

# Corking the Baltic: Danish defence and Swedish neutrality during the Cold War

by *Iben Bjørnsson*

## Resumé

Under den kolde krig skulle Danmark lukke Øresund for fjendtlig gennemsejling, hvis det kom til krig mellem NATO og Warszawapagten. Det skulle gøres med minebælter i de danske stræder; Store- og Lillebælt samt Øresund. For Øresunds vedkommende var dette dog ikke ligetil, idet en del af farvandet var svensk – og Sverige var ikke medlem af NATO. I denne artikel undersøges det, hvordan man i dansk planlægning tog højde for at Sverige – i hvert fald officielt – var neutralt og derfor ikke – officielt – kunne indgå i planlægningen. Svaret er, at det gjorde man ikke – officielt. Alligevel havde Danmark forskellige muligheder for at lukke Øresund, både med og uden Sveriges hjælp. Dette blev muliggjort ved et tæt net af uofficielle kontakter, samarbejde på ikke-operative områder og med lidt ekstra hjælp fra geografien i Øresund. Artiklen konkluderer således, i lighed med tidligere forskning på området, at Sverige, trods neutraliteten, var en del af forsvaret af det skandinaviske område og via Danmark og Norge havde døren på klem til et samarbejde med NATO i krig.

SWEDEN'S 2024 ENTRANCE into NATO solves what was, during the Cold War, at least a theoretical problem for Danish military planners: one of Denmark's tasks within the NATO alliance was closing off the Baltic Straits (Great and Little Belts + the Sound) and hinder passage by Warsaw Pact vessels.

This was primarily to be done by mines and for the Belts this was pretty straightforward. However, part of the narrow Sound separating Denmark from Sweden consists of Swedish territorial waters. Sweden's official policy was non-alignment in peace, aiming for neutrality in war, which meant that Denmark could not officially plan for mine barrages in Swedish waters. Thus, in theory, enemy vessels would be able to pass through the Sound in Swedish territorial waters in crisis or war. This article asks: how does one close off the Sound, if Sweden is

neutral? And how did Danish planning reflect this problem?

One could argue that with Sweden's NATO membership, this question is no longer relevant. However, this investigation does not only say something about an operational problem, but also about the fact that war planning contains inconvenient variables and insecurities, that does not necessarily respect territorial borders or official security policy. Lastly it tells us something about how informal procedures and contacts can render possible what alliance policy cannot – and pave the way for closer integration.

## 'We now know'

In the early 1990s, Swedish Cold War neutrality was subjected to scrutiny as it was revealed that Sweden had had a connection to

NATO, primarily through cooperation with Norway and to a lesser degree Denmark.<sup>1</sup> This led to an official Swedish investigation ready in 1994, whose somewhat cautious conclusions was elaborated in the 2000s by other Swedish research on cooperation with (countries within) the NATO alliance in different areas such as technology, intelligence, airspace surveillance, etc.<sup>2</sup> This research found that cooperation was mainly between Sweden and Denmark/Norway, rather than NATO directly. Thus, Denmark and Norway functioned as a link to NATO, but the cooperation remained primarily local/Scandinavian. This, one could imagine, would be more acceptable and less controversial in a Swedish context.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, it has been shown that such contacts and cooperation between Sweden and her Scandinavian NATO neighbours was encouraged by the US and UK as their military authorities considered Scandinavia an area whose defence must be considered collectively and as a whole.<sup>4</sup> In 2012, Robert Dalsjö called for further investigation into Swedish cooperation with Denmark, which has remained less explored than with Norway.<sup>5</sup> Since then, not a lot has happened in the field, with the notable exception of Hans-Ove Görtz' works on cooperation within the air force area.<sup>6</sup>

How these results should be interpreted, has been up for discussion along with the question of what neutrality entails and whether Sweden during the Cold War could be labelled as neutral.<sup>7</sup> Standpoints vary from those who argued that neutrality was a façade (Wilhelm Agrell) over those who, while expressing less outrage, still leaned towards Sweden having functioned as a covert NATO ally with a 'pragmatic non-alignment' (Robert Dalsjö, Magnus Petersson), to the view that while Sweden did have more Western connections than was expressed or admitted publicly, no binding agreements

were made. Thus the fundamental principle of non-alignment in peace, aiming for neutrality in war was not broken – cooperation with NATO simply gave more options and thus more freedom of choice (The Neutrality Commission).<sup>8</sup>

This author does not harbour strong feelings either way, but tend to agree with the 'middle group' – that Sweden was, in reality, less neutral than presented outwardly. However, it is not the purpose of this article to assess Swedish neutrality from a military or judicial perspective. Rather, it is an investigation of a Danish operational problem.

On the subject of closing off the Sound, the Neutrality Commission concludes that some planning for this was done in 1949, that we now little of what went on during the 1950s and that there were no operative cooperation in the 1960s. There was cooperation on search and rescue (SAR) at sea, but this was purely civilian.<sup>9</sup> Most elaborate is journalist Michael Holmström, who, based on both documents and interviews, show that some preparations were made for cooperation/coordination on mining, coastal artillery placement, submarine operations and communications, and that cooperation with NATO in these waters was part of some Swedish exercises. This cooperation did not take the form of common operational planning, as much as it was a division of labour as well as a net of contacts between the responsible instances.<sup>10</sup> Much of Holmström's book is based on interviews, and sometimes the interviewed subjects hints at something or explains it in broader terms – I have chosen to only use the parts of the book that are either based on documents or where the interview subjects has expressed specialised knowledge.

An important takeaway from the existing literature is, that Swedish-Danish/Norwegian military cooperation was often borne by

individuals, rather than organisations, and informal and personal contacts on different levels.<sup>11</sup> As such it bore the mark of an ‘old boys network’ as seen in intelligence or political (inner) circles, and between Nordic/Scandinavian countries in general. Here individuals from a certain group carry policy, planning or whatever the group’s purpose is. Holding them together is a shared ideology or sense of purpose.<sup>12</sup> The downside to such person-driven networks is that they are vulnerable to changes. As such, connections can be lost fairly easily with no institutional memory in place.<sup>13</sup>

Characterising the existing research is, that it is all done by Swedish researchers in Swedish archives. This is a natural consequence of the issues of neutrality and their bearing on Swedish defence and security policy, but it seems that a view at the issue from across the border might be able to contribute some pieces to the puzzle. This article is such an attempt.

Existing information about Danish preparations or considerations in this regard, have come mainly from former officers, either in autobiographies or interviews. This (relatively sparse) information will be held up to the findings of this article as well.

## Sources

This investigation rests on material from the Danish Navy, located in the Danish National Archives. Given existing research conclusions that cooperation was borne out of operational-level contacts, the article primarily uses material from operative and planning units within the Danish Navy rather than high level leadership; the Naval Command, the Marine Staff, the Sound’s Marine Command (later Marine District), mine squadrons, etc. It consists mainly of classified correspondence, reports, planning,

exercises and evaluations. Searches have also been done in sub-units and the Foreign and Defence Ministries, but as the archives of both ministries and the Danish Defence are vast, and not always easy to navigate. Sources are spread out over many different instances in a ‘needle in a haystack’ sort of way, and it is entirely possible that I missed something. Lastly, ‘old boys’ networks’ are characterised by committing very little to paper. Bottom line up front: no ‘smoking gun’ such as Danish-Swedish operational planning or exercises have been found. But, going by existing research, this was also not to be expected: rather, the task has been to extrapolate strategies from Danish planning and identify the operational structures in place.

