“We few, We happy few, we band of brothers; for he today that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile. This day shall gentle his condition; and gentlemen in England now a-bed shall think themselves accurs’d they were not here. And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks that fought with us upon Saint Crispin’s day.” Henry V by William Shakespeare.
Introduction
The battle of Agincourt[1] was fought on St. Crispin’s Day (25th October) 1415 between the English army, under the command of King Henry V, and the French army near the town of Azincourt in the north of France (usually given as to the east of the town but it has been argued that the battle might have been fought to the west of the town). The is the second in a set of three articles and my purpose in looking at the Battle of Agincourt in this article is to reflect on Swedish defence policy and the need for change in the Swedish army[2].
An Overview of the Battle of Agincourt
The battle of Agincourt was fought as part of the Hundred Years war. The English had captured the town of Harfleur and then withdrew back to the main English town of Calais as the campaign season for the year was coming to an end and the King wanted to winter in an English stronghold. The French followed the English army and harassed them on the way, hindering the English army’s ability to cross the River Somme. Both armies eventually came to face each other for battle on the 24th October. No battle occurred, so both armies spent the night in the field.
Both armies stood ready for battle again on the 25th. The battlefield was like a funnel formed between two woods with the English deployed at the narrow end and the French at the wider end. It rained heavily the night of the 24th / 25th, turning the field into mud. The size of each army is not known but estimates put the English army at about 6,000 but it could be as high as 9,000 men. Mostly archers that formed up on the flanks with a small contingent of knights in the centre. The French army is estimated to have been about 12,000 knights. Each knight would have had an armed servant that would also engage in the fighting, giving a French army of about 24,000. Whatever the exact numbers, the contemporary sources all agree that the English were heavily outnumbered.
The French army was commanded by Charles I d’Albret, Constable of France, and Jehan le Meingre, Marshal of France. These were both professional soldiers. They drew up a plan for the battle. The plan was as good as plans go for the time but had one major flaw; it was drawn up two days before the battle and hadn’t taken into account the terrain at Agincourt. Not that that mattered. The night before the battle the French noblemen, who out ranked both d’Albret and le Meingre, disregarded the plan as they focused on what positions would give them the highest glory and the best opportunity to capture English knights, which they could then ransom back. This led to a French formation of three groups called battles. In the first battle went many of the high nobility. The second battle was the main force and, due to the restrictions of the terrain, anyone left over went into the third battle. Each battle formed up one after the other. Due to the desires of the French noblemen to be at the front, the archers were pushed back in the lines to a position where they were unable to act effectively.
On the 25th October, both armies formed up in the morning and stood there for about three hours. The French were waiting for more knights to arrive but they could also be delaying in the hope that the English army would disintegrate anyway, negating the need to fight. The English army was in a poor state. They had marched for days and many were sick with dysentery. They had also not eaten for a few days.
The archers in the English army were composed of both English and Welshmen armed with English longbows (there is still some debate if the English longbows used were developed from the Welsh longbows or represented a separate development). They spent the morning hammering in stakes to protect themselves from cavalry (they also removed their breaches).
The waiting basically forced Henry’s hand. He was unable to retreat to Calais without defeating the French and he planned to fight a defensive battle. However, as the French would not attack he had to act. Henry conducted an extremely risky move and advanced the line of English forward. This meant taking up the stakes that protected the archers which left them open to a French attack. Had the French attacked at that moment it could well have been all over for the English. However, the French were delayed in their attack. They were not ready as many of the French knights in the first battle had gone off to get warm, feed their horses, or just generally walk around. When the French (at less than full capacity) did charge, the English were in their new positions and within bow range of the French lines.
The French charge was met with a rain of arrows. About 75,000 arrows were loosed onto the French in the first couple of minutes. It turned the sky dark. However, the arrows didn’t inflict much casualties directly on the French knights. The English bodkins used were made of iron and were unable to penetrate the steel armour of the French. One weak point, however, of the French armour was the gap in the helmet that allowed the knights to see. To protect themselves from the arrows, the French knights would have had to hold their heads down, which would have made it difficult to breath. The horses, however, were not so well protected. Any horse hit would most likely have thrown their rider and fled in terror. Some ran back into the French lines. The panicked horses also turned the already soggy muddy field into a quagmire.
The English army was pushed back but the lines held. The second battle then advanced into combat. The knights bunched up with each other as the funnel terrain forced them together (the battlefield was basically a crowd control nightmare). They were so packed together many were unable to raise their arms. Knights in their heavy armour became stuck in the mud. They bumped into each other, fell over, and then more knights would fall over them. Piles of knights formed on the battlefield. The biggest pile was close to King Henry, who was fighting in the centre of the English army. It has been estimated that as much as two thirds of the French knights that died that day could have drowned in the mud or suffocated due to the weight of other knights falling on top of them.
