Introduction

Traditionally, military procurement can be said to take time. A long time. But, in the modern world, technology changes at a rapid pace. One could argue that part of the army’s need to change is the need to rapidly acquire new equipment. Perhaps a new procurement model is needed? A way to procure rapidly? But the slow method that is often used to procure equipment is as it is for reasons. It helps to ensure, although one could argue imperfectly, that the new kit works when it is needed to work. It could be argued that a rapid procurement system runs the risk of making more mistakes. Then we have a dilemma; if we procure fast we make more mistakes but if we don’t procure fast we can be out of date. Can we procure fast and minimise mistakes?

I would argue that we can procure fast and minimise mistakes if we have a clear idea of the overall goal. But goals can have problems. I will start this article with a short look at goals and their problems. Then I will give some examples of one such problem; the shifting goal problem. Finally I will look at the shifting goal problem in the context of procurement.

The Goal

If you want to achieve something, set a goal. If the goal is achievable and you have people with the right skills then the goal will be achieved. Goals are a very powerful way to make things happen. But they can be a double edge sword. Set the wrong goal and that will be achieved too. Sometimes goals will be achieved but not in the way envisioned. That can be advantageous. Creative problem solving might lead to a better solution than was first envisioned. But sometimes it can be disadvantageous, especially if the goal has shifted away from what was intended.

Shifting Goals

One Potato, Two Potato, Three Potato, Four …

“Spokesmen announced allied forces killed a record 2,675 communist troops last week while 573 of their own men perished” – The Michigan Daily, 1967-03-24.

We want to win a war? How do we do that? Kill large numbers of the enemy soldiers? During the US’ Vietnam War, the US army implemented a body counting policy. General Westmoreland believed that if the Viet Min and Viet Cong sustained high levels of casualties, they would be forced to stop. Soldiers would count the number of dead after an engagement and these numbers were reported upwards. A number of metrics were used by the US army but success on the battlefield was often determined in terms of the number of the enemy that was killed.

However, the body count policy had problems. The numbers were considered to be inflated. Dead civilians were counted among enemy casualties, some estimates put it as one third of the casualties counted were civilians. Numbers were made up as junior officers were under pressure to increase statistics.

The body count in Vietnam is an example of shifting the goal. Originally the goal was to win the war. This was then shifted to killing large numbers of the enemy. This goal was then shifted to generating statistics. The goal of generating the statistics was then reached, by fair means or foul. But did the generating of statistics for the body count actually contribute to the overall goal of winning the war?

Say “Hello” to the “Hello Nurse”

In the 1990s, the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK came under increasing strain due to a rising elderly population, internal structural problems, and poor funding. There was also increased expectations from the public. Complaints were made regarding waiting times, for example.

The Conservative government at the time decided to deal with the problems by introducing an internal market. Health care providers such as hospitals would compete with each other and managers should be assessed based on various statistics. This led to a number of problems and cosmetic solutions. For example, to reduce waiting times (which was one of the statistics), hospitals would focus on quick to cure patients (and even allocation of resources to projects that would give a quick result), discharge patients earlier, as well as just plain old fabricating waiting times. And in amongst all this came the “hello nurse”. The hello nurse helped patients with their anxiety when arriving at hospital but they also reduced the time it would take to see a medically qualified person (but did that really solve the waiting time problem?).

This is another example of shifting the goal. The goal shifts from solving problems, such as waiting times, due to staff shortages to achieving the goal of improving statistics. This led to a number of creative solutions such as the hello nurse but also to reclassifying trolleys as beds and corridors as wards. It also led to increased inefficiencies as competition led to fragmentation with little coordination between health providers. The short term was prioritised over any long term investment. Nurses suffered more from burn out. Just to name a few of the problems. However, the underlying problems with the NHS were not effectively addressed.

A Game of Numbers

If we go back to a military context we could find another example of shifting the goal in the US Army’s NCO promotion point system. How do we promote the right people? We could measure certain qualities and award points. The one with the highest points gets promoted. You can get points for training, awards, and courses. But does getting points mean you are a good NCO? Not according to the Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Weimer.

“The No. 1 thing we should be basing off whether or not you’re ready to be promoted is how good you are at your current job,” … “Call me crazy, but that’s not where we’re at right now.”

The way the US Army promotes it’s NCO became a numbers game. People learnt to play the game but playing the game didn’t translate into producing NCOs who could do the job. The goal has shifted from producing good NCOs to producing people who can get the points.

