On 13 May, the Security Policy Section (VI) of the Academy arranged an on-line seminar aimed at providing a comprehensive and realistic picture of US strategic interests and priorities in relation to Europe and its northern part.
The seminar was the second in a series aimed at deepening perspectives on the impact for the Nordic region of the evolving security trends. Our first seminar focused on perspectives from the Nordic countries themselves. A main conclusion was that a realistic understanding of US perspectives is crucial.
This seminar therefore focused on US security interests (while largely leaving US domestic political issues aside). The seminar started with comments from two eminent US security and defence experts, Dr. Dov Zakheim and Jim Townsend, both combining long experience from senior civil positions in Pentagon with broad understanding of the Nordic area. Dr. Zakheim who is a corresponding fellow of the academy since many years served as Under Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2003 (during the George W. Bush administration), while Jim Townsend served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe and NATO policy from 2009 to 2016 (during the Barack Obama administrations).
The seminar was held under Chatham House rules. This summary has been written by Krister Andrén, chair of the security policy section of the academy. It is disposed along topical lines rather than as a direct record of the discussion.
General remarks
The two speakers, though representing different parts of the US political spectrum, were close in their overall perspective on the interests and priorities of the US political establishment and of US public opinion. They both emphasized the continuity of underlying US views and warned against linear thinking based on short term popular trends. Hope and belief in reason together with assessments of long-term US security interests formed their common basis.
Recent US polls were noted to show a great consistency of views over time, with attitudes towards Israel as the one important exception. US public opinion is since long negative to free trade, to costly distant engagements and is increasingly negative to immigration from the non-white world. It is negative to the US playing the role of world policeman and it wants the US to pay less for doing that. It supports weapons to Ukraine but is pessimistic about the Ukrainian prospects. The exception to stability was attitudes to military support of Israel, where the Democratic support was noted to have dropped dramatically to less than 30 % in the last months.
President Trump has a firmly established belief in the merits of tariffs in line the American people. We were reminded that a clear majority of Republicans as well as of Democrats are in favour of tariffs. Lacking – or having forgotten – the lessons of the basic college course in economics the American people does not seem to understand the significance of the capital side of the trade balance or of the export surplus emanating from ”Silicon Valley”. Nevertheless, the direction is clear. Tariffs are on the rise.
The overarching interest of the President and his administration was expressed as ”business”. This was illustrated by references to the recent presidential tour to the Middle East, which included a great number of business leaders. Transactional priorities were highlighted. The Presidents approach was seen as to maximise US economic benefits, while giving traditional strategic issues a minor role. Pocketbook issues not strategy were perceived to drive US policies.
The President’s approach to dealmaking was described as favouring extreme and chocking opening bids, which later could be corrected or abandoned if the corrections could be placed in a narrative of claiming victory. This was illustrated with the rapidly changing tariff bids and by the shifting declarations on NATO policies. Dealmaking tactics include conscious manipulative moves. Deeds more than words and rhetoric should be used to identify policies.
This summary focuses on the following dimensions:
- US policy towards Russia and Ukraine
- US policy towards Europe and Nato
- Nuclear deterrence and proliferation
- Economy as a strategic factor
It should be underlined that the short seminar consciously tried to focus on trans-atlantic issues with particular significance for northern Europe, while leaving most global issues and the US domestic scene aside. In addition, the discussion did include some quite explicit recommendations to Europe!
US policy towards Russia and Ukraine
While recognizing the shifting signals from the US administration, an overall conclusion was that genuine uncertainties characterise the evolving relations between the presidents Trump and Putin. It was noted that the Trump administration repeatedly has been presenting a confrontational approach to its European allies and the European Union contrasting with a more cooperative approach to Putin’s Russia. Signals appear contradictory. Unpredictability seems to be systematically and pragmatically used as a negotiation tool.
US policy towards Ukraine was seen as representing a litmus test for US overall policy towards Russia, Europe and NATO. Signals have been contradictory and genuine uncertainty dominates.
It was noted that President Trump lately seems to have taken some steps to distance himself and the US from Russia and Putin following recent indiscriminate attacks on Ukrainian civilian targets. A possibly more forthcoming policy on delivering arms to Ukraine (F- 16) was also noted. However, rhetoric cannot substitute for deeds. The proof of the pudding remains in the eating.
Nuclear deterrence and proliferation.
Neither nuclear deterrence nor nuclear proliferation was explicitly mentioned in the initial comments, seemingly reflecting a view that nuclear policy was mainly be discussed within the academic “blob”, without any clear link to public opinion or real policy.
In the following discussion though the complexities of building a credible deterrent posture were underlined. Question marks were raised about the credibility of present US extended deterrence particularly in relation to small NATO member states.
Although not explicitly stated the underlying message was that strong US interests in a solid nuclear deterrence remains unaffected by the ups and downs of the day-to-day rhetoric.
There is a deep awareness in the US about the complexities involved in developing a credible nuclear capacity. The US seems confident in its capacity to receive ample prewarning of any emerging new nuclear power.
French nuclear protection was perceived as credible mainly in relation to threats against France. The British nuclear capability was viewed as closely linked to the US. Any emerging ”European” nuclear capability was seen as beyond the Trump time horizon. However, French and British nuclear weapons were seen as adding to US deterrence as any use of British or French SLBM:s would always be difficult to distinguish from US use.
With two important exceptions proliferation beyond the present nuclear powers were seen as distant. The two exceptions are South Korea and Japan. Their decisions were seen as very much linked to China and North Korea. The dramatic Chinese nuclear surge was emphasized raising serious questions about possible links to North Korea. South Korean way ahead was seen as closely linked to its overall trust in the US protection. Trust was seen as severely undermined implying a real risk for a South Korean decision to develop an independent nuclear capability. Furthermore, a South Korean development of a nuclear capability was seen likely to be parallelled by a similar and immediate Japanese development.
