Forms of Conflict, Actors' Means and Methods of Controlby Jan Foghelin This is a translation of a speech held in Swedish by Jan Foghelin at a symposium arranged by the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences on October 21, 1999 and published in The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences Proceedings and Journal, no. 1 2000.
Actors and reasons for conflictDuring the Cold War, attention in Europe was concentrated on the ideological differences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and on the risk that such differences could lead to armed conflict. The actors during the Cold War were governments/coalitions of states and the reasons for conflict were primarily ideological. After the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, attention was drawn to other actors and reasons for conflict. A few of these are new but several have been present before, though not so much attention has been drawn to these, because of the dominant role formerly played by the conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Discussions today in Europe thus centre on a wide spectrum of different actors and reasons for conflict. 2 Actors (examples): Reasons for conflicts (examples): Combinations of actors and the reasons for conflict can lead to many types of conflict. These conflicts can take different forms and different means can be used. This is mainly what this paper is all about. International and internal conflictsDifferent forms of armed conflict are probably as old as mankind itself. The organisational framework of conflicts and the methods used in such have changed over the centuries. In this context there is reason to point out that change is a continuous process. If one is to assess the pattern of conflicts of the future, one should not be too quick to adhere to the patterns that are currently most topical. Fifty years ago, the conflicts in Europe were mainly deemed international. Nowadays, these are mainly of an internal nature. On the other hand, these conflicts need not be the only type of conflict in the future. To contribute towards the expansion of one’s perspective, here follow a few examples of types of conflict.
Forms, means and methods of controlIt is not possible to make definite statements about the forms of future conflicts, the means or methods of control. Here, I have chosen to formulate a number of hypotheses with reasons for and against. In the last section I have presented several summarized conclusions. Hypothesis 1State monopolies on organized violence continue to decline. New actors appear. The manner of financing wars changes. Reasons for this hypothesisA growing number of conflicts today are internal. In these conflicts it is not only regular military units that participate but also paramilitary forces, self-defence units, mercenaries and international forces. 6 Non-governmental supported terrorism is a growing problem 7 and IT terrorism is a particular problem. 8 Technical advances within the sphere of "small arms" have in turn led to forces capable of achieving substantial fire power at limited cost. 9 New actors also entail new forms of financing, such as foreign aid to specific groups, private financing, theft, foreign aid contributions,etc. 10 Reasons against this hypothesisInternational conflicts will once again dominate. States will, through international co-operation, counteract organized violence being conducted by other actors than states. Hypothesis 2:Future conflicts will often be asymmetric. There are no examples of wars where two opponents have exactly the same type of weapons, with identical qualities and use the same combat techniques, tactics and strategies. In the strictest sense all wars are therefore asymmetrical. What is meant here by asymmetric conflicts, is that between the warring parties there are major differences in vital circumstances in the manner in which war is conducted. 11 Some examples of asymmetrics may be the separate choices that the different types of warring parties make within certain areas:
Different parties may have different views on legitimate ways to conduct a war. 14
Reasons for this hypothesisConflicts, to an increasing degree, will occur between parties with widely different resources. To be successful, one seeks those areas where an opponent has weaknesses. How a war turns out is determined by all involved parties. In the West there is a wish that war should be of the high tech kind, but without the use of weapons of mass destruction, that war should be short, that they should be run in the form of "conventional" operations and that losses are low. 16 Opponents will try to exploit asymmetries so that these wishes are not fulfilled. 17 Reasons against this hypothesisBy conducting a war in a suitable manner, through deterrents and by referring to the views of "the international community" as to how a war should be conducted, one party can restrict a war to a symmetrical one. Hypothesis 3:Insecurity will henceforth be a major issue when conducting military operations. Reasons for this hypothesisThe combination of antagonism and complex socio-technical systems mean that military operations even in the future, will continue to be activities burdened by a high degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome of different courses of action. 18 Reasons against this hypothesisModern technologies enable us to receive a great deal of detailed and complete information. Precision weapons mean that the hit and effect probabilities are close to 1. At least for the technically superior side there are no longer uncertainties as to the outcome. The art of warfare and uncertainties will consist in trying to understand and outmanœuvre one's opponents by using the information superiority, concerning one’s own forces and those of one’s opponents. Hypothesis 4The spread of advanced weapons technology. Long-range weapons increase the risk of armed conflicts between non-neighbouring countries. Reasons for this hypothesis
