Wanted—German Military Engagement on the Northern Flank

by Robin Allers

Resumé

Russlands aggresjon mot Ukraina og Trump-administrasjonens utfordring av vestlig samhold utgjør et dobbelt sjokk. Hvordan påvirker det Tysklands rolle på NATOs nordlige flanke? Denne artikkelen argumenterer for at materiellsamarbeidet sannsynligvis vil fortsette å danne ryggraden i det sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitiske forholdet til de nordiske landene. Det kan til og med bli ytterligere utvidet på grunn av den nye tyske regjeringens beslutning om å fjerne begrensninger på forsvarsutgifter. I hvilken grad dette vil føre til økt tysk operativt engasjement på Nordflanken er mindre sikkert, ettersom viljen til å engasjere seg i et dypere militært samarbeid i Nord sannsynligvis vil bli balansert av presset for å prioritere forespørsler fra andre allierte, eller reagere på kriser andre steder. I en situasjon der Europa vil bli tvunget til å ta større ansvar for sin egen sikkerhet, vil Tyskland imidlertid ikke ha noe annet valg enn å engasjere seg mer og vise mer lederskap, noe som vil bli ønsket velkommen på Alliansens Nordflanke.

THERE IS NO doubt that February 24, 2022, will go down in history as a watershed moment. Russia's full-scale attack forced NATO allies to rethink their military support for Ukraine and strengthen their ability to deter and defend against attacks on their security. In many countries, Russia's aggression led not only to an increase in defence spending but also to a reassessment of their position and role in Euro-Atlantic security. On the northern flank, Finland and Sweden renounced their policy of non-alignment and joined NATO. Denmark decided to put aside its reservations about full membership in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In Germany, Chancellor Olaf Scholz famously recognized the Russian attack as a *Zeitenwende*, a historic turning point that required a fundamental reorientation of German security policy. This included the decision to significantly increase defence spending and provide military support for Ukraine.[1] The extent of this change remains controversial to this day. It can hardly be denied that Germany's foreign and security policy stance has changed, but of the hesitant implementation of the new course also led to fierce criticism.[2]

November 6, 2024, could also go down as a memorable date in the history of Euro-Atlantic security policy. On that day, Europeans woke up to the victory of Donald J. Trump in the US presidential elections for the second time. This immediately triggered a new debate about the state of the transatlantic relationship and the future of NATO. Since that day, and especially since the Trump administration took office in January 2025, there have been almost dai-

ly reminders that Europe would have to do more for its own security.

On the evening of the same day, the so-called traffic light coalition in Germany collapsed. A prolonged dispute over budget rules escalated and led to the departure of the Liberal Democrats (FDP). The Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens remained in the government but quickly had to agree to new elections in February of the following year. The immediate impact can be considered as limited. Despite a difficult political landscape, in which parties on the extreme right and left gained influence, government and the main opposition party, the conservative CDU/CSU, agreed on a timetable for snap elections, which were held in February 2025 without any major problems. Regardless of a tough election campaign, the parliament even managed to agree on a number of important investment projects. Following the CDU/CSU's slim victory, negotiations with the social democrats focused on forming a stable and less divisive coalition government.[3]

On the international stage, however, Germany seemed to be hibernating. As Russia continued its aggression and Trump's initial statements and actions plunged transatlantic relations into a state of unprecedented turmoil and uncertainty, Germany was unable to participate in formulating responses, let alone provide leadership. French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer attempted to fill the void, meeting the new Trump administration and gathering European allies for summits.

Discussions include strengthening the European pillar of NATO, a stronger role for EU in security and defence, the establishment of more flexible formats such as coalitions of the willing as well as closer cooperation within regional alliances like the Nordic and Nordic-Baltic group. It is clear, however, that leadership in Europe, whether within the framework of the EU and NATO or in a new constellation, cannot function without the involvement of Europe. Therefore, allies and partners are eagerly awaiting how the new German government will position itself, which priorities by the new Chancellor, Friedrich Merz (CDU) will set, and how he will approach international cooperation and division of labour.

