief merely at having survived, and more than a million Lebanese will now finally be able to return home, in the battered south, glad to be back and in safety, sad in many cases to encounter a home in rubbles. The latter confirms the old truth in the history of calamitous wars that whereas ceasefire is a necessary condition in any effort at restoring peace, a necessary start, it is far from a sufficient condition and most often merely a fragile and bumpy beginning of a long journey. And the more laborious and protracted the efforts to arrive at a ceasefire, no matter how desperately needed in view of human suffering, the more vulnerable, sadly, the truce to breakdowns and setbacks. There is historical evidence in abundance, as we have seen, of chains of collapsed ceasefires.
But regardless, president Biden no doubt can sigh with relief that finally, under the guardianship of his outgoing administration, some diplomatic success could be registered in the war-torn Middle East arena, giving rise to some hope that détente in the north-Israeli and south-Lebanese area could spill over to and pave the way for a long-overdue ceasefire also in the south, in Gaza. And similarly, the incoming Trump administration could, conceivably, welcome the Lebanon ceasefire as helping to clean the Trump slate before the Jan 20 inauguration. After all, one (of several) set of signals so far coming out of the Trump camp in Mar-A-Lago is generally understood to mean a wish expressed for a geopolitically fresh start as from inauguration, fresh, or clean, that is, from inherited and dispensable wars.
So why this seriously belated ceasefire over Lebanon now, only now in view of months of tremendous US/French and international diplomatic efforts, already now, in view of remaining problems still to be resolved? What are the – tentative – lessons for a) Gaza, b) Sudan and c) Ukraine?
The bumpiness of roads to a ceasefire, expressing parties’ defiance of international outcries at the disastrous humanitarian consequences of the conflict and more often than not also the lack of leverage on the part of involved mediators, is typically a manifestation of irreconcilable war objectives of the warring parties. After the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack initiated the disruption of the pre-existing security balance, or terror balance, in the region, Israel under the Netanyahu regime has during the year taken on its enemies one by one – Iran and its Shia proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and Hamas in Gaza – , leading PM Netanyahu, upon announcement of the negotiated Lebanon ceasefire, to declare not total but comprehensive military victory there, sufficiently comprehensive for him to accept the ceasefire arrangement: 60 days cessation of hostilities, withdrawal during these two months of Hezbollah to behind the Litani river and (gradually) by IDF forces to south of the border, monitoring of the abandoned area by UNIFIL and the regular Lebanese army, and establishment of a US led implementation control mechanism, plus a number of details, all in all essentially a copy of the 2006 UN Resolution 1701.
In his announcement speech Netanyahu stated his and Israel’s reasons for “why now?”: that Hezbollah was by now sufficiently crushed, that Israeli IDF was by now in dire need of refreshment after a year and more of constant warfare, Gaza included, and that a truce in Lebanon would now allow Israel to reopen northern Israel for the 60 000 odd evacuees and to focus strategically on the main adversary Iran and on the remaining war objectives in Gaza, including the release of the hostages. It so happened, incidentally, that the truce agreement’s stated 60 days would expire well after January 20, Trump’s inauguration day, meaning that the critical issues of final implementation of the deal would take place under the auspices of an (even more) Israel-friendly US regime, as such a further element of Netanyahu reassurance. And moreover, at least implicitly the deal contains some degree of allowance for Israeli IDF to reenter militarily should Hezbollah prove ready to non-comply with the agreed provisions, and should the new US-led observance mechanism and a reinforced Lebanese army (LAF) and UNIFIL presence in the border area (again) prove unable to prevent this, before or after the expiry of the 60 days.
And why “only now”, after all these tremendous diplomatic efforts? In brief, apparently, because this is what it took to have all these conditions (for acceptance) fall into place, given Netanyahu’s comprehensive but not “total” war objectives. Clearly, his stated reasons for accepting the truce, for now, beg many questions as to what this means as regards the other strategic directions, Gaza, Houthis in Yemen, shia militias in Syria and Iraq and, especially, Iran, including whatever on this may be tentatively pre-agreed with the incoming Trump administration. Exploiting the new Iranian strategic vulnerabilities after its loss effectively of both its main deterrence against the nuclear power Israel, I e, Hezbollah, and a large part of its air defenses against Israeli threats to its nuclear and oil facilities, for a final blow while the window of opportunity remains open? Or daring the Iranian leadership, at least first, with a continued waiting game, testing and tempting the Iranians’resolve whether to carry out its long-delayed retaliation for the Israeli air strike and/or attempts to rebuild its Lebanese proxy? Perhaps while battering Iran’s proxies in Syria and Iraq?
