A certain strategic idea of France and Europe in the twenty-first century

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The business of a French ‘strategist’ is to be at the heart of national strategic debate and to make it easier for both our countrymen and our partners to understand French defence commitments to reduce risks and face threats, as well as also being in the service of peace and international security. The recently departed (and sorely missed) Pierre Chaunu regretted some twenty years ago that ‘France, tired of grandeur, is looking for increased security and fewer initiatives, responsibilities and adventures’. While it was true in those days, France is today still in the forefront of a group of states which are trying to promote a new system of governance for the planet: one which acknowledges the realities of the twenty-first century, a system of governance which respects the interests of the greatest number. As [the Polish essayist Witold] Gombrowicz noted, to be French is also to be aware of something which is greater than just France itself.

But beyond these external realities there remains a domain in which France has an obligation that remains its priority: as for any other state, to defend its national interests. So in starting this paper it seems appropriate to review French strategic interests and to spark a debate on this theme. Subsequently I propose to examine the question of the recent manoeuvre to stabilize and rebuild Europe after the end the Cold War and the limits of it, and finally, to conclude in proposing a new manoeuvre to achieve the goal of structuring the area from the Atlantic to the Urals and from the North Cape to the Sahel, as General de Gaulle might have defined Europe in the 1960s.

French strategic interests

As an opener, perhaps, three observations on methodology:

- Firstly, it is clear that each country has its own strategic equation, driven by its history, its geography and its own special character. It is this equation which determines its definition of security and forms the basis of its strategic personality.

- As a consequence of this, each state organizes its internal security around a dual contract: a political contract which links together the peoples and territories for which it is responsible, and a social contract which over time becomes the basis of its economic and social legitimacy. The coherence of its national identity rests on this dual contract.

- Finally, each state conducts its foreign policy in a way that is unique.
to itself, a synthesis of three main ingredients: its interests, its values and its responsibilities. It is these that determine its external commitments.

It is under these three headings that one can attempt to sketch out what France’s strategic interests are, and venture to examine the way in which they are currently thought through and organized in order to underpin the security of the country and to influence world affairs.

**France’s strategic equation**

France’s strategic equation is conditioned by its geopolitical position at the western end of the Eurasian landmass. In fact, mainland France lies at the intersection of three major geographic axes. This situation is engraved on our national consciousness; it is something which has been the cause of our successes and our failures, and for many years it has determined our approach to security and power. A fourth axis overarches these three geopolitical axes: the universalist character of our involvement in world affairs. This conceptual pyramid defines the strong strategic personality of our country.

Some additional remarks may help to further clarify this geopolitical thinking. France lies at the western end of the continental plain linking the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals along the 50th parallel. Lacking a solid natural frontier, France has long established its lines of defence facing east: it has built fortifications, established lines of defence and concluded alliances with the Grand Turk or the Tsar. For France, the threat came from the east.

To this continental east-west axis was generally associated a further, opposite one: the transatlantic axis, the relationship with the North American continent. To France this western axis was the one of reinforcements, strategic manoeuvre and depth; an axis where French enterprises generally met British ones; an axis of competition but also the *Entente cordiale*. For France, salvation has frequently come from the west.

And then perpendicular to these two, there has always been the southern axis – the Mediterranean and, via this sea and the Suez Canal, Africa and Asia. This axis gave France the freedom needed for the exercise of political influence and strategic breadth of vision. For France, adventure and prosperity have often been found to the south. Many times it has been the French strategic priority because the South was the trigger of the continental or oceanic stability or the alternate solution to escape to obstruction.

It is this tri-axial system that, implicitly, informs our national thinking. In former times it was all about issues such as our alliances and our strategic safeguards, notably facing east. For the past 50 years, however, France has no longer been in the front line of continental or maritime conflicts, and its strategic interests are no longer threatened in the first instance at its own physical frontiers.

**The foundations of internal security**

The foundations of our internal security are anchored, basically, in the vigour of a French national identity that has been gradually fashioned over a thousand years – initially Christian, then republican and secular, and now multiple. It is this identity (which we love to question so much) that goes a long way in explaining French
specificity when we confront issues such as communitarianism or regional integration. Because the great importance that we attach to national unity is the consequence of our history: it is what doubtless distinguishes us from our European neighbours. It is, moreover, this characteristic tendency which confers a historic dimension and a long-lasting political character to the response developed progressively by our country to risks and dangers. This response is a global security strategy which has been essentially unchanged since the edict of 1959: it has as its central theme ‘resistance to national crises’, what is now referred to as national resilience.

