“Sedan det ryska angreppet på Ukraina 2022 har det svenska försvars- och säkerhetspolitiska läget fundamentalt förändrats. Försvarsmakten och armén måste därför snarast utvecklas och transformeras för att anpassas till denna nya kontext.” – Major-General Jonny Lindfors.[1]
The battlefield is the ultimate judge, jury, and executioner of any defence policy or any decision made within or relating to the defence. The battlefield is unforgiving of mistakes and she is merciless. If bad decisions are made regarding defence, the price is paid in blood. No exceptions.
For this article I have chosen to look at the Battle for Hostomel Airport and the following Battle for Hostomel. From what we can learn from those battles, I argue that there needs to be a rethink of how the territorial defence is done in Sweden and that will involve a change in the army and a change in defence policy at the political level.
Goal
This article aims to be part of a set of three articles that looks at Swedish defence policy from a battlefield perspective. I also aim to contribute to the debate around the need for change within the army. To do that, I want to look at a few battles and see how they reflect on Swedish defence policy and how it highlights aspects of the defence that needs to be changed.
Overview of the Battle for Hostomel Airport
The battle for Hostomel airport was fought between the 24th and 25th February 2022 and was part of the Russian’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, before the battle began the Ukrainian’s received intelligence from the CIA that stated that Russia was planning to capture the airport. The intelligence was received by the Ukrainians in January. Further intelligence was received on the 23rd February stating that the Russian invasion would begin on the 24th February.
Despite the initial warnings, the Ukrainians were ill prepared. The airport was defended by about 200 – 300 National Guard soldiers from the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade. The National Guard are internal troops with some police-like duties. They have the missions to protect infrastructure as well as handle grey-zone tasks and public order duties. These soldiers were relatively lightly armed with hand weapons and 9K38 Igla man portable AA missiles (MANPADS). They also had some BTRs as well as ZU-23-Z AA guns.
After an initial missile strike on the airport, 200 – 300 Russian airborne troops (VDV) from the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade and the 45th Guard Spetsnaz Brigade began to land at the airport during the late morning of the 24th February at about 11:00. The Russian airborne troops were equipped with hand weapons and were transported in Mil Mi 8 transport helicopters with Ka-52 Hokum A attack helicopters and Mil Mi 24 Hind helicopter gunships in support. The Ukrainians were able to destroy some Mil Mi 8 helicopters using their MANPADS. The Ukrainians were also supported with Mil Mi 24 Hinds.
Within an hour of the Russian assault, the Ukrainians were forced to leave the airport due to a shortage of ammunition. The airport was then subjected to an artillery bombardment by the Ukrainian heavy artillery. This made the airport unusable for the incoming IL-76 transport aircraft bringing in more Russian soldiers. The aircraft were forced to turn back.
The Ukrainian Special Forces (SF) from the 3rd Special Purpose Regiment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) (along with civilians) continued to engage the Russians at the airport as the UAF organised a counterattack. The counter attack was led by the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade (from the National Guard) with the Georgian Legion in support as well as elements from the 80th and 95th Air Assault Brigades and the 72nd Mechanised Brigade. Air cover was provided by Ukrainian Su-24s and a MIG-29. The Russian air force Su-25s attacked the Ukrainian positions. By the end of the first day, the Russians were forced to withdraw from the airport.
On the second day of the battle more Russian airborne troops (possibly up to 200 helicopters) arrived at the airport as well as Russian mechanised ground forces, which had made their way from Belarus. The Russians used an unknown number of armoured vehicles such as BTR-MDs, BMD-2s and BMD-4s. The resulting force was able to recapture the airport.
Overview of the Battle for Hostomel
Following the loss of the airport, the Ukrainians and Russians continued fighting in the town of Hostomel from the 25th February to 1st April. Numerous units were involved and included units from the Russian 41st Combined Arms Army and the VDV as well as Kadyrovites. The Ukrainian forces included the 72nd Mechanised Brigade, 3rd Special Purpose Regiment as well as units from the Territorial Defence Forces and the National Guard. During the first few days, Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed 56 Russian tanks and caused heavy casualties among the Chechen fighters in the outskirts of the town.
By the 3rd of March, Russian and Ukrainian forces were engaged in urban combat within the town. Numerous Russian BMDs were destroyed and the Russians suffered a number of casualties. The Russians were then forced to retreat from the town by the 4th March.