For this latter purpose, the military strategic and operational material has been supplemented by the Archive of the Danish Defence Attaché’s office in Stockholm, which documents cooperation in a series of areas relevant for the article.

The material mainly concerns the 1950s–1960s, due to practical issues of classification and availability. It is, however, also worth having in mind a central conclusion by Dalsjö, namely that in this period, a Swedish expectation of some help from the West in case of war, was occasionally and relatively uncontroversially stated – also publicly. However, the issue became more fraught as strict neutrality became an increasing part of Swedish identity and public rhetoric, especially during the reign of Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1969–1976 and 1982–1986. This rhetoric, Dalsjö argues, also influenced the Defence organisation so that operational cooperation became harder during the second half of the Cold War.<sup>14</sup> While this article will not be helpful in that regard, I will try to make some cautious conclusions on the earlier period. This aspect also requires further investigation.

The article will proceed as follows: first, I introduce early plans and recommendations for defending the Sound and how these thoughts were continued in the first years of Danish NATO membership. I then investigate Danish exercises and planning, before zooming in on the theatre geography. Lastly, I look at three possible scenarios and discuss their likelihood, before concluding.

## Defending the Sound

### The legacy of the SDU committee

During the negotiations about a Scandinavian Defence Union (SDU) in 1948-49, a committee was assembled to investigate the strategic and operative needs for the defence of the area and map out where cooperation between the Scandinavian countries would make sense. In its report, the committee listed two models for cooperation: a full defence alliance and a 'partial military cooperation', which consisted mainly of cooperation on communications and surveillance, search and rescue, standardisation of equipment, research, intelligence, and between military leadership.<sup>15</sup>

Existing research seems to agree that the recommendations for partial cooperation was, on the whole, followed, and that the report generally functioned as a guideline for future cooperation. As such, it served as a 'strategic blueprint' that formed the basis of further (informal) cooperation.<sup>16</sup>

On the Sound it stated:

...the waters' relatively limited breadth will mean that a rewarding use of Danish and Swedish naval warfare means can only happen, if the forces are deployed without regard to borders etc. For example, laying out mine barrages, which stretch across the waters' entire breadth, should be planned,

and executed as one collective operation to secure an unbroken prohibitory line.<sup>17</sup>

The report entertained a hypothetical war scenario, in which only Norway and Denmark were attacked, while Sweden remained neutral, and Soviet sea transport would be able to pass through Swedish waters. This, it stated, would significantly weaken the Danish-Norwegian defence.<sup>18</sup> A special report on naval issues recommended preparation of common plans for mine fields plus exchange of information on their placement. It also mapped existing capabilities in coastal artillery, base- and dockyard facilities and recommendations for their extension and establishment.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, it recommended that coastal artillery was 'organised and utilized according to a common plan and in tactical cooperation'.<sup>20</sup> According to Holmström, the latter was carried out as coastal batteries were placed to ensure the best coverage of each others' blind spots – or rather, they were built where the SDU committee had recommended, with an eye to complementarity.<sup>21</sup>

That the committee's report functioned as an outline for further cooperation is not only something that researchers has found afterwards – it was also something planners were conscious of at the time. A Danish-Norwegian PM by an unnamed naval commander from each country in July 1949 (post NATO membership), stated that analyses for further planning could in part be taken directly from the committee's report, with the necessary updates, as the strategic picture hadn't changed. The Danish commander stated that the report should be used 'as far as possible', but also that every mention of Swedish cooperation should be left out. The commanders drew up scenarios like those in the report, including one in which Denmark-Norway was attacked and Sweden remained neutral. And, in spite of

the statement about leaving Sweden out, they also drew a scenario in which Sweden intervened.<sup>22</sup> A 1950 PM from the Naval Command on Danish-Norwegian defence of Scandinavia stated that this could only be effective if ‘adjacent coasts’ were denied enemy control.<sup>23</sup>

The head of the Danish military delegation to the SDU negotiations was Vice Admiral A.H. Vedel, who went on to become chief of the Danish Navy and Flag Officer Denmark (FOD) in 1950–1958. As late as the fall 1952, he consulted documents from the committee’s report (unfortunately not evident for what purpose).<sup>24</sup> This supports the findings of it being a later guideline.

Dalsjö finds that Swedish politicians gave the go-ahead to the military to continue contacts to Denmark regarding mining of the Sound.<sup>25</sup> According to the Neutrality Commission, Swedish and Danish defence representatives continued talks about the issue in the Spring of 1949.<sup>26</sup> Holmström reproduces Swedish documents from 1950, which shows a mutual understanding regarding mine fields in the Sound, both on government and operative level (Danish prime minister Hedtoft and Admiral Vedel participating in talks with the Swedish chief of the navy). The occasion was apparently a visit from Hedtoft to suggest continuation of military contacts between the two countries. Apart from the mine fields, the Danes also wished for a cooperation on radar coverage and communication.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore a Swedish study on how to block the Sound was ready in 1950. It included recommendations on cooperation with Denmark, but it is not known whether it had direct consequences.<sup>28</sup>

This correlates with a few findings in the Danish archive:

In January 1949, Minister of Defence, Rasmus Hansen went to a meeting in Karlstad,

Sweden, where the ‘problem regarding closing Danish Sea territory and the Danish straits’ was raised. Upon return, he asked Vedel to draw up a memorandum on the issue. The memorandum (made in January and thus before signing the Atlantic Pact) had a sketch of possible mine fields, including one from South of Copenhagen to South of Malmö.<sup>29</sup>

A hand-written note in the archives of the Danish Marine Staff from 1950–51 is entitled “Cooperation in the Sound” and lists the following: radar warning, adjustment of locations for coastal batteries, common codes between the two countries’ coastal defences and options for refuelling and smaller reparations in Swedish harbours (respecting neutrality rules). It also refers to a sketch of planned Danish mine fields (not enclosed), listing ‘Agreements on placement in the southern entrance to the Sound’ and waters around the Baltic Island of Bornholm.<sup>30</sup>

In a meeting between Danish top ministers, general staff and the Ministry of Defence about the defence of Zealand 1953, one MoD official stated that it was his impression that the Swedes were very interested in this question, including the placement of Danish coastal batteries, and were prepared to move the defence of middle Sweden “further down.” A present general had had conversations with ‘people that has a certain insight into the Swedish defence’.<sup>31</sup>

While these examples show intent, it is not entirely clear what came of it. However, there are a few ambiguous mentions of Sweden in early planning.

