1. Introduction
The Swedish army, like many others, finds itself at a critical juncture, necessitating a transformation to effectively handle the complexities of tomorrow’s warfare. The traditional logic, processes, and systems for capability development upon which the army has relied, are increasingly inadequate in meeting future threats. This shift necessitates a re-evaluation of the army’s strategies, capabilities, and overall readiness.
Three main factors drive the need for this transformation. The first is the Russian aggression, which dramatically has changed the security landscape in Europe. Russia’s strategic posturing and acts pose a clear and present threat to regional and global stability and therefore requires a reconfiguration of Western defense strategies. Due to that, the Swedish army must adapt to counter this renewed threat by effectively integrating modern capabilities that can address both conventional and unconventional challenges posed by Russia’s actions. Besides the qualitative aspects, the Swedish Army must also grow in numbers to meet and sustain a potential conflict in the Baltic Region.
The second factor is Sweden’s recent accession to NATO, which marks a fundamental shift in comparison to the state’s past defense strategy based on non-alignment in peacetime striving for neutrality in war. The NATO membership demands alignment with the alliance’s collective defense principles as well as the operational standards. This alignment requires the Swedish army to enhance its interoperability with NATO forces and consequently adjust to standardized tactics, organizations, and procedures. A transformation that includes the adoption of NATO doctrines, interoperability standards, and operational practices to ensure effective collaboration with allied forces. This transformation requires significant changes in the mindset of how Sweden regards the employment and use of its armed forces in general and the army specifically.
The third factor is the rapid pace of technological advancement. Innovations in cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, precision-guided munitions, and other emerging technologies are reshaping military operations and tactics. To maintain a competitive edge, the army must continually adapt to these technological changes, integrating new technologies into its capabilities to enhance effectiveness and respond to evolving threats. The Army’s current structure, heavily influenced by Cold War-era systems, is ill-suited to address these challenges. It is built on national doctrines and legacy technologies, limiting our ability to effectively respond to the diverse threats of tomorrow’s warfare.
This article approaches these three challenges by discussing how the Swedish army must adopt a new doctrine, integrate new technologies, and restructure our force composition to remain effective in a new security environment.
2. A new doctrine
The evolving context for the Swedish army requires a broad overhaul regarding doctrines, handbooks, manuals, etc. This becomes particularly clear in the preparation to align to Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). MDO represents a shift from past doctrines, by not only underscoring the integration and synchronization of operations between the land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains but to emphasize the importance of enhancing effects through convergence. This shift reflects the complexities of modern conflicts, where threats and opportunities stretch multiple domains simultaneously, requiring a coordinated and rapid response. All domains are interdependent, with actions in one potentially affecting outcomes in others. MDO strives to orchestrate this interdependence by synchronizing all actions across all domains, with emphasis on speed, and agility, to achieve tactical and operational advantages. Consequently, the adoption of MDO has significant implications for the Swedish army that extend across several areas and requires a fundamental shift in the army’s current doctrinal and tactical approaches. Sweden must move from a perspective of the army fighting as a single service with joint support, to understand its role as the land component serving a joint and multinational forces command.
On a tactical level, the Swedish army must therefore develop its understanding of the synergies generated by MDO. This involves using cyber capabilities in lower echelons to engage an adversary’s surveillance and communication networks to degrade his situational awareness capability. Similarly, space sensors could provide intelligence and targeting data enabling the army to execute deep strikes and maneuvers to maintain momentum. This highlights how MDO requires not only cutting-edge technologies but also a doctrinal shift that supports and inspires cross-domain synergies aiming to converge joint effects. For the army, this means developing new tactical frameworks that enable the integration of these capabilities, creating a force multiplier that can target and engage an enemy in multiple domains simultaneously. The Swedish army’s adoption of this is to reinforce the current application of combined arms with new technology and new perspectives on joint effects to create and exploit relative advantages in support of the joint commander.
The integrated strategies described in MDO, require a deep understanding of how different domains interact and how to coordinate actions across them to achieve desired effects. As a result, MDO will have a significant impact on training within the army. Consequently, all personnel must be trained to think and operate in an MDO environment, and tailored training programs for officers and senior leaders must stress tactical thinking and decision-making in a combined joint multi-domain context. MDO also requires a transformation from domain-specific exercises to joint all-domain exercises, focusing on cross-domain coordination and effects.
