The Ukrainian offensive into Kursk Oblast has taken many by surprise, especially the Russians. Not only because the operation was daring but also because it may have shown that it is still possible to surprise an adversary on an otherwise transparent battlefield. The rapid advance seems to have been enabled by what some have called an “electronic” and “drone blitzkrieg”.[1] Thus, in part shaping the battlespace with unmanned systems to Ukraine’s advantage, at least for the initial phase.
Using unmanned systems as a means to shape the battlespace is neither unknown nor spectacular by itself.[2] Not when taking into account the use of RPAS[3] for reconnaissance and surveillance as a means to give ground forces actionable information. Neither is it revolutionizing using weaponized drones for area denial operations which has been shown multiple times throughout the war with various types of loitering munition targeting soldiers and vehicles trying to penetrate the frontline. However, what is noteworthy is how unmanned systems were used for air interdiction at both low and high altitudes, denying the Russian units valuable information from their reconnaissance drones as well as being able to intercept helicopters in what the Russian forces likely thought was safe air space.[4] The ability to find, fix, track, and finish Russian air assets with drones must be seen as, if not spectacular so at least, impressive.
Now, it should be stated that this article will not argue that the initial success of the Kursk offensive is not only due to RPAS. Unmanned systems are one part of the bigger picture where OPSEC[5], electronic warfare, and the use of well-equipped brigades[6] all add to the sum that is the rapid advance some 30km into Russia.[7] In essence, Ukraine conducted multi-domain operations. The ability to conduct electromagnetic warfare and operate drones simultaneously in support of ground troops seems to have one key aspect to gaining the upper hand on Russian troops in the region. Denying the enemy the ability to operate drones and communications while being able to operate unmanned platforms themselves during a critical phase, while conducting offensive ground operations indicates some form of battlespace spectrum management. Something to note for Western military forces in a future war.
What we have seen so far is a form of A2/AD with drones as the main component, clearing the operational area as well as targeting airbases from which Russians could launch counter-attacks.[8] An offensive where drones are used as a substitute for mortars and artillery in front of the advancing troops.[9] Furthermore, according to Russian military bloggers, drones have been, and may still be, used to suppress the critical command links for Russian drones although we now can see Russian drones active over Ukrainian troops in Kursk. As a cherry on top, drones have been shown being used with speakers instructing Russian soldiers to surrender and how to do so safely.[10] One should also note that Ukrainian drones have been used to surveil surrendering troops, creating valuable imagery for the ongoing Ukrainian information operation as well as adding an extra layer of security for Ukrainian soldiers tasked with collecting the prisoners of war.
All in all, Ukraine has (yet again) shown the world that cheap and simple unmanned platforms can be utilized as multirole assets to gain tactical advantages, shaping and denying key terrain and thus enabling ground troops to move into striking positions. However, at the same time, Ukraine has yet again shown that unmanned systems cannot win the battle (or the war) by themselves and that the effort needs to be followed by capable ground forces. The soldier in the trench is still the foundation on which modern warfare relies. It is the soldiers that can take and hold ground, the unmanned systems cannot. They can however assist in shaping future operations and denying the enemy from gaining a foothold in key terrain.
Our officers and cadets need to start training and exercise today on how they can utilize unmanned systems on the ground, on (and below) the surface and in the air to support the different phases during an operation. Not just as a means to reconnoitre or to strike but also, as we have been shown by the Ukrainians, to suppress enemy assets, influence the enemy soldiers and support troops logistically. Otherwise, we run the risk of “underusing” our assets on the battlefield in the future.
