Introduction
This is the final in a set of three articles that looks at Swedish defence policy and the need for change within the Swedish army from a battlefield perspective. Except, this article doesn’t look at a specific battle as the previous articles did. Instead, I will be looking at an organisation and how it performed generally in a war.
The Foundation
In the British Isles, there has been a tradition of part-time territorial defence of one form or another going back at least to Anglo-Saxon times with the fyrd that defended the shires and the burhs but could also have some foreign service requirements. In the Middle Ages there was the militia and the trained bands. By Victorian times there was the militia, volunteers, and the yeomanry (cavalry). The Victorian part-time territorial defence was a set of organisations that did not work well. There was no (or very little) standardisation for training and equipment and there was needed very little commitment from the soldiers. These problems were addressed in the reform of 1907 which was put forward by Richard Haldane (although the primary reason for the reforms was cost as the various organisations that formed the part-time defence were costly and bringing them together in one organisation was cheaper). The reform led to the disbandment of the previous organisations and the establishment of the Territorial Force in 1908[1] [2] [3] [4].
Lessons learnt from the Boar War (1899 – 1902) showed the need for an army reserve. It was Haldane’s intent that the changes he proposed would lead to the formation of such an army reserve. However, he was overruled and the Territorial Force (TF) became a defence force for the UK only. Even so, it was possible for members of the TF to volunteer for overseas service (called the Imperial Service Obligation) and, before the First World War, about 10% did so.
The TF was composed of infantry battalions, artillery batteries, and yeomanry regiments as well as supporting units such as hospitals, supply companies, and engineers. The various battalions were then organised into brigades and divisions. Civilian associations were responsible for administering the units and the army was responsible for the training. Training was conducted once a week in the evening and at some weekends as well as at a two-week camp (going on a two week camp was one of the main motivators to join the TF) once a year.
The Problem Child
The TF gained a poor reputation prior to the First World War[5]. This was primarily due to external factors rather than problems with the soldiers themselves. First, there was an active campaign against the TF launched by supporters of conscription who would actively try and discouraged people from joining the TF. This was a major reason why the TF had recruiting problems and was understrength prior to WWI. The TF lacked government commitment. They were underfunded and what funds were available were often delayed by the War Office. Equipment was in short supply (especially boots) and outdated (like the 1888 pattern webbing). The TF was supposed to use the Small Magazined, Lee Enfield (SMLE) rifles but used Lee-Metford rifles dating from the previous century instead. Other equipment were hand-me-downs from the regular army. The equipment was in a well-used state and often dated back to the Boar War. The associations had problems finding and building training grounds. One association applied for permission to build a firing range in 1908 but after meeting after meeting they still did not have permission by 1942. Despite having regular army offices in charge of the battalions, the army was not fully committed to the TF (TF units were attached to regular army units but the army would not allow them to use the regiment’s motto on their cap badges, for example), thus, the training was poor. The soldiers scored poorly on their musketry tests and they were often of poor physical condition as well. The army’s opinion of the TF was so low and the TF’s reputation so poor that when war broke out in 1914, Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, allocated regular army divisions to the territorial defence of the UK and raised new battalions with new recruits (like the pal’s battalions) rather than use the TF battalions (Kitchener’s opinion was also tainted by the performance of the French reserves in 1870 but the TF was not in such a poor state as the French reserves).
The problems with the TF were recognised and efforts were made in 1912 to improve the situation. The problems, however, also drove innovation. Horses were in short supply. The TF had to hire horses as and when they were needed. But it was difficult to find horses. Those soldiers with their own horse often used them (such as the yeomanry). Artillery at the time was horse drawn and many TF batteries found themselves short of horses for their yearly two-week camp. The problem was solved by using vehicles to pull the guns. This was the first use of vehicles to pull guns in the British Armed Forces. TF units were also the first to mount machine guns onto vehicles.
To the War
Despite Kitchener’s reluctance to use the TF, reality dictates and he had to call in the TF. Kitchener’s New Army ran into problems. There was a shortage of kit and many recruits had to train in civilian clothes or were issued with Boar War kit including red jackets. There was a shortage of weapons and officers to train the recruits.
Many TF soldiers volunteered for overseas service at the start of WWI (varying in each battalion from 50% to 90% of the soldiers). This allowed TF units to be split into two, those who volunteered for overseas service went into the first part, whereas the others remained as home defence in the second part. So, for example, the 4th Battalion, Hampshire Regiment was split into the 1/4th Battalion and the 2/4th Battalion (some battalions were split into three battalions). This changed in 1916 when conscription came into effect and all TF units were liable for overseas service. TF battalions were being sent to Egypt, India, and Aden as well as other places.
To cover for losses in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France in 1914, TF battalions were sent to the Western front with the first TF battalion, the 1/14th Battalion (London Scottish), London Regiment, arriving on the Western front in September 1914. They were also the first TF battalion to face combat (at the Battle of Messine in October). By 1915, whole TF divisions were being sent to the War.
Part of the idea of the TF was that they would be mobilised in the event of a war but would then have six months to train. However, this didn’t happen as planned. It wasn’t unheard of for TF soldiers to be given an SMLE, told how to hold it, and then sent off to the front. Many TF units were mobilised and went straight into service, patrolling coastal areas and protecting vital lines of communications such as railways. TF battalions were used to relieve the regular army units in garrison duties. This allowed some TF battalions to gain some extra training but training was problematic with a lack of equipment and personnel (as regular army soldiers in the TF were transferred back to their parent regiment).