Embracing MDO will compel a rethinking of the army’s structure and command systems. Traditional hierarchies with stove-piped command chains, designed for single-domain operations, must evolve structures with the capacity to coordinate operations across multiple domains simultaneously and interoperable with allies in a NATO context.
Consequently, our capability development must have a backbone of interoperability, both within the Swedish structure and with allies. MDO is by nature joint and coalition-centric, which means that Sweden must not only develop its own MDO capabilities but also ensure that these capabilities can be seamlessly integrated with allies. This will involve aligning to technical standards and protocols for communication and data sharing[1] as well as participating in joint exercises and training programs with NATO allies. The biggest challenge and need for change, however, is the necessity of a cognitive shift to understand the new operational environment.
Simultaneously, at low tactical level, we must continue to operate according to the fundamental principles of combat – fire, movement, and protection – however supported by new capabilities. This will enable us to create multi-domain operations on a smaller scale, utilizing advanced sensors and weapon systems. Key elements will include electronic warfare (EW), drones, loitering munitions, and space capabilities, allowing us to effectively engage adversaries across various domains while maintaining tactical flexibility.
3. New technology
The integration of new technologies, supporting MDO capabilities, must be approached with careful planning. The complexity of MDO necessitates not only the adoption of cutting-edge technologies but also the seamless integration of these innovations with existing legacy systems. This process requires a multifaceted approach and includes methods such as prototype warfare, System of Systems (SoS) integration, and innovation development.
Prototype warfare represents a dynamic approach to integrating new technologies into military structures. It emphasizes experimentation, testing, and iteration of new systems in real-world environments. This method allows us to assess the effectiveness of emerging technologies in operational settings, providing immediate feedback that can be used to refine and improve these systems before acquisition and deployment. For the Swedish Army, adopting prototype warfare means establishing a framework for continuous experimentation with new technologies. This must involve deploying prototypes in training exercises where their performance can be evaluated without risking a mission’s success in a real-world scenario. By integrating prototype systems in controlled environments, potential issues can be identified to ensure necessary adjustments. This approach emphasizes collaboration with academia, research agencies, and industry partners, improving the rapid development and fielding of new technologies. Prototype warfare also allows for a more flexible and adaptive approach to military modernization. Rather than committing to a single technological solution, we can explore multiple options, iterating and refining them in response to real-time feedback. This not only accelerates the integration of new technologies but also ensures that these innovations are truly operationally relevant and effective.
The System of Systems (SoS) approach is essential for ensuring that new technologies are effectively integrated with legacy military systems. Rather than viewing each new technology in isolation, SoS addresses the importance of seamless interaction between various systems.
For the Swedish Army, SoS integration involves using common processes, and technical protocols to ensure that new technologies can work seamlessly with existing legacy systems and processes. By adopting an SoS approach, an operational environment can be created where new technologies enhance overall capabilities rather than creating silos of functionality. As new technologies such as AI-driven decision support systems and autonomous platforms are introduced, it is crucial that these systems can communicate and operate in harmonization with existing command structures. SoS integration supports the broader concept of MDO, where the ability to operate seamlessly across the domains is critical. The SoS approach ensures that technologies designed for one domain can interact and complement systems in other domains.
Innovation development in the army refers to the need to go beyond the traditional focus on incremental material improvements – such as thicker armor or longer barrels – and embrace a broader, more holistic approach to advancement. One of the risks of focusing exclusively on technical systems or technological advancements is the risk of creating an innovation theater, where new technological solutions are introduced without following tactical and operational advantages. For example, the introduction of autonomous systems or AI-driven platforms must harmonize with new tactics that exploit these capabilities fully, rather than just attach them to existing structures. Consequently, it is important to not only introduce new technologies but also the integration of these technologies with the development of tactics, doctrine, and organizational structures. It is within this framework that true innovation occurs, providing a relative advantage over adversaries. To implement this approach to innovation, the army must enhance the capacity for innovative action at all levels, from the highest command down to the individual soldier, and in parallel foster an environment of continuous experimentation and adaptation.
The successful integration of new technologies also requires an approach to transformation, balancing the concepts of transformation in contact and transformation out of contact. Transformation in contact refers to the process of integrating new technologies and adjusting while engaged in combat operations. This approach enables us to adapt quickly to emerging threats and operational demands. However, there are also risks when fast implementation of untested technologies can lead to operational disruptions. Transformation out of contact involves adjusting the army in preparation for future conflicts. This approach allows for the integration of new technologies with thorough testing and refinement of systems before they are deployed in a combat environment. It also provides the time needed to train personnel and to ensure that new systems are integrated. Understanding and balancing these two approaches is important for the successful integration of new technologies. To summarize, true innovation is not just about keeping pace with technological advancements but about integrating these into the broader context of military operations such as tactics.