## An open door

Relatively early on it became clear that blocking the Baltic Straits would be a main task for Denmark within NATO. As far as NATO was concerned, this could be done by a mine barrage in the waters of the Scaw

(Skagerrak) from North Jutland to Norway. While that would have put worries about Sweden to rest, Denmark insisted that the blockade should start in Southern Danish waters. A glance at a map explains why: placing the mine barrage in the Scaw would make the Danish isles extremely vulnerable to invasion from the South-East.<sup>32</sup> By 1969, the FOD EDP (Emergency Defence Plan, to take effect upon the breakout of war unless other orders were given), stated that the mission of the Danish Navy was to 'conduct operations in the Baltic Straits and the Baltic with the object of denying the use of the Baltic Straits to the enemy and to maintain control of the Baltic Approaches' by laying, protecting and reinforcing minefields.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, Sweden was an issue. This was acknowledged in some early documents: In a 1950 report on plans for the Danish coastal defence, the Danish task within NATO was stated as blocking the Baltic straits, including 'covering the connection to Sweden'.<sup>34</sup> A 1951 report on Danish naval defence made on the basis of Atlantic Pact plans, stated that Sweden, because of its neutrality, might avoid being attacked in the first phase of a war, 'why we should not count on the significant enhancement of defence forces and supplies that Swedish participation would entail.' However, the report later stated, should Sweden become involved, a task for the Danish and Norwegian Defences would be to coordinate their operations with the Swedish. One of the army's tasks was keeping airfields in Northeast Zealand open for as long as possible to secure a connection to Sweden and further North. Supplies to Zealand could best be delivered by sea through Kattegat (the waters between the Sound and the Scaw with both Danish and Swedish coastlines), 'utilising Swedish territory as far as possible' and having mine swept

routes there. Moreover, patrols should be established in the places 'where enemy forces can leave Swedish sea territory, insofar as this can be used for passage'.<sup>35</sup> In 1955 and 1956, the Danish Naval Command stated that operations East of a certain line in the Baltic in the first phase of the war would be impossible 'unless Sweden is involved'.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, it seems plans were in place both for a neutral and a cooperating Sweden. This is in line with the 1950 NATO planning document D.C. 13, which states that 'The defence of Norway and Denmark must take account of the situation of Sweden which lies in the path of any attack against Scandinavia, from the East. On account of her economic, industrial and military strength, considerable benefits would derive if she were allied to us in war.'<sup>37</sup> NATO's 'Strategic Guidance' from 1952 stated that Scandinavia should be defended as a whole, and that the Scandinavian countries' defence plans, if possible, should be coordinated.<sup>38</sup> This 'open door policy' seems to have continued at least throughout the 1950s. The NATO strategy document MC 14/2 from May 1957 stated that Sweden could contribute significantly to the defence of Scandinavia, that the area should be defended as a whole, and plans be coordinated between Denmark, Norway and Sweden if possible. Moreover, weight should be placed on defending certain areas in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 'should she join the allies', from where contact to NATO's warning system could be upheld, the Baltic Straits controlled, Soviet nuclear forces and supply lines in the Baltic struck and penetration of Northern Norway hindered.<sup>39</sup> The potential role of Sweden in defending Scandinavia was also evident from a memorandum from NATO's Standing Group in 1958, which stated that CINCNORTH (Commander in Chief for the Northern Region) had been in-

structed to prepare inclusion of Sweden in the Northern command if became involved in a war on NATO's side.<sup>40</sup> Thus NATO, in line with US and UK not only recommended Swedish cooperation with Norway and Denmark, but also made plans for it.

Alas, in the Danish archives, the 1951 report mentioned above, is the last found direct mention of how to deal with Sweden in the defence of the Sound. While the archive is rife with planning documents stating how important closing off the Straits/Sound by mines was, they rarely mention any Swedish role in this.<sup>41</sup> The issue simply becomes absent from Danish written sources.

Nevertheless, by looking at exercises and planning throughout the 1950's and 1960's we can still trace the question.

## Danish planning and exercises

The Sound (and Belts) can be blocked in several places, but from the early 1950s, focus was on the Southern entrances.<sup>42</sup> This is logical, as it would put the defence as far forward as possible and protect the Danish

capital of Copenhagen. A 1962 memorandum from the Naval Staff stated that in the initial phases of a war, the collective Danish Navy would have to be dedicated to controlling the Southern entrances to the Baltic Straits.<sup>43</sup>

At the Southern entrance to the Sound, two stretches lend themselves particularly well to mine fields, which was pointed out already in 1950: Stevns-Falsterbo and Møn-Falsterbo.<sup>44</sup> (see fig. 1). Of the two, Stevns-Falsterbo was quickly established as the favoured location. In 1951, deploying the Stevns-Falsterbo mine barrage was established as of a top wartime priority for the Danish Navy.<sup>45</sup> Artillery coverage of such a minefield was also the reason for the placement of a coastal artillery battery at Stevns (a similar one on the island of Langeland covered the entrances to the Great and Little Belts).<sup>46</sup> It was also the location recommended by a visiting English Commander in 1953.<sup>47</sup> Throughout the 1950s, Stevns-Falsterbo was solidified as the main minefield, showing up in exercises, Marine Staff meetings and reports to NATO's Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).<sup>48</sup>




Fig 1: Southern entrances to the Sound and projected range of Danish coastal artillery batteries. Planned mine barrages between Stevns/Møn and Falsterbo added by author.<sup>49</sup>

While Stevns-Falsterbo thus had priority, Møn-Falsterbo showed up from time to time. This prioritisation might have been an issue of available means for a Danish Defence that was generally underfunded in terms of meeting NATO goals. Thus, it is probably not a coincidence that a memorandum from 1955, mentioning Møn-Falsterbo as especially important, was addressed to Parliament.<sup>50</sup> A 1962 Danish-German report to NATO mentions both the Stevns-Falsterbo and Møn-Falsterbo lines.<sup>51</sup> This is also the case for a 1963 summary of the FOD NEMOI (Naval Emergency Operating Instructions), but with first priority given to the Stevns-Falsterbo minefield.<sup>52</sup>

Perhaps one can conclude that Stevns-Falsterbo was ‘need to have’ while Møn-Falsterbo was ‘nice to have’ depending on resources. The thing they have in common, though, is their endpoint, Falsterbo in Sweden.

## Falsterbo: geography and history

Falsterbo is a peninsula poking out from the southwestern tip of Sweden, creating an approximately 23-24 km wide strait between Denmark and Sweden. The Swedish maritime border at the time was 4 nautical miles (1 nautical mile: 1852 metres).<sup>53</sup> Mining international waters in peacetime is illegal, so this could not take place as a preparatory measure, but had to wait until D-day, which rendered a swift operation necessary.<sup>54</sup> In the 1955 HORN BLAESER exercise, Denmark mined its territorial waters in the days up to D-day and the passage through the Sound on D-day itself.<sup>55</sup>

The aforementioned 1962 Danish-German report states that both the Stevns- and Møn-Falsterbo fields could be mined within 6 hours from getting the order.<sup>56</sup> The 1969 FOD EDP estimated 2 hours to lay the Stevns-Falsterbo mine field.<sup>57</sup>

The Sound is far narrower further north, but not until the Copenhagen area proper. Blocking from Falsterbo-Stevns (and/or Møn) makes sense as stops entrance as far south as possible – and perhaps also because geography lends military operations a helping hand.

The many mentions of ‘Falsterbo’ in planning and exercise material, could, at a glance, indicate that Danish plans were to mine all the way to the Swedish coast. However, exercise material often explicitly referred to the Swedish territorial border as the limit of the exercise area: For instance RED GAUNTLET in 1958, specified to not go closer to the Swedish coast than 4 nautical miles,<sup>58</sup> and 1959’s WINGED SHIP II exercise had the Swedish maritime border as its eastward limit.<sup>59</sup>




Fig 2: Exercise area of the COMNAV NORTH 1959 exercise FRESH WATER. Along the Southern coast of Sweden, a four-mile boundary is drawn. It is not clear why this is not the case in the Sound proper – however, the written material specifies a limit of four nautical miles off the coast at Falsterbo.<sup>60</sup>

In a 1950 plan for mining Danish waters, Falsterbo was more closely defined as Falsterbo Reef (Falsterborev).<sup>61</sup> The exercise STARTSKUD from 1955 stated that the minefield was to lay between Stevns Lighthouse and the Falsterbo Reef Lightship.<sup>62</sup> Later in the year, the Danish-Norwegian-British exercise NEPTUNE also gave 'Falsterbo Reef Lightship' as its limit.<sup>63</sup> The same was the case for the permanent patrol vessel between Stevns and Falsterbo.<sup>64</sup>




Fig 3: Known ship wrecks in the tricky waters off Falsterbo, 1750–2000 (Fotevikens Museum).<sup>65</sup>

The waters off Falsterbo Reef are tricky to navigate and have been the scene of numerous wrecks throughout history. The very shallow waters of the reef stretches three nautical miles out from the coast, making that stretch unnavigable for larger ships. Therefore, a lightship was anchored outside the reef from 1831 until 1972, where it was replaced by a permanent structure.<sup>66</sup>

The lightship was anchored approx. 4 nautical miles South-Southeast of the southern tip of Falsterbo, at the end of Falsterbo Reef and marked the narrow passageway where it was possible to circumvent the reef. It also, conveniently, marked the border of Swedish territorial waters.

To get a sense of the military meaning of all this, we must take a quick glance back at World War II:

In 1939, Germany, to gain control of shipping to and from the Baltic, laid out mines until three nautical miles off the Swedish coast. Three miles was the internationally recognised border at the time, so while Sweden claimed four and protested Germany's actions, this was to no avail. And, by mining the waters as close as three nautical miles off Falsterbo, Germany had in effect cut off traffic through the Sound to and from the Baltic. This is the background for the construction of the Falsterbo Canal, which cuts through the Falsterbo peninsula, giving not only a safe alternative to navigating the reef, but also a shipping lane to the Sound entirely within Swedish territory.<sup>67</sup> The canal was done in 1941.

This episode teaches us that of four nautical miles off the Swedish coast at Falsterbo, only one mile (the outer) is navigable by larger vessels. Thus, in order to close off Swedish territorial waters, one needs only to mine an area of one nautical mile, or 1,85 kilometres (see fig. 4).

Had the Cold War turned hot, there would have been three options for the navigable nautical mile:

1. Sweden stays neutral – Denmark accepts any potential passage of all, including enemy vessels, in Swedish waters.
2. Sweden stays neutral – Denmark mines Swedish territorial waters.

3. Sweden gets involved, mines own territorial waters.

As for passage through the Falsterbo Canal: While international maritime law ensures that vessels can pass in Danish or Swedish waters through the Sound (because it is so narrow), the channel is entirely within Swedish jurisdiction and would likely not have been opened for Warsaw Pact vessels in war.

## Discussion of scenarios

### 1. Sweden stays neutral – Denmark accepts passage

If a war broke out, vessels from warring nations could in principle pass through Swedish waters if Sweden was neutral. Likewise, in principle, Denmark would be obliged to respect this.<sup>68</sup> This is the most unlikely alter-




Fig 4: Falsterbo Reef coast and lightship. Conditions for navigation added by author.<sup>69</sup>

native, for the simple reason that it would be unacceptable to Denmark and NATO. According to Holmström, the Danish Chief of Defence Staff, at a visit to the Swedish Defence University in the 1970s, was asked about it by a student. He declared that Denmark would not let Russian naval vessels through.<sup>70</sup>

In practice, we see that plans were also made to block the sound for civilian vessels, meaning that there would be absolutely no way through: A 1957 draft for messages to Danish fishing vessels upon crisis, mobilisation, or war, stated that these should leave the Baltic in the fastest and safest way possible, “possibly through Swedish territorial waters”. This indicates that they risked being trapped in the Baltic and passage through Swedish waters was an uncertain option.<sup>71</sup>

More specific plans for evacuating the Baltic were indicated in the exercise LONG GRIND from 1962. Control vessels would be placed at the minefields ‘where possible’, to guide merchant vessels through.<sup>72</sup> The Danish Navy also suggested the issue be incorporated in that autumn’s NATO FALLEX exercise, by having a list of merchant ships retained in the Baltic. Getting out of the Baltic via Swedish waters does not seem to have been an option.<sup>73</sup>

In 1964, the Danish Marine Staff made further plans for alarming and guiding civil (and allied) ships through mine fields in the Sound via planned routes.<sup>74</sup>

These deliberations confirm that in practice, Swedish waters would be closed, possibly even to civilian traffic and most definitely for enemy vessels – this was, after all, Denmark’s main task in NATO. Thus, the first scenario is also the most unlikely, which brings us to the next two.

## 2. Sweden stays neutral – Denmark mines Swedish waters, with Swedish (implicit) acceptance

This option is altogether possible. As we have seen, all Danish minelayers needed to cover was one nautical mile. Danish vessels were used to navigating the Sound, also on the Swedish side, as is evident from the following examples.

Danish vessels often sailed right up to the territorial border both during exercises,<sup>75</sup> and with a permanent patrol vessel between Stevns and Falsterbo.<sup>76</sup>

Moreover, unless sailing by the lightship, knowing exactly when the border was crossed at sea was not always possible as navigational equipment was not 100% accurate. During a Danish minelaying exercise in 1953, the orders were to presume lighthouse lights were out, so that vessels had to go entirely on navigational equipment. The vessels were instructed to limit sailing in Swedish waters to what was ‘strictly necessary’ – thus acknowledging that some trespassing was probably inevitable.<sup>77</sup> Navigation methods and equipment being unprecise was also evident from a 1954 minelaying exercise, where the order was to ‘aim’ for laying the mines in the given positions, which were to be determined ‘optically’, by radar or Decca.<sup>78</sup>

A 1955 order for peacetime patrol vessels at sea stated that ships were only to transgress territorial borders in emergencies, except one route (32) that lay within Swedish territorial waters and where sailing was permanently permitted. In case of transgressions, the Sound Marine Command was to be notified.<sup>79</sup> This tells us not only that there was a route within Swedish borders, but also that there was a procedure for transgressions. The next step would be for the Sound Marine Command to notify

their Swedish counterpart, Malmö Naval Surveillance District (more on this below).

Observing the Swedish border *was* an inconvenience in exercises. In the 1956 exercise VEGA, Orange forces was tasked with trying to enter the Sound unnoticed from the south. In the evaluation, it was noted as an annoyance that they had to observe Swedish territorial borders as it had significantly reduced their freedom of operation and given them a disadvantage.<sup>80</sup> Perhaps as a consequence, ahead of the 1957 exercise GROVSMED, the Sound Marine Command obtained permission from Malmö Naval Surveillance District to lay out and recover a number of buoys in Swedish territory. This was deemed a necessity in order to carry out the exercise satisfactorily and secure the ships' freedom of movement.<sup>81</sup> An enclosed map shows the planned manoeuvres in Swedish waters.<sup>82</sup>

Aside from these smaller intrusions, there was a flurry of Naval visits between the two countries as is documented in the Defence Attaché's material. They are too numerous to detail here, suffice to say that they were several each year, evenly spread over the entire period of 1949–1968. If we take just one archive box from the middle of this period they were: Danish minesweepers visiting the Swedish West Coast archipelago (Varberg, Grundsund, Strömstad, Dynekilen, Marstrand), three Danish oceanographic vessels visiting a Swedish ditto in Svensksund, the 1<sup>st</sup> Danish Torpedo Squadron visiting Karlskrona, 1<sup>st</sup> Danish Minelayer Division visiting Trelleborg on the Swedish South coast, a fregate + 5 minesweepers from Denmark visiting Uddevalla, Swedish torpedo boats (unclear how many) visiting Korsør Naval Base, 4 Swedish torpedo boats and 4 minesweepers visiting Århus, 14 Swedish mine sweepers (+ four assisting vessels) visiting Rønne, Bornholm.<sup>83</sup> Captain Poul Grooss,

who used to command both Danish corvettes and torpedo boats in the Baltic remembers one such visit when the Swedish Coastal Fleet came to visit its Danish counterpart. It was, he states, obvious that the Admirals knew each other well, some of these acquaintances going back to the war, when Danish naval officers were exiled in Sweden.<sup>84</sup>

Moreover, every summer from the early 1950s until at least 1968, the Swedish Naval Home Guard vessels was granted a standing permission to access Danish waters and harbours – and the other way around). Only condition was that they gave direct advance notice to the relevant authorities.<sup>85</sup>

In 1967, Denmark and Sweden cooperated on a series of oceanographic surveys, meaning several vessels performing studies in each other's' territorial waters in the Sound and Kattegat.<sup>86</sup>

As such, Denmark was fully capable of mining the one nautical mile needed to close off the Sound. Generally, however, Denmark respected Swedish territorial waters and made sure to notify about transgressions and keep good neighbourly relations. It seems most likely that they would keep this respect in war as well, especially if they trusted that Sweden would take care of their side. Which brings us to the last option.

### 3. Sweden mines own territory

This, in my estimation, is the most likely scenario, and as we have seen, one that NATO kept an open door for.

According to Holmström, Sweden mining its own territory was sometimes part of Swedish war games between 1958 and 1976.<sup>87</sup> The same is the case for some Danish exercises, like HORN BLAESER in spring 1955, which assumed that Sweden was 'still neutral but has laid mines in Swedish waters.'<sup>88</sup>

Former Danish Chief of the Naval Command, Rear Admiral Jørgen Bork, tells Holmström, that he and his colleagues had no doubt that Sweden would end up on NATO's side in a war.<sup>89</sup> In his memoirs, Bork divulges that during a 1958 Danish naval visit to Sweden, when he was chief of the Danish Coastal Fleet, he exchanged information with Swedish officers, and even drew up a common document about their respective navies' operation plans in war. Not an operation order or detailed plan, he states, it merely served the purpose of knowing each other's priorities in order to better plan one's own.<sup>90</sup> Bork has elaborated to Holmström, that cooperating was a necessity, not only for the defence of the area as a whole, but also in order to not inadvertently do damage to each other. This was also expressed by former Swedish Marine Chief, Vice Admiral Per Rudberg and former Chief of Swedish Southern military section (1982–1984) and Chief of Navy (1984–1990), Bengt Schuback – that there was an extent of, if not direct cooperation, then mutual information both regarding mining and naval surveillance.<sup>91</sup> Former Danish General Kjeld Hillingsø, expresses that while he was not aware of any planning (perhaps as he was from the Army), he had been 'assured' that Danish mining would not be circumvented by passage through Swedish territory.<sup>92</sup> Also Poul Grooss was under the impression that there was some coordination or agreement in place.<sup>93</sup>

For this to work, communication channels would have to have been established and kept open. This was the case, according to Bork.<sup>94</sup> Communication would take place between Malmö Naval Surveillance District on the Swedish side and the Sound Marine Command in Copenhagen, which moved to Stevns in 1961 and became the Sound

Marine District. Dalsjö concludes that the two were in daily contact in peacetime for information exchange on ship movements and maritime safety, 'but in crisis or war, it could also be used for operational coordination'.<sup>95</sup> Even the Neutrality Commission's cautious conclusion that there was cooperation on search and rescue (SAR), backs this up, as at least the Sound Marine District was the responsible Danish entity for SAR operations in the Sound.<sup>96</sup>

That the two districts were in regular contact, is corroborated by several findings in the Danish archives: In 1951, when Malmö Naval Surveillance District was founded, it replaced the Swedish Sound Marine District. On this occasion, the Danish Naval Attaché in Stockholm received a transcript of the general order for the new district, including its organisation and responsibilities, to forward to Denmark.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, the aforementioned naval visits would often entail direct communication directly between Sound Marine Command and/or Malmö Naval Surveillance District and between those headquarters and the visiting ships. Other instances of contact include notifications ahead of firing exercises at Danish coastal installations, naval exercises,<sup>98</sup> cooperation on minesweeping in both the Sound and Kattegat,<sup>99</sup> and sailing with submarines in adjacent waters.<sup>100</sup>

Lastly, an odd detail confirms the lines of communication: the former headquarters of the Sound Marine District in Denmark is a museum today. In a bunker which used to house the radio communications centre is a tiny cupboard with a list of numbers to various relevant Danish authorities such as Karup (BALTAPHQ) and Vedbæk (Defence Command). The last two numbers on the list are dedicated to 'Hemlige Jönsson' – 'hemlig' meaning 'secret' and 'Jönsson' being a common Danish nickname for Swedes. The wording, albeit jokingly, expresses the fact

that personnel the Sound Marine District was aware of the possible precariousness of the contact.<sup>101</sup>

Another thing that speaks for the possibility of coordination is the vast net of contacts covering the Sound in peacetime. We have already seen the vast number of Naval visits.

They are not alone: visits back and forth, from Defence Staff over individual officers, study and research trips/exchanges, exchange of knowhow, social visits, friendly competitions, Home Guard exchanges and more.<sup>102</sup> The many different levels of contact not only contributed to a general familiarity, but also allowed for the lower-level cooperation described in existing research. This familiarity with each other at all levels could also come in handy, in an operative situation: One of the conclusions of the 1955 exercise STARTSKUD was, that the amount of decision-making meant a backlog of signals and messages, which in turn meant delays. The solution to this strain on communication channels was a delegation of tasks and 'extensive powers' to subdivision officers.<sup>103</sup>

With open lines of communication and so many contacts at all levels, the structure to

support operative cooperation was certainly in place. Delegation of power to subdivision officers would even give defence leadership deniability. And while the strongest indications, including statements from former officers themselves, point to a division of labour between Denmark and Sweden, there are also small pulls toward scenario 2: Holmström writes about a Swedish Commander who was on a study trip in Denmark in 1986. Here he attended a talk by Lieutenant Commander Hans Garde (later Vice Admiral, Chief of the Naval Command and Chief of Defence Staff) about the Danish plans to mine the Sound. Garde showed maps of mine fields transgressing Swedish borders around Falsterbo and the island of Ven.<sup>104</sup> This is in some opposition to Schuback's and Bengt Gustafsson's (Swedish Commander in Chief 1986–1994) statements to Holmström that mining on both sides was coordinated.<sup>105</sup> Dalsjö finds that the Danes, in the latter part of the 1980's was pushing Bengt Gustafsson to get plans up to date – but also that three senior naval officers have stated that plans for naval cooperation in the area was still in place in the 1980's.<sup>106</sup>




Fig 5: Contact list, including number for 'Hemlige Jönsson'. Photo courtesy of Stevnsfort Cold War Museum.

However, both things might be true at the same time.

If it is true that Sweden's 'life-line' to NATO withered in the 1970's and 1980's, as Dalsjö argues, there is a possibility that reliance on Swedish mining was, if not replaced, then at least backed up by a 'plan b' to go at it alone. The structure was in place for that too.

## Who controls the Sound?

Whether Denmark would mine Swedish waters or there was some form of tacit coordination, both options demanded a relationship of trust and that (communication) networks formed in peacetime should be able to hold up in war. This raises the question of command over the Sound in war.