Reasons against this hypothesis
Hypothesis 5Technical advances are of great importance for how wars are fought. In the end however, war is a social phenomenon. Reasons for this hypothesis
Reasons against this hypothesis
Hypothesis 6Military units will gradually lose their importance as targets for war activities within internal conflicts. Civilian populations, societal infrastructures, etc, will become more prioritized. Reasons for this hypothesisMurder of selected groups (ethnic groups, women), ethnic cleansing and making regions uninhabitable by different means, can, under certain circumstances, be considered more effective than fighting against military units. 25 That is not to say that international forces could not under certain circumstances be attacked. Reasons against this hypothesisActivities of the types given above are unacceptable by the international community, who can choose to intervene. The means must therefore be considered no longer worthwhile. Hypothesis 7Point targets, particularly fixed, can be destroyed with precision weapons. Reasons for this hypothesisThe technical advances in many fields have today meant an improvement in every link of the chain consisting of reconnaissance - weapons platform - control of weapon - effect of weapon. The result is a high kill probability. This chain can also act much quicker. Reasons against this hypothesis
A natural, attendant question to this theory is whether or not a war can be won solely by destroying point targets. First, one should note that the use of precision weapons will gradually be cheaper for destroying targets, even if the systems themselves are expensive. Naturally the benefits mainly lie in the fact that fewer resources are needed to achieve destruction. The next question deals with suitable "tactical adaptation". If a point target can be knocked out relatively simply and quickly, then obviously the defender will attempt to minimize or contain the damage. This can be done in the following manner, for example:
Hypothesis 8Gradual phase-out of large, expensive, manned platforms. Reasons for this hypothesisThe present and forthcoming generations of MBTs, combat aircraft and larger surface warships (primarily aircraft carriers) are extremely expensive. An increasing amount of system costs is dedicated to self-protection. Different types of unmanned systems pose a serious threat to these manned platforms. Unmanned systems can also gradually take over more of the tasks of the larger platforms. 27 Reasons against this hypothesisDiscussions about the missile threat to larger, manned platforms are not new. They have been going on for decades. So far, it has been possible to protect these platforms in different ways. Is there anything which indicates that even in the future it will not be possible to maintain a balance between means and counter-measures? There are certain tasks, like "power projection", whereby one can ask if unmanned systems can take over completely. Among other things, it may be occasionally necessary to have a decisive person relatively close to the target ("a man in the loop"). Hypothesis 9Qualified infantry (personnel and materiel) undergo a revival. Reasons for this hypothesisPlatforms are gradually becoming more and more vulnerable (hypotheses 7 and 8). Ground forces must disperse. This can be done by creating more units that disperse over wider areas. Technical advances mean that the equipment carried can be extremely qualified. Professionalism of soldiers entails the implementation of extensive training. 28 The reasons against this hypothesisThere are tasks (e.g. offensive operations) that cannot be performed with infantry units. Hypothesis 10Space will increase in importance for warfare. Reasons for this hypothesis
Reasons against this hypothesis
Hypothesis 11The USA is hegemonic and invests most in research and development. What's good for the USA, e.g. Revolution in Military Affairs, 30 does not however always mean it’s good for the rest of the world. Reasons for this hypothesisThe USA has a number of operational tasks that control the design of their defence. The USA has a number of restrictions (budget, extremely low tolerance for own casualties) that also affect the design of its armed forces. On the basis of its military traditions there exist in the USA specific conceptions, for example, such as solving problems with "technological fixes". 31 Together, this means that a unit and system which is good for the USA does not always need to be the most suitable for other countries, from the cost - effectiveness aspects. Naturally, in many instances there is reason to adopt American solutions. The reasons may be for cost-effectiveness purposes as well as a wish for interoperability. Reasons against this hypothesisInternational co-operation and international operations are becoming increasingly important. In many cases the USA will play a leading role in operations of this kind. To have the same or at least interoperable systems with the USA will therefore increase in importance. To have the same system is therefore an important goal in itself. Hypothesis 12Nuclear weapons will be used operationally during the coming decade. Reasons for this hypothesisThe probability of the use of nuclear arms will increase because: 32