This also applies to the countries on NATO's northern flank. In this region, which encompasses the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the North Atlantic all the way to the European Arctic (also known as the High North), countries expect more from Germany but are also hesitant to demand too much. This attitude reflects a certain ambivalence towards Germany's role in this region. On the one hand, all Nordic states recognize that Germany is an indispensable partner and ally due to its economic, political, and military clout. At the same time, they are aware that the Alliance's comparatively stable northern flank is not always a top priority for Europe's middle power.

Although the Nordic countries often desire greater German involvement and even a stronger leadership role, none of them considers Germany their most important security partner. Alongside the United States, which remains the Nordic countries' undisputed closest and most important defence partner, Great Britain, is generally considered their most important European ally. Security strategies, defence plans, and expert analyses usually rank Germany third or on a par with European powers such as Poland and France.[4]

The reasons for this ambivalent attitude toward Germany as a defence partner can often be divided into three categories: First, for Germany, the northern flank is only one of many areas requiring its attention. The

security of the eastern flank is the priority for Germany, and a core task of the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*) is that of a logistical hub (*Drehscheibe*) for Allied reinforcements. Second, contrary to Germany's strong standing as a partner in defence material cooperation, its rather restrained role in military operations is not consistent with its ambition to be one of the largest conventional armies in Europe. Third, Germany's alleged lack of strategic culture and its reluctance to assume a leadership role in Europe limits its willingness to be the partner that the region can rely on as a security guarantor.[5]

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The *Zeitenwende* of 2022 has raised hopes for greater German engagement and has already led to a deepening of bilateral and regional defence relations. As Norwegian Defence Minister Bjørn Arild Gram wrote in early 2023, "Germany's role in European defence has completely changed in recent years, paving the way for greater cooperation".[6] Indeed, some of the initiatives undertaken over the past three years, have been received more positively in the Nordic countries than elsewhere, including in Germany itself.

This article examines how the dual shock of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the Trump administration's challenge to Western cohesion affects Germany's role on the northern flank. It argues that defence cooperation is likely to continue to form the backbone of German relations with the northern flank countries and may even expand further due to the new coalition's decision to remove fiscal limitations on defence spending. Whether this will lead to increased German operational engagement on the northern flank is less certain. The willingness to engage in deeper cooperation with trusted and like-minded nations in Northern Europe will surely be balanced by pressures to prioritize requests from other allies or respond to crises elsewhere. In a security environment where Europe will be forced to assume greater responsibility for its security, Germany will have no choice but to engage more and provide more leadership. This is undoubtedly wanted on the Alliance's northern flank.

Defence Material Cooperation

Arguably the strongest signal of Germany's *Zeitenwende* was the announcement of a special fund of 100 billion euros for defence investments and the promise to spend at least two percent of GDP in the coming years.[7] This announcement also triggered positive reactions in the Nordic countries and raised high expectations. For all Nordic countries, cooperation in the defence materials sector is a central priority in relations with Germany. Official strategy documents and expert analyses point to the defence industry, materials cooperation, and capability development as the most important areas.[8] Accordingly, all Nordic countries joined the German-led Framework Nations Concept (FNC) for multinational capacity development and the establishment of joint armed forces. In addition to cooperation within NATO and other multilateral forums, Germany is also

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an important partner in various EU projects and initiatives.

Among Germany's bilateral defence relations in Northern Europe, Norway stands out, primarily due to the strategic partnership in the maritime sector concluded in 2017.[9] The agreement went far beyond the procurement of six identical submarines (two for Germany, four for Norway), which both countries had jointly negotiated with the German shipyard TKMS. The agreement set a new standard in multinational cooperation and included joint training, logistics, maintenance, and the joint development of new missile systems, linking the navies and industries of both countries for decades. Negotiating such a complex undertaking was anything but easy, but in 2021 the contract was signed, and a year later, now under the impression of the *Zeitenwende*, cooperation was further expanded. A comprehensive bilateral defence agreement was signed when production began in 2023.[10] At the end of 2024, the demands of numerous experts and the Chief of defence for additional boats were heard. On the Norwegian side, the government and parliament agreed to order two additional submarines. Later that year, Germany followed suit, adding four submarines worth almost five billion euros to its order.

