Drones and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) have, since “the First Drone Age”[1], become intertwined. In some instances, ISR is used as a synonym for remotely piloted aerial systems using an electro-optical payload, and the military-industrial complex is keen on using ISR as a selling point, a buzzword when introducing new products or capabilities. Yet, what seems to be overlooked is that no platform today, at least not known when this piece was written, can produce intelligence as defined by NATO.[2] There is no processing and analysis of the collected information.
Instead, the systems used on today’s battlefield provide near-real-time information[3], usually transmitted in full-motion video depicting a, based on the payload field of view, demarcated piece of the battlefield. Thus, only presenting a sequence of events transpiring at that specific time and space. Such a visual representation cannot give us full context on why something is happening or what may happen in the future. The viewer cannot by the video feed itself determine if an attack is a diversion or a full-scale assault by an armoured division. Remembering this is critical when receiving an image or video from an unmanned platform (regardless of domain). If we truly want the ISR capability within our brigades and task forces, we need to restructure our units and adapt our methods of handling information accordingly.
An image is electromagnetic data absorbed through a sensor payload, which usually entails an image-forming sensor. To understand the visual representation we need context, a level of knowledge about what we are viewing. Up until given that context, often through interpretation by an analyst, it must be handled with care and interpreted with caution. This means, from a Swedish perspective, that units from the company level and below will gain information from their sensor platforms but not intelligence. Units on this level may not have full situational awareness nor an understanding of what may happen next due to being unable to interpret the information relayed from the platform.
Meanwhile battalion, brigade and above may be able to churn the information into actionable intelligence with some detail due to having more resources available. As such, there is a risk of misunderstanding when saying that a unit has “ISR-capable” drones when they in reality possess a flying video camera and no processing capability. Until such time the unmanned platforms themselves process the collected information and disseminate a product with some form of assessment, what we do have is a surveillance and reconnaissance platform.
Now, it should be said that this is not necessarily to be viewed as a major obstacle. Information in its simplistic form has its place and is, as pointed out by Friedman, important for precision-strike weaponry and the reconnaissance-strike regime where context may not be required to accomplish the task.[4] Nor is it particularly unique to unmanned platforms being a provider of information to staff. When supported by communication intelligence (COMINT) on the tactical level we understand that the COMINT asset gives us information about an emitter. Nevertheless, COMINT tends to be viewed as incomprehensible “blips and blops”[5] for the untrained. We are, at least subconsciously, aware that we may need help interpreting the collected information to determine what type of emitter it is and how it may affect us.
We as a collective have accepted that we need at least a electronic warfare liaison officer who translates that information for us and puts that information into context to be added to our situational awareness. We also trust the report from a reconnaissance patrol in the field as a trustworthy representation of how they view and interpret their surroundings. We can’t have a commander or staff member out in the field with the recon element to verify the information provided or directly dictate in what direction the unit should look at that specific moment. There must exist a level of trust in how the task is completed and what information is yielded in return.
However, when seeing an image or video we automatically assume that we are perfectly capable of understanding what we are seeing and that what our eyes tell us is facts, an unquestionable view of reality. A commander may request to view the imagery to verify it by himself- or herself that the report is correct. Not only can our eyes be deceived by decoys or camouflage, but our emotional state and biases will also affect what we think that we see. We have seen it happen with both helicopter and drone engagement videos from previous conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.[6] The pilot or payload operator thinks that they observe a weapon, engaging what they have identified as an enemy. Later when the video is reviewed no weapon can be observed.[7] It has also been demonstrated in the famous “gorilla test” where humans selective attention filters out visual information.[8] You tend to see what you want to see which can turn deadly in an instant if it is not kept in check.
So how does this affect the commander? First, we must understand that a drone does not equal ISR capability. That unit has an asset that can, during a specific length of time and within a clearly defined space, observe and document what the specific payload can detect and relay that information to us in near-real time. There will be technical limitations that undoubtedly will affect the level of detail provided. This is a universal truth for all types of collection assets. However, what also affects the quality is the people in control of the platform. If we, in the short term, want actual ISR capability on lower levels, we need to expand the organisation by adding a single source intelligence cell or attaching specialists to the existing intelligence or command section. This should not be interpreted as a call for bigger staff on every echelon. Nonetheless, the staff composition must reflect how the battle is fought today and might be fought tomorrow. Unmanned systems need adequate command and control while relaying information from the battlespace to the commander. In the long term, the knowledge has to be available to commanders and staff officers across all echelons.
Secondly, we need to understand that the image is a piece of unprocessed information, a snapshot and that it may even be counterproductive for a commander to look at an image or video feed in the hope of gaining some special insight instead of receiving the information verbally or in writing from a specialist. What we think we see may contradict what we are being told by an operator or imagery analyst which might not only affect the trust between sensor and commander but also hamper the operational tempo. Imagery should be treated in the same way as COMINT or the report from a reconnaissance patrol in the field. Trusting the LNO or the soldier on the ground is vital.[9]
Thirdly, increasing the number of unmanned systems throughout the organisation means that we also need to develop methods to prevent misunderstandings with the provided information. This should include training our unmanned operators, intelligence specialists, and battle captains to interpret imagery more efficiently and provide accurate information.[10] We already know this thanks to our previous engagements in Afghanistan and Mali where unmanned aerial systems have been used to collect information and support ongoing operations. We have learned that these systems need trained personnel on several levels to operate and be used correctly. It is no different from training staff in how an armoured or an artillery unit conducts operations.
Lastly, to not only be able to use the information collected directly but also convert it into intelligence, we need to prepare to handle the amount of data these assets will generate. Imagery and video tend to demand large volumes of storage. Add other sensor data like synthetic radar or geographical data to the equation and we are most likely looking at terabytes of data that need storage after a couple of weeks of running operations.[11] Although a flight may be uneventful with no observations, in itself that flight is a data point that potentially will add to a future assessment. It is by no means an easy challenge to solve how to store, assess and push/pull gigabytes of data daily. Something that today is enabled by buying a cloud service from Amazon or Google[12], by using third-party applications to distribute data[13] or by developing your own cloud service.[14] Although unorthodox, the path forward for all branches (and not only special operations) seems to be carried on clouds to handle large amounts of data and utilise computer power to keep the kill webs agile and robust.[15]
To conclude; when talking about ISR drones the intelligence portion is often overshadowed by the reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, or purely forgotten. To fully utilise the potential that unmanned systems bring a structural and educational change is needed within the units utilising these assets. We also need to educate and train the personnel accordingly, not limiting it to a few specialists but keeping as many as possible in the know-how on all levels. To prevent commanders and staff from drowning in terabytes of information, we need to adapt what modern technology offers in terms of cloud computing and machine-assisted processing and analysis. This is the way.