US policy towards Europe and NATO
The American people and Congress generally have a quite positive view of Europe as well as of NATO. This is evident in polls as well as in actions. Despite much talk about the US pivot to Asia, Americans at large prefer going to Europe to other parts of the world. The President is using a language that breeds uncertainty, but his words should be seen in the light of a strong will to put maximal pressure on ”Europe” to pay a larger share of the common defence bill. Much of ridicule wordings about Europe and the EU should thus rather be interpreted as part of a deal making process than as a true disdain of Europe. Rumours about the US leaving NATO could similarly be seen as aimed at maintaining pressure! The earlier signals about readiness to leave the SACEUR position to a European general were worrisome, but were rapidly abandoned when they met resistance.
The general impression was rather that US interests in NATO remain strong and that the US hardly is ready to abandon its leading role. There seemed to be agreement that the overarching priority of nuclear deterrence made it impossible to leave conventional deterrence entirely to the Europeans.
Burden-sharing thus does not equate to real power-sharing!
Burden-sharing
Burden-sharing has been a permanent issue in the trans-Atlantic dialogue for decades. The need for a substantial increase of defence investments by European NATO allies was emphasized already by former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates in his famous farewell address in Brussels in June 2011 and all NATO allies agreed in Warsaw 2016 to raise defence spending to two percent of GDP by 2024. The background is well understood although implementation has been hesitant. The US is unable to meet all emerging global security challenges on its own. China represents the major long-term threat implying a US pivot to Asia and an absolute necessity for the European allies to bear a major part of the future burden in Europe.
The Russian threat and increasing pressure from the US has now finally lead to implementation of the agreed two percent goal by most European allies. The Trump Administration is now demanding a rise to five per cent to be agreed at the Nato Hague Summit in June. The final result remains to be seen, but will likely be well above 3,5 % (which is close to equal with the present US level).
It was noted that ”burden sharing” is a complex issue involving difficult comparisons of apples and oranges. The US is spending substantially more of its GDP on defence than its European allies, but a large share is obviously motivated by strategic tasks outside Europe and NATO. Subtracting the US part that is motivated by its global and Asian role, the balance becomes more even in monetary terms. For Europe a permanent challenge is to overcome vasteful but inherently national duplication. For Nato as a whole a challenge is to overcome strong US interests to put itself in the controlling driver’s seat. The fact that US contributes most of the critical capabilities (modern weapons, air-refueling, C4I etc) is largely a reflection of US priorities rather than European neglect. A changing US attitude to assigning a greater role to Europe is an important part of any serious discussion of burden shifting.
A key question is thus what kind of burden sharing the US aims at? How much real power sharing with European allies is the US willing to accept? The ongoing negotiations in view of the Hague summit provide important litmus tests of real interests.
Economy and strategy
The reserve currency role of the US dollar was seen as a major strategic enabler for the US. Questions were raised about the strategic impact of economic trends beyond the military dimension. Is economy today a strategic factor in its own right? Is the present tariff war a signal that the role of the dollar as the globally accepted reserve currency is coming to an end? While acknowledging that there are signs of a more complex structure with some states acting outside the dollar economy, the answer tended to be that it was difficult to see serious challengers on the world scene. The Euro and the Renminbi were seen as the only real challengers, but neither were seen as realistic alternatives for a very long time.
Conclusions
The future of traditional transatlantic relations seems presently impossible to predict. Even if strong common strategic interests ought to favour continued relations built on trust and cooperation, nothing can be taken for granted.
The US signals linked to the Russia-Ukraine conflict have so far largely expressed support for Russian aims and interests. Future concrete US decisions with respect to a peace process represent key litmus tests on the future course with respect to Russia, Ukraine and European allies.
It is clear however that future relations with Europe must build on European allies carrying a far greater part of the security burden than hitherto.
It is equally clear that US leadership is needed. The way ahead for NATO that will be signalled at the summit in the Hague will therefore represent a second critical litmus test. An eventual US decision to abandon the SACEUR post would most likely represent an irreversible break of the transatlantic security link. It was seen as unlikely, but not entirely impossible signalling a far-reaching uncertainty, which has already spread large distrust around the world that will take strong efforts and long time to overcome.
Perspectives from both sides of the Atlantic indicated consciousness of a dramatic loss of trust in the US since Donald Trump’s reemergence as US president. Reactions have been swift. Credibility and trust in the US as a reliable ally and partner has evaporated in Europe as well as in Canada. There has been a significant reduction of interest in travelling to the US and of buying US products. There was general agreement that these trends will now take long-term efforts to break. The official political reactions are now largely expressed in similar terms, but could also be interpreted as signals of ambitions to meet US demands for taking greater responsibility.
At the end of seminar voices were raised arguing for a more proactive European way ahead. After decades of US resistance to talks of more European autonomy it was interesting to listen to advice advocating that Europe should understand that the time has finally come to emerge as a grown-up.
In sum European states were recommended to take the situation seriously, to get its act together and to move ahead from its position of economic strength recognizing its substantial soft power. The importance of a strengthened German-French-British leadership in Europe, as well as of a further strengthened regional role for the North European states was highlighted.
The discussion confirmed the importance for the Nordic region and of course for Sweden to maintain an open approach built on realistic analysis of a troublesome situation.
In the short run the decision process is facilitated by the fact that a rapid strengthening of defence capabilities as well as societal resilience is needed independently of how the trans-atlantic relations move ahead. It will be an essential element in a strategy to foster a stronger NATO within the established trans-Atlantic, but it is equally important if Europe has to rely on itself.