Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) can be seen as an example of the need to continually adapt and develop. It can be argued that it takes Joint Operations a step further as a result of changes in society and technology. Adding cyberspace, space, and the cognitive domains. This, to my mind, creates an even more complex web of interaction. This article is in reply to Major General Jonny Lindfors et al’s article “Multi-domäna operationer (MDO) – en Arméangelägenhet”.
The Complex Webs We Weave …
“The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.” – Sun Tzu, The Art of War
“Därför riktas fokus mot MDO, som koncept och doktrin. Detta betyder inte att vi anser att MDO som doktrin okritiskt ska anammas och inte heller att detta är ett färdigt koncept eller operativt ramverk som vi utan friktioner kan ansluta oss till.”
Although I do see the necessity of MDO, it does give me some concerns. The concept developed from the multi-domain battlefield and is continually being developed. But it comes over to me that we are shifting focus from the Global War on Terror to a “near peer” conflict with Russia or China. And it is this “shifting of focus” that concerns me.
One could argue that neither Russia nor China poses a significant threat in the near future. Russia is busy destroying itself and is caught up in a deluded and paranoid view of the World. It could take years or even decades before Russia recovers. China, on the other hand, is very pragmatic. China’s success has made it a central hub in the World’s economy. If it was to enter in a full scale war with the US and her allies it could seriously set back China. Even if China was to win such a war it would be a pyrrhic victory. Would China be that stupid? On the other hand, one could argue that “it’s a stupid thing to do” has never stopped people before. Human beings are, after all, the stupidest animal on the planet. But in the end, I would argue, what Russia or China does or doesn’t do is irrelevant; we should build our armed forces regardless of what the enemy may or may not do. To tie ourselves to the developments of a potential enemy means we lag what they do.
Essentially, this is, what I would argue, one of the major problems of Swedish defence policy. When we have “peace in our time” there’s a rush to cut back the armed forces only to switch to “all hands panic stations” when we are surprised by aggression in our neighbourhood. Thus, Sweden finds itself having to rapidly rebuild the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF), again, when the government realised that defence isn’t a “särintresse” after all.[1] More characteristic of here and now thinking (or reacting) than intelligent planning, I think.
At the end of the day, we don’t know where the next threat will come from. Where the next war will happen. Maybe it will be China or Russia or maybe it will be home grown terrorists or perhaps, given, what appears to me to be, our failure to deal with global warming, resource wars driven by climate change (if we haven’t already started given the events in West Africa). Thus, I would argue, we would need a doctrine (or maybe even a set of doctrines) that will allow us to operate all across the spectrum of violence. From peacekeeping, to counter insurgency to full scale war. Instead of switching from one focus to the next every time the wind blows. Does MDO set us up for that? If not, should it be modified so it does?
Another concern I have is to do with MDO coming over to me as being US centric. The US Armed Forces have all the sexy toys and are well funded. That means they can solve problems in ways that SAF might not. Can MDO be adjusted to SAF? Should MDO take into account the variations within NATO due to the different nations that compose NATO?
On the other hand, it does give direction of a sort. Markus Selin[2] argues that Swedish cyberdefence has no direction, quoting from Alice in Wonderland;
“If you don’t know where you want to go, then it doesn’t matter which path you take”.
But I would argue that that goes for the defence as a whole. We have a rush to rebuild the defence by building an army of numbers using out of date ideas and complementing it with a rush to NATO crying “save us”. But from my corner of the Universe, I see nothing that actually defines what a modern defence of Sweden actually is. In some way, Major General Jonny Lindfors et al’s initiative in creating an open debate about the future of the army is a step towards finding direction. MDO can then be seen as an input to that process.
What Stays Hot in the Fridge?
“Slagfältet förefaller idag vara mer transparent än någonsin och i denna nya miljö finns det små möjligheter att gömma sig.”
In the spirit of questioning everything; why do we want to hide? Is it not so that we can move and act in such a way that the enemy doesn’t know what we are doing thus giving us the advantage? Can we do the same without hiding?