Bork points out that the plans for coordination of mining were between Denmark and Sweden, not NATO and Sweden, thus confirming the Danish and Norwegian functions as links to the NATO defence.<sup>107</sup> Still, if the plans were bilateral, they would need Danish control over the operational area and minimum NATO interference to work.

Luckily, as it were, Denmark remained in full operational control: Danish officers and commanders continuously insisted on keeping full authority over mining the Sound. This was the message at a meeting already in 1949 on the division of labour between Denmark and Britain.<sup>108</sup>

In 1958 Vedel stated that mining the Sound must remain a Danish task, while the Belts (Danish territorial waters only) could in principle be transferred to other allies.<sup>109</sup>

When the NATO Baltic Approaches Command, BALTAP, was formed in 1961, Denmark also insisted on keeping control over naval operations in the Sound. In 1962, it was noted that COMNAV BALTAP *could* take over operative responsibility from Flag

Officer Denmark,<sup>110</sup> but it seems to have been an unattractive option: After the FALLEX-64 exercise, the Danish Naval Command summarised that it would have to be up to the Danish government alone to make any decisions about mining Danish and adjacent international waters and that Flag Officer Denmark would have to be the only one in command of the forces in those areas.<sup>111</sup>

According to the 1969 EDP, mining in the Belts were to be done with assistance from German vessels, whereas in the Sound it was Danish vessels only. Danish forces were to be concentrated in the Southern Sound, German in Fehmern Belt.<sup>112</sup>

Obviously this insistence on keeping sovereignty over naval operations in the Sound can have other reasons, but it is notable for a Danish Defence which, in general did not shy away from having NATO forces fill out national war functions and which was almost entirely dependent on allied reinforcements. Certainly, for the drawn-up scenarios to work, the Danish familiarity and tacit arrangements with Sweden was paramount. And, as stated by Bork, these were bilateral.

## Conclusion

How do you close off the Sound, without involving Swedish territorial waters? The short answer is: you don't. Danish (and Swedish) planners knew this, which is why mining was made an obvious area of cooperation in the report by the Scandinavian Defence Committee.

In the very yearly days of Danish NATO membership, there was still an open acknowledgement of this. However, it did not make its way into Danish official planning and exercises. It all explicitly stops at the Swedish territorial border at four nautical miles off the coast, the main endpoint of Danish mine fields being Falsterbo Reef.

What would happen in the Swedish waters is absent – it simply was not mentioned. It represents a lacuna in the planning, which, if taken at face value upon the outbreak of war, would have been intolerable to Denmark and NATO. Open territorial waters on the Swedish side was not an option, as we see both from the fundamental operational task of closing off the Baltic straits, but also from the planning for evacuation of civilian vessels from the Baltic with assistance through secured routes. Had open territorial waters on the Swedish side been counted as a real option, one could assume that it would somehow show up in the planning as a contingency to be aware of. Instead, it was entirely non-existent.

This left the Danish Defence (in reality, Navy) with two options: to trust that mining would be done by Sweden, or to do it themselves. All evidence points to the former being the case: it has been stated by former actors involved in operational planning and could be coordinated by underhand agreements made on numerous visits and talks between Defence Staff and subdivision officers at several levels. Moreover, communication lines were established, not only between operational headquarters but also between headquarters and individual naval units. These contacts were established and kept up through numerous communications on exercises, SAR, etc., but also through frequent naval visit. Thus, the apparatus was in place as was, it seems, the agreements. As such, this followed the recommendations of the SDU committee, on exchanging information about each others' plans and intents.

At least in the 1950's and 1960's. Going into the 1970's and 1980's less information is available, statements are not as clear-cut and point in different directions. This is a period in which Swedish neutrality policy became more declaratory and perhaps

old networks dating back to the war also thinned out. However, the Danish Defence had a backup option if Sweden were to fail mining her part of the Sound in war: they were perfectly able to do it themselves without much extra work. The stretch of Swedish waters that needed mining amounted to as little as one nautical mile, due to the special – in this case one might say fortunate – geography of Falsterbo Reef. Therefore, any Danish incursion into Swedish waters in this connection would have been minor and could be done with relatively few mines. Once again, though the many visits, Danish crews were knowledgeable of Swedish territorial waters in the Sound and had the capacity to carry out this operation quickly.

All the Swedes had to do was to look away for a little while and give the leniency they already gave when Danish vessels sometimes made incursions during exercises. While all available information thus points to a tacit understanding between Denmark and Sweden about Swedish mining of the Sound, Sweden could, in principle, stay uninvolved in a war and perhaps put forth an official protest to incursions to make sure of its intent to stay non-aligned. It is extremely unlikely that Sweden would take military measures against its neighbour and good friend, Denmark.

Regardless of which option would be used in a war, it demanded Danish operational control in the Sound. This was assured when BALTAP was created and allowed for the Swedes to limit cooperation on the issue to Denmark, not NATO, even though in the end it would hardly have made a difference. It did, however, make a difference for the optics. Thus, Scandinavian cooperation once again became Sweden's link to NATO's defence, long before her entry into NATO. Good neighbourly relations and informal cooperation on several levels did

what great power politics and official planning could not.

The author is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College. She formerly worked at Stevnstort Cold War Museum, where the research for this article was carried out.




Fig 6: 1966 'division of labour' map between Denmark and Germany. The Sound well ahead of the entrance is marked FOD area of primary interest, whereas FOG area of interest goes all the way up to the entrance of the Belts at Langelandsfort.<sup>113</sup>

