It took a long, long time for the stakeholders of the management of the Israel-Hamas war to arrive at a much, much needed ceasefire, a sine qua non for both desperately needed humanitarian assistance to the suffering civilian Palestinians, and for the release of suffering Israeli hostages and their families, and for setting the conditions for a final peace settlement. The tragic fact that it took so long and thereby caused so much extra suffering and death will be the subject of analyses for years to come, but it is widely realized that among the relevant causes there is both the total incompatibility of the parties´ war objectives, the policies of the two involved US administrations, Biden and Trump respectively, and the insufficient strength of the mediator function. A long and complex story, one key question being that of whether and to what extent in time and space the support rendered by the incoming Trump administration for the Netanyahu coalition government´s Gaza policy would remain essentially unconditional.
Donald Trump´s plan: why the launch now?
Well, for reasons still to be fully explored, the answer ascended as a result of many deliberations during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), its 80s in line, in September, and apparently as a result of team Trump´s perceptions of increasingly unacceptable political costs of the extreme levels of suffering in Gaza and extreme pressure inside Israel regarding the fate of the hostages: Time had come to say enough and stop! Including a stop signal also to friend Netanyahu; finally a Trump red line to Netanyahu. And opportunity had arrived using the premises and the dynamics of the Assembly for mobilization of Arab state (and Turkish) support for a – or the – big push. Hence the launch of “peacemaker” Donald Trump´s 20-point plan for Gaza and, by extension, the wider Middle East, announced euphorically at the Israeli Knesset and then formally launched at a major summit gathering in Egyptian Sharm El Sheikh, now with Turkey joining the circle of mediators-cum-sponsors, i.e., Egypt, Qatar and the US.
Adding to the international pressure for an end to the Gaza disaster at the time (of the UNGA) was also emerging activism on the part of a number of US Western allies, UK, France, Australia, Canada, Belgium, Portugal and some smaller states, these formally recognizing Palestinian statehood during the 2025 UNGA, as had three other Western states the year before, Norway, Ireland and Spain (and Sweden already in 2014), all with varying references to the plight of Palestinians and the need for a political solution, i.e., a two state solution, all ignoring both Netanyahu´s (et al) statements that “this will never happen” and ongoing steps in the West Bank to prepare for annexation, regardless of international law. All this a manifestation of emerging transatlantic tension over the Gaza/Palestinian issue.
Like earlier attempts at ceasefire and peace process, the Trump 20 point plan was construed as a phased process, the first of which combining the ceasefire with a commitment by Hamas to release all living hostages within 72 hours followed by a subsequent delivery of those deceased as speedily as feasible in view of conditions on the ground, a limited withdrawal of IDF forces to a pre-agreed (“yellow”) line, the release of a pre-agreed number of Palestinian prisoners in Gaza and the West Bank, and opening up of humanitarian convoys into Gaza to a pre-agreed level, some 600 trucks. These first-phase elements were based on Trump-dictated demands on both sides, for Hamas to formally accept abstention from any role on the rulership of Gaza (handing over to a vaguely defined “technocratic” interim regime), for Israel to (grumblingly) accept ceasefire and partial withdrawal, thus to abandon the ruling coalition´s war aims of “total victory” and – by implication – any steps towards annexation of either Gaza or the West Bank, at least with US support.
The link between phase 1 and phase 2
And then there was, in the Plan, the link between this first phase – universally characterized as extremely fragile, in view of the tension and hostility between the parties and the scarcity of guiding details, – and the phase or phases to follow, visionary in outlook but poor in guiding detail as regards conditional and gradual implementation. Thus, the Plan foresees demanding and operationally uncertain steps towards the full disarmament of Hamas, the full withdrawal of Israeli IDF, the establishment of a “technocratic” (i.e., non-political Palestinian) administration (until there can be a PA reform process and then elections, etc), the assembly and deployment of a 5000 strong International Stabilization Force (ISF) consisting presumably of troops from those Muslim countries collectively supporting the Plan, probably led by Egypt, perhaps legitimized by a UNSC mandate, of sorts, and then, as the crown of the structure, a “Board of Peace”, overseeing the peace process, chaired by Donald Trump himself and with some managerial role assigned for Tony Blair. All this according to the Plan, now with some three weeks into implementation, and several indications of a high risk of early collapse, given expected difficulties in implementing the demanding provisions of phase one.
