Will the Gaza war end – to quote T.S.Eliot- with a bang or a whimper?
This obviously cannot be answered unless we undertake the intellectual burden of defining what “bang” and “whimper” might mean, when we try to understand what is at stake in the current Gaza disaster – clearly a disaster already, and since long, regardless of how and when the Gaza war ends, if indeed there is ever an end, regardless of bang or whimper. But the focus in this text is now on ending the war, rather than on the disaster dimensions (in Gaza, and in the West Bank, and in crisis-ridden Israel itself) during these soon two years of almost unprecedented destruction.
But first, nonetheless, a reminder of the relevant, co-existing perspectives.
For all the infinite meandering maneuverings on the theme of ceasefire as a means of bringing the war to an end, it has long stood clear that the Netanyahu coalition government is locked on the war aim of “total victory” and hence the reluctance (or more) to any form of compromise deal with the mortal enemy Hamas (and Islamic Jihad, not to forget), even if that takes huge costs in international reputation, given the suffering of the 2 million Palestinian civilians, and even if takes continuously resisting the demands for compromise of an avalanche of protesters on Israeli streets prioritizing the fate of remaining hostages in Hamas’ tunnels. And even if prominent figures in the Israeli security establishment for long have maintained that Hamas no longer represents a strategic threat and that therefore a compromise deal with rump-Hamas is not only militarily tolerable but indeed crucial as a means to have the hostages, dead or alive, released and Israel’s international reputation restored. And to save Israel, and the exhausted IDF, from a likely protracted guerilla/anti-guerilla war against an actor, mainly Hamas, that is utterly unlikely to surrender completely and unconditionally.
At the time of writing (Aug 28) it seems – although several processes are ongoing simultaneously, in Doha and elsewhere – that Netanyahu and his team are intent on and committed to fulfilling the “total victory” line, believing it can do so, in spite of growing international (and domestic) condemnation, as long as Donald Trump’s support remains steady and unconditional, whether by silence or explicit greenlighting. This in spite of the internationally proliferating narrative that all the suffering of the Gaza Palestinians and the still surviving hostages and their families and sympathizers is objectively unnecessary and exclusively rooted in Netanyahu’s personal struggle for political and juridical survival.
Hence the current IDF operation in Gaza City, with the stated objective to crush Hamas (and Islamic Jihad) holdouts there, including civilian Hamas administrative institutions, to “evacuate” the million or so civilians having gathered there during the war to the already over-crowded not IDF-controlled minute areas further south, pending vague further evacuation plans abroad, and to rescue by armed force remaining living hostages, the latter obviously militating against the view held by protesters and some IDF leaders that the operation will instead guarantee a death sentence for the hostages.
This indicates that Netanyahu – so far with vague support by Trump – has de facto abandoned considering the current mediator – Hamas-accepted – ceasefire proposal that is still a compromise of sorts, a 60 day temporary ceasefire in stages with half the number of living hostages released in a first step and a certain number of Palestinian prisoners released at the same time, plus a myriad of details, Netanyahu instead holding forth, rhetorically, that all that now counts is instant release of all hostages (and Hamas’ total surrender). But in reality, what apparently counts is the ongoing operation, not the parallel negotiation track. The hostages are secondary priority, no matter the rage on the streets of Israel, and the alarm in worlds capitals.
In sum, it seems Netanyahu counts on a continued unconditional support from Trump’s US for a line of action – as a means of keeping his coalition intact even though opposition figures like Lapid and Gantz have pledged to step in to compensate for the loss of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich should they abandon the government in case of a compromise ceasefire – that goes all in for “total victory”, whatever that means. The driving motivation seems to be that if we (team Netanyahu) have gone this far in resisting condemnation and avoiding unheroic compromise there is simply no choice but to follow through, all the way, even if it means staring into the abyss. Even if it means a big bang, rather than a whimper, all drama petering out, somehow. But Israel simply cannot allow to leave Hamas “standing” and surviving as a permanent threat to the survival and security of the Jewish state – after all Israel has been going through as from October 7, 2023.
But then there is the other, alternative, perspective, or several other perspectives if that of embattled Hamas were to be included, historically and operationally, and its likely refusal to surrender to the heavy might of Netanyahu’s Israel, backed by Trump’s US, so long as that lasts.
The other side of the coin is the costs, to the suffering Palestinian civilians and of the so far surviving hostages, of Israel’s warfare, initially seen by a broad international consensus as just, but gradually loosing legitimacy under the established principles of the just war and criteria of proportionality, following reporting of shocking death figures and emerging famine as a result of the lethal combination of military onslaught and starvation encirclement.