Fighting continued and by the 11th March, the Russians controlled a large part of the town. The Ukrainians began a counter offensive on the 16th March near Hostomel. However, the Russian forces did not leave Hostomel fully until the 1st April as the Russians began to withdraw from the north of Ukraine.
Discussion
One of the main things I can take away from analysing the Battle of Hostomel Airport and the Battle of Hostomel is that territorial defence is a function not an organisation. Units can be assigned the task of territorial defence as their primary task but territorial defence is still the primary task of the whole of the armed forces. So, those units that have territorial defence as their primary task need to be treated and considered as part of the armed forces as a whole. That means same equipment and training.
If we look at the National Guard of Ukraine and the Territorial Defence Force, we can see the task of a territorial defence force covers the entire continuum of violence. The gendarmerie function of the National Guard of Ukraine is basically akin to peacekeeping (and peacekeeping aboard is one of their functions as well), which forms one end of the continuum of violence. The National Guard of Ukraine are also responsible for aiding in boarder security and protecting infrastructure, which are common grey zone tasks of a territorial defence that fits between peacekeeping and the midpoint of Counter Insurgency (COIN) on the continuum of violence. The Territorial Defence Forces are the UAF reserves and are composed of part-time solders (similar to the Home Guard in Sweden). The task of the Territorial Defence Forces includes protecting infrastructure, grey zone tasks, and forming a guerrilla force in the event of occupation. However, as can be seen from the Battles of Hostomel and Hostomel Airport, both the National Guard of Ukraine and the Territorial Defence Forces were involved in the full scale fighting right from the start, which forms the other end of the continuum of violence.
Traditionally, it can be argued, Swedish defence policy sees the territorial defence[2] as a minor function, for example, they do not have the full range of equipment as the regular army (compare the list here[3] with the regular army equipment shown here[4]). Yet what we have learnt from the war in Ukraine is that territorial defence and the units that have territorial defence as their primary task are a central part of a nation’s defence. Territorial units can be called upon to operate at any point along the continuum of violence. Up to and including full scale war.
The other main thing that I take from the two battles is the way the Ukrainians failed to prepare adequately. I have not seen any analysis of the wherefores that led to such a failure but I can speculate. Humans have a number of cognitive biases that can lead to erroneous decisions. When it comes to predicting the future, we tend to base our predictions on past events. Such an approach can work well if future events are much the same as past events, which they are often as we live in a Cantor set. But such an approach fails when there is major deviation from the past (such as Russia conducting a full-scale invasion of Ukraine). We also tend to projection. That is, we model other people’s behaviour based on our own. If we wouldn’t do an action then we find it hard to understand (and therefore predict) other people doing said action. We can see similar problems when it comes to Swedish defence policy. I suspect that projection was, at least partly, why Sweden failed to predict the Russian invasion[5] in 2022.
Conclusion
The invasion of Ukraine represents the worse case scenario for a defence force. But we can conclude from the invasion that a territorial defence force can be called upon to defend the country in a full-scale war. Therefore, I would argue that we need territorial units to have the capability to operate at all points along the continuum of violence. And by “territorial units” I’m including the Home Guard as from what we can see from Ukraine all and any war fighting unit can be and will be involved in the defence of the country along all points of the continuum of violence. To my mind, the Home Guard would not be an exception but a central part of such a defence (both the Territorial Defence Forces and the National Guard were involved in both battles). From peacekeeping to COIN to total war. A territorial force, therefore, I would argue, needs the same equipment as the regular army from rifles and uniforms to armoured vehicles, AA systems and on to tanks. The Swedish defence policy, should, therefore, aim to lay the foundations for such a territorial defence force. To do so, Sweden would need to develop a defence policy that is more battlefield focused and supportive of the armed forces. At the moment, one could argue that Swedish defence policy is rooted in “that’s how we have always done things” with an outdated view of the defence rather than adapting to the realities of modern warfare.
Territorial defence, to my mind, should be seen as a function of the armed forces as a whole but especially as part of the army. Here, I think, we need to see a change in the army. Traditionally, there is a prejudice[6] [7] [8] against the territorial defence forces in Sweden. Such a prejudice could be seen as hindering the defence of Sweden. I would argue that the territorial defence needs to be seen as an integrated part of the army rather than as a poor country cousin. Which would mean the army is to be committed to building up the territorial defence force as a serious fighting force capable of operations from grey zone to full scale war. The territorial defence needs to be trained and equipped as a major contributor to the defence of the country, even if it is composed of part-time volunteers.