Entering the end of May, the Middle East dramaturgy keeps boiling, with very real risks of boiling over. At the moment of writing, focus of the dramaturgy is, obviously, on the Iran war (or peace) war of nerves: escalation versus de-escalation, although the Trump administration now, again, signals that a negotiated settlement, including a prolonged (two-month) ceasefire arrangement and a combination of temporary opening of the Hormuz Strait and a plan for negotiations on the sticky issues, is under way, despite all the recent indications of an Israeli-US resolve to resume warfare with strategic patience running out.
If this indeed proves be the outcome, albeit temporary, it clearly and vividly reflects the profound dilemma that Donald Trump has maneuvered himself into, in highly controversial partnership with Israel’s Netanyahu. The conflict being his “war of choice”, with attempted justifications losing credibility by the day, domestically and internationally, ending the conflict with a declaration of “victory” is a must, but this “must” has to meet at least minimum criteria of credibility, and here the dilemma is that mere compromise (perhaps resembling the Obama time JCPOA) on the nuclear file is a weak basis for “victory”, and a mutual opening of the Hormuz traffic only means a return to the status quo ante the beginning of the war, February 28, not progress as a result of the war. Hence Trump’s manifest anger at his European partners, and others, for their refusal to help Trump escape his self-inflicted dilemma.
Moreover, contrary to many claims by “war secretary” Hegseth, everyone, friends and adversaries, realize that time is of the essence, that there a limits to how long the US can maintain the current degree of military readiness in the region, costing hundreds of millions of dollars daily even during the 6 weeks of ceasefire, not to speak of the previous 5 months of depleting warfare, at the expense of readiness needs in other theaters. So allowing the indirect, mediated, talks to continue much longer is not an option. But to risk a resumption of bombardments, further destabilizing the Persian Gulf region and beyond and further hurting the wider international market in all sorts of alarming ways, is not an option, either. Or so it seems.
Hence, the need to find the politically necessary off-ramp to end, if temporarily, the conflict, for now, but at the same time the political necessity for this necessary off-ramp to be politically defensible. Otherwise, there is a real risk for the stormy Trump administration to have to allow the Iran adventure to be a critical liability in November’s mid-term elections, much to the chagrin of GOP loyalists. The clearly visible unpopularity of the Iran war is a politically significant reality even now, as is the harm done to world energy supply and economics.
But the turbulence in the Middle East is, as we have seen, not limited to the Iran war. Bibi Netanyahu, Trump’s hitherto comrade in arms, leads an Israeli government that is facing existentially important elections in the autumn (October or November), simultaneously with the US mid-terms, and the way Netanyahu’s regime, including a surprisingly loyal IDF leadership, has ignored the imposed ceasefire in Lebanon (and Gaza) and international law over the West Bank, has reinforced Israel’s status – or image – as a pariah state, as such offering a partnership with diminishing returns, for Trump.
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Given these dizzying developments over Iran and the Persian Gulf, and Lebanon, it is perhaps no wonder that the recently dominating Gaza issue, or tragedy, or disaster, has – again – come under the radar shadow of these developments, at least and especially as regards attention and prioritization by the Trump administration.
For both the Hamas terror attack on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s ensuing and protracted war of retaliation, costing some 72 000 Palestinian lives and huge suffering and destruction for most of the others, were indeed a tragedy and a disaster, as we may recall. The war was ended, after months and years of frustrated attempts at ceasefire and humanitarian rescue, when Donald Trump put down his fist and imposed a phased 20-point peace plan, in the first phase of which remaining Israeli hostages were released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, a (fragile) ceasefire was introduced and full-fledged humanitarian assistance was (supposed to be) launched. The Trump plan was launched against the backdrop of earlier and wilder plans both to evacuate all Gazans from the strip and to convert Gaza to a haven of tourism. The final plan, for want of alternatives, was perceived internationally to be so serious as to be subsequently endorsed by a UN resolution (UNSC Resolution 2803).