4. New force structure
The new security environment discussed in section 1, and the need for a new doctrine and to integrate new technology into our warfighting units, as discussed in sections 2 and 3, underscores the need to transform the army’s force structure to remain relevant. The new force structure must not only be capable of meeting immediate operational demands and fighting tonight, but also be adaptable and continuously evolving to integrate new technologies, tactics, and personnel strategies. The key components of this transformation focus on ensuring that the Army’s warfighting units are ready for immediate deployment, addressing material and personnel challenges, and ensuring full interoperability with NATO standards.
For the Swedish army, the most important aspect of the new force structure is to make sure that the warfighting units are prepared for immediate deployment and combat operations. As Sweden integrates more deeply into NATO defense planning, the army must ensure that the force structure is interoperable with NATO allies. Interoperability extends beyond mere technological compatibility; it also involves shared doctrines, training standards, and tactical procedures that enable seamless cooperation in combined joint operations. Therefore, the Swedish army must align with NATO joint functions[2], not only by adopting standard technology but also by restructuring the command chain to fit into NATO’s integrated command structure. This ensures that our warfighting units can operate effectively as part of multinational NATO task forces. Interoperability together with a robust fight tonight capability will be the main driver of how to structure the units, organize our personnel, and allocate resources. Achieving this level of readiness requires a fundamental shift in how to approach personnel and material in the warfighting units. It is no longer enough to rely on accepted methods, with a prioritization on long-term development over the need for immediate readiness. As an alternative, a more agile approach must be adopted, where the army’s warfighting units are continuously assessed and resourced based on their ability to deploy and execute combat operations. This includes ensuring that all units are equipped with the necessary weapons, equipment, and supplies to conduct sustained operations in any environment.
The ability, to be prepared for immediate deployment and combat operations, extends beyond material readiness. It also includes our ability to mobilize the warfighting unit, and this requires a re-evaluation of our logistical and transportation capabilities. In parallel, existing equipment must be upgraded to ensure that it remains operationally relevant.
This transformation of the force structure also requires a broad rethinking of our personnel as well as our training and readiness. The Swedish army must therefore adopt a more flexible approach to personnel management and use both professional soldiers and reservists in a more integrated and consistent way. This includes consolidating the roles and responsibilities of professional contracted soldiers and reservists, where professional soldiers must continue to form the backbone of the army, providing the experience and preserving the craftsmanship needed to execute complex tactical operations. However, the role of reservists must expand to include robust and intense training and exercises, alongside a higher level of readiness, to ensure that these units are prepared to advance and engage an opponent on short notice. Reservists and reserve units must be considered as crucial components of our overall capability. This urges us to provide reservists with the same level of training, equipment, and support as their professional counterparts.
Sweden is a small country with a limited population, and as such, we have historically relied on conscription as a method to build our wartime units. For us, it remains the only feasible way to muster a large army. However, building wartime units with conscripts requires highly focused training and exercises. In this regard, we are now in the process of reinstating the principles from the Cold War era, which enabled us to field a relatively large army efficiently and effectively.
The new context, as described earlier, also highlights the need to constantly evolve (continuous transformation) our warfighting units to meet new challenges and integrate new technologies. This means that our units will never be finished but are instead in a process where new technologies and tactics are tested, refined, and integrated into the force structure. However, this approach must be backed up by a culture of experimentation and curiosity, where all parts and levels of the army are engaged to embrace change and innovation. Additionally, this transformation must also strive to make our units and warfighting functions interoperable with NATO standards. This is a shift of focus from technology-driven solutions to a system-based approach where personnel, organizations, and methods are integrated.
As perceived in Ukraine, the current and future battlefield will be more transparent than before, presenting a major challenge to our ability to act undetected. The ability to operate undetected, or unidentified, highlights a need to change the structure of the units. The development of highly mobile, flexible, and resilient warfighting units that can operate effectively under a constant threat of detection must be a top priority. This includes lighter, and more deployable command posts, and decentralized logistics procedures that reduce the reliance on large, vulnerable supply depots. Additionally, the army will explore methods of deception and camouflage, using both physical and digital means. In parallel, our training programs must evolve to prepare soldiers for operating in this transparent environment, underscoring the importance of speed, adaptability, and the effective use of cover and concealment.
