At the time of writing, it is not known what to expect from the April 7 meeting at the White House between Donald Trump and “friend” Benjamin Netanyahu, but we do know that Trump’s summons signaled urgency, so much so that Netanyahu had to fly directly from Budapest, where he had been for a rare official visit, his host there, Viktor Orban, being so keen for the visit that he took the trouble of announcing Hungary’s departure from the International Criminal Court (ICC) which has Netanyahu listed as a war criminal. So this time it is Trump summoning Bibi, not the latter insisting on being the first head of government to see the new president in the White House. But, regardless, Netanyahu is the first leader to visit Trump in the White House twice, and the first leader to appear there after Trump’s highly controversial tariffs announcement some days ago. So, the relationship is special, and the agenda is plentiful.
Might we, at the time of writing, guess that the reason for Trump’s insistent urgency is not so much a felt need to explain why the 17 % tariff slammed on “friend” Israel, well over the general 10% global level, and a readiness to negotiate negotiable reductions, and not so much – perhaps, at this stage – the notorious issues pertaining to the fractious ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, nor the volatile situation in the “new” Syria, nor the delivery of a second advanced THAAD air defense battery (with needed US personnel), but rather the acute issues of war and peace between Israel and Iran, on the one hand, and Israel and Turkey, on the other, the two combined in various, complex ways?
Guessing this – as a reason for particular urgency on team Trump’s part – is not to underestimate the importance and, yes, urgency, of also the other items of the US-Israeli agenda and the way these are affected by the personal Trump-Bibi relationship. Curiously, thus, when Netanyahu asked the Jerusalem District Court to postpone compulsory hearings in its corruption case against him, referring to the Trump summons, the Court’s ruling was to agree postponement of the Monday session, but not the Wednesday one, so this time Netanyahu’s US trip will have to be swift, bouncing back to Israel after a mere one day of deliberations. So for Benjamin Netanyahu, legal pressures are added to the pressures from families and friends of the remaining Hamas hostages, still utterly unconvinced that continuing the warfare in Gaza is the best, or only, means to bring back the hostages, dead or alive.
And then, in spite of the enhanced support for Netanyahu’s Israel by Trump and his administration, there is the utterly, utterly untenable humanitarian situation in Gaza where more than 1000 people have died from warfare since Israel broke the ceasefire some weeks ago and where an incredible 50-60 000 people (mostly women and children) have died since October 7 2023, and where more than 110 000 wounded people have suffered from the destruction of most available hospitals and clinics. And the pressure from the wider international community following these and all other measurements of extraordinary human suffering – in any global or historical comparison (so assures you AI, after due check-up). Even Trump administration-style prestige cannot totally avoid suffering the cost of constant support of an internationally pariah-stamped ally.
So could it, speaking about prestige, now be Trump’s mission to order, or strongly advise, Netanyahu to put a swift end to the Gaza war, and if so by sped-up military action including the use of US-supplied heavy bombs regardless of the fate of the hostages or by somehow restoring the ceasefire, or a ceasefire (should such an agreement, under new terms, at all be relevant and feasible)? Or, rather, explicitly greenlighting Netanyahu to finish his Gaza quagmire to his and his volatile coalition government’s liking, regardless…? Or, perhaps, to seek to convince “friend” Netanyahu that in view of everything pertaining to war and peace in the wider region, it could be worthwhile to at least pretend some interest in the Egyptian/Arab proposal for a Gaza settlement, including conditions for the “day after”?
After all, urgency or not, a clock is definitely ticking with regard to the fate of Gaza – and the West Bank, i.e., the Palestinian issue, no matter how much and how long team Netanyahu seeks to postpone the “day after” challenges by continued warfare, to the chagrin and concern of indispensable neighboring Arab states. Even though opinion polls have indicated great hesitation on the part of (war hardened but frustrated) IDF military circles when it comes to obey potential government orders to enforce evacuation of Palestinians from the flattened Gaza, rumors of Israeli diplomatic efforts to persuade neighboring Arab states, notably Egypt and Jordan, to allow Palestinian evacuees into their territories, indicate that Donald Trump´s shocking suggestion of total evacuation (and the transformation of a cleaned-up Gaza into an Eastern Mediterranean “riviera”) is far from dead in the water. Even for the total rejection, so far, of this vision by Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and others. And another topic for Trump-Netanyahu discussion is likely to be “what about the West Bank – is the US now, really, ready to explicitly support annexation, in full or in part”?
These are indeed burning issues on the table of a Trump administration busy with changing the economic world order and busy with changing the nature of the US. But for now, the most urgent matters seemingly causing the urgent summons of Netanyahu to the White House for a lightning visit pertain to Israel versus Iran and Israel versus Turkey, i.e., the two most important allies of the US in the region, alongside Saudi Arabia, and Iran as the main adversary of Israel and hence, almost by security policy definition, the US.
In the current war of nerves between Trump’s US, Netanyahu’s Israel and a cautious but still defiant Iran over whether prevention of the latter’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is best achieved by hard negotiations, backed by devastating sanctions (as seemingly preferred by Trump, so far), or “fire and fury” (or “shock and awe”) military attack, as seemingly pushed for by team Netanyahu as a follow up to perceived military victories in Gaza, Lebanon and to some unfinished extent the Houthis in Yemen, and elsewhere, it can be assumed that the emerging conflict between US’ two allies, Israel and Turkey, is seen in Washington as a major irritant, if not stumbling block.
If that conflict concerned only Hamas, Gaza and the Palestinian issue, as has been the case for years (remember President Obamas efforts to negotiate reconciliation some 10 years back), things could perhaps be handled by US diplomacy. But now the bones of contention have grown in size and number in view of developments in both Lebanon and Syria where the national security interests of the two countries manifestly collide – even though Turkey’s foreign minister Hakan Fidan recently called for calm. How Trump’s US is to navigate, in its wider vision for the Middle East (if there is one), between its two allies with clearly and manifestly colliding security interests pertaining to the fragile emergence of a “new”, infinitely complex, Syria, and inherent escalation risks, neighboring the ongoing crisis over Ukraine, is one of the many unknowns in the region.
May we assume, therefore, that a US (Trump) perceived, potentially dramatic, urgency over these matters is what made Trump summon Netanyahu to Washington, immediately. Perhaps we shall learn soon, even though a lot of the conversation can be expected to be shrouded in secrecy.