Without Operational Thoughts

Summary of Olof Santesson's article in RSAWSPJ no 6 2001.

As a former Deputy Supreme Commander, Vice Admiral Frank Rosenius gives a rather surprising picture of the decision-making process behind the current restructuring of the Swedish Armed Forces. It is true that something had to be done about the quality of our army units. This was illustrated by the extra resources needed to deploy a single mechanised field battalion in Bosnia on a peace mission. Lack of money and changed circumstances after the end of the Cold War, however, led to a hasty process where very little of the Army’s organisation was left intact. Rosenius notes that not enough effort was put into the discussions about the need for a continued deterrence capability against possible future threats. But it seems all too clear that our politicians were not the least interested in the possibility that Sweden might in the near future, or in fact ever, need try to repel a larger attack.

It is really frightening that there was no time for the politicians and the Joint Staff of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces to reflect in some depth on operational matters, i.e. how we should best use our few remaining units (in the Army only one divisional staff and four mechanised brigades) now and in the foreseeable future. There is also the depressing fact that Sweden will not have the resources to acquire the amount of competence that the doctrine of adaptability presupposes. The whole idea of growth, if and when necessary, has been botched.

Have we started from the wrong end, tearing down before creating a clear picture of what to build? That’s the truly embarrassing question.