Some major advantages illustrate our national cohesion, which we see as a strategic imperative:

- Our current demographic vitality, which currently gives France the prospect of parity in population with Germany towards 2035.
- State-led industrial dynamism, a Colbertist legacy which is not doing at all badly in sustaining the economic fundamentals of French growth during the current period of systemic crisis in world financial governance.

This internal dimension of France’s strategic stability forms part of its vital imperatives, of the crux of its identity, and of the basis of its national consensus. This self-aware internal power, supported by a jealously guarded sovereignty, characterises our country. Any factor that threatens or weakens this dimension is for France of strategic interest.

Interests, values and responsibilities: the motor of French external action

The objectives here are well known:

- **French security interests.** The strengthening of European defence and the stabilization of our immediate neighbourhood.
- **Values.** The promotion of peace and security, and involvement in development while preserving diversity.
- **Lastly, responsibilities.** To promote appreciation of the pertinence of the French principles of international organisation, based as they are on a strong institutional, multilateral and cultural heritage.

These lie at the heart of the wide-ranging strategic survey in the latest White Paper on national defence and security (2008). The strategic debate falls under the three general headings sketched out above. We are looking to situate the questions of the European project, Atlantic solidarity and our commitment to the UN more clearly in this overall framework, because these three themes adequately explain our current strategic options:

- The autonomy of decision-making and action that lies at the core of our emphasis on technological sovereignty (specifically in the fields of nuclear weaponry and space).
- National influence and prestige, as demonstrated by wide French involvement in the UN, G8/G20/WTO and Francophonie.
- European cooperation and Atlantic solidarity which has turned defence against our neighbours into
collective security (good neighbourliness – and regional integration policies).

There seems little doubt that from these major national options a certain concept of Europe and globalization results as a continuation of a certain idea of French security.

We continue to combine and prioritize these major options in the twenty-first century world, because the strong points and the constraints that underlie France’s strategic posture also reveal our country’s strengths and weaknesses. They explain why the strategic model which France has developed continues today to make our country a special case. As we have said, it is a model which has evolved with time and experience. It is based on geopolitical and human realities, and it is modest in terms of forces and means: France accounts for just one per cent of the world’s population and three per cent of its turnover.

Nevertheless, this is a model that gives the country a real freedom of action in the world far in excess of what might be inferred from mere statistics. And it is the familiarity with these accepted contradictions, with this imbalance between ambitions and means, which defines the particular character of French strategic interests.

This is the paradox at the heart of the power which is proclaimed, and of the influence maintained, by France in spite of some obvious weaknesses. It is the key to the special nature of French strategy which allows our country to punch above its weight in world affairs; to participate actively in achieving a new system of organization and governance of a future planet of nine billion people; and tenaciously to defend its interests, its values, its place and its ranking in world affairs. France’s cardinal strategic priority today must be to preserve this special reality, which derives from our most profound identity.

France’s strategic history has been defined by the advantages and constraints of its geopolitical position. Like many other countries, France’s history has been a consequence of its geography. That accounts for its current strategic personality, and still conditions its reflexes when it comes to homeland security and the defence of the population. Nobody should forget that, like the countries which surround it, France bases its actions in the field of security on the defence of its interests and values, not only as it sees them today, but also with regard to the experience acquired across the centuries and the responsibilities it has inherited from its historic past.

Based on the above approach, one can understand the deep French frustration at European development. And it isn’t difficult to demonstrate that the current crisis gripping the European Union in its search for a genuine strategic position is the result of the confusion which reigned ten years after the Cold War. Even after the enlargement of NATO and of the European Union, the two did not adopt separate strategic positions but remained linked in their Cold War positions. One now enrols the other. This anomaly persists and continues to undermine relations between the United States and the European Union. It is the main theme of the next part of this paper.

Strategic manoeuvring in Eurasia

The French strategist Castex best describes the importance of upstream strategic manoeuvre -manoeuvre to create a favourable situation.6 He presented this notion as an artistic feat appealing to all the
treasures of the mind: intelligence, knowledge, will and imagination. It requires the careful determination of a “primary objective” to which everything is subordinated, including national security. The aim is to pursue a security which must not be underestimated, too demanding or treated lightly, as this would jeopardize the achievement of the target or even replace it.

