Abstract of Olof Santesson's article in RSAWSPJ no 1 2001.
Sweden lost its eastern half, Finland, in one of her worst fought wars. Why was there such a disastrous outcome? Our main source of knowledge is the nine volumes published by the history department of the Swedish General Staff, "Sveriges krig åren 1808-1809", a work which, however, mostly deals with strictly military operations and which finds the surrender of the fortress of Suomenlinna (Sveaborg) the determining factor behind the defeat.
Recent research, however - e.g. in a book published by the Swedish Army Museum, "Between the Imperial Eagles", and even more explicit in a couple of articles treating of Sweden and Finland in the Swedish Journal "Historisk Tidskrift" - stresses the importance of the supply problem. Both the Swedes and the Russians found it difficult to manoeuvre their armies in sparsely inhabited country. But it seems that the Russians managed rather better in a decentralized mode than the Swedes with their centralized supply system.
Especially from a supply point of view, however, the Swedish King, Gustavus IV Adolphus, was not wrong in trying to advance reinforcements from the sea behind the Russian advanced lines. But his forces were too weak. Practically alone, Sweden was not in a position to push back an invading great power.