The English and Welsh archers, who were not hindered by armour, were able to move freely through the muddy battlefield. They used their maces and daggers to kill French knights who were stuck fast in the mud. The battlefield turned into a slaughter.
As the French third battle formed up, a cry came from the rear of the English lines to say the rear baggage train was under attack. Faced with French forces in front of him and an attack from the rear, Henry made his most controversial decision. The English had captured many French knights. There was a risk that they could attack when the English were fighting both French forces to the front and to the rear. So, Henry ordered the prisoners to be killed. This was deeply unpopular with the English knights as it went against the rules of chivalry (not to mention the loss of any ransom they might have got). It is unlikely that all the prisoners were killed before the order was rescinded as the third French battle left the field and the attack on the baggage train turned out not to be a serious attack by the French army (the attack was probably locals trying to steal what they could).
Agincourt was a major victory for the English. It was devastating to the French. The French lost about 6,000 knights that day, killed in battle with about 1,000 or so captured. Many French noble families were wiped out. For the English, however, losses were in the hundreds. Could be as much as 600.
Discussion
What does a battle fought in France in the fifteenth century have to do with modern Swedish defence policy?
There are a number of proximate causes for the English victory. One of the most significant was the terrain. The muddy field that hindered the French knights and the funnelling effect of the woods either side. Another factor was the French failure to charge when the English were moving forward. And yet another factor was the English’s ability to hold the line despite their poor condition and the French charge. But what is more significant (and of relevance to Swedish Defence policy) is the ultimate cause of the English victory.
As Sun Tzu says:
“Every battle is won before it’s ever fought.”
The French lost the battle on the night before the battle started. Two professional soldiers drew up a battle plan that was overruled by a set of aristocrats (a sort of “expert in the room” problem) who were far more interested in their own personal glory and the money they could make than actually doing what was needed to win. The English, however, were led by Henry V, a well experienced and capable soldier. The English were focused on doing what was necessary to win. They were very battlefield focused.
It was this difference in focus that led to the set of events on the battlefield that ultimately led to the English victory. If the French had been more battlefield focused, they would not have formed up the way they did. If they had been battlefield focused, they would have been able to exploit the English advance when the English and Welsh archers were exposed and unprotected. The odds were all in the French favour but it was all messed up because glory and ransom outweighed battlefield necessity. But the battlefield is the ultimate judge, jury, and executioner of any battle plan. Of any defence policy. The battlefield does not forgive mistakes and the battlefield shows no mercy. The cost of mistakes is paid for in blood as the French did at Agincourt. The Russians also paid the price of blood for their mistakes during the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Question; is the Swedish defence policy battlefield focused? To my mind, defence policy should act like a customer specification. It should say what needs to be done but not how it should be done. But with in that boundary, defence policy should lay the foundations for a defence force that is battlefield focus. Does it do that? From what I see from my corner of the Universe, defence policy is dictated by political agendas that are not focusing on the battlefield. It is full of augmentation with no overall direction. No use case analysis. Poorly laid our specifications and requirements (I’ve also argued the goal is in error as well, see[3]). This makes Swedish defence policy a poor foundation for building an effective defence policy. Documents from the Swedish government on defence policy often begin with an analysis of the geopolitical situation (see, for example, “Allvarstid”[4]). Interesting as it is (and I can’t fault the analysis), it is not really of relevance (which is not to say it should be ignored) because a nation should build a defence regardless of what a potential enemy might or might not do or is doing. Having a geo-political analysis leads to a defence policy that lags the geopolitical reality. It was that mistake, I would argue, that led to closing down much of the defence after the Cold War. Swedish defence policy is essentially still making the same mistake. It is not as obvious as the mistake is resulting in a build-up of the armed forces. Yet it is still a defence policy based on the geo-political reality and results in a defence that lags said reality. Instead, I would argue, we need an analysis of the current and future state of the art of war fighting. Then develop a policy that lays the foundations for the development of the armed forces to a battlefield focused military.
As for the need to change in the army. The army should be even more focused on the battlefield. I’ve argued before that there is much positive with the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF)[5]. It is a very professional military but it is also a very professional peacetime military. It has had decades of, what can be argued, political mismanagement and decades of focusing on peacekeeping. It is also an armed force that hasn’t done much since the age of muskets. This has left many out of date ideas within the SAF that needs to be fixed. But to change, SAF (not just the army) needs to focus on the modern battlefield.