First we had eyes and ears to observe the enemy with then telescopes and binoculars. Later we had balloons and aircraft. Now we have drones, satellites and other sensors. Liddell-Hart described combat as two men fighting in the dark.[3] First they send out their arms to feel for the enemy with their fingers. Those fingers are now a complex web of electronic sensors but aren’t we still two men fighting in the dark?
Operating under the eye of Sauron is an old problem and has a standard set of solutions; “hide a tree in the forest”, “Frodo goes to Mordor”[4] [5], and “to cross the sea under the emperor’s gaze” (which is what the Ukrainians did for the Kursk operations[6]), among others. Chilli remains hot in the fridge. But it is not really hot. Chilli contains a neural-toxin that stimulates the heat sensing nerves. The brain is then swamped with false signals that it reacts to as if they were real, creating the sensation of heat.
Basically, all this comes down to the same thing; deception. As Sun Tzu says;
“All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.”
It’s the same old same old but different. Like zooming in on a Mandelbrot set.
It’s a Trap!
“Enligt General Mark A Milley, tidigare amerikansk Arméchef och Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), pågår just nu en förändring av krigets karaktär där teknologisk utveckling är den drivande faktorn. Enligt honom kommer nästa konflikt därför, i ännu större utsträckning, att präglas av yttäckande sensorer med inhämtningsförmåga och kostnadseffektiva autonoma plattformar utrustade med kommersiella bild- och beteendeanalysalgoritmer, förstärkta av artificiell intelligens (AI) och analysverktyg.”
In our unbounded enthusiasm for adopting new technology, I wonder, are we running blind into a trap? Ever noticed how modern cars all look alike?[7] The same can be said for smart phones.[8] But the feeling everything is the same even extends to company logos and fashion.[9] A lot of this sameness is driven by physical reality and technology. Cars are all subject to the same aerodynamic forces, designers use much the same computer tools, and mobile phones are limited in size, for example. Sameness, however, has been with the military since the dawn of combat. In the ancient world, both sides would be armed with swords, shields, and bows and arrows. Later we see both sides armed with muskets and cannons. In the modern world we have both sides armed with missiles, tanks, and aircraft. But during all this time, decisions were made by people and those people could come to different decisions. If we add Artificial Intelligence (AI) to the all seeing eye of Sauron, will we become predictable? Take Artificial Neural Nets (ANN), for example. If we do anything with ANNs we will most likely use back propagation, rectified linear units, sigmoid functions and the like. Just the same as anyone else using ANNs. Given a representative data set, our AI will most likely come to the same results as our enemy’s AI. We would be able to second guess them and they us. Bringing us to a stalemate like two AIs playing chess.[10]
“On two occasions I have been asked [by members of Parliament], ’Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine wrong figures, will the right answers come out?’ I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a question.” – Charles Babbage, inventor of the computer.
Does our rush to adopt AI also make us vulnerable in another way? If the enemy is able to feed the wrong data into our sensor net, like the neural-toxin in chilli does to us, will our AI still be able to produce the right answer? Or do all these sexy toys just present more opportunities for an enemy to deceive us? During the US’ Vietnam War, who had all the sexy toys and who didn’t? Who won? And, more interestingly, why and what part did technology play?[11]
This isn’t an argument against the idea of adopting new technology (needs must as the devil drives) but it is wise to remember that new technology isn’t a panacea for all our ills. Nor is it a silver bullet to fix all our woes. In fact, it will most likely create new problems[12] [13] for us to solve as anyone who has had to engage in mortal combat with the algorithm gods of sites like Facebook can testify.[14] At the end of the day, I would argue, that it all comes down to people, all the way to the soldier level. All this new technology like AI and drones needs people with skills to know how to use it. People who will know when an AI solution is predictable and when our sensors are being deceived. So, when it comes to MDO, I would argue, it is how do we get the right people in the right organisation to be able to operate in multi-domains?
