Revolution in Military Affairs - Myth or Reality?

Summary of Lars Ulfving's article in RSAWSPJ no 2 2001.

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), as well as its future applications, is nowadays being widely discussed within the Swedish Armed Forces. It has in fact by some experts come to be regarded as a viable solution to the majority of possible future military threats against Sweden. This, however, raises some pertinent questions that have to be answered, such as:

• Is the RMA concept something entirely new or is it just different?
• Is "revolution" really the best or even the most appropriate term for this new concept?

In this essay Lars Ulfving intends to examine and discuss this recent revolution in warfare. I will further contend and try to show that the RMA is not so much a revolution as a fast developing evolution using available information technologies (IT).

For practical purposes, however, it might serve us well to adopt the attitude that what we are dealing with now is first and foremost an entirely new approach, a unique "strategic opportunity", a paradigmatic shift which at its best truly reflects the state of the art of modern warfare.

My presentation will centre upon the following two arguments:

• Shifts of paradigms have been known to take place throughout the history of warfare with some regular frequency.
• If the RMA is to be labelled a revolution, this term would at present suggest a future (virtual) battlespace model rather than a traditional, historic battlefield.

One of the three major components of the RMA is the Dominant Battlespace Awareness (DBA) element. However, modern technology will certainly lead not only to great advantages, but also to disadvantages or uncertainties. A case in point is when, in a conventional conflict, one of the belligerent powers is supposedly technologically inferior and thus cannot be expected to wage war on equal terms. Here, the Russian concept of maskirovka is still very much in the forefront and can be used to advantage to open up for asymmetrical warfare. Conflicts other than real war pose a particular problem. When warring parties or factions cannot be distinguished from one another by uniform and/or equipment, and when, in addition, they tend to mingle freely with the civilian population, it becomes increasingly difficult to tell who is friend and who is foe, even when resorting to advanced modern surveillance systems. Military geography and harsh weather conditions are also to be considered. In short: The battlefield - virtual or otherwise - is today not as transparent as some would assert. Thus, for instance, the successful use of arms of precision presupposes accurate target acquisition. The conflict in the Balkans is a case in point.

In Ulfving's opinion, today’s battlefield, in RMA terms, consists of more than three physical dimensions. There is, in addition, an "immaterial" dimension whose existence is mainly due to modern information technology. It is in this cyberspace that we find the virtual or imaginary communities that can do battle using hitherto unheard-of weapons of mass destruction. In this plethora of information technology we are likely to find the most complicated forms possible of asymmetric warfare. Also, it is very difficult indeed to determine who is or who is not the aggressor.

To sum up: Lars Ulfving's conclusion is that it is in this "immaterial" world of virtual communities that we will find the real RMA. The following vitally important question then remains to be answered: How are we to deal with an aggressor who can operate at will either within or from within these communities, an aggressor to whom all means are available, both conventional and others and who is not bound by national boundaries. Alas, he has no answer to this question.