When Sweden end January 2025 decided to implement its so far largest defence assistance package to Ukraine amounting to 1.23 bn dollars this was a powerful signal also to other donors: Do not give up. Enable Ukraine to fight and when the time comes to negotiate from a position of strength. And there is no doubt that the signal was welcome from the perspective of President Zelensky. He needs support and he needs it now.
This article follows up on an earlier article on the future of the European Defence industry published at the end of 2023 at this point focusing on the crucial choices facing members of NATO as regards Ukraine. It does so from the perspective of the school of propaganda analysis developed during the second world war by scholars such as Alexander L. George aiming at inferring intentions from words and actions.
In the realm of decision-making, opting to do nothing is, in itself, a choice. While many may instinctively prefer to wait and observe when faced with uncertainty, this inaction can have significant consequences, particularly in complex situations like the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion, both warring parties appear to be exhausted. Reports suggest that both sides might be contemplating a ceasefire, potentially around the third quarter of the year 2025. In such a context, assessments of capabilities are of great importance. Which are the possibilities of the parties for future action? However, such assessments may be influenced by subjective factors, ranging from wishful thinking to uncertain statistical forecasts or even an intention to disinform. It is crucial to scrutinize the interests served by various analyses, including those derived from AI sources, to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the current situation, of vital importance for the entire Western world.
The issue of the military capabilities of the parties in terms of equipment is a case in point. Evaluating the state of defence equipment on both sides in the Ukraine conflict presents a formidable challenge, particularly as we look ahead to the remainder of 2025. Analysts must navigate the complexities of data that may be skewed to influence perceptions, often lacking in accuracy or completeness. The veil of secrecy and confidentiality surrounding these data further complicates the task. As with any major military endeavor, the focus should be on determining to what extent the necessary and sufficient conditions for warfare and defence are met.
In the United States, decision-makers, including Congress, and their counterparts in the European Union, such as the European Parliament, rely on analyses that are partially public. For instance, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) regularly updates its assessments of the situation on both the Ukrainian and Russian sides, with the latest update released in October 2024.
Counting weapon systems and ammunition is relatively easy but not enough. It is much more important and difficult to assess morale and level of training – a broader issue. Political uncertainties add another layer of complexity. In the United States, the transition to a new administration raises questions about the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms among Western allies, including Germany. There is concern about potential delays in the delivery of equipment already promised, due to the new Trump administration’s policies. On the eastern front, Russia’s struggling economy poses questions about its ability to sustain military procurement in the short to medium term. The European Union’s coordination mechanism, the European Peace Facility, has significantly increased its efforts.
However, where funds have been allocated, actual delivery of equipment in many cases remains uncertain. Reports dating back to 2022 and 2023 also highlight significant possible diversions and delays of deliveries intended for the battlefield. The impact of delivery delays on the front lines is a critical consideration, as time lags affect the situation on the ground.
Public discussions have pointed out deficiencies, such as the reported need for NGO:s to provide body armor and other essential equipment for soldiers – one significant example of the lack of necessary and sufficient conditions for defence.
The cost of military production is another pressing issue. The price of producing 155 mm artillery shells has skyrocketed on the Western side, reaching several thousand dollars per shell, while Russian production costs appear to be lower.
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Forecasts of the way ahead are part of contentious domestic political debates in many countries about the value and appropriateness of various forms of assistance to Ukraine. Assessment of capabilities play an important role in such a debate. The interest by the parties to form these assessments are, hence, important. This debate is further complicated by other challenges facing countries in Europe and North America.
In Europe, countries with defence expenditures at a low percentage of GDP, particularly those in southern Europe, face complex political pressures from the South, the East and from within. Belgium, host to both NATO and EU headquarters, struggles to increase defence spending due to constitutional constraints.
The military establishment in many Western countries acknowledges that aiding Ukraine is essential for countering Russian aggression. However, this assistance may delay the buildup of their own defences. Sweden, for instance, yearly donated the equivalent of half a brigade to Ukraine since 2022, a significant contribution for a country rebuilding not least its landbased armed forces. The urgency of immediate deliveries necessitates deprioritizing long-term procurement projects, such as aircraft and submarines, as seen in the case of Sweden.
In the coming months, we can anticipate a flurry of communications between Washington and its allies regarding equipment deliveries. The channels for these communications will most likely be difficult to keep open and efficient given the transition period in the US and the upcoming elections in Germany, to mention two of the most obvious complications. The question remains whether these exchanges will result in additional delays. A further uncertainty is whether countries will postpone making substantial additional commitments, hoping for a ceasefire to take effect.
Expect therefore during the coming weeks and months a flood of often very self-assured forecasts where – as always in wartime situations – purposes behind the messaging need to be carefully analysed. All will not be propaganda, but much will be based on an ambition to influence readers in different directions. For a long time in countries such as Sweden the idea that Ukraine would eventually have to accept some sort of defeat was widely characterized as defaitist. There are significant forces at play at present seeking to change that discourse towards making Ukrainian concessions politically palatable.
The danger inherent in such an approach is, however, a deep uncertainty about under what conditions security guarantees can be made which do not unravel as quickly as those given by Russia, the US and the UK in the Budapest Memorandum from 1994 – when Ukraine was persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons. Again another topic worthy of a separate discussion.