At the time of writing the world is holding its breath in anticipation of the next step in the ongoing action-reaction process between the US and Iran – and Israel, not to forget. Acutely, the issue at stake is what will be Iran’s answer to the latest variety of Trump/US attempts to arrive at an off-ramp from the course of a quasi-inevitable resumption of full-scale warfare after the weeks of shaky ceasefire. At the time of writing, the world is kept guessing as to not only the Iranian response but also – equally important – as to what is the content and orientation of this latest US proposition, said this time to be a one-page Memorandum of Understanding, i a suggesting a 60 days long period of continued “real” negotiations on the main issues and root causes of the conflict.
So the question remains: are we – the world – headed for escalation into a resumption of full-scale war, if so even harder than the first four weeks of the war, according to Trump´s threats part of his mixed signaling, or a genuine off-ramp, prolonged ceasefire and serious negotiations?
Both alternatives are based on solid and credible arguments.
The war alternative evidence, as emphasized by hawkish voices in the US and Israel, perhaps to some degree also in Iran, is in the estimate that the objectives of the two (or three) sides are and will remain irreconcilable and that the stand-off status quo is untenable, given the already ominous global implications. To resolve satisfactorily the thorny issues that have arisen as a result of decades of conflict and the current war by means of diplomatic negotiations, even if supported on the part of the US by a massive, 50 000 or so strong military power projection, is tantamount to mission impossible, unless negotiations (“returning to the table”) means Iran’s acceptance of near-total surrender. And any step towards compromise would have Trump face the intolerable risk of ending up with a situation and a net outcome of this adventure with very little gains at very high costs, again given the global implications. And a temporary off-ramp and an arrangement to kick the negotiating cans down the road will hardly satisfy deeply worried markets.
It may be true that Trump really would prefer a quick-fix off-ramp, in view (also) of rising impatience at the domestic political market, but the bind he is in, and the scarcity of options, leaves him (to the delight and relief of Israelis) with no other choice than to pin hopes on a new round of bombardments, perhaps even including some “boots on the ground”. There are limits to how long he can maintain the current level of force projection. And with added time, the Iranians – already apparently emboldened – will be offered the opportunity to regain military strength and resilience after the losses suffered. Politically, declaring “victory”, and credibly, is a must.
BUT, and here comes the big but, essentially the same factors serve to advocate enhanced efforts to escape the quagmire and to seek an, or the, off-ramp, and quickly, given the catastrophic implications of a prolonged war, or war-like basic uncertainty, testified to by an emerging expert consensus that points to a sequence of inter-linked consequences, oil and gas price hikes, oil and gas scarcity of supply, food scarcity crisis resulting from fertilizer scarcity, inflation, etc, etc, with ominous perspectives threatening to supersede Covid 19-time challenges. And any other crisis comparison. So the opening of Hormuz is a (another) must, and if it cannot be achieved, in relevant time, by means of military might, and if Iran’s surrender, total or partial, seems non-achievable, then there must be negotiated compromise settlement, ASAP, no matter the bitterness of the pill.
This is an attempt to describe in a few short lines the basic choice between the war case and the “peace” (or ceasefire or “table talks”, or…) case, focusing on Trump’s choice but remembering that there are two other players around, Iran and Israel, and in addition a Pakistani-led consortium of deeply engaged mediators. And in addition, of course, the profoundly affected grouping of GCC states opposite to Iran at the Persian Gulf. And an attempt made pending information of a possible Iranian reply to the latest US proposition, whatever this contains and entails.
Now let there be the entry of the factor of Xi’s China, one day after the visit in Beijing by Iranian foreign minister Arachi, and one week ahead of the planned visit there by Donald Trump, himself. It is commonly stated by analysts that just as Trump’s reason for postponing this important visit was his hope that by the later date the Iran war would bet settled, he is now similarly keen to avoid having to follow through with the summit with Hormuz still closed, by “joint” Iranian-US efforts, and/or a resumed war ongoing. That would not be good for business. In addition, there are indications now of a Chinese readiness, based on pre-existing ties between China and not only Iran but also GCC Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, to engage more actively and directly in a mediating role, of sorts, rather than as a discrete back-up behind Pakistan. A basic motive for this would be a combination of the Iran war’s negative effect on China’s energy supply and hence economy and perceived Chinese opportunities to fill the void created by US-Israeli mistakes in the vitally important region. Hence, a powerful incentive for Donald Trump to at least be seen to be going seriously for a negotiated settlement, whatever the substance, with Iran, at least throughout the Beijing visit. Even if it takes lots of spinning on social media.