In the post-Cold War world and in the so-called war on terror, tough questions are being asked about the strategic manoeuvrings of both Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Many have identified haphazard strategic planning as leading to a risky ‘Euro-Atlantic’ strategic posture, a position created by incessant tactical manoeuvring. This disturbing reality can be illustrated with two examples that affect us today.

Firstly, the European strategic manoeuvre. It began immediately after the Second World War with the primary objective of putting an end to the tragic history of continental Europe, the scene of many endless conflicts leading to two world wars and its ruin. Whilst the initial design of this concept was touched up in the 1950s, the original approach was roughly sketched in 1947 with the Western Union. It was outlined more clearly in the episode of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952 and the Paris agreements of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954, finally materializing in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The manoeuvre involved in reality a double move comprising a response and a wager. The response was to look closer to the base, to the economic, social and political integration of the continental enemies of yesterday into a caring and prosperous community. The wager was to postulate that the general European interest would always prevail over national interests. For the manoeuvre to succeed in the context of a very tense situation, security was needed. This came in the form of a combined guarantee from Washington by the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance with its military organisation, NATO. This combination brought economic and military security to the free people of the European continent.

This European strategic posture lasted over 40 years. It even appeared to be reaching its end as the Cold War ended and in 1991 the EU consolidated into 15 member states assuring each member of its individual security. This was indeed its main objective. However, things got progressively more disorganized, undoubtedly because NATO had not considered in advance the consequences of a security victory, a ‘cold victory’ without combat against the Soviet system which had been the fundamental reason for cohesion and validated the methods used to ensure European security. The European Union, which had been established based on fate and interests as an appropriate response to the national divisions of continental Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and had wagered on a common future, now had to consider sharing with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe subjugated by the USSR. The simple questions about Europe’s borders, of East and West, of overall governance and the nature of the power required to sustain this new union were carefully kept in the shadows as the Union was not prepared for the opening. At the same time, the security provided by NATO had secretly changed its centre of gravity and also its nature. In a move to exploit the cold victory, the Atlantic Alliance would leave the ocean of the same name and move to the borders of Asia. The European strategic manoeuvre was greatly affected and
the freedom of action of the Union was seriously curtailed.

The Atlantic strategic manoeuvre was diverted after the demise of the USSR as another main objective loomed: the containment of rising Chinese power – a strategy elaborated in Washington. The partnerships developed in central Asia were one arm of the pincers of which the other was the alliance of North-East Asia (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). In this new manoeuvre that had not altered but only delayed the surprise attack of 11 September 2001, the issue of Central Europe faded fast. The European Union that had been the subject of the initial manoeuvre found itself suddenly enrolled through its security guarantor, NATO, to be the object of another manoeuvre with multiple variations designed elsewhere. It entailed a battle against strategic disrupters (the challenge of ‘aggressive sanctuary’ with nuclear proliferation was raised in Brussels in 1994) also the Euro-Atlantic integration just steps away from the Russian Federation and of the security of major energy reserves in Central and Eastern Asia. Then came GWOT, the ‘global war on terror’ and political modernization forced by a Greater Middle East stretching from Nouakshott to Peshawar and situated on the route from Florida to China.

Today, this multifaceted second manoeuvre has replaced the first and eroded the results and has stopped the former manoeuvre from perfecting its results on Continental Europe (the former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is having difficulty in achieving the completion of the European edifice and the question of EU enlargement remains suspended on the Turkish issue, which is mostly being discussed elsewhere). This manoeuvre has also by extension affected military security as NATO, which was yesterday victorious without passing the test of combat with the USSR, is today weakened by serious operational difficulties encountered outside its normal scope in Afghanistan where its military capacity and authority are seriously undermined.

The changing of the main objective assigned to the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ strategic manoeuvre will eventually help to undermine the two multinational instruments forged for the success of the initial operation, i.e. NATO and the European Union. It was in this context rather than to show solidarity and with a certain candour that France chose the 2009 summit in Strasbourg-Kehl to resume its full military role in an integrated NATO, thus contributing to definitively linking the original principal objective, a strategic Europe and the security which was necessary for it, but with NATO remaining subordinate to help creating a strategic Europe.

It is understandable that some may consider the French move to be anachronistic and naive. It was seen as unnecessarily altering the structure of Europe and causing a rift in the Atlantic Alliance.11 The main objective of change made in the late 1980s, without sufficient strategic analysis by the European side today, weighs heavily on the scope and ambition of the European Union, now subject to external manoeuvres that do not directly serve its cohesion and stability and do not necessarily satisfy its interests.