The More Things Change, The More They Remain The Same
“Samtidigt som vi ser hur de pågående konflikterna innebär ett allt mer högteknologiskt krig, ser vi i Ukraina också stora inslag av reguljära anfall med skyttesoldater och konventionella stridsfordon mot klassiska, eller första världskrigsliknande befästningslinjer med skyttegravar, minfält och bunkrar. Detta påvisar att samtidigt som krigets och konfliktens karaktär ständigt förändras, ser vi också hur ny-gamla tillämpningar av krigföring fortfarande är tillämpliga.”
Problems like the Surovikin line have a standard solution; “to entice a tiger from the mountains.” Thus, the Ukrainian attack on the Surovikin line in 2023 could be seen as the wrong move. But the slow advance of the Russians away from the Surovikin line in 2024 could be seen as working to the Ukrainians’ advantage (if the Ukrainians can exploit it). Same old same old but different.
It’s All Perfectly Natural …
“För den svenska Försvarsmakten och armén beskriver MDO därigenom både en operationsmiljö och ett operativt förhållningssätt som de flesta av oss ännu inte vant sig vid. Till skillnad från andra medlemmar i Nato behöver vi dels anamma en ny operationsmiljö, dels en ny operativ kontext genom anslutningen till en allians.”
To my mind, MDO looks like a multi-agent system[15] [16] or a holonic system.[17] Multi-agent systems are composed of autonomous task oriented agents that communicate with each other to achieve an overall task. Holonic systems are similar but the system is composed of part-whole entities. Holonic systems mimic nature. A cell, for example, is an autonomous task orientated system but it is composed of other autonomous task orientated systems such as mitochondria. Cells then form part of other autonomous systems such as organs. These types of structures are common in Distributed AI (DAI) and are well researched. Basically, they come down to communication strategies and task allocations, problems that are familiar in a military context. However, tasks are not allocated in a detailed order received from higher command. It is more like mission based orders as each of the entities is autonomous. Communications are also not like a traditional hierarchical military structure but can have a number of different solutions from each entity interacting only with local neighbours to blackboard architectures.
MDO presents a complex system distributed over many domains in both time and space. All the characteristics that would make a DAI solution applicable. Basically, DAI techniques are a divide and conquer approach to a complex problem domain. To try to control such a complex system of systems that MDO would lead to through a centralised command structure, I would suspect, would be challenging at the least. I would also suspect that it would fail in the long run. Taking a more distributed approach to the problem presented by MDO is something that I think SAF will fit in well with as it would fit better with SAF’s ideas about mission tactics. However, this type of approach is more complex than a traditional hierarchical approach. I would argue, to get MDO to work will take people with skills and expertise. Skills need to be built up over time and retained. Are we doing that? How can we do that?
All Together Now …
“Detta betyder att den svenska armén i större utsträckning än tidigare behöver fokusera mer på hur vi strider med andras staters markförband och hur dessa förband kommer att ledas, parallellt med att armén ökar förmågan att samordnas i ett försvarsmaktsgemensamt koncept och en gemensam nationell ledningsstruktur.”
This, to my mind, is demanding a holistic approach. I think the whole idea of MDO is also demanding that. Not just the army having to think more about working with other nations but also how it works as part of a national defence force and how that national defence force integrates with other nations. This, again, fits well with ideas from DAI. Even as part of NATO, SAF is an autonomous entity. But within Sweden, I would argue, we are not taking a holistic approach to defence. To my mind, there is a tendency to set units apart for “their task” without thinking of the defence as a whole. How the part time defence[18] [19] is handled is one example of that.
“Det innebär också en viss förskjutning från vårt traditionella DNA, att vinna genom manöver, till förmån för att vinna genom eld.”
This comes back to my concern earlier, that MDO might be too US centric. Or more specifically, US Army centric (with all their sexy toys). Can SAF emulate that? Should it? Or is there a need to adjust MDO so it can encompass non-US armies? I would argue that if SAF is to emulate the US army it would be a very poor shadow. According to SAF’s military doctrine, SAF is supposed to use manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre warfare differs from attrition warfare in that it aims to defeat an enemy psychologically. That is to say, defeat is defined as destroying the enemy’s will to fight. Whereas, attrition warfare defines defeat as destroying the enemy’s ability to fight.
