Texten jämför kriget i Irak 2003 med det pågående kriget mot Iran 2026 och varnar för att vinna kriget men förlora freden. Irakexemplet visar hur snabb militär seger följdes av ett långvarigt uppror när Baathpartiet och armén upplöstes, vilket skapade ett stort, förödmjukat och vältränat motståndsläger och banade väg för Al-Qaida i Irak och senare IS.
I Iran 2026 dominerar massiva flygoperationer och regimen har försvagats efter Khameneis död, men landets institutioner, proxy‑nätverk och tekniska förmåga gör risken för ett utdraget irreguljärt krig ännu större, särskilt om eliterna helt stängs ute efter ett eldupphör. Författaren pekar på faran för global terrorism, energichock och europeisk sårbarhet och drar slutsatsen att väst måste hantera Irans maktstrukturer som ett komplext ekosystem, definiera tydliga politiska mål och snabbt stärka Europas försvar, underrättelsearbete och diplomatiska hävstång för att hantera efterdyningarna till kriget.
Iran 2026: Winning the War, Losing the Peace?
Scene setter:
The year is 2006, and the current author is on his way into Baghdad together with several EU colleagues for political director level meetings with the Iraqi leadership. After a relatively uneventful flight into Baghdad Airport, there follows a risky helicopter journey with constant evasion maneuvers using different evasion tools into the Green zone, where even the swimming pool is not safe to use due to the risk of small arms ammunition coming down from the sky. Every movement outside and even inside the Green zone has to be planned for days, and ex-special forces personnel has to protect the visitors housed in air-conditioned containers protecting against 53 degrees C. The UN compound looks like an obstacles labyrinth after earlier having been attacked, killing Sérgio Vieira de Mello. The acronym IED – improvised explosives devices, started to become a well-known threat to allied troops both in Afghanistan and Iraq. And the sensitive question how to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance becomes an ever more traumatic topic in Eu council meetings.
Is that the perspective we must adopt when planning future European journeys to Tehran or the countryside?
Can the international community, in this situation led by the US do better this time? The issue here is probably not one of military victory or not for the United States and Israel in the current war with Iran. The question is perhaps more what happens afterwards.
From quick victory to long insurgency
In Iraq in 2003, Washington could declare military success within weeks: Saddam’s regime collapsed quickly. Yet the decisive mistake came immediately afterwards, when the Coalition Provisional Authority dismantled the Ba’ath Party and disbanded the Sunni-dominated army and security services. The US created a large, well‑trained, humiliated constituency with both the incentives and the latent capabilities to fight back. The result was a multi‑year insurgency, the rise of Al‑Qaeda in Iraq, and eventually the emergence of the so‑called Islamic State.
Swift military success against a regime obviously does not translate into total success if key elites and armed networks have no future. When that happens, the battlefield risks shifting from regular war to irregular violence and terrorism, with a much wider geographical reach.
Iran 2026: different war, similar risks
The war against Iran in 2026 is unfolding along a different operational script but faces a structurally similar risk of “victory without an endgame”. The current campaign has so far been dominated by massive air operations, with the United States and Israel striking many thousands of targets. Khamenei has been killed and his so far invisible successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, has moved quickly to consolidate control, while Iran has retaliated against Gulf states and regional bases. The White House publicly speaks of a four‑to‑six‑week horizon to achieve its military objectives, echoing the optimism that surrounded “mission accomplished” in 2003.
Yet Iran is not Saddam’s Iraq. It has a more robust institutional architecture, an extensive network of regional proxies and criminals, and the capacity to strike far beyond its borders using missiles, drones and cyber‑tools. And the US faces formidable domestic policy constraints in terms of presence on the ground.
Managing Iran’s power structures after a truce
Against this background, the way in which the US and its partners handle Iran’s power structures after any eventual truce or “ceasefire” most likely will be decisive, as it no doubt also is in Venezuela. The Bush administration’s decision to excise the Sunni elite from the Iraqi state provides a negative template of what not to do: comprehensive de‑institutionalization without a realistic plan for inclusion or security. Such an approach would almost guarantee the emergence of a new insurgent ecosystem. Elite units and intelligence operatives would not simply disappear; they would reconfigure themselves inside and outside Iran, combining clandestine structures at home with transnational networks abroad. In practical terms, that would mean a long war “after the war”, fought with car bombs, assassinations, cyberattacks and proxy operations rather than divisions and brigades. The situation is further complicated taking into account that the January 2026 protests were the largest since 1979, with thousands killed and being killed by the regime. A substantial domestic opposition exists, including the 70-member Strategic Council of Republicans Inside Iran and exile figures like Reza Pahlavi.
In addition: The IAEA has confirmed it cannot ensure the nuclear programme is ”exclusively peaceful,” and experts worry that if the regime fragments, fissile material could fall into the hands of rogue elements. A post-truce insurgent ecosystem with access to nuclear material would be qualitatively different from Iraq.
