Russia's Capability for Limited Operations with Long-Range Forces

Abstract of Helge Löfstedt's article in RSAWSPJ no 1 2001.

Mig-31

The ability to counter an air-to-ground attack is an essential task for the Swedish Armed Forces. In the Scandinavian region, Russia is considered the prime source of instability and insecurity. The strength of the Russian Air Force was reduced in the 1990s - as were the Russian Armed Forces in general. This trend could, however, change.

There is a rapid development of precision weapons, and Russia has the resources and the ability to acquire a variety of such weapons. If that occurs, and should the Russian Air Force again reach its former level of normal maintenance of materiel and training of personnel, there might well be a considerable shift in its present capacity for air superiority.

The result of the considerations in this article is presented below.The figures will develop into a threat only after a political upheaval. To guard against that, it is necessary to give political as well as material support for a continued Russian democratic evolution. However, in the final analysis, we will also need a Swedish Air Defence.

Supposed development of Russian air-to-ground regiments for action in Scandinavia

Years 2000 Years 2005 Years 2010 Years 2015

Number of regiments ? 1-? 1-6 1-6

Attack capacity per regiment (relative increase) 1,0 1,5 3 5

Guided weapons 5 % 10 % 25 % 50 %

Air-to-air capacity (relative increase) 1,0 1,1 1,3 1,5

	Years 2000	Years 2005	Years 2010	Years 2015
Number of regiments	?	1-?	1-6	1-6
Attack capacity per regiment (relative increase)	1,0	1,5	3	5
Guided weapons	5 %	10 %	25 %	50 %
Air-to-air capacity (relative increase)	1,0	1,1	1,3	1,5