It has been called “morbid”[1] and “macabre”[2]. The point scheme that Ukraine utilises to maximise the overall effectiveness of its drone forces. However, the gamification of the war in Ukraine is less about war mixing with gaming mechanics than social engineering during warfare becoming more prominent. Ukraine has tapped into the human psyche, showcasing an innovative approach to modern warfare. We are essentially seeing a deadly version of Pokémon Go! or the classic military competitions that armed forces worldwide have organised for decades.

By giving drone operators points, the Ukrainian armed forces directly validate that particular soldier’s performance. Moreover, the unit gets noticed, just like units showcased during competitions like the U.S Army’s “International Sniper Competition.”[3] I would argue that the Ukrainian point system is no more “morbid” or “macabre” than those competitions. We have known for quite some time that humans can be influenced to make certain choices by “gamifying” everything from becoming more physically active, learning a new language or lowering their power consumption. In the Swedish armed forces, we have seen some historical attempts to “gamify” certain activities like marksmanship by handing out medals (and small amounts of money) to conscripts who are efficient marksmen and thus did not have to consume as much ammunition as their peers to pass weapons training.

But the point system is not only a clever way to trigger the operator or unit to become more effective in killing Russian soldiers. It also incentivises the units to document their actions and thus provides the Ukrainian armed forces with current battlefield intelligence and imagery used in information warfare, as well as valuable data for logistics planning. As stated by other commentators[4], by giving the soldier a platform to trade points for drones (or other equipment) [5], Ukraine is tackling a logistical problem as old as time: getting the correct type of equipment and ammunition at the right time and place. Units with a high spending on drones and a high efficiency can ensure they receive the kind of drones they need to continue maintaining pressure on Russian troops. They can also adapt to the changing environment or changing needs. Since 2022, both Ukrainian and Russian forces have relied on donations, not just monetary but also things like medical equipment and drone parts. However, that need still exists and likely will continue to exist during the remainder of the war; the Ukrainian solution with a market connected directly to the industry has the potential to shorten the time between an identified need for specific equipment and the delivery of that product to the unit.

But shouldn’t soldiers always be motivated to do their best at all times? Well, they’re likely encouraged to perform their duty to the best of their ability every day to stay alive. However, that does not rule out the need to influence units and soldiers in choosing targets or remind them to actively push information up the chain of command. After an operation, it is natural to want to move on to the next task, sometimes forgetting to debrief past events or being unable to pass on detailed information due to a high operational tempo. Utilising soft power, such as points for equipment, lowers the acceptance threshold that otherwise may hinder the execution of command decisions at the lower levels. It may even give units a sense of agency and control over their situation. As such, military organisations during war are no different from those during peacetime.

So why should we care about the Ukrainian point system and their market? As I have pointed out in this article, it is not the point system we should pay attention to. We need to dissect further social engineering utilisation and innovative technologies, as well as how the alliance may apply those. While everyone is looking to the defence industries to produce next-generation weaponry and AI-enhanced C5ISR systems, we seem to forget the humans who are supposed to use those systems. “Humans are more important than hardware”[6] is a well-known “SOF truth”. It does not, however, only apply to the special operations community. With the proliferation of uncrewed systems throughout all forces, we must not forget that humans are still required to manoeuvre the drone. And as long as there is a human in the loop, there is a need to take social engineering into account. That is why we should care what the Ukrainians do with their point system.

The author is a master sergeant in the Swedish armed forces.

Notes

[1] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DJMz85JxWZy/
[2] https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraines-army-have-video-game-like-digital-weapons-store-deadly-realistic/
[3] https://www.benning.army.mil/Sniper-Competition/index.html?_=2098
[4] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DJMz85JxWZy/
[5] https://market.brave1.gov.ua/
[6] https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths