
ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF WAR SCIENCES · AUTUMN SYMPOSIUM 28 OCTOBER 2026

The United States, Europe and Sweden before and after the American midterm elections

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Security policy questions that the academies, not least the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, keep returning to: a brief overview

Seven questions recur in the academies' work. They are the point of departure for the report, and on none of them can the Academy be neutral:

1. **Ukraine** how the war ends, and what the outcome means for Europe
2. **The rule of law** the threat to it, also in the United States, and what it does to the alliance
3. **NATO and the EU** Sweden is a member of both; how the two fit together
4. **The Nordic and Baltic region** the circle in which commitments are actually made
5. **People's lives** climate, environment and megatrends pointing the wrong way
6. **Systems collapse** crises that trigger one another in the global order
7. **Two wars** Ukraine and the Middle East, increasingly interlinked

DETERRING THE LARGER WAR

The question beneath all the others. A global nuclear war is no victory but a loss for all of humanity; deterrence can never be dismissed, however the war in Ukraine develops.

STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE

Society, supply and flows. The two tasks belong together; the final report therefore placed deterrence and resilience side by side in its title.

The stance is not neutral, but not polemical either. The question in the report is: what can Sweden and Europe do?

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Four concepts carry the report, and what is said about the war is part of the war

1 Independent and dependent variable

The United States is the independent variable in relation to Europe and Sweden, the dependent ones, that is, those whose room for manoeuvre is to be explained. But the United States is at the same time dependent on its own domestic politics and on what the economy allows (Part I, sections 1–2).

2 Actor and arena

Every country and organisation is both an actor with a direction and an arena where domestic politics, the economy and outside influence meet. A guard against the slide that says “Trump” when the matter is Hormuz, or “systems collapse” when the matter is a single negotiating somersault.

3 The leader’s situation

What do leaders do to win elections, and what do they then do to carry out their policies? Strategy is not enough; the situation, from regime survival to election campaign, decides. Part I’s reading rule: test every foreign policy move against its domestic political function (section 6).

4 Capacity and effect

Europe’s GDP and defence spending are capacity; effect is what can be achieved, and when. That is why the time axis is central, and why every conclusion in Part I and Part II is given a time horizon.

What is said is part of the war

Statements about war and peace are meant to influence the outcome, as propaganda analysis showed already during the Second World War. Academic language helps, but gives no neutrality: values cannot be thought away (Myrdal). The points of departure are therefore stated, and evidence is kept apart from judgement.

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From SV-A-R to SV-A-R 2.0: ten years of shifts, and six new ones since the final report

- **2014** Maidan and Crimea
- **2015** The migration crisis
- **2017** Trump I
- **2020** Covid-19
- **2021** Biden: the withdrawal from Afghanistan
- **2022** Full-scale invasion; Nord Stream
- **2025** Trump II; Vance in Munich on AI
- **Feb 2026** The final report; the Iran war begins
- **3 Nov 2026** The midterm elections

Six shifts that justify the follow-up

1. **China into the picture**
   Enabler of the war against Ukraine (jet engines for drones). Drone swarms controlled by AI agents: a new form of weapon of mass destruction? The actors include the technology giants.

2. **Domestic politics is decided by how people are doing**
   Petrol prices, inflation, corruption. Hybrid influence has limits. In Sweden, defence issues ranked low in the election; awareness of the phases of war has to be built.

3. **Ukraine is helping us**
   The dependence is mutual. Ukraine and Russia are Europe's most war-experienced countries; American experience lies further back.

4. **The time axis to 2030**
   Better after 2030 in many scenarios, but the period until then is critical: logistics to the Baltic states across the Baltic Sea, finite resources (the Swedish National Audit Office).

5. **American capacity, not only will**
   The final report was written with the Iran war as a risk; now deliveries are committed until around 2030 (O13).

6. **What is said is an indicator**
   A sanctions act against Russia in the same week that Putin is invited to the G20: tracked as data, not as chance.