But back to Castex and the strategic manoeuvre that he so shrewdly conceptualized by taking care to illustrate it through the recurring strategic posture taken by all Russian rulers. It is the object of his brilliant essay ‘Genghis Khan to Stalin, or the Vicissitudes of a Strategic Manoeuvre (1205 to 1935)’.12 It is a historical reflection
that reminds us of the crucial importance of geopolitical factors, history, geography and culture in the strategies of nations. It reveals the continuing sway of Russia between East and West, Asia and Europe. It is in the same way that the current masters of the Kremlin are divided today, between the same necessities to articulate in both areas and to be assured enough in one area in order to face the other. Whilst Russian territory was carefully consolidated in the nineteenth century up to the Pacific coast, the vast majority of the inexorably declining population lives to the West of the Urals. The gains that were enabled by the traditional sway between East and West are increasingly uncertain.

But reading Castex means understanding that the main objective of any strategy in Russia since Genghis Khan has ultimately been a determined action to support the West whilst having security in Asia, mainly in China. Today, after having scored three brutal shots at Western companies in its traditional strategic space, Russia’s Medvedev and Putin seem to be, relatively speaking, preparing a new strategic manoeuvre of great magnitude towards the West. This will permit Russia to combine its principally Western identity with its mainly Asian positioning in the division of responsibilities, interests and strategic resources from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Will we know how to offer a response to the Russian Federation by way of a new European strategic manoeuvre? One that is sufficiently ambitious to articulate to the East the relationship between the Atlantic alliance and North America, in Eastern Europe the pan-European development from the Atlantic to the Urals and in the South the Mediterranean Union with all the people of North Africa. Should we not be preparing a new architecture in which continental Europe would be the pivot – a new manoeuvre to consolidate the continent and the puzzle of globalization through the successful experience of regional integration? What would be the safety of such a manoeuvre? Vis-à-vis the South, would it be to the East with a new OSCE? Vis-à-vis the East, how would freedom of action be consolidated? That is the core of the next and last part of this paper.

Defining Europe’s strategic identity

One feature that stands out from the 2008 French White Paper on security and national defence is the strategic priority accorded to the arc of crisis extending from Mauritania to Pakistan. This unstable axis seems today to monopolize our thoughts on security and defence. Large though it may loom in the quest to protect France against the dangers which this arc breeds and however necessary France’s contribution to the European continent’s stability, it must not dominate French thinking to the exclusion of all else. In particular, it must not divert us from the central strategic approach, launched a half-century ago, of the creation of a common European security and prosperity identity. This approach was, of course, a response to the tragedy of the European wars of previous centuries. It was also based on the calculation that a common European interest would outweigh national interests and create a community with a future along with our neighbours.

We could, however, claim that with the end of the Cold War, the construction of Europe has deviated from its initial path as demonstrated above. That it has in fact given way to a wider transatlantic movement intended to modernize, secure and
control a wide corridor running from Florida to Central Asia, in accordance with the Greater Middle East rhetoric pushed by the George W. Bush administration. Have the successive enlargements of NATO and the European Union of the last decade not been conducted with this more or less implicit motivation? Certainly, they have brought together states which the Cold War had ranged against each other under the same democratic and economic umbrella and which the end of that era liberated from totalitarian political and ideological constraints. But for some, they also meant contributing to an enlarged Western camp aimed at confronting a new, latent antagonism from an intrusive Asia, with a resurgent and threatening champion in the form of China. And on the route from America to Asia, which passes through the Mediterranean, it was necessary to engage with an Arab/Muslim society discontented with its social and political conditions; a Middle Eastern region containing energy resources vital for the development of the planet; the borders of an Asia which still retained the unstable vestiges of an Ottoman Empire dismantled nearly a century before, and a failing Soviet Empire.

**Building a European strategic space**

The arc of crisis generally considered in France as part of the Western world is the ill-governed weak link which illustrates this analysis; a link which touches on four continents in various stages of development: America, Africa, Europe and Asia – a link which crosses the Mediterranean and the Sahel, the southern shore of that other Mediterranean which is the Sahara.

We should perhaps take a more static view that is more centred on the European continent rather than this transatlantic vision, which has its counterpart in a transpacific concept linking America to the strategic triangle formed by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This would mean readopting the concept of considering the European strategic space as extending from the Atlantic to the Urals and from the North Cape to the Sahel. This approach has a lot to recommend it from the point of view of the security of our country and of Europe.

And so, and without responding directly to the implicit question of the viability of the European structure authorized by the new Lisbon treaty, let us sketch out some thoughts on three subjects essential to our security: the collective management of the peripheral security of the European continent, the definition of Europe’s frontiers and Euro-American strategic coordination.

**European good neighbourliness**

It is important to recall that the European powers made war principally amongst themselves over the centuries and frequently over matters of territorial sovereignty or national competition. Also, when the neighbour at one’s frontier is no longer an enemy but first and foremost a partner in the European Union, Europeans no longer see enemies at the gate and manage their borders with frontier controls, procedures and partnerships. They are easily accused of cowardice and pacifism, whereas in fact this is dearly bought wisdom, for which they should be congratulated. Their diminished military spending and will to fight, reduced in favour of the ideals which inspire their societies, are criticized, whereas they understand better than anyone that lasting peace is not the silence of weapons achieved by military victory but
neighbourliness between different peoples and development built on common interests. This safe posture is today the only one possible to accompany the current so-called Arab Spring.

So today’s Europeans focus on their immediate neighbourhood and seek to create around themselves a process of secure development which facilitates good neighbourly relations and enables them to participate in a general prosperity. This, therefore, is how they approach the arc of crisis defined above, centred on questions of judicial cooperation to limit risk, and also of administrative development to promote modernization, but less inclined than their American allies to change regimes and reconstruct states by military force. Vestiges of empire still survive and mark the periphery of Europe: those of the Soviet Empire to the east, the Ottoman Empire to the south, the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Western Balkans and the colonial empires in North Africa. These pose problems which they are tempted to address from a practical angle in the American style. In fact, it is easier to separate them from history, geography and culture, and to link them with the great issues of the modern world such as the conflict of civilizations, terrorism, fundamentalism, etc., and apply proven generic remedies such as the reform of security structures, the denationalization of security policies and the adoption of market-oriented economies. Following European experience, it is helpful to foster the development of regional common interests, a degree of military moderation and the joint development of a collective security, justice and equity space. This can provide a clearer vision of the future to neighbours and be integrated into a European process they all want to be part of.

The coherence of European geopolitics

The European Union has no frontiers and intends to diminish or suspend its enlargement, possibly for a considerable time. One may regret that a pause is happening now, in midstream as it were, when the Union at 27 has not achieved a geopolitical posture comprehensible to the outside world or internally, and is scarcely viable from a security point of view. In principle, the door is open for all the countries of Europe, but the EU also offers partnership status to some neighbours; Turkey has even become a full European economic actor without being a member of the EU. But can a group whose nature is strategic and whose declared ambition is to bring a form of guaranteed collective prosperity to 500 million citizens do without borders? To pose the question is to answer it. Must we continue to exist without speaking about this? No collective security system can develop properly if the territory it covers is either informal or half-formed and temporary. To be concerned about the arc of crisis to its south but not to provide the EU with permanent, safe and recognized frontiers is hardly coherent. The current preventive approach which concerns itself primarily with future tensions originating in Asia must not take precedence over the business of organizing the European continent.

There is little point in repeating the discussion over the Turkish question. But let us not forget that the continental mass of Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Urals, with France in the West and Russia in the East, and this continental mass is flanked by two closed seas: the Baltic in the north and the Mediterranean in the south, whose riparian peoples have in each case had a destiny closely tied to the European
continent. Let us simply note that the EU at present only partially includes the countries which belong to these large regions of European geopolitical interest. We can only conclude that we will not be able to find a durable collective security system until we have finally solved the jigsaw containing the nearly one billion people that this geopolitical approach directly concerns.

Clearly, a new collective approach is necessary on a planet which will peak at nine billion inhabitants in 30 or 40 years’ time. This will consist of getting the transatlantic relationship in perspective, along with its embodiment in NATO, finding a more integrated transmediterranean formula which must draw on Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, taking up the Union torch in the Mediterranean and also developing a new Eurasian political structure in conjunction with the Russian Federation. The task of developing this architecture cannot be left to a NATO with a damaged reputation which mistrusts all forms of pan-European security architecture and which nowadays functions as the principal vector of an approach directed almost entirely towards Asia. It is clear that the Turkish question is not so central.

The direction of European power

The Western world has manifestly achieved the victory of liberty and enterprise over nationalism, imperialism and the ideologies which sparked off the great crises and conflicts of previous centuries. But today’s world, whose population has tripled since the end of the Second World War, has diversified its businesses in spite of the information technology revolution and globalization, along with the tendency to homogenization which these encourage. We are probably at the end of an historic era and the systemic crises which we have been facing since the end of the Cold War derive mainly from political (the state), economic (liberalism), ethical and social models which Western society has promoted. We do not yet see a glimmer on the horizon of a new international order to replace Yalta and the UN, both probably out of date. The crisis of this ‘zero-polar’ moment, as Simon Serfaty has termed it, may last a long time. It is already testing, and will continue to do so, solidarity between Europeans and Americans. It will challenge their interests, their values and their responsibilities as it is already shaking intra-European solidarity, and will doubtless soon do so among Americans.

At this particular conjuncture, which will erode, change the perspectives of and perhaps even undo the Western world as we have known it, it is important that the personalities of each country can be given free reign, their priorities declared and their strategic affinities organized. Today, it is customary to mock the European project and to predict its failure, just as it is fashionable to criticize the ineffectiveness of the Obama administration. Let us leave each of the Atlantic partners to organize itself on the road to power which it has chosen or which its history and geography dictate, and coordinate our moves so that the world is safer and the common values on which our Western societies are founded prevail.

What we need on this side of the Atlantic is the collective security of our European space, guaranteed by identified common regional interests, not an anti-missile shield conceived elsewhere and capable of neutralizing an attack coming from an arc of crisis whose tragedy is primarily socio-economic. We need to create a region of secure energy
supplies with our Asian neighbours and a region of economic co-prosperity with our North African ones. We must encourage the development of a European community which will not be a besieged fortress but a space whose diversity has been integrated into an architecture sufficiently flexible to absorb any differences in development. And at the heart of this community, we must allow the closer grouping of those who wish to combine their futures—as France and Germany regularly evoke—in a Carolingian union, or cooperate militarily for specific purposes, as Britain and France have recently decided to do.

Is the EU capable of such a metamorphosis? Probably, unless we bind it up in a straitjacket not of its own making and which scarcely gives it the chance at present to play a decisive role in solving the current systemic disorder.

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To conclude, I would like to put forward these themes for consideration by calling for a genuine strategic debate to clarify the country’s choices and options. To develop a national security strategy in the following years enabling us to face today’s challenges would be to respond appropriately to the following difficult questions: how to allot a portion of our country’s national wealth to security logically compatible with the economic situation and sufficient to contain the security tensions which affect us; how to make available a capability for external action and how to organize the European strategic space in a safe and durable way. To develop and adopt a collective European security posture, we need a common robust answer to the following questions: who we are, where we live and what we want. And to be able to answer these embarrassing questions we first need a European geostrategic vision. Much has still to be said on these matters.

But rather than another new White Paper on security and defence, it seems to me we need to reconsider collectively our global strategy and reintegrate the generic arc of crisis into an approach to regional security with the prime aim of consolidating the European space in a dialogue with our neighbours and on the basis of our own historical experience. This paper is offered as a contribution to this necessary effort.

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Notes

1. This paper combines and reorganises previous essays as building blocks of a vision elaborated progressively and published here for the first time as a contribution to a more dynamic strategic debate on the future of a European Union which seems today paralysed and unable to define itself in the globalized world. See A) RDN January 2010 XXXX; B) EUFAJ March 2010 XXX and French special issue July 2009 Revue défense nationale et sécurité collective. C) RDN February 2011 XXXX.


5. Editor’s note: the term Francophonie refers to the large group of states and governments that have French in common.


7. See previous note, p. 2.

8. See, p. 13: ‘La sûreté est par conséquent l’âme de la manoeuvre, et ce n’est que lorsqu’elle est obtenue que l’on peut prétendre à posséder sa liberté d’action, en raison du lien intime qui existe entre les deux notions. C’est là un principe fondamental. La sûreté est l’une des bases essentielles, l’une des conditions nécessaires à la liberté d’action.’


12. See pp. 316 ff.

13. See the detailed description by Castex on Soviet security action towards the East from 1919 to 1925, ranging from Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India, to Japan pp. 329-35. One can there find analogies to the preoccupations of the Kremlin of today.