Advances in surveillance and reconnaissance technologies result in that it will be increasingly difficult for any unit, regardless of type, to hide from an enemy force. This is especially challenging e.g., command post and logistics units, which are traditionally less mobile and more exposed to detection due to emission.
To address this challenge, we must prioritize mobility, flexibility, and survivability. Command posts, for example, must become smaller and more mobile to avoid detection and targeting. If hiding is impossible, these units must be designed to be difficult to identify and engage, using deception and camouflage to reduce vulnerability. The same principles apply to logistics units, which must be more independent and flexible. This might involve decentralizing the logistics function, allowing smaller units to operate autonomously and resupply forces without relying on large, centralized depots that are vulnerable to enemy actions.
5. Discussion
The Swedish army has recently begun its adaptation to a new operational context based on a new security landscape and a changing operational environment. This change emerges from the driving forces of new and potentially disrupting, technologies, a Swedish abandonment of non-alignment through the accession to NATO, and a current and immediate threat from a once again aggressive Russia. Any of these driving factors would stress the need for a change in the Swedish army. But together they require a swift and thorough response posing a challenge to the norms of the organization. These challenges should, however, not be perceived as obstacles to overcome, but as opportunities to define what it means to be a modern army within an alliance. Therefore, this change is not only about the organization and the tactics but rather a cognitive shift in how the army conceives and develops its capabilities, but maybe even more about how it sees itself.
One of the most obvious understandings derived from this analysis is the need for increased readiness. The new operational context for Sweden, calls for a rethinking of how to prepare the army, and how to define the ability to execute combat operations. The existing army culture is rooted around a steady, deliberate buildup of army units based on a fixed training cycle. The army of today must therefore embrace a culture of force protection based on agility, flexibility, and a persistent focus on immediate readiness. Readiness is founded and drives its forces from the mindset and culture within the organization. Due to that, Swedish officers and soldiers must be as adaptable as the technologies used, besides being capable of operating in a context where the lines between all domains are increasingly blurred.
This is where the MDO becomes even more important. MDO is not to be perceived as only a doctrine, but rather as a vision or a cognitive mindset that requires a different way of thinking about how to integrate capabilities across all domains into convergence. The future battlefield will not allow us to operate isolated or as a single service. Survivability, lethality, and success will depend on the army’s capability to apply combined arms to support the joint forces’ ability to coordinate and synchronize effects across domains and between allies.
One other challenge is designing and training our wartime units to make them capable of operating in the sub-arctic environment. Training individual soldiers to function in this environment is one thing, but training an entire brigade or division is an entirely different challenge. It requires a specific design of the units, not only to endure cold weather and snow but also to navigate the lack of infrastructure, such as roads, and contend with rivers and marshlands. These environmental factors demand specialized designed and trained units.
The discussion around innovation brings light to a crucial aspect, namely that innovation is not just about the latest technology. It is about how to integrate these technologies into a broader tactical and operational context. This requires a perspective that new technologies, emergent threats, and changes in the strategic context must be allowed to drive changes in tactics, doctrine, and organizational structures. The goal must be to design, organize, and train warfighting units that are not just technologically advanced, but tactically superior to support strategic and operational objectives.
To accomplish this, the idea of continuous evolution must be embraced. Warfighting units will be in a constant state of transformation, always adapting to new challenges and integrating new technologies and tactics. This continuous transformation requires a culture that embraces change, where experimentation is not just tolerated but encouraged. It is about creating an environment where every soldier is encouraged to innovate, to test new ideas, and to push the boundaries of what is possible.
The transformation of the Swedish army is about redefining our identity for the next century. It will be challenging, but it also presents an opportunity to build an army that is not only ready for combat operations today but also prepared for tomorrow’s war. The future of the army will be defined not only by its readiness and its ability to adapt and innovate but also by the capability to defeat an enemy in an increasingly complex and interconnected battlefield.
Jonny Lindfors is major general and chief of the Swedish army as well as a fellow of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences. Jan Lundberg and Filip Scheynius are both Lieutenant colonels serving at the Swedish army staff.
Notes
[1] According to Federated Mission Networking/Mission Partner Environment – FMN/MPE
[2] Command and control, maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, information, protection, and CIMIC.