The Academy's projects moved from the space of possible outcomes (how the defence could be rebuilt) to the outcome of crisis after crisis. New structures: the Global South, China–Russia, American capacity limits in Asia, Japan and South Korea going their own way.

The structure of the report: Part I sets the premises, Part II tests what they require

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PART I · SAHLIN · 14 SECTIONS · O1–O14

The United States and Europe: independent and dependent variables

- The goal seems stable, the means do not; the question is whether a transactional ally is a credible guarantor (O1–O2)
- Two wars as a linked pair of risks; the hemisphere and China as conditioning factors; global systems collapse as the frame
- Systemic risk, a condition not an episode, “lame duck” as acceleration (O3, O5, O6)
- Capacity is dated to around 2030; two clocks for the economy (O13, O14)
- Since the final report: from unpredictable actor to unreliable guarantor, from restoration to condition

PART II · LUNDIN · 11 SECTIONS · E1–E11

Europe and Sweden before and after the midterm elections

- The final report's architecture holds: integration, differentiated autonomy, Sweden as a bridge, dependence as leverage
- Timings and instruments have changed: the 2027–2030 window closer, New START gone, a Franco-Swedish steering group
- Capacity constrains as much as will; Article 5 planning starts from the day count (E2, E10)
- The bottleneck is on the procurement side; the rules-based order is a security matter but presupposes others' compliance (E8, E9)
- Every conclusion for action can be traced to a premise in Part I

NOW	Economic defence and readiness below the threshold: what must exist tomorrow
2027–2030	The window of vulnerability: what must be ready before the Russian clock catches up
DECADES	Economic security: what preserves the prosperity on which defence rests

Three panels on 28 October (the United States, Europe, Sweden) mirror the architecture. The symposium is a check-point; version 8 is completed shortly after the election on 3 November, when the marked election-dependent passages are rewritten within a week.

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OVERARCHING FRAME: GLOBAL SYSTEMS COLLAPSE – the erosion of the rules-based order

USA
affects Europe, but depends on its own domestic politics, electoral calendar and capacity (economy, industry)

→

Two wars
affect Europe and Sweden as intervening variables: the Middle East/Hormuz and Ukraine, where American decisions hit European security and supply fastest

→

Europe · Sweden
what the report sets out to explain and analyse; Europe and Sweden are seen both as actors and as arenas

PART I – Analytical foundation
- The United States as independent and dependent variable; the American economy; ends and means
- The election, “lame duck” and the question after the election
- Two wars, the Western Hemisphere, China and global systems collapse
- Fourteen conclusions to plan by

PART II – Options for action
- The final report's conclusions tested against the situation since February
- Dependence, autonomy domain by domain, Europe's own unpredictability, resilience, multilateralism
- Sweden as a bridge; four scenarios; three horizons
- Six measures that pay off in every scenario

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The United States: the goals seem to hold, the means do not. A working hypothesis, not a conclusion

"The question is no longer whether the United States is unpredictable, but whether a consistent yet transactional ally is still a reliable guarantor – and what the United States can actually deliver, economically and industrially."

Part I, synopsis

Two caveats

- The text was written in early October. The facts on the slides were checked on 26 October; what depends on the election is rewritten after 3 November.
- The emphasis is on what persists regardless of the election outcome, and regardless of how the hypothesis on goals turns out.
- Actor and arena are kept apart: do not say "Trump" when the issue is Hormuz.

Three levels to keep apart: what the United States wants, how the state is being rebuilt, how the United States acts abroad

1

The direction: probably stable, but that is an assumption

Own defence and own hemisphere first, allies to carry more, distrust of Europe and of binding agreements. The assumption is tested continuously and may fall.

2

The rebuilding of the state itself: planned and far advanced

Administration and agencies are rebuilt according to plan and staffed by loyalty. There is nothing capricious here, and it persists whatever the election result.