In a remarkable act of cross-party unity, the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag supported this decision during the transition period following the collapse of the government.[11] The same committee also approved funds for the development of a new frigate, the F 127, which is also being offered to Norway. Without committing to Germany as a partner, the Norwegian repeatedly declared that it will use the German-Norwegian cooperation on submarines as a model for larger procurement projects in the future. Joining forces with a close ally is intended to prevent a small power from being left alone with the operation, maintenance, and further development of a particular capability. Importantly, however, Norway also insists on entering partnerships with allies who commit to jointly operating the shared capability.

In addition to the strategic partnership in the maritime sector, cooperation on land systems is a traditional strong-point of German defence material relations with the Nordic countries. When Norway decided in 2023 to renew its main battle tank fleet with the German-produced Leopard 2 A8, the fact that all its Nordic neighbours operated this model was a decisive argument.[12] In February 2023, the defence ministers signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at expanding cooperation in the land domain.[13] In early January 2025, the Swedish armed forces announced that, in addition to upgrading their existing forces, they would also acquire a large number of new Leopard tanks.[14]

Although Germany decided in 2022 to purchase the US-produced F35 fighter jet, which several Northern European countries already operate, there are few indications so far that Germany will play a prominent role in the increasingly integrated air force cooperation on the northern flank. In contrast, Germany's acquisition of the American made P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, which Norway and Great Britain also operate, will strengthen cooperation in anti-submarine warfare and surveillance of the North Atlantic.[15]

At the same time, the war in Ukraine has not only prompted all Northern European countries to increase defence spending but has also expanded cooperation into new sectors. One example is the acquisition of ammunition, both bilaterally and within the framework of the European ASAP (Act in Support of Ammunition Production) program. Another example is the procure-

ment of air defence systems. All Nordic countries joined the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) proposed by Olaf Scholz in 2022, because they need to expand their own capacities in this critical capability area, because they acknowledge the need for better European cooperation, and not least because they see potential for their national defence industries.[16] The same applies to cooperation in the protection of critical underwater infrastructure (see below), which became a priority area of cooperation following the Nord Stream incidents in 2022 and will require the development and procurement of new technologies. In December 2024, Norway and Germany agreed to expand their cooperation regarding the military use of space and satellite technology.[17]

A Real Zeitenwende?

Despite these initiatives and commitments, doubts remained about the Scholz government's ability to deliver on its promises. Earlier hopes that the FNC would become a driver for deeper defence cooperation in Northern Europe had not been realized, or only partially. Now, Scholz faced criticism for not doing enough to strengthen the European defence industrial base. Even more critical, the traffic-light coalition seemed unable to agree on how to finance the promise to spend more than 2% of GDP on defence.

Against this backdrop, the announcement by the new coalition partners to relax the country's debt brake to invest in defence and infrastructure was hailed as a groundbreaking deal. On the one hand, Merz's promise to strengthen European security "whatever it takes" (a reference to Mario Draghi's famous promise to defend the eurozone) is seen as a strong signal that the new government recognizes the seriousness of the changing security environment.[18] On the other hand, increased and sustained investments in defence and infrastructure mean a further boost for the defence industry, from which the Nordic countries are likely to benefit.[19]

It is another question, however, whether the Merz government's prioritization of security and defence will also lead to increased and deepened operational cooperation on the northern flank.

Operational Cooperation

"The core task of the Navy is and remains securing the northern flank." With these words, the Chief of the Navy presented his priorities for 2025.[20] Such messages will certainly be received positively in the Nordic region, where there have long been calls for greater German military engagement and even stronger German leadership. With Finland and Sweden in NATO, all Nordic countries share the strategic goal of committing key allies like Germany closer to the defence of the region. While Denmark, Finland, and

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Sweden see an important role for Germany in the Baltic Sea region, Norway wants greater German engagement in the North Atlantic and the High North.[21] The Norwegian Defence Commission argued in 2023 that Germany is "now increasingly turning its gaze northward, toward the Atlantic and the northern regions," which offers "opportunities for increased cooperation". The

government's new long-term defence plan for 2024 saw indications that Germany will turn its attention to the North.[22] A greater emphasis on deterrence and interoperability is also reflected in the bilateral defence cooperation agreements recently updated by Norway (September 2023), Sweden (March 2024), and Denmark (June 2024).[23]