And what about Hezbollah’s – and Iran’s – acceptance of the Lebanon ceasefire, with the important implication that the acceptance means abandoning the pledge as from October 8 last year that their missiles will keep flying until there is a ceasefire in Gaza. Instead, the discourse is now whether Hezbollah suing for a separate deal in Lebanon might pave the way for a similar arrangement in and over Gaza, and whether Hezbollah’s (and behind it Iran) step might encourage other involved actors, such as the Houthis in Yemen, to similarly back off from its solidarity pledge to the battered Hamas. Regardless, it appears Hezbollah had come to a point of thorough military defeat that led it to prioritize physical and long-term political survival, even at the cost of accepting a largely dictated ceasefire deal. And, unlike the case of Gaza, and in spite of protests from the likes of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir in the Israeli coalition government, the Israeli stated war objectives were never a binding commitment to a “total victory” over Hezbollah in the complex Lebanese political realities.
So now it is time, finally, for a ceasefire also in Gaza, after all these months of incredible suffering both of the (surviving) hostages in the tunnels and of (surviving) Palestinians in the ruins of what was Gaza, and after all these months of frustrated diplomatic efforts? Could it be, and will team Trump allow it or even welcome and support it, that there is now the momentum, exploitable by team Biden in its remaining weeks in the White House, for a final push and a desperately needed ceasefire deal? Is there, really, still in place a fighting force named Hamas, able and willing to now negotiate a package deal with the components inherent in the package foreseen last summer: a timetable of stages, release of the hostages in exchange for a negotiated number of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, launching of a massive, unhindered humanitarian rescue operation and at least some idea of what is to follow “the day after”?
Is there such a thing now as a negotiated (compromise) settlement still in the offing, one in which the Israeli side – and PM Netanyahu personally – could conceivably settle for a deal with what is left of Hamas, still apparently putting up sufficient armed resistance among the ruins and in the tunnels to engage IDF in continued combat, further prolonging the war – and suffering? What would a ceasefire deal look like now? Perhaps no one has the answer, not Biden, not Trump, perhaps not even Netanyahu, Israel’s warrior PM.
For the alternative to a negotiated settlement, with the assumption that Hamas retains some capacity and status as a competent, legitimate negotiating counterpart, is fulfilment of Netanyahu’s declared war objectives of “total victory” and release/rescue of the hostages by means of military force, regardless of “the day after”. And judging from the fact that Israeli IDF is still engaged in devastating military operations against an apparently still resisting Hamas foe, the day of “total victory” might not be something for today or tomorrow. So to the extent that Netanyahu is now, again, turning to the original conflict for a “final countdown” he is very likely to have both Joe Biden and Donald Trump on his mind, knowing that Biden is more than anxious to see through a settlement in Gaza, if ever so fragile and tentative, before he hands over the keys, and that Donald Trump while being generally supportive of the cause of Israel would very much expect friend Netanyahu to deliver, before January 20, a clean slate, a “solution” of sorts, a success narrative.
Meanwhile, pending clarification of this, the hostages in the tunnels (and the Palestinians in the Israeli prisons) and of course all the Gazans mourn their losses and try to stay alive.
The minimum requirements for the ceasefire success in Lebanon as summarized above – limited war objectives, strongly engaged international mediation with some leverage, one side’s military superiority, etc – clearly have been largely missing in the sad case of Gaza, so far, the big difference being the total incompatibility of the two sides’ war aims, and the consistent Biden administration de facto support for the Israeli war aims and gradual loss of leverage, and the Hamas determination to continue to resist militarily Netanyahu’s “total victory”. And Netanyahu’s ability to politically and morally resist all internal objections to this strategy, including desperate protest marches of hostage families.
So what about lessons learned for other devastating conflicts, such as Sudan today, and Ukraine when the time comes?
One is perhaps that ceasefire agreements in violent conflicts are, tragically, rarely possible unless the two sides are equally affected by war fatigue and trust each other not simply to accept ceasefire for tactical advantage, or that one side is so manifestly militarily superior that the other side is made to realize that the longer the war the worse the outcome, or that the mediation or arbitration party has such power and leverage that makes it capable to impose ceasefire (and peace) on unwilling or reluctant warring parties. World history displays evidence in abundance of these varieties.
But both the Lebanon case, a success story of sorts, so far, and the Gaza tragedy with apparently diminishing chances to be resolved in a negotiated, long-term sustainable settlement, regardless of wishes and prayers on the international arena, provide examples and lessons for these other conflicts: ceasefire agreements are hard to reach for they are connected to the broader war and peace issues, and starting a war is much easier than ending it, even temporarily in a ceasefire.