3

Conduct abroad: unpredictable from case to case

Towards allies and adversaries, timing, tone, tariffs, troop presence and signals on Article 5 shift. Partly negotiating technique, partly decisions driven by one person.

Four reasons not to take the stability of the goals for granted

- **The person: prestige and visible victories may weigh more than the goals**
- **The evidence: stability is demonstrated at home, not abroad**
- **The method: doctrines may be explanations after the fact; the Iran war does not fit the pattern**
- **Susceptibility to influence: Europe's own conduct shapes which means are chosen**

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The economy has become a limit on what the United States can do

$40 tn

The national debt passed 40 trillion dollars in August

1,040 > 885

Interest on the debt exceeds the defence budget ($ bn)

5.0 %

Ten-year yield around five per cent, peak 5.3 in October: levels not seen since 2007

+0.25

The Fed raised rates against the president's will – the corrective held

$1.15–1.35 tn

Promise of $5,000 per adult if the Republicans win

½ – ⅔

of certain missile stocks consumed in the Iran war

At least five years to rebuild

Three limits at once – the premise for everything said about burden-sharing

The bond market
charges for political unpredictability

Congress
the defence budget settled only until 11 December

Production capacity
a physical limit until around 2030

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The election on 3 November: three scenarios – and a president who accelerates

A The governing party keeps both chambers

The executive dominates, but the dividend promise moves the conflict into the party.

B The governing party loses one or both chambers

Polling on 26 October points here: the Democrats lead by 7–9 percentage points. Investigations and budget fights follow, but foreign policy remains the president's free field.

C A contested electoral process

Fraud allegations likely, a blocked transfer of power unlikely: Congress constitutes itself on 3 January. The risk is drama abroad.

3 Nov 2026
Midterm elections

≈22 Nov
Saudi nuclear energy agreement

11 Dec
The budget deadline expires

2027
The debt ceiling; French presidential election

Nov 2028
Presidential election

"Lame duck" = acceleration, as a hypothesis. The newly elected take office only on 3 January: the majorities remain until year-end. If the Democrats also win the Senate, the brake grows stronger over time but the dramatic moves more frequent in the short term.

A condition, not an episode. The state apparatus is changed whatever the election result; 2026 is a rehearsal for 2028.

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Domestic politics drives foreign policy: eight mechanisms

1 **Electoral fraud and certification**
Foreign policy victories as proof of strength; “foreign interference” explains setbacks

2 **Compensation**
Setbacks at home produce drama abroad: Iran, Venezuela, Greenland

3 **Ukraine as an election victory**
Deadlines set by the American calendar, not the situation on the ground

4 **The economy as an election issue**
The tariff weapon curtailed; now dividends, data centres and attacks on the Fed

5 **Immigration and shows of force**
Troops in cities and deportations spill over into hemispheric policy

6 **Israel as a party issue**
The Democrats vote against, opinion has turned; Israeli election on 27 October

7 **Loyalty tests ahead of 2028**
Foreign policy decisions as positioning in the succession struggle

8 **The family fortune**
Nearly doubled since 2024, through deals with Gulf states

Reading rule
Ask first what domestic function a move serves – before reading it as a change of course.

PART I

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The Middle East and Hormuz: the war that was not supposed to happen, in its eighth month

28 Feb
American-Israeli strikes on Iran


7–8 Apr
Ceasefire brokered by Pakistan

13 Apr
American naval blockade of Iranian ports

17 Jun
Islamabad memorandum: end of war within 60 days

8 Jul
The deal collapses

Sep–Oct
Missile salvo in September; in October the most attacks on merchant shipping so far, mines in the strait



$115–125 per barrel (22–24 Oct)

$38–45 bn in war costs

Two straits as bargaining chips: Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab

Managed instability

Three bad roads: escalation, withdrawal or attrition. Israel's planned offensive on 10 October was stopped by Washington with reference to the election; the president speaks of a deal after 3 November, Tehran sets seven conditions. The calendar at home weighs heaviest. The energy shock lasts into 2027.