These commitments go beyond mere intentions. In the Baltic Sea region, the reorientation toward collective defence since 2014, and especially the response to Russia's all-out war against Ukraine since 2022, has led to increased German engagement in the region. This has particularly benefited the Baltic states, where the Bundeswehr has been involved in air policing since the mid-2000s, has taken responsibility as a framework nation for NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence a in Lithuania since 2017, and has been establishing a permanent brigade there since 2023. But the German Navy's traditional role in the region has also experienced a renaissance in recent years.[24] Following up on chancellor Scholz' "Zeitenwende"-commitment that the German Navy must protect the North and Baltic Seas, Berlin has underlined its ambitions to play a leading role in coordinating naval activities in the region. In October 2024 Commander Task Force (CTF) Baltic was inaugurated as a national headquarters with multinational participation. The CTF builds on earlier German initiatives such as the Baltic Commander Conference of chiefs of navies, the German Maritime Forces ("DEUMARFOR") staff and command structure or the Baltic Maritime Component Command ("BMCC").[25]

The Nord Stream incident in September 2022 was a strategic shock for regional security and represents another step by Germany towards a more prominent role in the region. The importance of energy security and the need to protect critical infrastructure are now widely recognized as priorities.[26] Within weeks of the attack on the pipeline in the Baltic Sea, Olaf Scholz together with his Norwegian counterpart Jonas Gahr Støre, proposed the establishment of a new mechanism, which led to the establishment of a NATO Maritime Centre for Critical Undersea Infrastructure Security (NMCSCUI) based at MARCOM. Another German-Norwegian initiative followed in 2024, this time with the aim of establishing a network of regional centres (Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, CUI).[27] In response to repeated suspected acts of sabotage against submarine cables, NATO Allies launched the "Baltic Sentry" surveillance activity in January 2025. Together, NMCSCUI, CTF Baltic, and NATO's standing forces will improve situational awareness, deter hostile activity, and create an integrated regional picture of critical infrastructure.[28]

While Germany's interest in taking a leading role in the Baltic Sea region is regularly acknowledged by military and political leaders, its willingness and ability to engage further north has long been more uncertain. To be sure, German navy regularly participates in exercises and operations in the North Sea, along the Norwegian coast an up to the high north. German land forces also train regularly in northern Norway and deployment to the northern flank has been an important part of larger multinational

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exercises such as Trident Juncture 2018 or Nordic Response. Nevertheless, the predominant impression among Nordic observers has long been that in contrast to the US and the UK, who maintain a demonstrative presence in form of freedom of navigation and intelligence operations close to Russian territory, the German navy remains deliberatively cautious and less visible.[29]

A recent report investigating which European armies would be ready to send reinforcements to the northern flank, concluded that it would take "a long time before Germany is able to make major contributions to Norway and the Nordics".[30] There are indications that this image is about to change. According to the German chief of the navy's "target document" for the coming decade, German warships must be able to cooperate with allies to secure the sea lanes from the North Atlantic to the North and Baltic Seas, and be on high alert, ready to fight multidimensional naval battles over great distances.[31] In his "Commander's intent" for 2024, chief highlighted anti-submarine warfare on the northern flank as an area where Germany must prove itself as a reliable bilateral and multilateral partner.[32]

Celebrating the start of construction for the new submarines, Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius emphasized the operational advantages of closer material cooperation and the importance of cooperation at troop level through training, exercises and operations.[33] In a significant departure from previous editions, the government's Arctic guidelines, published in 2024, commit the government to "playing its part in protecting the entire NATO Allied territory" and supporting "EU and NATO partners in the region in defending shared security interests".[34] Experts also note that "[f]ollowing Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Navy is refocusing on the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea" and acknowledge that "Germany has managed to maintain a sustained operational pattern in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic".[35]

However, neither Germany's rhetorical commitments nor its increased military presence is likely to challenge Britain's status as the Nordic countries' most important European ally. While operational cooperation with Germany is often seen as on a par with France, the Netherlands, and Poland, Britain is viewed not only in the North Atlantic but also in the Baltic Sea as a partner that "offers ever more and better opportunities for operational cooperation in the North".[36] To Norway in particular, this status is based on long traditions dating back to World War II and before. But Britain's position is also linked to its geostrategic interests, its explicit commitment to a military presence in the Baltic Sea, the North Atlantic, and the High North, as well as to its assertive military posture.