So will the ceasefire in Gaza and the other provisions of the Plan hold? Or is there a real risk that difficulties of implementation – notably of the phase one requirements – are so formidable as to seriously jeopardize the whole project? After all, there is a conditionality link not only to the turbulent domestic political scene in Israel – issues pertaining to accountability for what happened October 7, 2023 and to forthcoming elections, and more – but also to simultaneous processes in Lebanon and its ceasefire struggles and as regards strategically relevant developments in Syria, Iran, Iraq and others.
We have seen that during the first weeks of implementation of phase one, as expected, there have been a number of hurdles and violations, following the classical process of accusations and counteraccusations, as if confirming the mission-impossible fear on the part of many in this difficult case. How can, for instance, it be avoided that by way of action-reaction and non-acceptance of the enforced compromise the powder keg be rather instantly re-ignited, as slow delivery of deceased hostages and Hamas´ non-control of other militants in the strip was seen to compete with recurring Israeli air attacks. Has any negotiated ceasefire been as fragile as this one, historically? And pending final resolution to the issue of dead hostages the Israeli side has kept the promised delivery of humanitarian assistance to a miserable low, further increasing the number of Palestinian deaths, although rather by famine than by bombings.
And meanwhile Israel can note, with alarm, that pending resolution and clarification to all these hurdles, Hamas – like Hezbollah in Lebanon – is given the chance to regain military strength and restore some degree of political legitimacy, internationally (Turkey never designated Hamas as a terror organization) and domestically inside the wider Palestinian community, according to recent opinion polls.
The prospects – two perspectives
This is one perspective, one perception, to be validated during the next few days and weeks.
But then there is the more optimistic scenario: in view of prestige involved, it is unthinkable for Donald Trump to tolerate anything less than the untarnished success of his Gaza plan, and unthinkable for a any involved stakeholder, notably the three mediator states, Qatar, Egypt and Turkey and their supporting Muslim states, not to be seen to be fully on board with Trump´s vision. As it is unthinkable for Netanyahu – for all the intra-coalition turbulence – not to put up a brave face and to continue to rely on his link to Trump as key to political survival, while struggling with the home-front consequences of Trump´s recent compromise rulings. Ergo: the ceasefire and the continued process under the 20-point plan will hold, regardless of messiness of implementation, at least initially, pending clarification of conditions and prerequisites for the demanding phase two, in parallel.
Trump has, after all, demonstrated, to Israel, to Hamas and to all other stakeholders, that he means business – both by committing himself to the realization of his plan through the gesture of naming himself the chair of the preconceived “Board of Peace” and by sending the likes of Vance, Rubio, Hegseth, Witkoff and Kushner to the area in an intense program of visits with a view to keeping up the pressure, not least on Israel, thus accompanying simultaneous steps of diplomacy in various stakeholder circles in order to prepare for phase 2, preparations deemed helpful in surviving the pitfalls of phase one.
Hence now the US-Israeli innovation in the history of military cooperation, the recent establishment, inaugurated by JD Vance, of a permanent US military facility on Israeli soil, the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) in southern Israel (Kiryat Gat, some 15 miles from the Gaza border), manned so far by some 200 US military personnel together with a small number of allies, tasked to monitor the ceasefire and the wider process. Clearly, the Netanyahu government is less than amused by this innovation, the Israeli reaction to these developments so far being limited to officially vetoing any (at least) military role in the emerging Gaza institutions for Turkey – leaving the US less than amused. For now.
So these are concrete steps in preparation for the mountain of difficulties pertaining to phase two as (vaguely) conceived in Trump´s plan: the disarmament of Hamas, the withdrawal of Israeli IDF from Gaza, the establishment of the (vaguely defined) “technocrat” interim governance, and the deployment of the 5000 strong ISF, The International Stabilization Force, with as yet unclear mandate (UNSC?) and unclear national composition, but with Egyptian leadership. The operational interdependence between these steps, and between these and the phase one requirements, is for each and everyone to see. That timing will be of essence is a clear understatement.
So here we are now, in early November. While implementation of phase one suffers from varying interpretations of the basic, US dictated, compromise, timing and sequencing included, frantic diplomacy is ongoing to operationalize the requirements of phase two – an almost impossible equation without a strong, sustained and fully committed Trump/US leadership. While voices in Tel Aviv/Jerusalem may still hope that in the end (whenever that occurs) this whole exercise will lead to the final death of global and domestic two-state-solution aspirations, contrary to prevailing, current global trends, a huge global majority now perceives of a promising potential for a qualitative leap towards a, or the, political solution, after all these years of painful waiting game.