EU måste omgående utveckla en sammanhållen agenda för flödessäkerhet som en kärnuppgift för unionens säkerhets- och industripolitik. I stället för stuprör mellan migration, energi, handel, digital infrastruktur, hälsa och försvar bör EU utgå från hur dessa flöden samverkar och kan utnyttjas politiskt av motståndare. Krigen i Ukraina och Mellanöstern, attacker mot sjöfart och kritisk infrastruktur samt weaponized interdependence visar att legitima flöden blivit säkerhetspolitiska hävstänger. Detta kräver gemensam hotbildsanalys, bättre datadelning, integrerad riskbedömning och prioritering av kritiska noder snarare än enbart territoriärt gränsskydd. EU bör använda sin normativa och ekonomiska tyngd för att forma globala regler, standarder och partnerskap kring flöden – inklusive genom Global Gateway, utökade säkerhetsdialoger med nyckelpartner och stöd till motståndskraft i grannskapet. En flödessäkerhetsagenda bör förankras i EU:s strategiska kompass, ekonomiska säkerhetsstrategi och framtida utvidgningspolitik.
When the current author wrote a chapter on flow security in 2015[1], the message was simple: European security is determined not only by borders and territory but by how we manage flows of energy, people, capital, goods, data, ideas, and weapons. Flow security was about protecting the good flows on which our economy and welfare depend, stopping the bad flows that spread conflict, crime, and instability, and managing environmental and health threats, including pandemics. Today, as everyone can see during the Iran war, this map has become far more complex: several major flows are under pressure simultaneously. It is a systemic crisis, not a sectoral issue
This article makes three arguments. First: the EU must treat flow security as a coherent political priority, not as a series of separate sub‑issues. Second: the current combination of the war in Ukraine, the war with Iran, and global trade, food, and drug flows creates a situation in which old assumptions about “stable” interdependence no longer hold. Third: without a better overview of how flows are connected, the EU risks reacting late, at greater cost, and in a fragmented way to the next crisis
The risks of global systems collapse are becoming ever more visible, with cascading consequences for Europe
Ten years ago one could speak of a relatively stable constellation of flows that the EU needed to manage
- Nuclear proliferation and related technology: the threat was serious, but the framework was clear – the Iran deal underway, the non‑proliferation regime, export controls.[2]
- Migration: largely seen as a positive force for economy and demography, even though the 2015 refugee crisis quickly added a security dimension and created internal instability in many countries.[2]
- Organized crime and terrorism: classic “bad flows” – drugs, arms, and money‑laundering exploiting the same infrastructure as legitimate trade
- Energy: lessons from the 1973 oil crisis and recurrent gas disputes with Russia justified diversification, the internal market, and strategic stocks
- Financial flows: after the euro and financial crises, regulation in the EU was strengthened, but the link to security policy remained weak
The starting point was that the EU – with its combination of internal market, legal instruments, and foreign and security policy – was particularly well placed to handle flows strategically. But flow security remained mainly an analytical frame, often discussed in the context of intelligent border management; it was not translated into clear political goals, budgets, or institutions
2. How flows – and our perspectives – have changed
Since then both the flows themselves and the politics around them have changed fundamentally. A central change is that the old distinction between “good” and “bad” flows is breaking down as legitimate flows are routinely instrumentalized for strategic purposes – what the academic debate calls “weaponized interdependence”. For policy, this means we must distinguish between flows that are vital, flows that are malign, and a large group of ambivalent flows that can shift category depending on who controls them and in which context.[2]
Views of migration have become far more negative. Directed migration flows are also used as a political tool – visible at the EU’s borders with Belarus and in the debate on “weaponized migration”. Flow security must therefore treat migration simultaneously as a societal resource, as a societal challenge, and as a potential instrument of pressure. A policy that ignores the security dimension creates vulnerabilities: a container can contain both good and bad things, and a human being can be used for good and bad purposes
The salience of terrorism has risen and fallen on the political agenda, and the question what the Iran war will bring is as open as it was after the Iraq war from 2003. Flows that sustain terrorism remain: illegal weapons, explosives, money, recruitment via digital platforms. The modern drug trade – with fentanyl and other synthetic drugs – shows how quickly criminal networks adjust their flows to new regulations: remove one substance and another appears. The policy consequence is clear: one‑off crackdowns are not enough; the EU must build long‑term systems that combine public health, customs, police, financial regulation, and cyber policy
Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine made Europe’s vulnerability clear when a single supplier controls large parts of gas flows. The ongoing Iran crisis with the closure of Hormuz and attacks in the Red Sea reinforces the point: maritime chokepoints can rapidly have global effects on prices and availability. At the same time, climate policy is forcing a rapid transformation of energy flows: new infrastructure, new dependencies (for example on rare earths), and new political conflicts. This requires energy, climate, and security policy to be linked in a much deeper way than before
Food and agricultural flows
Food and agricultural trade – grain, fertilizers, and basic commodities – is another example of flows that were once seen as unproblematic but now generate serious security externalities. The disruption of grain exports from Ukraine and Russia, fertilizer price spikes, and their effects on food prices and political stability in parts of the Global South illustrate how quickly “good” flows can become vectors of systemic stress. For the EU, food and fertilizer flows are now both a development issue and a strategic lever in relations with partners, not least in Africa and the Middle East.