Trump’s 20-point plan was, on paper, an almost overwhelmingly ambitious piece of peace-making, as such a Trump-imposed compromise between conflicting interests, Israeli, Palestinian, Arab states and others. And as such questioned by many analysts in terms of means and ends, hence credibility. It introduced, with a lot of pomp and fanfare, a Board of Peace (with Trump himself as the permanent Chair) to oversee the process, an International Stabilization Force (ISF) nominally tasked to provide stability and impose Hamas disarmament (and allow for Israeli IDF staged withdrawal), and a National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) with technocrats replacing Hamas in daily administration. This in brief, presupposing a functioning ceasefire and full, unhindered humanitarian assistance and initiated reconstruction.
So what is the status now of the Trump Peace Plan, some seven months after its inauguration, some five months after the start of the second phase of the Plan, some three months after the beginning of the Iran war, and a couple of months after the Board of Peace’ appointed Director-General Nickolay Mladenov (not Tony Blair!) launched a detailed plan or roadmap regarding Hamas’ disarmament and the IDF´s withdrawal?
The basic answer: a deadlock and a strange catch 22 situation as a result of the vagueness of the Plan and complexities in its implementation, or lack thereof. The deadlock/impasse is not a single dispute but the result of a chain of conditional vetoes, each contingent on the resolution of the next. The anatomy of the deadlock consists of four separate but interconnected variables.
Hamas disarmament vs. IDF withdrawal. In short, whereas Hamas is conditioning concrete steps towards its own disarmament, as pledged procedurally, to parallel steps towards IDF withdrawal, the Netanyahu/IDF position is the opposite, Hamas disarmament first, then (may be) the IDF can start withdrawing from the half of the strip it now occupies. Pending resolution to this mutual conditionality, and exacerbated by ongoing ceasefire violations, Hamas is regaining authority in the Palestinian inhabited part, while the IDF is expanding its occupation zone. Clearly an untenable situation.
ISF deployment vs. ceasefire fragility. Under the Trump plan the IDF withdrawal would also be contingent on the deployment of the international force, the ISF. But whereas several countries initially felt obliged to pledge troop contributions to this force, but with apparent hesitation on the part of these countries (Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco) preventing going from words to action, this hesitation was manifestly enhanced come the February 28 US-Israeli war with Iran. The same with the Egyptian/Jordanian pledge concerning a police force. Hence still today no international boots on the ground, and poor prospects of it happening any time soon. Hence the IDF staying put in Gaza. Hence no Hamas disarmament.
NCAG vs. Hamas’ de facto control. The Trump plan and the UNSC resolution (2803) tasks the Board of Peace and, under its supervision, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza with administering Gaza, yet so far the absence of an international force (ISF) and the prohibitive attitude of the Israeli government as regards allowing the NCAG entry into and “work permit” in Gaza has prevented implementation, with Hamas instead “de facto” regaining lost authority.
Arab contributions vs. statehood pathway. A last-minute US concession to Arab negotiators preceding the launch of the plan was the introduction in the UNSC resolution of a vague reference to the plan and the process eventually providing a path to Palestinian statehood. It is rather clear that the enthusiasm of Arab states as regards committing to a demanding and concrete role in handling, transitionally, the Gaza crisis will have been further reduced by Israel’s continued warfare in Lebanon and explicitly anti-two state policies in the West Bank, and of course its war adventure against Iran. This adds to the insecurity factor making non-Arab states on the Trump list shy away from commitments.
This, in sum, means that the Gaza component of the Middle East dramaturgy is highly likely to remain stuck in these catch 22 mechanisms until either the entire plan implodes under the combined pressures of untenable balancing acts, or the US and its partners, or some consortium of likeminded actors, find it (before it is too late) possible and necessary to review and revise the plan with a view to getting rid of harmful ambiguities and stating more clearly points of parallelism and of sequencing.
But for that to happen there probably has to be a new government in Israel, perhaps also in the US.
Meanwhile, as a result of the deadlock, the suffering of the Gaza-Palestinians is continuing unabated, with much of international attention, even outrage, now looking elsewhere.
How utterly sad.