The Shifting Goal Problem and Procurement

What the fashionable Soldier wears

Camouflage has the goal of concealment. Whether it is concealing a soldier or a vehicle on the battlefield.  What works and doesn’t work is dictated by the environment. Ignore that reality and you put the lives of the soldiers at risk. Yet, one could argue that that is what the US army did. In 2005, the US army introduced the new Army Combat Uniform in the new Universal Camouflage Pattern (UCP). The pattern failed to achieve the camouflage effect that was needed.

The goal shifted from providing camouflage necessary for combat to providing an “identity” for the Army. It could be argued that the focus on providing an identity emerged because of the post-Cold War environment and the release of the US Marine Corps digital Marine Pattern (Marpat). This led the Army to search for its own identity in competition with the US Marines. Battlefield focus was lost and fashion became the way forward. It took external forces in the form of Congress to resolve the situation.

A Uniform Uniform

“No combat ready unit has ever passed inspection. No inspection ready unit has ever passed combat.” – Murphy’s Laws of Combat.

A military uniform is uniform, it says so, right there in the definition. But in what way uniform? Normally it is taken as in appearance (although that is strictly not true). But what about uniform in function? Then we can have a variation in appearance with a number of uniforms but they all have the same function. This might not be relevant to a parade uniform but what about a combat uniform?

A combat uniform needs to meet a number of specifications due to the type of environment it is to be used in. There are safety requirements, such as fire resistance, and the need to all use the same camouflage pattern for a given nation. But beyond the camouflage pattern, do all combat uniforms need to have the same appearance? If you want a combat uniform, should the goal be to produce a uniform that works in combat?

Norway, Sweden, and Finland have recently bought a common uniform system, the Nordic Combat Uniform, but in different camouflage patterns. But I wonder, is this another case of shifting the goal? Should the goal be to produce a common uniform from a single source? Or should the goal be to produce something that works in a combat environment? For the second goal, a number of specifications could be set to define the environment. Then, if a manufacturer can show that their uniform system meets these specifications, then each country could purchase whatever uniform in what ever pattern they wish. You would have multiple suppliers. And perhaps a more cost effective procurement process?

Don’t Lose Your Head

Another example of where goals shifted from what is needed in combat to other considerations is the new purchase of the Special Operations Force (SOF) helmet Caiman Ballistic Helmet as a combat helmet. The previous helmet purchased by Försvarsmakten, the 3M Combat II Ballistic Helmet L110 (Hjälm 18A) was purchased for limited use. The 3M combat helmet is a combat helmet and offers reasonably good protecting from splinters as opposed to the Caiman SOF helmet (which was not intended as a combat helmet), which, as a high cut helmet, does not (does that bring up some interesting legal questions from a health and safety point of view?). So, it looks like the goal shifted from providing protection in combat to providing something cheap and comfortable.

Discussion

“Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.” – General George S. Patton

Goals maybe a powerful way to achieve a desired outcome but they can also be a powerful way to get things wrong. For goals to work, I would argue, there needs to be an overall vision that defines why we are doing what we are doing. If the US soldiers in Vietnam understood the overall vision then would they have seen that faking body count statistics would not contribute to the overall goal and should be avoided? If managers at the NHS understood the whole idea of reducing waiting times was to get treatment to patients quickly, would the hello nurse been seen as a good idea? If we define the environment for a combat uniform to function in, do we need to run a competition and award a contract to a limited set of suppliers? If we focused on the goal, maybe a manufacturer would come out with a novel solution that wasn’t thought of to start with?

Another way of looking at this is from a mission command perspective. A goal to be achieved is set and sub-commanders go about achieving it. But they do so within the frame work of the commander’s intent. Could we not take that approach with procurement? State the commander’s intent and then let the manufacturers produce solutions. So long as each solution meets a given set of requirements, then the armed forces can order x amount of whatever from whatever supplier they wish. Contracts wouldn’t be awarded to one supplier.

The author is an engineer with a background in Artificial Intelligence, mobile robotics, and communications. He also has a military background having served in the I19 Regiment.

References

https://www.tocinstitute.org/the-goal-summary.html

https://eu.starnewsonline.com/story/opinion/2017/11/12/back-then-vietnam-casualty-counts-reported-daily-in-1967/17073437007/

https://mikefrost.net/body-count-syndrome-vietnam-war-church-growth-movement-failed/index.html

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4222149/

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https://www.armypubs.org/adp-6-0-mission-command-command-and-control-of-army-forces/

https://www.ausa.org/news/sma-drives-initiative-refine-enlisted-promotions

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https://www.forcesnews.com/services/raf/vegan-boots-or-womens-dresses-i-dont-care-what-military-wear-long-they-get-job-done