Data, cyber, and AI dependence
Digitalization has turned data flows into the nervous system of the economy. Cyberattacks, disinformation, and intrusions into critical infrastructure affect not only information security but all other flows: logistics, payments, power grids, and health care. The EU’s response – including GDPR, the NIS directives, and new cyber strategies – are important steps, but they are often designed sector by sector. From a flow‑security perspective, a disruption in a connected logistics system can have effects comparable to a physical attack on a port, a pipeline, or a data cable. Our growing dependence on AI models, cloud services, and platforms hosted outside Europe raises new questions: what happens if access, updates, or training data are restricted for geopolitical reasons?
Nuclear materials and proliferation
One under‑discussed question concerns enriched nuclear materials and related technologies. Where will any enriched material in Iran ultimately go and for which purpose – and how will the war affect nuclear proliferation dynamics in the region and beyond? Flow security here is about tracking and constraining sensitive materials, knowledge, and dual‑use goods before they create new chains of vulnerability.
3. Today’s stress test: Iran, Ukraine, and geoeconomics
The current situation can be described as a stress test for the entire flow system. Several critical flows are under pressure at the same time, with feedback loops between them.
Hormuz, the Red Sea, and global energy flows
The closure of Hormuz means that a large share of global oil and LNG exports does not reach the market. Even before that, traffic through the Red Sea was disrupted by attacks on merchant vessels. The result is price and supply shocks that feed directly into Europe’s inflation, budget, and industrial policy. The typical mistake in traditional economic analysis is to see this as a temporary price issue. From a flow‑security perspective, it is a structural vulnerability – and an argument for redundancy in routes, fuels, and storage as well as cooperative security efforts such as Operation Aspides in the Red Sea.
At the same time, a protracted war is ongoing in Europe. Ukraine’s military endurance depends on Western flows of weapons, ammunition, and finance. The Iran crisis risks competing for the same air‑defense missiles, the same budgetary resources, and the same political attention. Damage to Iran’s defense industry may in turn disrupt the flow of drones and ammunition from Iran to Russia. For EU decision‑makers this means that every measure in the Middle East must also be evaluated in terms of consequences for Ukraine – and vice versa.
Tariffs, trade wars, and drug flows
Recent US tariff policy has tied together trade and drug control in a new way. High tariffs on Canada, Mexico, China, and others are justified by the need to stop flows of fentanyl and other drugs. The EU is caught in the cross‑fire – both as a trading partner and as a target for synthetic drugs in its own right. Economically, we risk fragmented value chains; in security terms, we risk attention shifting to symbolic tariffs instead of more effective measures in production and financial channels.
Military mobility, chokepoints, and the global commons
Flows of troops and equipment within Europe have become a core issue. The EU’s investment in military mobility – sometimes called a “military Schengen” – is an attempt to adapt civilian transport networks to rapid reinforcement needs, not least in the Nordic‑Baltic region. At the same time, we have seen how vulnerable chokepoints are, from the Red Sea and Hormuz to the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. Ports, railways, bridges, and sea lanes are both economic assets and central components of deterrence. More broadly, global flows pass through the global commons – sea, space, and cyberspace – all under growing pressure from territorialization, commercial congestion, and new military capabilities.
4. Where the gaps are
There are positive signs – from sanctions coordination to new cyber and infrastructure initiatives – but at least three major policy problems remain
- Silo thinking
- Lack of shared priorities
- Insufficient use of data and analysis
A related challenge is that the EU often treats itself as a passive recipient of shocks rather than as an actor that can help shape flows “at source and in transit”. Initiatives such as Global Gateway, trade and investment agreements, and connectivity partnerships can become tools for flow security if they are explicitly used to support resilient infrastructure, diversified routes, and partner capacity to manage their own flow vulnerabilities.
Lars-Erik Lundin
(original text enhanced and reviewed using different AI models. Thanks to Navy Captain Lars Wedin for valuable comments)
Published by Consiliot International AB
[1] Lars‑Erik Lundin, “Flow Security” in EU and Security: A Handbook for Practitioners (Stockholm: Santérus, 2015)