Clearly, it would not be at all good for Donald Trump’s legacy – ahead of November’s mid-terms and the remaining time in the White House – if he, having lost any hope for the Nobel Peace Prize in his current role as war president, were to have to leave behind his Iran venture with the Iranian regime still standing and its population non-rescued, with a compromise settlement leaving the Hormuz and nuclear issues largely unresolved, with the global consequences of the conflict taking months or years to repair, AND with China stepping in as the main mediating and stabilizing force in the region in lieu of a failed US, as perceived by all other Middle East states than Netanyahu’s Israel.
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Currently the entire Middle East is more turbulent than in a very long time, with most or all states involved in or affected by either open warfare or a state of unruly, fragile ceasefire, starting, some (and certainly team Netanyahu) would say, on October 7, 2023, with Hamas’ terror attack on southern Israel, followed by Israel’s drastic war of retaliation against Hamas, and then against its other enemies, in Lebanon, Iraq/Syria and Yemen, and then the wars directly with Iran, supported by Trump’s USA.
Currently, formally, there are ceasefires in operation in all Israeli/US wars in the region, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Iran, all dictated by Trump’s US as against reluctant or unwilling partners and parties. More precisely, these ceasefires, albeit directed at both sides and restraining the US itself, essentially represent “the dog” (US) seeking to restrain “the tail” (Netanyahu’s Israel facing autumn elections) in the latter’s constant effort to achieve total victory over its enemies, be they Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq (formerly also in Syria, and Iran.
So to the extent the current maneuverings between the US and Iran is supposed to lead to a prolonged ceasefire, as a deemed necessary condition for orderly peace talks, it should be sobering to observe how little “peace” the existing ceasefires have brought wherever, after acrimonious diplomatic efforts and Trump dictates, these have been put in place.
Some figures, gathered from AI, may serve as an illustration.
In the case of Gaza, the existing ceasefire was part and parcel of Trump’s peace plan of October 10 last year, the plan that in a first phase had the parties agree also to hostage/prisoner exchanges, partial steps to disarmament and (Israeli) military withdrawal and humanitarian assistance to the 2 million Palestinian civilians, and that in a second stage were to establish a Board of a Peace (with Trump personally as permanent chair!) and to deploy some 5000 troops for stabilization, among other things. Not much has come out of this strange but potentially useful initiative, and the suffering of affected Palestinians has hardly improved. And, significantly, in spite of the ceasefire some 828 deaths and 2 342 wounded, largely Palestinian civilians as a result of Israeli/IDF direct fire, have been recorded, adding to the total death list of some 72 000 plus since October 7 -23. So the tragedy continues.
In the case of Lebanon, the current ceasefire is the second in line since the start of the regional war in October 2023 (the first imposed on November 2024, and broken at the start of the new Iran war this year). The current one was “directed” by Trump in March 2026, overruling Netanyahu protests, in a clearly visible link to ongoing US-Iranian ceasefire interaction. However, here too the ceasefire has been a “ceasefire-in-name-only”, with Israeli IDF defying Trumpian expectations (in view of Iran war priorities) through continued air bombardments and ground force incursions, costing as per early May some 2 618 lives and 8100 wounded. So the tragedy continues, here like in Gaza as a result of Israeli attacks and enemy resilience.
And then there is the current ceasefire in the Iran vs Israel/US war and the formally ongoing ceasefire during which, according to AI estimates, some 1054 people have been killed, part of the total death figure of some 2 800 – everyone realizing that casualty figures from and concerning Iran are particularly hard to verify, given the closure of Internet, among other factors. But regardless of the uncertainty, this figure, all the above figures, serve to illustrate both difficulties to uphold ceasefires once arrived at and the common gap between ceasefire as a necessary first step to and condition for peace, and ceasefire as a miserable but indispensable way to put a halt to disastrous full-scale warfare.
So much to learn for probable upcoming talks about talks. Or about ceasefire, in Ukraine and Sudan and elsewhere.
But for now, military skirmishing in the Strait of Hormuz, the two sides still claiming that the ceasefire still holds. And waiting for Iran’s next move.