Artikel publicerad av Björn Körlof i Open Access här
Engelsk sammanfattning:
This article focuses on a few different aspects of the Swedish concept of total defence and its possible implications following Sweden’s membership in NATO in February 2024. However, the article mainly deals with questions pertaining to the civilian part of the total defence that arise after Sweden joined the alliance. The first aspect analysed is that the Swedish concept of total defence, for a long time, was closely linked to the Swedish security policy posture of non-alignment with the intention to stay neutral in case of war between the big powers in Europe. This posture necessitated a very high degree of self-reliance, both regarding military means and civilian perseverance as well as an organization of the total defence that could – in case of an armed attack – lead coordinated military and civilian efforts to defend the country, also in different parts of Sweden at the same time. After these introductory descriptions, the article focuses on some of the most essential requirements for the civilian part of total defence that arise from NATO’s Seven Baseline Requirements for its member states. Therefore, the article deals with the importance of secure leadership and command in peacetime and wartime of the different organizational levels of public administration and the needs within the area of civilian protection. The article also remarks on the need to analyse closely the important logistics questions that arise from NATO’s host nation support policies and their applications to Swedish transport facilities and other support functions, which must be considered in a comprehensive Nordic view. At the end of the article the author offers some very short remarks on the question of protection against nuclear weapons and the upcoming discussion in Sweden on nuclear weapons on Swedish soil. Since questions of nuclear deterrence are considered in a special part of the SV-A-R-project the risk of warfare with the use of nuclear weapons is therefore here only shortly analysed with the view on how to protect the population and essential functions in the society in case of attacks with such weapons in Sweden.