Supply
Hormuz turns an American-Iranian conflict into a European supply question

Burden-sharing
Europe is asked for escorts where Europe's interest is greatest

The guarantee
Air defence leaked; the Gulf and Turkey built their own complements before Europe did

The norm
Europe's divided Israel policy lends the double-standards argument a hand


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Ukraine: calendar-driven support, committed production – two wars as a pair

Ukraine follows the American electoral calendar

- No result before the election: trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi not until mid-November. Donbas and the guarantees unresolved; Moscow rejects a ceasefire before a comprehensive settlement.
- The Black Sea: Odesa closed, Russian terminals knocked out. Moscow has rejected a maritime ceasefire; Russian grain goes via the Baltic instead.
- The sanctions act signed on 18 September but suspended by the president on 17 October, two days before it took effect. Putin invited to the G20 in Miami.
- Ukraine receives a third as many air defence missiles as in 2025: a queue behind the US Army.
- Sweden: a ceasefire this winter puts the peacekeeping-force question in the middle of government formation.

Amerikansk produktion av de mest efterfrågade luftvärnsrobotarna per år – kön bakom den amerikanska armén



Five links between the wars

Materiel
Iranian drones in Ukraine, Russian technical support in return

Economy
every Hormuz crisis raises the oil price and finances Russia

Capacity
the same missiles and explosives for both wars

The negotiating room
Ukraine support conditioned on escorts in Hormuz – over European heads

Precedent
attacks on near-nuclear facilities affect Russian signalling

Conclusion: the wars can deteriorate at the same time. Plan for them as a pair, not separately.

The hemisphere and China shape what is left for Europe

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The Western Hemisphere – the doctrine at its most consistent, Europe with the least leverage

- Venezuela: Maduro seized by American forces on 3 January, interim rule without an election date, oil agreement with the United States in August. Cuba: fuel blockade since January with regime change as the stated aim.
- Greenland: the hemispheric policy's European landing point, with a nuclear dimension (Pituffik, Golden Dome).
- The agreement signed on 22 September: the United States gets “permanent control” of Greenland’s security, Golden Dome may be placed there, bases outside NATO are prohibited.

Three readings

Lowers the risk: a negotiated order with Danish consent	Codifies the doctrine rather than revoking it	The precedent remains: renegotiated under pressure

For Sweden: from watching for escalation to interpreting an agreement.

US–China – managed rivalry that prices Europe's choices

- The 2025 tariff war followed by stabilisation: Xi at the White House on 24 September (trade truce extended, AI dialogue), APEC in Shenzhen 18–19 November, G20 in Miami in December.
- Taiwan: not mentioned in the White House account of the summit; American deliveries there are mortgaged by the Iran war.

Five mechanisms

Bandwidth
competes with Europe for the same resources

Linkage
a European China policy as the price of the guarantee

The limit of triangulation
Beijing is part of the Russian war economy

The Ukraine link
China enables the Russian war

Europe cannot choose between Washington and Beijing, but every choice is priced by the other. Decoupling shows first in supply chains.

PART I

The frame: five factors eroding the order, and clocks that risk striking at the same time

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Arms control

New START gone; the Russian threshold lowered in words, not in strategy; Belarus as a platform

The norm

The campaign against the ICC; Europe's own division over Israel

Institutions

Democratic recession as a condition; no to OSCE election observation; the sanctions act suspended by the executive on 17 Oct

Cascades

Hormuz → energy prices → interest rates in Europe; can also start in Europe

The economy

Fiscal checkpoints: 22 Nov, 11 Dec, the debt ceiling in 2027; ten-year yield around five per cent

The clocks: the hypothesis is that they strike together

The timeline in Part 0 shows ten years of shifts that came one at a time. The risk now is that several clocks run together within the same four years, November 2026 to 2030: then several correctives fall at once.

- The United States loses leverage after 3 November
- French presidential election 2027
- Russian reconstitution by 2030
- Chinese summits: September, November
- Fiscal clock: 11 December, 2027
- The pace of AI – the unknown variable

The AI debate – four dangers

Control is personalised; cascades within hours; militarisation without human judgement; allies shut out from frontier models.

– and three opportunities

The industry itself asks for regulation; a ban on AI in nuclear decisions on its way into American law; an opening for a Nordic position.

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Fourteen conclusions to plan by

O1 **Plan on the assumption that American goals hold, but test the assumption continuously**
the uncertainty concerns the means, and increasingly the president's person

O2 **Does the guarantee hold, and from which day?**
from which day does Article 5 take effect?

O3 **Systemic risk in the decision process, not only policy risk**
commitments can change quickly and personally

O4 **Conflict management is driven by the domestic calendar**
the electoral calendar decides, not the situation on the ground

O5 **The change in the state apparatus persists whatever the outcome**
2026 is a rehearsal for 2028

O6 **Waning authority means more dramatic moves, not fewer**
more dramatic moves in 2027–2028

O7 **The alliance's predictability becomes a European task**
the alliance's signal to Moscow becomes European

O8 **Autonomy area by area**
accepted dependence for 15–20 years

O9 **The Iran and Ukraine wars are planned as one pair of risks**
Iran and Ukraine are planned as a pair

O10 **The hemispheric doctrine is taken seriously, Greenland included**
Greenland: the agreement of 22 September is to be interpreted, not just watched

O11 **Worst cases are tracked with indicators, not forecast**
indicators on election night + 100 days

O12 **The US–China relationship prices Europe's choices**
Taiwan as a crossing clock

O13 **Capacity to deliver is limited until around 2030**
deliveries committed until 2030

O14 **Economic defence and economic security: two clocks**
defence now, security over 20–30 years

The bridge to Part II

Part I sets the premises; Part II tests what they require of Sweden and Europe.

Del II: från beroende till aktör



Fyrfältare, inte skala: avskräckning och resiliens förutsätter varandra.

Tre nivåer hänger ihop
Amerikansk, europeisk och svensk handlingsförmåga: en svaghet fortplantar sig uppåt och nedåt

Tre teman
Kärnvapen, flödessäkerhet, multilateralism – lästa mot Försvarsberedningens Skärpt läge

Metod
Slutrapportens slutsatser prövas som hypoteser mot läget sedan februari

Tempot sätts av Washington: femprocentsmål, halvårsöversyn, ”Nato 3.0” – en tidsfrist att klara. Tre horisonter: nu, 2027–2030, och tjugo till trettio år.

Beroendet: enablers och kärnvapenparaply

Strategiska enablers

- Lufttransport, spaning, satellitkommunikation, precisionsvapen, tankning: accepterat beroende i 15–20 år.
- ReArm Europe rätt men för långsamt; flaskhalsen är konsolidering och beställarsidan.
- Köp inte drönare på hylla – kontraktera förmågan att skala upp.
- Betalningsvilja ger ingen volym; bara egen produktion gör det. Mottagning, transport och förhandslagring först.

Kärnvapenparaplyet

- New START borta; fransk-brittisk koordinering och en fransk-svensk styrgrupp har börjat.
- Omkring 500 fransk-brittiska stridsdelar mot amerikanska tusental: ett komplement, inte en ersättning.
- Vem trycker på knappen? Sverige bör driva en verklig europeisk planeringsfunktion inom Nato.
- Gulfen och Turkiet visade: komplement byggs regionalt, av dem som känner läckan först.