## Notes

1. Agrell, Wilhelm: *Den stora lögnen: ett säkerhetspolitiskt dubbelspel i alltför många akter*, Ordfronts förlag, Stockholm 1991; Dalsjö, Robert: *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of "Neutral" Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West*, Santérus, Stockholm 2006, pp. 160, 210. On cooperation with Norway, see Petersson, Magnus: *Brödrafolkens väl: svensk-norska säkerhetsrelationer 1949–69*, Santérus, Stockholm 2003.
2. SOU 1994:11, *Om kriget kommer... Förberedelser för mottagandet av militärt bistånd 1949–1969: betänkande av Neutralitetspolitikkommissionen*, Fritze, Stockholm 1994; More general accounts include op. cit., Petersson, Magnus, see note 1; Op. cit., Dalsjö, Robert, see note 1; Holmström, Mikael: *Den dolda alliansen: Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser*, Atlantis, Stockholm 2011. On intelligence, see Agrell, Wilhelm: "Sweden and the dilemmas of neutral intelligence liaison", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 29, no 4, 2006, pp. 633–651; Petersson, Magnus: "The Scandinavian Triangle: Danish-Norwegian-Swedish military intelligence cooperation and Swedish security policy during the first part of the Cold War", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 29, no. 4, 2006, pp. 607–632. On technology as an integrative force, see Weinberger, Hans: "The Neutrality Flagpole" in Thad Allen, Michael and Hecht, Gabrielle (eds.): *Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2001, pp. 295–331; Gribbe, Johan and Nilsson, Mikael: "The Foreign Domestic: Hard Artefacts and Soft Politics in Sweden During the First Half of the Cold War, 1945–1967", *Icon* 11, 2005, pp. 51–62; Nilsson, Mikael: *Tools of Hegemony: Military Technology and Swedish-American Security Relations 1945–1962*, Santérus, Stockholm 2007; On airspace cooperation, see Nilsson, Mikael: "Amber Nine: NATO's Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the Incorporation of Sweden in NATO's Infrastructure", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 44, no. 2, 2009, pp. 287–307.
3. Op. cit., Agrell, Wilhelm, see note 1, p. 91; Op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, pp. 34, 89–90, 94–95, 497.
4. Aunesluoma, Juhana: "Britain, Scandinavia and the Early Cold War: Background and Influences on Policy" in Zetterberg, Kent (ed.): *Hett och kallt – Tre studier i svensk säkerhetspolitik och strategi gentemot västmakterna i början av det kalla kriget*, Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm 1999, pp. 73–96; Op. cit., SOU 1994:11, see note 2, p. 13; Op. cit., Dalsjö, Robert, see note 1, pp. 53ff, 76–79; Op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, p. 290.
5. Dalsjö, Robert: "Sveriges hemliga militära samarbete med västmakterna – Vad vet vi? Vad är vi osäkra på? Vad vet vi inte?" in Almqvist, Kurt and Gerner, Kristian (eds.): *Sverige – En stormakt utan vapen?*, Atlantis, Stockholm 2012, pp. 197–209; Op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, pp. 29–30.
6. Görtz, Hans-Ove: "Samarbete inom luftbevakningen mellan Sverige, Danmark, Norge och Finland", *Försvarets Historiska Telesamlinger*, Flygvapnet, 2016; Görtz, Hans-Ove: "Svensk – Norska flygövningar med radarstation PJ-21 och dess personal från Norge på F 9 Säve", *Försvarets Historiska Telesamlinger*, Flygvapnet, 2016; Görtz, Hans-Ove: "SVENORDA Flygsäkerhetssamarbete mellan Sverige, Norge och Danmark – en del av krigsförberedelserna", *Försvarets Historiska Telesamlinger*, Flygvapnet, 2020.
7. For discussions on the meaning of neutrality, see op. cit., SOU 1994:11, see note 2, pp. 49 ff; Op. cit., Petersson, Magnus, see note 1, pp. 84 ff.; Op. cit., Dalsjö, Robert, see note 1, pp. 41 ff.
8. "pragmatic non-alignment", op. cit., Dalsjö, Robert, see note 1, p. 262. For a more in-depth historiographical overview and discussion of positions, see Malmberg, Mikael af: "Sweden – NATO's Neutral 'Ally'? A Post-Revisionist Account" in Schmidt, Gustav (ed.): *A History of NATO — The First Fifty Years: Volume 3*, Palgrave Macmillan UK, London 2001, pp. 295–314 and Nilsson, Mikael: "Sweden and the Cold War: A Historiography of a Work in Progress", *International Bibliography of Military History*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2013, pp. 35–71.
9. Op. cit., SOU 1994:11, see note 2, pp. 15, 17, 24.

10. Op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, p. 31, ch. 13.
11. Ibid., pp. 28-29, 94, 136-137, 143 ff, 498-499, 510-513; Op. cit., Dalsjö, Robert, see note 1, pp. 51, 151, 162, 168-170, 193, 216-217, 229-230, 253-254.
12. Christmas-Møller, Wilhelm: *Obersten og kommandøren*, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, p. 183; Bjørnsson, Iben: *Norse Brothers: Social Demoratic anti-Communism in Norden 1945-62*, PhD thesis, University of Copenhagen, 2012, pp. 28-29.
13. Op. cit., Dalsjö, Robert, see note 1, pp. 24, 216-219, 223, 229-230, 241, 258, 282.
14. Ibid., pp. 22, 28, chapters 3, 4 and 8; Op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, p. 28.
15. Op. cit., SOU 1994:11, see note 2, pp. 72-73, bilagor, bilaga 4; Olesen, Torsten Borrying: "Brødrefolk men ikke våbenbrødre – diskussionerne om et skandinavisk forsvarsforbund 1948-49", *Den Jyske Historiker* 69-70, 1994, pp. 151-178.
16. Op. cit., Agrell, Wilhelm, see note 1, pp. 64, 67, 74, 81-83, 88; Op. cit., SOU 1994:11, see note 2, pp. 72 ff., ch. 5.2, 5.4, pp. 286 ff; Op. cit., Dalsjö, Robert, see note 1, quote, p. 49-50, 148-151; Op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, pp. 28, 90, 96 ff, 192 ff, 323 ff; Görtz, Hans-Ove: "Skandinavisk försvarsutredning 1948-1949 – uppstarten och dess inverkan under kalla kriget", *Forsvarets Historiska Telesamlinger*, Flygvapnet, 2020.
17. "i Öresund vil farvandet relativt ringe bredde medføre, at en lønnende anvendelse af danske og svenske søkrigsmidler kun kan ske, hvis kræfterne indsættes uden hensyn til grænse-dragning o.l. Exempelvis kan nævnes, at udlægning af minespærringer, som strækker sig over farvandets hede bredde, bør planlægges og udføres som én samlet operation for at sikre fremskaffelse af en ubrudt spærrelinie." All quotes translated by the author. "Den skandinaviske forsvarskomités betænkning", Danish National Archives (Rigsarkivet, hereafter, RA) Marinestaben, V. Den skandinaviske forsvarskomité 1948-1949, 1, p. 154.
18. "Den skandinaviske forsvarskomités betænkning", pp. 130, 198, RA, Marinestaben, V. Den skandinaviske forsvarskomité 1948-1949, 1.
19. "Den marinetekniske redegørelse", RA, Marine-staben, V. Den skandinaviske forsvarskomité 1948-1949, 1, p. 14.
20. "disponeres og udnyttes efter en fælles plan og i taktisk samvirke." "Den skandinaviske forsvarskomités betænkning", RA, Marinestaben, V. Den skandinaviske forsvarskomité 1948-1949, 1, p. 154.
21. Op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, pp. 499-501.
22. "P.M. vedrørende fælles dansk-norske strategiske overvejelser og undersøgelser", July 7, 1949, RA, Marinestaben, V. Atlantpagten, 1, 1949.
23. "P.m. vedr. gensidig dansk-norsk bistandsydelse til søs indenfor 'short term plan'", SVK, May 1950, RA, Marinestaben, V. Atlantpagten, 1, 1950-1951.
24. Korrespondance, Vedel, October 1952, RA, Marinestaben, KC Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret), 3.
25. Op. cit., Dalsjö, Robert, see note 1, pp. 150-152.
26. Op. cit., SOU 1994:11, see note 2, pp. 17.
27. Op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, pp. 492-495.
28. Ibid., pp. 491-492.
29. Strictly confidential note of 14 January 1949 + "Memorandum vedr. spærring af dansk søterritorium...", Naval Command to MoD, January 11, 1949, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret), 1946-1975: 1.
30. "Aftaler om Mineudlægningssteder i den sydlige Adgang til Sundet", Undated., RA, Marinestaben, V. Atlantpagten, 1, 1950-1951.
31. Meeting, January 22, 1953, RA, Forsvarsministeriet 7. Kontor, Journalsager, alfabetarkiv 1951-1973, 6, Det danske kommando i Tyskland 321/51-59.
32. Larsen, Margit Bech: *Mellem afskrækkelse og symbolforsvar. Den politiske og militære baggrund for opførelsen af Stevnfort og Langelandsfort 1945-54. Et casestudie i dansk forsvars- og alliancepolitik*, M. Phil thesis, University of Copenhagen, 2010, pp. 114 ff.
33. "Doktriner for indsættelse af søværnet", SOK, June 11, 1969, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 26.