Despite recurring doubts about the ability of the British armed forces to fulfil their commitments, Nordic governments (and experts) emphasize Britain's capable defence forces and point to its status as a nuclear power. The Nordic countries' strong Atlantic orientation is reflected in their wish to be included in NATO's Regional Plan Northwest and the responsibility of Joint Forces Command Norfolk. Germany (and the Baltic countries) will continue to belong to the plan for central Europe and fall under the responsibility of JFC Brunssum.

The UK's unique position is further linked to its leadership of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a format designed for rapid response and expeditionary operations in which all Nordic and Baltic states are members.[37] Established at the 2014 Wales Summit (together with the German Framework Nations Concept) the group's importance seemed to

decrease in the following years. With the security situation in the Baltic Sea deteriorating, however, the JEF is experiencing something of a renaissance. While most commentators see a role between national activities and operations in the framework of NATO, others even discuss a role in securing a peace agreement in Ukraine.[38]

Germany is not part of the JEF and has always been sceptical of the format's usefulness. The recent German-British rapprochement, which led to the Trinity House Agreement on Defence Cooperation in 2024 (see below), has not changed Berlin's view that the JEF is a distraction from efforts to coordinate the region's naval forces within NATO and potentially a duplication of resources committed to the CTF Baltic. While this criticism may be partly justified, Germany's non-membership means that it is not participating in a cooperation format that the northern flank countries consider particularly relevant due to its flexibility.

A New Regional Security Architecture in the Making

Given the ongoing transformation of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, Germany may be forced to rethink its position on the JEF and, more generally, its position as a security actor on the northern flank. One of the most important recent developments for regional security is the UK's rapprochement with the EU and the major European powers. This rapprochement has led to a revival of Franco-British relations and also to the conclusion of the German-British Trinity House Agreement on defence cooperation. Signed in October 2024, the agreement provides among other projects and activities, for German P8 maritime patrol aircraft to regularly operate in the North Atlantic from RAF Lossiemouth base in Scotland.[39] Another agreement that might contribute to involving Germany further into the region's security architecture is a trilateral security partnership together with Norway and Canada.[40]

It cannot be denied that most new security agreements are closely linked to the participating countries' interest in securing major contracts for their defence industries. When Norway's (then) Minister of Defence spoke about the strategic partnership agreements he had signed at recent meetings with British, French, and German counterparts, he added: "They all naturally focus on frigates. We plan to procure, operate, and maintain new frigates in strategic partnership with a close ally."[41] A key reason for Germany and Norway to invite Canada to a trilateral strategic partnership is Ottawa's decision to procure 12 conventionally powered submarines.

However, the multiple new defence bonds are also a response to two key security challenges: First, the ongoing threat from Russia remains, requiring the countries of Northern Europe to further strengthen their deterrence and defence capabilities. This threat is not just about a possible conventional attack, but also a response to grey-zone incursions, also known as hybrid warfare, that are already taking place daily. The second challenge is the new transatlantic reality, characterized by uncertainty about the future commitment of the United States to transatlantic security. Europe must consider new ways of organizing defence and deterrence on its northern flank.

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For now, both Germany and its allies on the northern flank strive to secure future American engagement in Europe. However, they must take seriously the signals for a reduction in American troops and prepare for the military consequences of disagreements and even conflicts over trade and resources. Trump's threats to the sovereignty of Denmark, Greenland, and Canada have already targeted two northern flank countries in the first weeks of his new term. These developments not only require greater investment in capabilities and more flexibility in cooperation within NATO, the EU, regional groupings, and ad hoc coalitions. They also require major European powers like Germany to assume a leadership role—not alone, but in close cooperation with their partners and allies.

Focus on the North? The New Coalition and the Northern Flank

Will the new coalition government, which took office in May, live up to these challenges? The coalition agreement does not go beyond the statement that "maritime security in the North and Baltic Seas is important", but such documents rarely contain concrete commitments for a specific region.[42] Indeed, there is reason to believe that the responsible ministers know what is at stake for Germany in the Nordic region.

