The Defence Resolutions of 1992 and 1996 - The Ultimate Outcome of Faulty Strategic Thinking and Lack of Reflection

Summary of the article by Carl Björeman and Helge Gard in RSAWSPJ no 6 2001.

This article is a brief analysis of the main reasons for the ongoing decline of our defence capability. The Armed Forces Headquarters planning documents give clear indications that the resulting Defence Resolutions were, in actual fact, not based on a strategy realistic or even budgetwise possible for a small country like ours - given the available economic resources.

In 1992 Sweden chose a defence structure which in reality cost about 15 billion Swedish crowns more per year than allocated in the budget. The overall strategic idea was that we alone should defend our country. A huge air force was to protect our cities, our infrastructure and, in addition, guarantee freedom of movement for our ground and naval forces.

This strategy was not in harmony with the ongoing technical development or with our economic resources. Optimistic belief in weapons systems dating from the 1980s in combination with a tremendous underestimate of cost made it possible to pass the 1992 Defence Resolution. Those who were responsible for this decision were at that time not fully aware of certain economic and technical facts.

But as early as the first half of 1995, both the Headquarters of the Armed Forces and the politicians knew that extra funding amounting to some 10 billion Swedish crowns per year was needed. The fact that the Defence Resolution of 1992 had been seriously underfunded was taken very little notice of.

Parliament decided in 1996 - following the Supreme Commander’s recommendation - to buy an additional 64 JAS 39 Gripen aircraft and to proceed with the mechanisation of Army units. These and other similar measures added to the imbalance of the budget even more - thus considerably reducing our defence capability - and this is what lay behind the disastrous Defence Resolution in 2000.