Reasons against this hypothesisNuclear weapons are political weapons. A nuclear weapon is not a rational means to use. They can only be used as a deterrent. For this reason it would thus be better if more countries acquired a nuclear capability. 34 Atomic weapons have not been used since 1945, not even by nuclear powers that have lost wars (USA in Vietnam, Soviet Union in Afghanistan), which shows that nuclear weapons cannot be used in war. 35 Hypothesis 13Biological weapons can be extremely dangerous. How, by whom, etc they can be used, are important, unanswered questions. Reasons for this hypothesisTechnical advances, production costs for these weapons, etc, make it tempting to develop them. Much of this development has already occurred, however, and the know-how could be spread. 36 Consequently, there is always a risk of their use. Reasons against this hypothesisA ban on their development plus uncertainty in case of their use make it improbable that biological weapons will represent a threat in the future. Hypothesis 14:Chemical weapons will continue to be used as a complement at the tactical level. Reasons for this hypothesisChemical weapons have occasionally been used during the 20th century. Experiences from such have been mixed. They are relatively easy to manufacture but not so simple to use tactically. Despite conventions, the use of chemical weapons will be a future possibility and part of weapons arsenals. Reasons against this hypothesisArms control regimes mean that the use of chemical weapons is associated with a political cost. From the military aspect, they are difficult to use and can also lead to an opponent responding using the same means. Hypothesis 15IT advances are of major importance for military operations in the future and psycological warfare, but they do not indicate a revolution. Reasons for this hypothesisAdvances within information technology (IT) have effected warfare since World War II. It has had considerable effect in command, control and reconnaissance functions. It has had a strong effect on the effectiveness of most weapons systems. At the same time, it has constantly been a question of the competition between measures and counter-measures. Advances have thus been evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Those parties that are clearly inferior in the field of IT will not try to fight in the same manner as those who have superior IT applications. Different ways to fight battles on other terms, which in turn reduce the advantages of superior IT, will be sought after. An asymmetrical war is the goal for IT inferiors. Psychological warfare dates back a long time also. Advances in IT are of great importance for the opportunity to distribute information. The possibilities of jamming is a direct consequence of this. Any radical changes in actual warfare due to these changes, is difficult to perceive, however. Reasons against this hypothesisAdvances within IT mean radical changes in command, control and reconnaissance systems as well as for weapons systems. Superiority of IT gives clear dominance over an opponent. The outcome of a war will become more of a 0-1 function with the IT superior as the declared winner. In this context one can therefore say that developments in IT signify a revolution in modern warfare. There are widely different opinions about the significance of IT advances for future military operations. Arguments relating to the extent of its effect are often toned down in the same articles. 37 Hypothesis 16Information warfare can disrupt vital functions in society. 38 Reasons for this hypothesisMore and more central functions in society, in modern communities, are becoming totally dependent on IT systems. Returning to older systems takes a long time. Finding and repairing faults in a destroyed IT system can also be a lengthy experience. "Insiders" probably know the weak points within a system extremely well. Reasons against this hypothesisEven under "normal circumstances", IT systems can be subjected to disruption. Different forms of robustness and safeguard measures are built into modern systems. Network structures make systems more insensitive. At the same time, the possibility to completely disrupt an IT system for any length of time should be limited. In such a case, this requires additional measures in the form of physical destruction. The impact of a "hacker" is not enough by itself. In the long term, introduction of IT systems can basically bring about changes in society. In such cases it can also create new societies and a new, global context, where questions as to what is to be defended and how this can be accomplished, need to be reviewed. 39 Hypothesis 17Economic warfare may be an active means in some cases. Reasons for this hypothesisEconomic strength has also been a measure of importance as a "power factor". An increasing number of countries will be dependent on international trade and by the international financial markets. There are increasing opportunities to bring economic pressure on countries by financial means, if sufficiently important and many countries can agree that this is desirable. Reasons against this hypothesisHistorically, embargoes and blockades have not proved particularly successful. Globalization of the world economy makes it difficult to direct active measures against one country. The need for change and tendencies for change within national defenceIn the previous section, several hypotheses dealing with tendencies for change have been presented, relating to means of warfare. Whether or not developments actually move in this direction depends on many factors. One important factor commented upon in this section is the willingness for change. National defence has no justification in itself, even if military capability has always been an element in international relations in "peace-time" also. The motives for a defence are that the surrounding world could become hostile and/or a need to participate in an international operation. 40 The need for different forms of national defence varies with time. To measure this need at present is difficult. To predict it in the future is even harder. Even if one has a clear opinion of the security policy objectives for national security in the short and long term perspectives, there are strengths and weaknesses in the matter of willingness for change and the opportunities. Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Summary of the annual studies of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, relating to forms of conflict and actors' meansIn the annual study by department VI (security policy) there is a section referring to the use of non-conventional weapons: 41 Non-conventional weapons and disarmament The thought that disarmament is an effective means of increasing international security must be questioned. The causes and connections are rather the reverse: When an exchange of information and subsequent feeling of security increases, room is created for disarmament. In spite of this, however, endeavours towards disarmament naturally play a part in the development of the political environment. Negotiations dealing with disarmament have an intrinsic value in themselves by providing a forum for the exchange of points of view between the various participating states. Confidence building measures and transparency contribute towards greater predictability governing the negotiative opportunities of the actors involved and thus increased stability in the international system. International disarmament activities following World War II have more or less been totally directed towards non-conventional, in particular nuclear weapons. One important purpose has been trying to halt more governments appearing as super powers, or producing chemical and/or biological weapons. Efforts to ensure this have not been crowned with 100 % success, and following the end of the Cold War, the risks for continued dispersion of non-conventional weapons, have been described as a serious threat to world peace. The appearance of more countries with nuclear capability is unlikely in view of strong international opinion and the technological difficulties that prevent their creation, but this can not be entirely ruled out. Any subsequent spreading would mean a great deal more for the political pattern worldwide than for the real military balance of power, and there are few reasons to believe that escalation itself would l ead to war. The risk of a nuclear war therefore remains extremely small. On the other hand, a new nuclear power may believe that it possesses a greater freedom of action politically, than previously (even if the opposite proves in fact to be true). None of the established nuclear super powers are prepared to give up their own nuclear arsenals independently, to counteract the continued escalation of nuclear weapons or as some form of public idealism. On the contrary, the deterrent value of nuclear capability has become more important in step with the de-escalation of conventional military forces, particularly in Russia. In the matter of biological and chemical weapons, the risks for escalation are greater, among other things, because they are much easier to produce than nuclear weapons. Despite these being banned by international agreements, we must also reckon on chemical weapons being present in many countries and that these could be used in war. On the other hand, it is improbable that any party would start a war, in the hope of winning it, just with the aid and use of their own chemical arsenal. Neither has anyone yet won a war by exclusive use of biological weapons, among other reasons, because their effect is difficult to predict and to control. There have been some speculations regarding the use of gene-manipulated biological agents, in other words, micro-organisms that have new, previously unknown properties and against which there are no known antidotes. These could pose an extremely serious threat, which in turn might tempt a government which has these at its disposal, and is willing to use them against another. This threat, however, should not become reality within the immediate future. The annual study by department I (land warfare) describes the following means at disposal: 42 It's obvious, however, that the invasion of our country which we had planned to resist during the Cold War, is no longer likely or worth directing our resources against. Elements of information warfare, chemical warfare, long distance missiles, UAVs, etc, have changed the circumstances radically. --- The escalation of weapons of mass destruction and in some cases the lack of control over them, is worrying. 43 --- The nature of war in the future is often described in technical terms, which makes such descriptions one-sided. New technologies can lead to new or modified tactics or a new doctrine, which in themselves are not enough to describe future developments. In all probability, wars will begin with a swift and violent introductory phase, and with the will to create collapse of systems among one's adversary. Attacks will be launched against central functions in the command, communication and coordination systems. In such cases, physical engagement, psychological warfare, information warfare, anti-radiation weapons and misleading deceptions of the traditional type as well as disinformation, will be utilised. --- The nature of warfare may change character, wholly or in part. The objectives for manœverable warfare will be to rapidly gain an advantageous starting point for a more precision-directed campaign far away. --- Development of command warfare capability and of non-lethal weapons should lead to increased opportunities for early intervention in a conflict. 44 --- Present technological advances are mainly concentrating on the development of greatly improved intelligence and command capabilities, as well as defence measures against one’s own C3I capability. The most rapid field of development takes place within the field of information technology. --- Precision engagement and protection systems undergo revolutionary changes in the constant race between attack and defence. Development activities based on the transfer of kinetic and chemical energy forms, complemented further by electromagnetic energy, such as lasers and HPM (High Power Microwave). --- Stealth and multi-sensor technologies will continue to be developed. --- In Western countries, demands will successively increase for a minimization of human life and casualties in military operations. This will mean developments in the capability to engage targets with high precision and at great distances, without exposing own forces. 45 In its annual study department II (naval warfare) gives examples of conflict scenarios. 46 From these one can see the different types of resources that will affect Sweden. Points from the section on conflict scenarios:
In a section dealing with policies of non-alignment, 47 the demands for a non-aligned defence are formulated and set out as follows:
In its annual study department III (air warfare) deals with future conflict scenarios that could affect Sweden: 48 When we discuss future conflicts, we often talk about the vulnerability of modern society. Yet it’s not just a question of increased vulnerability but rather changed vulnerability, which we should prepare ourselves for and be able to handle.
The following has been written about crisis management: 49 Successful handling of a conflict is mainly based on the same key words that guide developments in modern air combat forces, namely:
The annual study by department IV (military technology) deals with technologies and techniques for defence in the future. 50 A selection of these aspects is presented below: Continuation of this presentation will refer to revolutionary developments that are happening in the American defence organization. It is natural to have America as a reference since in many respects, this country lies well ahead of Europe. The USA is thus a world leader in technological development and the sole military super power remaining. The USA is also an important collaborative partner, not least from the peace-keeping aspects, which is why it’s important for Europe and Sweden to be familiar with developments in the USA. Questions concerning interoperability that are highly significant in the matter of future operations are becoming more complex in view of American technological development and advances. We can also count on many of the technological innovations developed in America being used by others, thereby in time posing a possible threat for Sweden in the future. This subsequently leads us to the conclusion that several of the prioritized technologies and techniques that the USA is developing, will also become a priority for us, not least because these will contribute to a more effective defence and armed forces. --- Space --- Space now represents an integral part of modern defence among the major powers. With developments occurring within the sphere of space, exploitation of space is bound to play a greater role in miliary operations than ever before. --- In the light of this, that space is so important for military and civilian use, not just for the USA, it’s important for us to understand the opportunities and the limitations of space and to exploit the same. So far, we have literally allowed space to rest high over our heads. Now is probably the time for us to reappraise the situation: not least when it comes to the matter of expansion of our international operations and coming into direct contact with space-bound systems. Such can either be straightforward military or civilian. --- Information technology IT or Information Technology is presently treated as a separate discipline, but since different forms of development date back to the 1950s, it has become an important constituent of our armed forces and defence systems. With IT help, far more complex and advanced weapon systems and platforms can be developed. --- Increasing reliance on computers and networks is accompanied by greater risk of attack. Virtually on a daily basis we hear examples of computer hacking or intrusions. The more a network is interconnected, the more complicated it becomes to safeguard against illegal intrusion. At the same time one could say that in certain cases safety increases, since there is the possibility to reconnect around a problem. Societies in the future will be inundated with different networks. Restrictions between military and civilian networks will partially be erased, not least because some commercial networks and satellites will be exploited by the military. In this type of environment it’s essential that the information received is accurate and quality assured. It will be of great military value to actively be able to interfere with or manipulate an opponent’s command and control or information system. One important measure for the future therefore, will be to safeguard the integrity of different information systems. This applies equally as much to civilian as to military systems. This will probably create a need for one or several organisational units that will have the collective opportunity of monitoring our prioritized information systems, and also to activate effective counter-measures if such systems or networks are intentionally attacked or degraded. RMA - Revolution in Military Affairs --- The RMA, which is now developing, has partly been inspired by the manner in which American society has changed its economy, technologies and business. The entire society is becoming increasingly interconnected in networks, and the actors in these networks react in order to be sufficiently flexible and responsive to market demand and market forces. The following trends in developments can be identified:
--- Exactly how the forthcoming revolution will take place is not yet known. Neither do we know exactly at what rate or speed it will move forward. The direction of travel, however, is already known. A great deal of experimentation will take place during the next decade, aimed, among other things, towards exploitation of the best and most advanced technologies. The American C4ISR architecture Activities with the C4ISR architecture are being prioritized and held under the auspices centrally within the Department of Defense. The C4IsR architecture being developed and which is necessary for implementation of JV 2010, has the following components:
--- Advances within IT are therefore progressing towards fundamental changes in modern warfare. In order to be able to exploit these advances, intensive activities are occurring in the integration of new technological opportunities in different structures and platforms for command and control. In the USA, people talk about networks and network-based warfare (network centric warfare). Networks will thus be a prerequisite for an effective combination of platforms. --- Platforms and weapon systems in an RMA environment. Inheritance As described above, developments are rapidly progressing, even though the risk of an immediate threat has been reduced. This leads to the need to modify older platforms - to enable them to continue to be used. For the major powers, this means complementing with more effective communication systems, precision weapons, etc. For Sweden, this line of reasoning probably means, from the adaptation aspect, that their should be a readiness to upgrade older platforms. To enable effective participation in an RMA environment in the future, it is likely that we must be capable of interacting with or exploiting such systems as exemplified here:
--- The USA - Europe and the RMA --- If we look ahead, then the USA will have a highly developed RMA capability somewhere around the year 2010. Already today, there exist large discrepancies between the USA and Europe regarding capability and interoperability. Europe, by itself, has little chance in catching up with the USA. On the basis of this, two main line alternatives have been sketched for Europe. Either we accept that the USA has an impregnable position in this field and that we must be satisifed with having a mainly non-RMA compatible defence and armed forces for more conventional combat purposes, or we must also try to establish a defence and armed forces based on the RMA concept, through collaboration with the USA. --- Developments worldwide and crises risks When it comes to evaluating which techniques or which technologies will be important in the future, it is natural to take a look at developments in the world at large and the current risks of a conflict or crisis. Through globilisation, the security and welfare of Sweden and Europe, to an increasing extent, is becoming dependent on world events and developments. Sweden therefore has good reason to assess her situation through a broader spectrum of risks and threats. The increasing complexity of global relations make economic problems or other conflicts spread much further than was previously the case. Globilisation of economies and their connection are here to stay. The development of new types of weapons also make it possible for a few individuals to create an effect at great distance or over a wide area. The spreading (dispersion) of weapons of mass destruction (NBC), in other words, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, today probably represent one of the greatest threats, in the aftermath of the Cold War. More than 20 countries presumably have or are developing nuclear capability. And even more countries have access to ballistic or cruise missiles. The forenamed asymmetric threat will continue to increase with time. This probably entails too an increased need for effective defence against similar threats. In recent years, Sweden, to a large degree, has internationalised her national defence and armed forces. This trend is expected to continue and develop. Today, Swedish forces and civilians participate abroad in many missions and activities. The aim is to develop Sweden’s total defence resources with the rising ambition to partake in more peace-keeping and PfP missions and operations. This direction will also have an effect on prioritized technological developments, direction and materiel supplies, since Swedish soldiers and officers are to operate in integrated environments and will be exposed to a broader spectrum of threats. The latter also applies in general to Swedish society. Some tentative conclusionsInternational:
From the Swedish aspect: 54 There are great uncertainties concerning where, when and under which circumstances our total defence will be needed. There is one future war. Uncertainties can be met in two different ways. One way consists of having a core of a multipurpose defence where the level of preparedness is high. The other way is to gradually adapt the defence to changing tasks. The consequences of these views are:
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