“They usually did not fight what is known as a “war of attrition.” Rather, they used deception, speed, fluidity of action, and strength against weakness. They used tactics that disoriented and confused—tactics that, in Boyd’s words, caused the enemy “to unravel before the fight.”” – Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War by Robert Coram.
The US Marines also use manoeuvre warfare as their foundation war fighting theory. How do they fit in with MDO? I tend to think SAF has more to gain by looking at the US Marines than the US Army.
“Förband behöver övas och tränas i den stridsmiljö som de ska verka i. …”
And this, I would argue, needs to be done from a holistic perspective as well. How will the army (including the part time elements such as the Home Guard) operate all along the continuum of violence? How will it integrate with other countries? Exercises can be seen as a way to test our system of systems.[20] In the engineering world, it’s realised that you cannot realistically fully test a complex system. It is time consuming and costly. But there are sets of tests that can be done to catch most errors (or, at least, the more serious ones). Black box testing, where you provide inputs and see what happens but have no idea what goes on inside the system. White box testing, where you check the internal functionality. Smoke testing where you push the system to its limits. Are we doing that? It could be argued that SAF has much work to do in this area.[21] I feel this is an area that much could be said! To be able to test a system effectively, to know what to provide as inputs and what results to expect, you need some idea of what the system is supposed to do. What the system is supposed to do is provided by specifications and requirements as well as use cases. Something not fully defined at the moment.
“Organisatoriskt behöver vi därför strukturera om våra förband då vi först efter NATO-inträdet fullt ut kan dra nytta av att verka i brigader, divisioner och kårer. Grovt beskrivet innebär det att vi kan/bör reducera vissa resurser från lägre nivåer och skapa dem på de högre.”
I quite agree regarding the need to restructure. Change, taking a holistic approach. Taking a battlefield approach. We have the opportunity to think of the whole of the Swedish defence. How it will fit in with MDO and, through doing that, produce a design of what we actually need to defend the country and fulfil our obligations to NATO. At the moment, I would argue, we are still thinking in out-of-date concepts such as levée en masse[22] [23] and the part time defence like it’s still 1940. In the process, I would argue, we are heading in the wrong direction; towards the 20th century rather than the 21st. I would argue we are not thinking holistically nor from a battlefield perspective. For example, what equipment does the Home Guard[24] have compared to the regular army?[25] We also need to think about skill retention[26] in the context of restructuring the organisation. However, I would disagree with the idea of shifting resources from lower units to higher units. That, to my mind, would go against the ideas of flexibility and adaptability as it would reduce lower units’ abilities. Also, I would argue, any new organisation should allow units to operate more as parts of a distributed system. Shifting resources would also contradict that.
All Change …
“Försvarsmakten och armén är i grunden förändringstrött.”
Once upon a time AVO meters were found in every electronics lab worthwhile calling a lab. They were the gold standard, the best of the best. But they were electromechanical in a world that was becoming more and more digital. But the company that produced AVO meters tried to keep to their standards (the demand for the meters was still high, right up to the end). When you are the best, why change? You don’t fix what’s not broken, right? Today, AVO meters are museum pieces.[27] But even if you do change, that might not be enough. Slide rules developed over hundreds of years[28] and when I started learning maths, slide rules and trigonometric tables were the norm. Despite resistance, electronic calculators entered the scene. By the time I did my end of school exams I mostly used a calculator (there was just one exam, air navigation, where I still had to use a slide rule). Now slide rules and trigonometric tables keep AVO meters company in museums.
In an organisation that must play Red Queen, change should be the norm. Perhaps the “strategic time out” has meant we have forgotten that? But sometimes when things change we stay the same. Alice and the Red Queen ran as fast as they could but the tree got to the same place by standing still. AVO meters may well have gone the way of the dinosaurs but we still measure current and voltages in the lab. Slide rules and trigonometric tables might be as dead as a dodo but we still need to solve mathematical equations. Sometimes change means doing the same thing in a different way. There’s nothing new under the sun.
