Summary:

The recent Finnish change of NATO-policy included many surprises. The process was dominated by a firm change of public opinion, which was unexpected in character and speed. Political parties were changing their course under heavy pressure from civil society. This is exceptional in a country whose foreign policy tradition is built on a strong belief in authority. The change of public opinion was a direct consequence of the Russian attack against Ukraine and of its demands to stop a further NATO enlargement. Together with the Finnish small-state identity, the domestic political background paves the way for a constructive NATO-policy once the membership will enter into force. Finland, however, has to adjust its aspirations to deepen the EU’s defence policy to a new transatlantic identity. The simultaneous decisions of Finland and Sweden to join NATO were at the end a surprise as well. Even if it had been a joint goal for the two countries, coordination of two national democratic processes had been considered a difficult exercise. That the accession will now happen in the middle of the most serious post-Cold War security policy crises is in conflict with an earlier Finnish understanding about the possibilities to ‘activate’ its NATO-option. It used to be widely stressed that the Finnish accession should take place in more peaceful security policy conditions.

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