Eskalationsstegen har blivit kortare, snabbare och bredare – utan rustningskontroll

Hypersoniska vapen
kortare varningstid


Autonomi och AI
eskalation utan mänskligt omdöme

Spektrumet
en egen stridsarena

Rymden
angrepp mot varning kan utlösa nukleär eskalation

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Autonomi domän för domän: snabbt där det går, ärligt där det inte går



Sårbarhetsfönstret 2027–2030

- Ryssland kan vara starkare än 2022 redan 2030; Europas uppbyggnad tar mer än tio år.
- Sverige: sju år för en brigad, tio för totalförsvaret.
- Fönstret är ingen krigsprognos utan en bedömning av relativ förmåga.
- Plan B som verkar nu: allierade förband på plats, snabba kontrakt, beredskapslager, gemensamt nordisk-baltiskt luftförsvar.

AI: tillgång till frontmodeller är sedan i juni en säkerhetspolitisk variabel. Att bara reglera eller pausa fördjupar beroendet.

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Europas egen oberäknelighet

FR **Frankrike – tydligt mål, osäkra medel**

Europeisering av avskräckningen – men budget utan omröstning, 2,3 % av BNP, och allt kan vändas efter valet 2027.

UK **Storbritannien – antaget mål, underfinansierade medel**

Mål antaget, pengar saknas, projekt försenade, ledarskifte på väg.

DE **Tyskland – fiskal och inrikespolitisk klocka**

Upprustningen vilar på en pressad koalition; en regeringskris träffar EU:s tyngsta ekonomi.

SE **Sverige – regeringsbildning i fel ögonblick**

Regeringsbildning pågår; en vapenvila i Ukraina ställer fredsstyrkefrågan direkt.

Motbilden Polen: högsta försvarsandelen, planmässig – men även Warszawa vet att östflanken inte kan försvaras utan USA.

Den amerikanska oberäkneligheten är delvis vald; den europeiska är institutionell och kan inte förhandlas bort.

Ifri: Europa kan möta Ryssland till 2030 – om viljan och sammanhållningen finns.

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Resiliens och flödessäkerhet: svaret under tröskeln

Fragmenteringsanalysen – tre sätt att misslyckas trots styrka

1. **Stark militär, svag civil infrastruktur**
   hybridangrepp lamslår före mobilisering

2. **Konventionellt försvar utan kärnvapenintegration**
   lämnar ett kärnvapenhot att utnyttja

3. **Alla Natokrav uppfyllda, splittrad hybridrespons**
   sabotage splittrar – artikel 5 aktiveras aldrig

Integration avskräcker, fragmentering bjuder in. Flöden måste hanteras i alla lägen – export lika viktigt som import.

Skuggflottan
sanktionsobjekt och sabotagerisk; i öster Belarus hybridtryck

Undervattenskablar
marin närvaro och sensorer, inte objektbevakning

Drönarvolym
tiotusental i månaden: skyddet dimensioneras för volym

Förnekbarhet
sannolikt är det som kan förnekas; snabb attribuering biter

Korruption
den svagaste punkten är institutionell, inte militär

Beställarsidan i civilt försvar
företagen saknar tydliga krav; få myndigheter har analyserat försörjningen

Från just-in-time till just-in-case: redundans i systemet, inte bara skydd av objekt. Använd industrins metoder: hitta det oersättliga och duplicera just det.

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Multilateralismen är svensk säkerhet – och beroendet en hävstång

Kaskaderna
Styrka i ett hörn åberopas i ett annat: Grönland → Arktis → Taiwan

Europas egen del
Splittrad Israelpolitik försvagar folkrättsargumentet; USA säger nej till OSSE:s valobservation

Budapest 1994
Försäkringar är inte garantier – gäller redan en sjövapenvila i Svarta havet

Ur rysk synvinkel
Ryssland vinner på fragmentering; rekonsolidering är motmedlet

Beroendet som förhandlingsstyrka

- Varje amerikanskt behov ger en europeisk hävstång: trupper, pengar, produktion.
- Hegseth krediterade Europa i juni – betalningsvilja ska växlas in i inflytande, inte beröm.
- Rikta hävstången mot det som består oavsett valutfall: produktion, marknad, sanktioner.
- Grönland: från press till avtal. Belarus: sanktionslättnader får inte bli förhandlingsvaluta.
- Människa i loopen: en lucka för en nordisk position.

