Perhaps it can be debated whether “revolution” is a useful description of recent days’ astonishing events in crisis-ridden Syria, after all these years of devastating warfare, but regardless of label it is clear to everyone that rarely in the history of the Middle East (or anywhere) has such a profound change occurred at such lightning speed, taking most of the world with big surprise. No surprise, therefore, that international media are now flooded by Syria-focused articles attempting to explain the near-inexplicable: whence the roots of this sudden outburst of change, how could the HTS-led Sunni opposition forces advance so quickly, how could (like in Afghanistan) regime forces crumble to quickly and so totally, how could the regime supporting actors, Hezbollah, Russia and Iran, give up so easily, etc?
So assuming that these developments, from day one with the advance towards Aleppo to around day 10 with the rebel conquest of the capital Damascus and the flight of Bashar al-Assad with family and advisor team to Moscow and hence the beginning of a new – and very uncertain – era, signify “phase one” in the transition, what about “phase 2”, the early stages of stabilization and state-building? The world at large, and in particular the main stake holders, then and now, in the Syrian – and Middle East – drama, is currently looking for answers as regards the character and intentions of the new power wielders in the new Syria, al-Jolani and his team of HTS leaders from the Idlib years. To the relief of many, these leaders, while announcing that a list of perpetrators representing the cruelties of the ousted regime is being put together, have been communicating messages of reconciliation and orderly power transfer. They, i.e. the HTS leaders currently at the helm of the mixed bag of Sunni opposition groupings, have been “saying the right things” (as did the Taliban after the US-led Western evacuation!), and they seem ta have learned several lessons, building on the negative experiences of others, including US mistakes in Iraq.
Nonetheless, it is clear to most or all observers that an ocean of uncertainties and risks is facing both the new leaders in Damascus and “useful Syria” in the west and the wide range of international stakeholders. What kind, and geopolitical role, of a country might emerge in the next few months and years as the dust settles from the current transition turbulence, given the country’s and the region’s troubled history and the country’s complicated neighborhood, Israel, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan? Now that Russia and Iran, the main state sponsors of the former regime, seem to be weakened, overtaken by the sudden events and hence in search for a policy reorientation, and now that Hezbollah has been severely hit by Israel in Lebanon and has lost any military clout inside Syria? A jihadist Syria (the Afghanistan model), a divided Syria (the Libya model), or a Syria in chaotic civil war (the Iraq, post US intervention, model? Or something much more benign, a Syria with tenets of democracy, inclusiveness, stability and rule of law, i.e., a Syria that serves as a net contributor to stability and prosperity in the wider region?
Nobody really knows, of course, but many are pinning hopes on the latter, for now rejoicing at the immediate blessings of seeing the Assad regime go, prisoners released and opportunities for returning home opened.
Now into “phase 2”, mixed messages are released from Washington – and Mar-A-Lago, reflecting both the demanding and confusing transition situation in the US, with Donald Trump and JD Vance signaling “non-interference” messages – for the time being -, whereas the outgoing Biden administration now has an added diplomatic challenge to deal with, on top of frantic efforts to finally see through a long-needed ceasefire arrangement in Gaza and to continue to build on the shaky ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah (and, by extension, others) in Lebanon. The dilemma over Syria for the Biden team is, among other things, that it (with others) has designated the leading HTS as a terror organization and that it has declared a USD 10 million bounty on the leaders (al-Jolany) head, while now needing pragmatically to deal with the new political realities, for influence and leverage. Before the baton is handed over.
But over and above the over-arching concerns with peace and stability (and promotion of US interests) in the wider region, the new Syria included, the outgoing Biden administration – anxious to prevent wherever possible rouge actors from exploiting the current transition uncertainly, and power vacuum – is faced with immediate diplomatic challenges from its main allies in the region, Turkey and Israel, said in the international “commentariat” to be the main net beneficiaries of the events of the last few weeks.
In the case of Israel, whose political leader, Netanyahu, is now under corruption trial and hence presumably in enhanced political need of external drama, recent days have witnessed an astonishing kind and degree of military forwardleaningness; the IDF has deemed fit to carry out a comprehensive air and naval bombardment campaign targeting military assets, including suspected chemical weapons storages and the Syrian navy, and army penetration beyond the Golan Hights buffer zone, justifying the action as a legitimate means to prevent these assets to “falling into the wrong hands”, whatever the “wrong hands” mean in the current fluid situation. For the Biden team, with its internationally controversial support of Israel, in Gaza and in Lebanon, this should represent a delicate dilemma: how could this added Israeli show of force conceivably complicate sensitive talks with the new rulers in Syria, and current thoughts on whether to remove the terrorist designation? How might it worsen prospects of survival of the fragile Lebanon ceasefire? How could this impact on the Biden legacy, and perhaps force the hands of the Trump successor? Another “known unknown”.
And then there is Turkey, and the Turkey-sponsored SNA forces seizing the opportunity to attack their Kurdish SDF foes in the north, on both sides of the Euphrates, with places like Tel Rifaat, Manbij and Kobane reminding the world of their symbolic role in the decade of conflict in this contested part of Syria’s north and north-west. Now that Anthony Blinken is again, for the 13th time since October 7, 2023, is commissioned to travel to the region, an important point on his agenda is meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan, with a view to seeking to persuade the Turks to abstain (at least for the time being) from further aggression against Kurdish SDF, and to explaining to his counterpart why the Biden administration has, for now, decided to stay put in Syria’s north-west with its 900 troops. Hoping, presumably, that in a new, peaceful and inclusive Syria under a reformed HTS leadership there can be breathing space for any and all minorities, and no breathing space at all for extremists like ISIS. If notorious disagreements between the US and Turkey on this, as regards the drastically new context, is of course and open, and difficult question.
Phase 2 will, in any case, be greatly interesting to observe.