Signals from the Trump administration’s handling so far
The way the Trump administration has handled potential insurgent actors and proxy networks up to now seems to points toward such a drawn‑out confrontation. On the one hand, Washington has promised maximalist outcomes—destroying Iran’s missile capabilities, dismantling its nuclear infrastructure, permanently ending its role as a regional spoiler. On the other, it has made clear that there will be no large‑scale ground intervention and has kept Congress at arm’s length, relying on expanded post‑9/11 authorities rather than a fresh war mandate.
A new wave of terrorism and instability
If elite factions in Iran conclude that their survival depends on asymmetric retaliation, the likely outcome is a new wave of terrorism and hybrid operations that radiate far beyond Iran’s borders. Some of this may take the form of “deniable” attacks by well‑known proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Yemen.
Compared to 2003, the infrastructure for transnational violence is denser and more technologically sophisticated. Iran and its partners have invested heavily in drones, precision‑guided munitions and offensive cyber‑capabilities, all of which can be deployed against embassies, shipping, energy infrastructure and civilian targets in Europe, Asia and the Americas. In a worst‑case scenario, mutual radicalization on both sides could produce a self‑reinforcing cycle in which each act of terrorism justifies broader military strikes, which in turn generate new recruits and new attacks.
Homeland security becomes global again
One of the more sobering implications of this scenario is that homeland security for US and Europe is once again a global issue, not a regional or Western Hemisphere‑centric one. In 2003, the United States could still frame the main homeland risk as emanating from Al‑Qaeda and its affiliates, with a relatively clear geographical focus on the broader Middle East and parts of South Asia. By contrast, an Iran‑centered insurgent ecosystem in the late 2020s would be structurally embedded in multiple regions at once: the Gulf, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, parts of Africa, and increasingly Europe. And virtually, the internet will no doubt be exploited to attack globally.
The energy shock triggered by the current war underscores this point. With around 20 percent of global oil and gas supplies disrupted and the Strait of Hormuz near‑blocked, the immediate economic impact has already been global, driving oil prices above 100 USD per barrel and forcing G7 states to discuss additional releases from strategic reserves. For Europe, which remains highly exposed after years of disentangling from Russian hydrocarbons, this is not just an energy or inflation problem; it is a security issue, as critical infrastructure and supply chains emerge as key targets in any extended confrontation with Iranian actors.
Europe’s exposed position
Europe enters this crisis significantly weaker, in relative terms, than in 2003. Then, the Iraq war produced a deep transatlantic political rift, but EU member states still had the capacity and the political will to operate militarily, whether in support of or in opposition to the US‑led coalition. In 2026, by contrast, Europe is described by observers as “stunned, sidelined and disunited”, with limited ability to shape either the initial decision to go to war or the parameters of any settlement.
This strategic disempowerment has direct implications for homeland security. European navies have struggled to surge credible forces to protect sea lines of communication, and planned initiatives such as a European drone defense capability are not yet operational. When Cypriot territory—an EU member, but not a NATO member—was hit by Iranian drones, the Union lacked both the readiness and the doctrinal clarity to respond collectively, even though the situation clearly touched on the spirit of Article 42.7 of the EU Treaties. In concrete terms, this means that Europeans may find themselves as front‑line targets in a conflict whose political terms they did not set, and whose long insurgent after‑phase they are ill‑prepared to manage.
Strategic lessons for the post‑truce phase
What follows from this for the way a ceasefire and post‑war order in and around Iran should be handled?
First, any strategy that aims to avoid an Iraq‑style insurgent spiral must treat Iran’s power structures as a complex ecosystem rather than a monolith. The Revolutionary Guard, the regular armed forces, the intelligence services, the clerical establishment and the economic networks around them do not all have identical interests or levels of ideological rigidity. A blanket attempt to purge all of them, combined with the absence of a credible stabilization force, would replicate the logic of de‑Baathification on an even larger scale.
Second, clear political objectives and realistic military means have to be aligned before a truce is declared. This clearly includes a consideration of Russian and Chinese options beyond the oil issue. If Washington and its partners announce “victory” based solely on damage to Iran’s military infrastructure, without a clear framework for how Tehran’s internal balance of power should evolve and how key actors are to be engaged or contained, they will again be declaring success at half‑time. That, in turn, will invite Iranian elites to treat the post‑truce period as a continuation of war by other means, with terrorism and hybrid operations as their main tools.
Third, Europe will need to move rapidly from a posture of stunned observation to one of proactive risk management. Air and missile defense, maritime presence, cyber‑resilience and intelligence cooperation focused on Iranian networks and their proxies are all relevant issues. It also requires searching for a more strategic use of diplomatic leverage, including with Gulf states and other regional actors, to shape any settlement in ways that reduce incentives for Tehran’s security elites to go underground and global.
Lars-Erik Lundin[1]
Earlier published by Consilio International
[1] original manuscript enhanced and reviewed by different AI-models