Sverige som bro

TRANSATLANTISK LÄNK

Nato, försvarsavtalet med USA, värdlandsstöd, kärnvapenparaply

SVERIGE – bron: trovärdig i båda lägren

Bron bär så länge brofästena inte glider isär. Därför är Plan B ansvar, inte defaitism.

EUROPEISK AUTONOMI

EU, ReArm Europe, kärnvapendialogen, autonomi domän för domän

Tre utgångspunkter

- Förståelse för legitima amerikanska intressen
- Regelordningen försvaras med ekonomiska och juridiska medel
- Europeisk sammanhållning utan konkurrens med Nato

Tre hävstänger

- Värdlandsstöd och försvarsavtalet, Gotland
- Nordisk-baltisk sammanhållning med Tyskland och Polen
- Baltikum, Arktis, Östersjön – och Belarus – som ett operationsområde

Flexibla format

- NB8, JEF, E3, koalitionen av villiga – formatvalet är strategiskt
- NB8 är både reservposition och industriverklighet: Kiev-deklarationen 23 augusti
- Diversifiering: Indien, Japan, Sydkorea, Australien

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Fyra scenarier, fyra komplikationer

USA: transaktionellt, oförutsägbart ⟷ institutionellt, alliansorienterat

EUROPA: fragmenterat ⟷ integrationsdrivande

Transaktionellt USA · integrerat Europa Nordisk-baltisk struktur med egen tyngd; kärnvapendialogen på allvar	**Institutionellt USA · integrerat Europa** Integration och transatlantisk länk stärker varandra
Transaktionellt USA · splittrat Europa Djupa bilaterala band: Tyskland, Polen, Norden	**Institutionellt USA · splittrat Europa** Status quo, gradvis större bördetagande i Nato

Bakom axlarna: fragmentering eller rekonsolidering av det internationella systemet.

Fyra komplikationer

- **Presidenten accelererar oavsett utfall**
- **Valets process kan bli variabeln – dramatik, inte stoppad maktövergång**
- **Ett Taiwanskov utlöser samma paketlogik som Hormuz**

Europa kan vittra inifrån utan att någon utomstående ”vunnit”
Pålar: Sverige eller Östersjön? Artikel 5 från vilken dag? Ukraina som ankare?

Lönar sig i alla fyra fall

1. **Nordisk-baltisk sammanhållning**
2. **Civil resiliens och flödessäkerhet**
3. **De snabba domänerna: cyber, rymd**
4. **Brofunktionen – så länge brofästena håller**

Handlingsprogram: tre horisonter, sex åtgärder

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Nu

- ReArm Europe, kontrakt, luftförsvar, ammunition
- Redundans, lager, flöden i alla lägen
- Halvårsöversynen som tidsfrist; bära Ukraina; fredsstyrkefrågan nu

2027–2030

- Förhandslagring och mottagning som kortar dagräkningen
- Beställarsidan reformerad, kontrakten ger volym
- En verklig europeisk kärnvapenplanering; riskreduktion

20–30 år

- Värdekedjor där Sverige är oersättligt
- Försörjning som tål stormakternas frikoppling
- Ekonomisk säkerhet som eget politikområde

1 Slagkraft och uthållighet

ammunition, luftvärn, logistik

2 Verifikation och konsekvens

förbud mot AI i kärnvapenbeslut

3 Uttalad avskräckningsdoktrin

signal och förmåga hålls ihop

4 Kriskommunikation

byggd före krisen

5 Industri i europeisk kontroll

beställarsidan reformeras

6 Ekonomisk säkerhet

eget politikområde

”Säkerhet skapas genom integration, inte isolering.”

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