Not much mention in mainstream international media of the fate of Gaza and its more than two million-size suffering population these days, some months or so after Donald Trump’s triumphant declaration of his 20-point, phased peace plan, linked to a wider vision of Middle East stabilization and normalization. “Other than the release of all living Israeli hostages from Gaza, most of the goals of Trump’s 20-point peace plan appear stillborn”, says David Ignatius of Washington Post, quoting a senior Israeli defense official complaining that “everything is stuck” (throughout the region, on the various fronts).
So several questions arise: why the international silence over Gaza, what is the current situation there as regards the various humanitarian benchmarks and as regards the status of the Trump plan (discussed by this columnist in a recent column) and what is the current status of the wider regional US policies (affecting Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others, in various ways)? And what lessons are there to be learned – as applied to other current cases, such as Sudan and Ukraine – from the three Middle East cases of ceasefire currently in place, Israel-Lebanon (November 2023), Israel-Iran as from June this year, and then Israel-Hamas from October last?
All these questions are obviously related, basically reflecting constantly shifting priorities by an overburdened, still “indispensable” team Trump that has taken upon itself to combine war-making in some areas (notably Venezuela, for now) with peace-making in others, notably Ukraine, the Middle East and – perhaps – Sudan. And others. Seeking and claiming “indispensability” clearly carries a cost as a test of endurability and professionality.
In earlier columns here this author has repeatedly focused of the problem of negotiating a ceasefire – as a sine qua non for serious peace talks aiming at a lasting and just peace – whenever the war aims of the conflict parties are totally opposite and/or whenever the leverage of third-party mediation is insufficient to enforce ceasefire upon unwilling parties. Hence still no ceasefire in neither Ukraine nor Sudan. But wherever in spite of enormous difficulties ceasefire deals are in the end arrived at, initially at great relief and even jubilation, the problem, expectedly, pertains to the risks of breakdown of the notoriously fragile ceasefire arrangement, i.e. the anticipated problems long making the ceasefire elusive, including the struggle with constant violations and their interpretation in terms of whether they signify ceasefire breakdown or tolerable means to in fact uphold the ceasefire.
This is the case in the Middle East, and this in all probability will be the case if and when there is a ceasefire in Ukraine and Sudan, for example. Still, ceasefire deals are, normally and typically, a sine qua non, as a necessary first step. A ceasefire arrangement, even if fragile and repeatedly violated, is and remains worthwhile, it goes without saying preferrable to continued full-scale warfare, implying continued suffering of civilians, but less suffering.
Now, refocusing on the case of Gaza, after the late summer, early autumn international focus on the plight of civilian Palestinians, first as a background to what became the Trump plan, a compromise at long last enforced by Trump power, and then the pomp and circumstance around the Plan itself and its initial triumphant results (the hostages), a strange cloud of silence has descended upon the Gaza scene of destruction. As if the fact of Trumpian priorities moving on to other crises, at home and abroad, were sufficient for world attention to move along, away from Gaza. As if the fait accompli of the plan endorsement, even backed by a near-unanimous UNSC resolution (Russia and China abstaining) would in itself, regardless of implementation, guarantee escape from hell and hence an excuse to look elsewhere, an excuse facilitated by the remarkable fact that international media remain prevented by Israel from reporting from inside Gaza.
As regards the implementation of the 20-point Trump plan, the facts of the matter appears to be that given the high degree of reluctance of the parties – and the vagueness of the plan – the essential steps from phase one (hostage release, ceasefire, Hamas acceptance of governance shift, partial IDF withdrawal, release of humanitarian assistance) to the far more demanding requirements and expectations of phase two (transfer of power, deployment of an international force (ISF), disarmament of Hamas, full IDF withdrawal, full-scale humanitarian rescue, etc), these steps have hardly started in earnest, other than as topics of conversation in endless multinational meetings. The “stillbornness” discussed by Ignatius being exemplified by a creeping development of a trend towards partition of the strip between the two sides of the “yellow line”, the one de facto (again) ruled by Hamas, the other by IDF – where some reconstruction is begun. And hundreds killed in ceasefire violations.
There seems to be tremendous difficulties in the way of seriously implementing Trump’s plan’s phase two, given inter alia Israel’s reluctance to proceed in a meaningful way before Hamas’ complete disarmament/disappearance is a verifiable reality, and Hamas’s (et consortes’) reluctance to bid farewell to its arms before the IDF has fully withdrawn from Gaza. And given, in this situation, the amount of hesitation on the part of would.be contributors to the International Stabilization Force, to commit, even for the UNSC mandate, their troops to a non-peaceful setting. And the foreseen “technocratic Palestinian/international administration”, thought to replace Hamas, is nowhere to be seen. Nor is Donald Trump’s and Tony Blair’s “Board of Peace”.
As has been stated all along, for this nightmare of negotiating difficulties to have any chance of succeeding, it is imperative that the initiator and hence owner of the Plan, Donald Trump, devotes his full focus on this, as his continued prestige project. Whether this really happens is the question. Otherwise, things are bound to fall apart.
Meanwhile, the suffering in Gaza continues, virtually unabated. And essentially unreported. The accumulated needs from the months and years of warfare and starvation are only marginally helped by the slowly increased levels of assistance now being offered, and there is in particular the question of medical care and residence; where to live when most of Gaza is flattened and even tents are in scarce supply – as winter approaches with wet and cold.
So why the silence over Gaza? Or is it an exaggeration to talk about silence? The criterion of proportionality suggests otherwise, even though there are exceptions. But Gaza and Gazans are perhaps faced with international Gaza fatigue.