Summary
This is my take on things so far;
MDO adds more complexity to an already complex field. To handle that complexity we will need people with skill and expertise. And this is something that will become increasingly more vital. People are the key. At the moment, we are rushing backwards in our attempt to rebuild the armed forces and throwing skill and expertise on the scrapheap. We will need to rethink how we are organised, from a holistic and battlefield focus, and how we retain skill and expertise as we think about MDO as MDO is going to force us more down that rout.
I also think MDO is going to force us to think in distributed terms and less in centralised hierarchical terms. MDO creates a complex distributed domain and trying to force a centralised solution on to such a domain would, in my view, go against the dictates of reality. It will be painful and end in tears. Reality is a harsh mistress, best do as she says.
MDO may bring about changes but much remains the same. We have different sensors, but we are still searching for the enemy in the dark. We might not be able to hide as we once did but we are still having to deceive. We may have AI and large amounts of data but we still have to use our minds.
But there are some problems I see with MDO. Switching focus is one of them. By the time we have developed MDO the focus could have changed again. Instead of focusing on one part of the continuum of violence we should think in terms of the whole continuum. We shouldn’t lag the enemy either. MDO comes over as a nice idea for the US Army but SAF isn’t the US Army and will never be. MDO needs to be developed in terms of the whole of NATO rather than just one part. And, I think, in doing so things will lead back to the distributed solution to implementing MDO. Being predictable is another problem. For that, we will need people with skills and expertise so we don’t become predictable nor vulnerable.
The author is Dr, BEng(hons) PhD EurIng
References
[1] https://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/reinfeldt-forsvaret-ar-ett-sarintresse/
[2] https://www.voister.se/artikel/2023/12/debatt-s-regeringens-cyberforsvar-paminner-om-alice-i-underlandet.
[3] http://www.regimentalrogue.com/misc/liddell-hart_man_in_the_dark.html
[4] https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/04/03/uk-small-unit-urban-combat/
[5] https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2020/december/21/201221-marines-in-the-desert
[6] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/17/europe/ukraine-kursk-russia-attack-explainer-intl/index.html
[7] https://www.jpost.com/brandblend/article-795296
[8] https://www.tomsguide.com/phones/smartphones-might-all-look-the-same-but-i-think-the-experiments-of-the-past-should-stay-there
[9] https://www.cheerfulegg.com/2022/12/03/why-does-everything-look-the-same/
[10] https://tcec-chess.com/
[11] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/Hain.pdf
[12] https://www.cio.com/article/190888/5-famous-analytics-and-ai-disasters.html
[13] https://www.pickl.ai/blog/13-biggest-ai-failures-a-look-at-the-pitfalls-of-artificial-intelligence/
[14] https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/10/05/1036519/facebook-whistleblower-frances-haugen-algorithms/
[15] https://www.turing.ac.uk/research/interest-groups/multi-agent-systems
[16] https://relevanceai.com/learn/what-is-a-multi-agent-system
[17] https://integrallife.com/holons-the-building-blocks-of-the-universe/
[18] https://militardebatt.com/2024/08/24/reservofficerens-tjanstgoring-och-utveckling-ett-gemensamt-ansvar/
[19] https://www.taktisk.se/2020/07/12/lokalforsvarsforbanden/
[20] [iran] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-us-military-lost-war-iran-simulation-207099
[21] https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/kritiken-forsvaret-fokuserar-pa-att-vinna-ovningar-inte-strider
[22] https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/vasterbotten/stor-militar-repetitionsovning-i-umea-kommer-fran-hela-landet-stor-forsvarsvilja
[23] https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/information-och-fakta/varnplikt/
[24] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Guard_(Sweden)#Equipment
[25] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Swedish_Army
[26] https://officerstidningen.se/lagen-som-begransar-gss-k-till-att-jobba-i-hogst-12-ar-maste-andras/
[27] https://www.electronicsweekly.com/news/design/test-and-measurement-2/megger-bids-farewell-to-iconic-avo-8-2008-09/
[28] http://www.sliderule.ca/4053.htm