For months and months the international community – and many actors domestically in Israel – have focused on ceasefire as the key to any progress towards sustainable peace. And for months and months such a ceasefire (whatever its format and layout and diplomatic cleverness) has eluded all the efforts, mainly due to the total incompatibility between the war aims of the two sides, Netanyahu and team maneuvering for “total victory” and Hamas refusing to surrender (totally). Meanwhile, a broad international consensus has turned increasingly dismayed and shocked at the (almost) unprecedented suffering and devastation inflicted on the millions of exposed Gazans, many perceiving on the persons of Netanyahu and supporter Trump as personally responsible for the lethal costs of every single day’s delay in ending the war, or at least arriving at a ceasefire, for at least temporary relief.
Many European leaders, including traditional friends of Israel like Germany, now – in front of the upcoming UN General Assembly – seem ready to change course and seriously step up pressure against Israel, nationally and/or collectively under the EU hat, including by means of recognizing a Palestinian state and reviving the notion of a so-called two-state solution. Pictures of children dying by famine apparently make tons of difference, evoking memories of the early 40s.
But still no answer to the most burning question as to how this war is to end, and when. Instead, at the time of writing, there were reports of a chain of meetings in Washington, but reportedly not about how to end the war but (another burning set of issues hitherto largely shied away from) about “the day after”- what is to happen after the war is officially declared (by whom?) over and formidable challenges are mounting as regards post-Hamas governance and reconstruction, among other things. But the discussants in Washington are likely to be aware that any such deliberation on the “day after” issues – fundamentally important as the issues are and have long been – will be severely dependent on how the war is ended, by last-minute political compromise against all odds or by military conquest and evacuation of all or most inhabitants?
And here one of the questions arising is this: even if team Trump were to be ready to support any and all Netanyahu war-winning strategies against Hamas/Islamic Jihad (even at a huge humanitarian and political cost), will they also stand behind and support – against the will of the rest of the international community – a Netanyahu coalition follow-up policy that includes capturing all of the strip and cleansing of all or most Palestinians to odd places like South Sudan or Somaliland and refilling Gaza with Israeli settlements? In view of known resistance to any such Israeli plan on the part of European and neighboring Arab voices, such US acceptance would seem unlikely. In addition, before any such plans would be ready to fly, there is likely to have to be elections in Israel probably at least jeopardizing maneuvering space for the current coalition. And also, any Netanyahu plan to evacuate Palestinians, whether in Gaza and/or the West Bank, to far away countries is likely to be highly dependent on a supportive US and its capacity to enforce obedience by tariff-scared far away countries.
But you never know where the Netanyahu-Trump liaison can take developments the next few days, weeks and months. And the disaster dimensions of the current situation, in Gaza City and beyond, are huge enough, and unpredictable enough in their fall-out, to reach global implications, and an enormous challenge to Europe and its leaders.
Netanyahu may have little choice now but to pursue the current course, given how far he has chosen or been forced to go and given that the Knesset in summer recess presents no immediate danger, Netanyahu being willing and able to resist protest internationally and domestically. He can always claim that Hamas can end the war immediately if it delivers the hostages and surrenders – BUT what about Trump and his willingness and ability to end the war?
Trump realizes, proudly, that he is currently the only agency with leverage enough to influence friend and ally Netanyahu, even though not infinitely. But in this he faces a thorny dilemma. If he were to put all his might behind a signal to Netanyahu clearly indicating ENOUGH! Stop the war now, accept a last-minute compromise deal with rump-Hamas, leaving rump-Hamas “standing” albeit severely weakened but leading to the release of all hostages and of massive humanitarian assistance to Gaza, etc, etc, he surely knows that this would lead to turmoil in Israeli politics and the likely fall of friend Netanyahu and chaotic scenes for the world to see (especially if international media are allowed in) in Gaza, and the West Bank. And if on the other hand he stands behind Netanyahu all the way, leading to a surreal humanitarian catastrophe and utter chaos in Gaza, protest waves in Israel over the likely loss of the remaining hostages, and severe international criticisms, this would be a nasty exposure and would render already difficult “day after” issues infinitely more difficult. Both options less than fully compatible with what is appreciated by the Nobel Peace Prize Committee.
But regardless, for many, many Gazans it is already too late. The next few days, or weeks, will likely tell how Trump would prefer the Gaza war to end, given this dilemma. But the next few days and weeks, and months, will also tell the world that even in the preferable event of an end by last-minute compromise deal saving the hostages, ending the warfare and opening up for a massive humanitarian rescue operation, many more children will die by famine, since for many of these children mere food supply is a life-threatening danger rather than a means for survival. Urgent intensive care is what is needed, but for long hard to deliver.
In short and in sum: whatever happens, there is no happy end to the Gaza disaster. And as regards Donald Trump and his responsibility, he after all has also Ukraine to worry about. Or has he?