Former and new Defence Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) has managed to bring controversial demands for the Bundeswehr's "warfighting capability" (*Kriegstüchtigkeit*) into the debate and yet remains Germany's most popular politician. Since taking office in early 2023, he has spent considerable time in Northern Europe and played a key role in deepening bilateral defence relations through agreements and capability projects. He also gained insight into the region's strategic environment by visiting headquarters and attending exercises. His inspiration for reintroducing conscription in Germany, the so-called "Swedish model", testifies to the positive impression his contacts in the Nordic countries have made.

Foreign Minister Johan Wadephul may still be unknown to the wider public, but on his way to becoming one of Friedrich Merz's closest foreign and security policy advisors, he has, among other things, supported a security conference with a focus on maritime security and the northern flank in his home state of Schleswig-Holstein. The new chancellor himself is considered to be well-connected and has already met with his future colleagues from the Nordic countries. More importantly, he is widely expected to become a chancellor who aspires to a strong role in foreign and security policy. He will be supported in this by a newly established National Security Council—a novelty in German government affairs—and by an experienced team of advisors in the Chancellery. Experts and colleagues expect better coordination between the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry than was the case in the previous government. Furthermore, having the Finance and Defence Ministries led by strong personalities from the leadership of the Social Democratic Party could be helpful for the implementation of *Zeitenwende 2.0*.

Of course, none of this guarantees that a new German government will give greater priority to the northern flank. However, it can be stated that since 2014 and again since 2022, some important parameters have changed that should give the region more attention: the threat to European and German security posed by Russia has been recognized, and the primacy of collective defence has been established. Germany's investments in

defence capabilities are now a priority, and many of the major investments favour an increased role on the northern flank. With the protection of critical underwater infrastructure and space, Germany is now prioritizing new areas in which closer cooperation with the Nordic countries is expected to develop further. With regard to the defence industry, however, German decision-makers should be aware that their Nordic partners prefer procuring capabilities from an allied country that is ready to operate together with them.

Conclusion

Half a year has passed between the collapse of the transport coalition in November 2024 and the formation of a new government led by Friedrich Merz. The timing of this absence from the world stage could not have been worse. Since Trump won the US presidential election in November and took office in January, discussions about the future of transatlantic relations and European security have evolved rapidly. Statements by Trump himself, his vice president, and his foreign and defence ministers express open distrust of European allies and can be considered as attacks on the foundations of the transatlantic relationship. In the medium (and perhaps even in the short) term, allies must prepare for a withdrawal of US troops and conflicts over previously shared values. At the same time, Trump's unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a fair peace agreement with Putin on Ukraine could pose difficult security policy challenges for Europeans.

Expectations for the new German government to help shape a European response and to become a partner to lean on are high, also among the countries on NATO's northern flank. There are several reasons for this:

Cooperation in the defence equipment sector can be built on several projects, and there is legitimate hope that relations with the Nordic countries will benefit from the coalition's commitment to prioritizing new defence spending and infrastructure investments in the future.

It is less certain to what extent the new government will prioritize a stronger military engagement on the northern flank. There are promising signs, concrete initiatives, and a growing awareness that threats to critical infrastructure and disruptions to sea routes require a greater German role throughout the region—from the Baltic Sea to the North and the European Arctic. However, this development risks being counteracted by the demands of other partners or acute crises.

In the end, it is even more important that a stable German government assumes a leading role in European politics and defence. Merz and his allies have promised a stronger Germany in Europe. They face a daunting task. With a narrow majority and a strong opposition, including an aggressive and strengthened far-right party (the AfD), the Merz government must overcome the economic recession at home and, together with France, Great Britain, and Poland, strengthen NATO's European pillar. At the same time, Merz's diplomatic skills are needed to build a working organization, which is urgently needed as Trump spreads uncertainty.

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Notes

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5. For a view on Germany's characteristics as a partner from Nordic perspective see Särkkä, Iro; Ålander, Minna; Linnainmäki, Joel and Pihlajamaa, Antti: *Finland's Partnerships as a NATO member, Prospects for defence cooperation in a multilateral framework*, FIIA Report 76 June 2024, *https://fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/fiia_report_76_finland-s_partnerships_as_a_nato_member.pdf*.
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7. Policy statement by Olaf Scholz, 2022-02-27.
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