Western engagement in the Global South will remain necessary for the foreseeable future. It is driven by commercial interests and by practical interdependence related to climate change, pandemics, migration and systemic financial risks. Western presence should therefore be understood less as a tool of power projection and more as a way to maintain a world that is already tightly interconnected. However, that presence is fragile, shaped by historical experience, contemporary power politics and new vulnerabilities in both physical and digital environments. The question is not whether Western actors will remain, but how they can operate without repeatedly triggering resistance that undermines their objectives.
Historical resistance and contemporary coercion
History offers many examples of how attempts to steer countries in the Global South through coercion tend to backfire. Decolonization wars, long sanctions regimes and guerrilla conflicts show that military and economic superiority does not automatically produce political control. Resistance movements have drawn legitimacy and energy from their experience of external interference. Over time this has become a shared frame of reference in many societies: external pressure is interpreted against the background of earlier domination, even when today’s ambitions are presented as more limited.
In today’s international environment this experience is compounded by a more confrontational American posture. Clear threats, economic punishment and public reprimands of larger states in the Global South signal that compliance is expected. European allies also find themselves placed in a subordinate position. For governments and societies that have long tried to strengthen their sovereignty and status, this looks like a repetition of previous patterns. It makes it easier to mobilize opinion against Western initiatives, even in cases where these are driven by European actors who do not fully share Washington’s approach.
Resistance is also less state‑centered than before. When governments accept Western demands, opposition parties, armed groups, social movements or religious networks can quickly brand them illegitimate. Western presence then becomes a domestic political symbol, tied to discontent over inequality, corruption or social change. Security interventions that aim for stability can in practice deepen polarization and broaden the circle of actors prepared to use violence.
From fortified compounds to virtual presence
At the same time, the practical form of Western presence has changed. The heavily protected compound model, evident for example in Baghdad in the early 2000s, has proved expensive and politically difficult to justify. Closed facilities with layers of private security cut foreign staff off from local society, push up costs and reinforce the image of an isolated enclave. In more high‑risk environments, many organizations have therefore reduced the number of expatriates and strengthened local teams to obtain better access, better information and fewer political complications.
Digital technology has accelerated this shift. Video meetings and collaboration platforms make it possible to manage operations, provide training and coordinate without extensive physical presence. Consultancy, legal work, software development and parts of the banking sector can be run remotely, while local partners or subsidiaries handle day‑to‑day operations. In development cooperation as well, many permanent field offices are being replaced by smaller liaison functions that follow up on national staff and local organizations.
Some sectors nonetheless require continued physical presence. Resource extraction, infrastructure projects and advanced manufacturing are based on installations and technical expertise that cannot be relocated or replaced quickly. Mines, pipelines, ports, power plants and factories need regular inspections, maintenance and sometimes foreign managers. In such settings Western presence is tied to visible assets that must be protected, licenses that can be revoked and workforces that can be mobilized. These sites offer natural points of leverage for both state and non‑state actors.
Even when physical footprints shrink, new vulnerabilities arise through greater reliance on virtual presence. Operations become dependent on stable electricity, functioning telecom networks, affordable data and secure digital platforms. Governments can restrict internet access, expand surveillance or change data‑related rules in ways that disrupt activities. Criminal networks and state‑supported actors can target companies, civil‑society organizations or local partners through intrusions, data theft or extortion. The result is a more diffuse and less visible form of vulnerability, where engagement can be cut not by expelling staff but by shutting down digital connections.
Flow security and hybrid pressure
Western interests depend to a great extent on the functioning of flows of goods, capital, data and people. Supply chains for exporting raw materials and importing finished products, payment systems, air and sea transport and logistics hubs tie regions together, and information flows make remote management possible. Each of these channels can be impeded or manipulated.
Hybrid methods exploit precisely these weaknesses. Instead of open military attacks, actors combine regulatory pressure, targeted violence, cyber operations, disinformation and stress on infrastructure. A port strike, an act of piracy, a new customs rule, an unexpected tax case or a coordinated protest can quickly raise costs and risks. For development actors, smear campaigns against local partners, data breaches targeting beneficiaries or threats against individual staff can knock out entire programmed without any military action at all. The pandemic showed how quickly global flows can slow down; similar patterns can be used selectively to achieve political goals.
Possible pathways and European choices
Several trajectories are visible. One possible direction is a more fragmented global economy, where parts of the Global South build alternative financial and trade arrangements to reduce their exposure to Western pressure. Another is a continued state of tension with recurring counter‑measures, where costs rise but full decoupling is avoided. A third scenario is a rapid retreat, in which overlapping crises and rising risks result in Western withdrawals from entire regions.
A more constructive option is a gradual shift towards ways of working built on resilience and adaptability. This means less concentrated physical footprints, greater reliance on competent local partners, more diversified supply chains and investment in cyber security and alternative digital solutions. Politically, it sometimes requires a clearer European profile: the ability to signal European presence should not automatically be seen as an extension of US pressure. In practice this presupposes that priorities are defined together with local actors, that influence is shared and that processes are allowed to take time.
For European governments and firms, a general withdrawal is neither realistic nor desirable. Instability in the Global South would quickly affect energy markets, migration patterns, financial stability and public health in Europe. The task is therefore to reshape power projection so that it strengthens the room for man oeuvre of local actors instead of narrowing it. Investment, trade and security cooperation need to contribute to local resilience and a wider set of policy options, rather than one‑sided dependencies. When local actors have real influence over agendas and outcomes, the chances improve that Western engagement is seen as a joint attempt to manage a turbulent world, rather than as yet another layer of domination.
The stage is being set for enhanced trade with the Global South
The legal foundations for more extensive cooperation between Europe and key partners in the Global South have strengthened markedly in recent years and even months. New or updated trade agreements with, notably, Mercosur and India (moving towards ratification) open not only markets but also more structured political and regulatory dialogues that can support a broader agenda of shared resilience, respect and sustainable development. These frameworks provide clearer rules of the game, dispute‑settlement mechanisms and sectoral forums where questions of standards, investment, labor conditions and environmental requirements can be handled more systematically. They thus offer an institutional structure for long‑term engagement that does not rest solely on individual transactions and that can help sustain a European presence even in a more turbulent geopolitical setting.
At the same time, many African societies are changing rapidly. Demographic projections point to a continent that is growing much faster than other regions, with an ever-larger share of the world’s young people living in African states. This development coincides with a political landscape in which many governments are challenged by indigenous communities, urban movements and other domestic actors, and where democratic institutions are fragile or incomplete across large parts of the continent.
For European policy this creates a dual task. Trade and investment must be used to support inclusive growth, job creation and regional integration, so that a growing population sees real economic prospects. At the same time, cooperation frameworks must be flexible and principled enough for Europe to work with societies where democracy is weak, without reinforcing authoritarian patterns or falling back on a narrowly security‑driven approach.
Lars-Erik Lundin
Tidigare publicerad av Consilio International