On 16 January 2025, the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences arranged a symposium on NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and Capability Targets (CT) with speakers from the French, German and Swedish Headquarters. The symposium was moderated by Captain (N) Per Edling.
In his opening remarks the chair of section II – naval science – Major General Lars-Olof Corneliusson underlined the rapidly changing security situation and the many new capability requirements the alliance membership brings along for Sweden. Also, some of the Alliance’s methods and processes are different. It is important for the Academy to understand these new work strands if it wants to remain a relevant advisor to the Swedish government and the Swedish armed forces. Arranging this symposium is a way for section II to commit to this idea.
The first speaker was Captain (N) Olle Mobergh from the Swedish Joint Force Command. Mobergh has previously been working for four years in Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, and introduced the NDPP to the audience. The aim of NDPP is to provide a framework within which national and alliance defence planning activities can be harmonized to meet agreed targets and enable allies to provide the pool of NATO required forces and capabilities in the most effective way. It also facilitates the timely identification, development and delivery of the necessary range of forces that are interoperable and adequately prepared, equipped, trained and supported, together with the corresponding military and non-military capabilities to undertake the alliance’s full spectrum of missions.
In general terms, the NDPP is a five-step, four-year process that NATO utilises to influence allies to allocate or develop and deliver, when required, forces with the required capabilities and readiness to ensure that the alliance successfully achieves its Level of Ambition (LoA). The LoA is expressed in NATO Capability Targets (CT) to nations. The CT’s cover both the short-term (0-6 years) and the medium-term (7-19 years). In other words; the aim of NDPP is to ensure that future commanders have the full range of capabilities available to undertake any NATO mission.
The five steps of NDPP comprises of;
- Political Guidance for Defence Planning (PG)
- Determining requirements (ACT and ACO together determines the Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR))
- Apportionment of requirements/set targets among allies
- Facilitation of implementation (supporting allies’ capability development)
- Reviewing results (Defence Planning Capability Survey and Capability Report)
According to Brigadier General Patrice Morand, from the French Joint Force Command, the Defence Planning Capability Review in step 5 allowed NATO to measure the extent of France’s capabilities efforts over the past two years, efforts that have continued in the following months. Indeed, the commitment of 2% of GDP in the Defence budget as a floor has been reached in 2024 and France’s effort will continue to increase (56 billion Euros and up to 3 billion per year in order to reach 70 billion).
France has a full military model to carry out non-NATO missions on her metropolitan and overseas territory and abroad. Regarding the Alliance, the ambition of France is to be a credible and exemplary ally (and also because she is a permanent member of UN Security Council). France is implementing a fair burden of capabilities, both in operational activities and strategic signalling in favour of the Alliance and by the quality of its participation in the NATO Force Model, the Allied Reaction Force, the NATO Security Assistance & Training to Ukraine, the Joint Analysis Training and Education Centre, in host nation support (France is leading the FLF (Forward Land Forces) in Romania and contributes to the Estonian FLF, and of course also the NDPP. Another point for France regarding the Alliance is having the particularity of being in all three Joint Operations Areas.
The CT25 for France are extremely ambitious but will be achieved. Beyond the increase in certain targets, the significant uplift in readiness which requires a notable effort should not be overlooked. France has positioned herself to show commitment to the collective defence of the Alliance. For example, facing the challenge of a significant increase in targets compared to CT21, France displays an acceptance rate of both qualitative and quantitative targets almost identical to that of the previous Joint Coordination Meeting for the CT21. For the success of all the challenges France face, including by exploiting an effects-based approach to reach for CT25, all French actors approach the discussions in a positive and constructive spirit, doubled with a rational and transparent posture with NATO. The other condition of success is the industrial capability to deliver.
Beside CT25 and because of Deep Precision Strike (DPS) is taking an important place in actual conflicts, France decided to initiate the European Long-range Strike Approach in 2024 (with Germany, Italia, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) in order to rationalize European supply and demand in DPS capabilities.
Brigadier General Markus Schetilin briefed the attendees in his role as the responsible division head within the German Federal Ministry of Defence on the German overarching effort on defence planning and the incremental role of the Bundeswehr Capability Profile, describing the national ambition for developing and implementing in particular the NATO capability targets.
The German efforts in national defence investment are increasing, resulting from the Russian war on Ukraine which worked as the catalyst and strategic game changer to fulfil the 2% GDP Defence Investment Pledge. The political commitment and the importance of the mindset of a whole of society and government approach to mirror the challenges arising from the new capability targets and national priorities are instrumental to realize the implementation of the so-called “Zeitenwende”, introduced by the German chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022.
As a full supporter of the NATO Defence Planning Process and due to its geo-strategic role, Germany knows about her prominent part within NATO. Germanay has created Special Defence Fund of 100 billion Euro and described the high volume of already initiated and approved projects in most relevant procurement areas that create, maintain and improve capabilities as a token and concrete example of Germany’s intent to deliver and to face both own expectations and those of her Allies.
Finally, and with a view on the resources and the upcoming General Elections in Germany in February 2025, there is a need to focus on the military core task of collective defence and to set the necessary political conditions for success by the new administration, mentioning the three core pillars: personnel, budget and a whole of society and government approach – including mindset.
Colonel Mikael Beck from the Swedish Defence Staff offered a Swedish perspective on the NDPP. During his discourse Beck stressed the similarities with the defence planning process already in place in Sweden. A starting point is that Sweden will be a trustworthy, reliable and solidary ally with the collective defence as a foundation. With this comes the aim and responsibility to align the national planning process with NDPP.
Foto: Jon Wikingsson
Both national planning process and NDPP aim to man, train and equip supported forces for the full spectrum of missions in NATO. Both processes are informed by threats and influenced by trends and have focus on capabilities rather than platforms and technical systems when it comes to Capability Targets in the midterm perspective.
The Swedish planning process with defence resolutions every five years where NDPP have four years will further be analysed. Maybe perceived as a challenge only because it’s our first NDPP cycle?
The high Level of Ambition (LoA) in step 1 (Political Guidance) is understood and shared by Sweden due to the security situation in Europe and has influenced the short-term perspective in NDPP. There is a gap between our plans and the draft CT25. This gap is identified, but how to address it, when it is possible to fill it and to what cost is still to be analysed. In the end this will be a political decision.
Sweden and Finland were not parts of the full planning process hence the geography, climate and terrain have not influenced the CT25 regarding capability codes and statements. This is why some capabilities in Swedish Armed Forces will be different in codes and statements in the next planning cycle. Sweden also recognises that enablement and Host Nation Support capabilities are not drafted in the CT25 and this has to be managed along the process. There are lots of possibilities for cooperation among allies in the coming months and years to ensure the requirements for operations in NATO core tasks. We share the same challenges and will for sure share the efforts going forward.
After a couple of questions from the large audience in “Sverigesalen”, Per Edling summarised the symposium. There are many similarities between France, Germany and Sweden when it comes to the understanding of NDPP and the interpretation of the respective CTs, which is reassuring for a new NATO member. During the years of austerity, the connection between operational plans and military investments and capability building was weakened in Sweden, but NDPP will help, or force, Sweden back into the operational logic. Since achieving CTs is a national and governmental assignment rather than a military task, the NDPP can be a driver of cohesion and consensus between agencies.
Foto: Jon Wikingsson
Lars-Olof Corneliusson concluded the symposium by thanking speakers and audience. Each speaker received a book on the Royal Swedish Navy’s Quincentenary as memorabilia of this evening with the naval section of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.
Foto: Jon Wikingsson