“The US innovates, China replicates, Europe regulates” – Unknown author.
In the Swedish part of the military “Twitterverse,” there is a continuous debate about whether smaller remotely piloted aerial systems (RPAS) should be considered ammunition or at least expendable items and if they should be issued to everyone. Although a meaningful discussion is to be had, another vital issue seems to be overlooked in the overall debate. Specifically, how can we supply our units with the needed number of drones during peace and war? While Sweden and its allies are not yet at war with Russia (at least not in the traditional meaning of the word), the war and the geopolitical positionings of various countries still affect the supply chain of drone systems and parts in the same way that the market of medical supplies was affected during the pandemic.
Ukrainian and Russian units have been relying heavily on donations from civilian efforts to keep up with the demand. Although complete systems are still in high demand, more requests are being made for spare parts of various kinds, like cables, housings, and engines. While Ukrainian units still can find spare parts on the open market, Russian units seem more often forced to salvage what can be found on the battlefield. It doesn’t matter if it is a DJI Mavic, a “Baba Yaga”, or FPV. Any RPAS platform found is either disassembled for spare parts or repaired and returned to duty under the Russian flag. Especially the larger heavy-duty platforms that Russian manufacturers are still struggling with building themselves seem to be popular in retrieving. Not being able to create that platform themselves, Russian companies are instead turning to reverse-engineering and constructing spare parts like propellers that fit with various systems.[1]
Although Russia can be said to have a partner in China, it is not an exclusive relationship. In exchange for money, Chinese manufacturers are more than willing to supply Ukrainian customers with fibre optic spools and other equipment needed to build drones resistant to jamming—effectively eliminating Russia’s technological advantage. Having the opportunity to buy the same equipment as your adversary levels the playing field and enables a shorter research process to find ways to counter new inventions. Instead of relying solely on finding and salvaging equipment from the battlefield to reverse engineer, you can turn to the internet and buy the parts or systems from a third party. One conclusion is that the complete supply chain needs to be controlled to protect innovations in future warfare.
Ukrainian and Russian units are sourcing plenty of parts from Chinese online markets like AliExpress, and it is no secret that the most used brand in the war is DJI quadcopters. Even if a system is manufactured in the United States or a European country, it will likely contain some parts imported or made with metals from China. Much of the commercial supply of drones and spare parts is tied to Shenzhen, which adds additional vulnerabilities to the European supply chain. This poses a significant threat to supply chains for European countries when China imposes various restrictions on the exportation of materials or parts needed to build drones.[2] The overall usage of drones in the war has had noticeable effects on the market for drones and accessories.[3] The increased demand has affected both the military sector and the civilian market. Browsing various European civilian drone shops online indicates that the demand outweighs the supply for specific items, incentivising other (predominantly Chinese) manufacturers to enter the market and further lowering the price tags, which affects Western companies’ abilities to enter the market.
As such, the most critical issue to address is not whether to define armed FPV drones as ammunition or even if various kinds of drones need to be distributed throughout all units. It is instead how to handle a supply chain that, in peacetime, depends upon an authoritarian state like China and, in war, may become dependent on what our troops can salvage from the battlefield. Until a long-term solution can be realised where the European industry can produce the components needed to develop and build drones, the short-term solution seems to be using the Chinese desire for economic growth and stocking up on parts. The mid-term solution would be finding suppliers outside of the Chinese sphere of influence, much like Russia has done by buying systems and parts from Iran. This may mean purchasing parts from “less liked” states as a “necessary evil”. All this while creating incentives and subsidies for European companies to enter the market. Through initial replication, the end goal is to move on to creating an innovative market with low to no dependence on Chinese suppliers.