As the War progressed, TF battalions and divisions continued to fight in many of the major engagements of the War such as the Battle of Loos, the Second Battle of Artois, and the Battle of the Somme. The TF also fought in other theatres of the War such as Gallipoli as well as Sinai and Palestine.
And how did the TF perform? One can define an army as an “organisation that is badly betrayed by the government it serves”. One could argue that the TF was not only let down by the British government (in the form of the War Office) but by the army and by society as well. The TF did not receive the support that was needed. Yet, when it came to it they performed their duty admirably. The French praised the TF and they were considered to be almost as good as the regular army (in some cases they outperformed the regular army). The TF performed better than the regular army expected (not that that is much of a compliment as the army’s expectation was low). The highest military award in the UK is the Victoria Cross (VC) and 72 were awarded to TF soldiers. Of the three bars that were ever awarded with the VC, two were awarded to TF soldiers. Brigadier-General Rouse said:
”I did not before think much of the territorials, but by God they can fight.” [6]
Liddell Hart, the British military theorist, said of the TF:
“It is surely one of the hardiest of British plants’ since it operated ‘in financially stony soil, without even being watered by morale encouragement.” – When Britain Goes to War, 1935.
After the War
There was some debate after the end of the “war to end all wars” regarding the future of the TF. There was a need to demob the soldiers but was there a need to retain the TF? As there was no immediate threat of invasion there was no need of a territorial defence force? The TF became the Territorial Army (TA) in 1921 but it wasn’t until the Second World War that the distinction between the regular army and the TA was virtually removed. Treating the TA as separate from the regular army proved to be a hindrance during WWI as it made it difficult to transfer TF units to regular army units when the dictates of war demanded it.
Discussion and Conclusions
Needs must as the Devil drives.
Reality is a harsh mistress, best do as she says. The realities of the First World War were such that what was considered a territorial only formation ended up on the front line overseas. And they performed well. This really highlights to me that an army unit is an army unit is an army unit regardless. And an army unit’s first task is combat. In the worst case scenario that means combat in a full-scale war wherever that happens to take place. And the experiences of the TF shows that that goes for territorial units as well. To my mind, I would say that it is unwise to think of any kind of territorial unit as “territorial only”.
I would argue that lessons learnt from the TF in WWI shows that a nation needs to actually build up a part-time reserve in peacetime that mirrors the regular army (that is to see the army, reserves, and territorials as one army). This is so that the reserves can replace regular army units in war time as the regular army units are depleted. It also allows for rapid expansion of the army at the start of a war. Both of these tasks fell to the TF in WWI. This was also realised by the UK during the Boar War yet it appears to me that this is a concept that Britain struggled with. Despite experiences from the First World War, the TF became the Territorial Army in 1921 still focusing on territorial defence. It wasn’t until 1967 that the idea of a reserve came back and the TA became the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR). But it then went back to just territorial in 1979 as the TAVR became the TA. It wasn’t until 2012, well over a hundred years after Haldane wanted an army reserve, that the TA became the Army Reserve. During all this time the part-time TA / TAVR was plagued with much of the same problems as the TF had before WWI[7].
To my mind, it is clear from the history of the TF and the later TA (not just WWI but also WWII and on to Afghanistan in the 21st century) that a part-time reserve needs the same kind of units, from infantry to artillery to air defence and so on with all the supporting units to go with them, as the regular army. Does Swedish defence policy lay the foundations for such a defence? I would argue not. The Swedish defence policy shows signs, from my corner of the universe, of being stuck in out-dated Cold War or even pre-Cold War ideas when it comes to the Home Guard and the new territorial units. I would argue there needs to be a rethink on how the part-time defence is organised and what units it has. More towards a national defence force that can act as an army reserve. A reserve that is capable of replacing regular army units on the front line.
As for the army’s need for change[8]. The territorial force can end up as a reserve for the regular army and as such needs to be treated with respect by the army. A part-time defence starts at a disadvantage when compared to a full-time regular army. Repetition is the mother of all learning and for a military unit to be well trained a great deal of repetition is needed. Part-time soldiers do not have as much time as full-time soldiers to do the repetitive training. So, the part-time soldiers need the full support of the regular army to be able to get up to an acceptable standard. To the British army, the TF was a joke, as it was to much of the country. It was treated like the poor country cousin. Poorly equipped and poorly trained. Not treating a territorial force with respect, not giving it the equipment it needs nor the training it needs nor the funding it needs, ultimately, I would argue, hinders the defence of the country.
What training you do before a war is vitally important. As Archilochus said;
“We don’t rise to the level of our expectations, we fall to the level of our training.”
The idea that a territorial force would have time to train after mobilisation is effectively counting chickens before they hatch. As with the Territorial Force. They did not get their six months of training and what training they got was insufficient. So, there is a need to insure adequate training of a high standard with any territorial force. In Sweden, that would be the territorial units and the Home Guard. And that is something the army must ensure.
This point on training becomes even more important when the complexity of modern warfare is taken into account. The poor training meant that the TF struggled with technically complex tasks such as handling the artillery guns. But interestingly, the regular army did have more respect for the TF engineering units, who were considered more competent. I suspect the reasons for that has to do with the ability to take civilian skills into the military world as many of the soldiers had a working-class background which would fit well with the engineering tasks of the army at the time. Modern warfare is even more demanding on technical skills than warfare of the early 20th century. Soldiers need to be able to build up skills and retain them. That will take time and will demand a long-term commitment from the part-time soldiers as well as adequate training.