34. “Kortfattet redegørelse for kystbefæstningens genopbygning”, SVK, October 7, 1950, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 1.
35. “hvorfør der ikke bør regnes med de betydelige forøgelser af forsvarsstyrker og forsyninger, som en deltagelse af Sverige vil medføre”, “idet svensk territorium anvendes mest muligt”, “hvor fjendtlige styrker kan forlade svensk søterritorium, såfremt dette kan benyttes til pasage”. “Almindelig orientering vedrørende det maritime forsvar i danske farvande primo 1951”, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 2.
36. “P.M. vedrørende søværnets behov for luftstøtte”, April 30, 1955. Repeated in similar report, January 2, 1956, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 5.
37. “North Atlantic Defene Committee Decision on D.C. 13”, 1950-04-01, *NATO Strategy Documents 1949–1969*, NATO Archives online, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a500328d.pdf>, (2024-07-04)
38. SG 13/24, *Note by the Secretary to the Standing Group on Strategic Guidance*, 1952-09-26, NATO Archives online, [https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/1/113790/SG\\_013\\_24\\_ENG\\_PDP.pdf](https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/1/113790/SG_013_24_ENG_PDP.pdf), (2024-07-04). See also “Notat vedrørende strategiske retningslinjer for NATO”, *Ministry of Defence*, 1952-10-28, RA, Forsvarsministeriet 7. Kontor, Journalsager, alfabetarkiv 1951–1973, 30, Strategic Concept Guidance “Strategi”, 311/53-61.
39. MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision), 23 May 1957, NATO Archives online, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523a.pdf>, (2024-07-04).
40. SGM-587-58. Memorandum, October 2, 1958, North Atlantic Military Committee, Standing Group, NATO Archives online, [https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/3/130474/SGM-0587-58\\_ENG\\_PDP.pdf](https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/3/130474/SGM-0587-58_ENG_PDP.pdf), (2024-07-04). See also op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, pp. 123–124.
41. E.g. “Denmark’s military position”, Vedel, RA, Marinestaben, A. Sagsarkiv 1950–1961: 1 1950–1952; “Bidrag til skitseforslag til ny forsvarsordning”, SVK, September 28, 1956; “Ordrer vedrørende forberedelse og udførelse af mineoperationer”, SVK, November 30, 1956, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret), 1946–1975: 5; “Redegørelse for de Søværnet påhvilende opgaver”, SVK, December 21, 1957, *ibid.*: 6; “Establishment of NATO Coordinating Authority for Maritime Mining in the NATO-Area”, SVK, April 8, 1961, *ibid.*: 14; “The Danish naval view on the proper concept for naval strategy in the Baltic”, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, Royal Danish Navy, November 18, 1963, *ibid.*: 19; “Doktriner for indsættelse af søværnet”, SOK, June 11, 1969, *ibid.*: 26.
42. Vedel to CIC AFNE: “Measures Necessary to Prevent Transfer of Russian Submarines to the Baltic”, 1952, Marinestaben, A. Sagsarkiv 1950–1961, 1: 1950–1952.
43. “Søværnets muligheder for at sikre gennemførelse i krigstid af forsyningstransporter mellem Jylland og øvrige landsdele”, SST, March 24, 1962, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 16.
44. “P.m. vedr. gensidig dansk-norsk bistandsydelse til søs indenfor ‘short term plan’”, SVK, May 1950, RA, Marinestaben, V. Atlantpagen, 1, 1950–1951; “Plan for mineudlægning i danske farvande”, SVK, October 7, 1950, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 1.
45. “Forslag til direktiv til søværnskommandoen vedrørende søværnets opgaver og indledende operationer i tilfælde af et østmagtangreb på Danmark”, SVK, March 16, 1951, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 2.
46. “Påtegning på skrivelse fra KYSTDEFENSIONEN Reg. U/49 af 8’d december 1950...”, January 10, 1951, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 1; RA, Marinestaben, A. Sagsarkiv 1950–1961, Batterier og MUS; “P.M. vedrørende placering af Stevns batteri”, SVK, March 28, 1951, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 2; Op. Cit., Larsen, Margit Bech, see note 32.
47. “Seaward Defence”, March 10, 1954, Top Secret, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Klassificeret kopibog HEM-YHM (afklass.) 1954–1969: 1.
48. “Exercise Red Gauntlet (GAUNTEX)”, August 1958, RA, Marinestaben, V. Materiale vedr. Motortorpedobådsøvelser, 1953–1958: 1; “Marinekommandoemøde nr. 9”, April 9, 1959 +

- “Costal Defence Forts”, SVK, March 17, 1959, tillæg 2 + 3, RA Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 10.
49. RA, Marinestaben, A. Sagsarkiv 1, 1950-1961.
50. Chief of Navy: “Redegørelse til Forsvarsudvalget af 1955 afgivet den 5 aug 1955”, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 5.
51. “Rapid Mining of the Baltic Straits”, January 10, 1962, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Klassificeret kopibog HEM-YHM (afklass.) 1954-1969, ks. 1.
52. “Udkast til chefen for Søværnets indlæg under øvelse Viking Skjold”, SVK, January 29, 1963, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 18.
53. “Danske Territorialfarvande versus Internationale Stræder”, Forsvarsakademiet, March 9, 1971, RA, Forsvarsministeriet 7. Kontor, Journalsager, alfabetarkiv 1951-1973, 30, Fastlæggelse af dansk søterritorium. See also “Definition af svensk territorium”, June 1956, RA, Forsvarsministeriet 7. Kontor, Journalsager, alfabetarkiv 1951-1973, 29, Udenlandske søterritorier.
54. “Seaward Defence”, March 10, 1954, Top Secret, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Klassificeret kopibog HEM-YHM (afklass.) 1954-1969: 1; “Minutes of the 53rd informal coordination meeting...”, C-I-CRDN, March 13, 1963, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 18.
55. “Øvelse HORN BLAESER, serie 1. Grundlag”, January 1955; “Øvelse HORN BLAESER”, November 27, 1954, RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv 1951-1961: KA-2, 1955, Øvelse Hornblæser 1955.
56. “Rapid Mining of the Baltic Straits”, 10 January 1962, Top Secret. RA, Marinestaben, KC. Klassificeret kopibog HEM-YHM (afklass.) 1954-1969: 1.
57. “Doktriner for indsættelse af søværnet”, SOK, June 11, 1969, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 26.
58. “Exercise Red Gauntlet (GAUNTEX)”, August 1958, RA, Marinestaben, V. Materiale vedr. Motortorpedobådsøvelser 1953-1958: 1.
59. “Concept for NATO SEADDEX ‘WINGED SHIP II’”, CINC RDN, March 25, 1959, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 1.
60. “Notat vedrørende øvelse FRESH WATER”, July 11, 1959, RA, Forsvarsministeriet 1. Kontor, Journalsager, afklassificerede 1950-1967: 4, 174.2-11.
61. “Plan for mineudlægning i danske farvande”, SVK, October 7, 1950, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 1.
62. Operations log, Øresunds Marinedistrikt, April 23-24, 1955, RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv 1951-1961: KA-2, 1955.
63. “Sundets marinekommandoes direktiv for øvelse ‘Neptune’”, September 5, 1955, RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv: KC-2, Fortroligt kopibog 1955.
64. “Farvandspatruljen ved Stevns”, May 27, 1955, RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv, KC-4, B-ordre, FTR 1955-1957.
65. Rosborn, Sven: “Vraken kring Falsterbonäset”, *Marinerat* 8, no. 24, 2000, pp. 16-19.
66. Komorowski, Antoni and Pietkiewicz, Iwona: “Danish and Swedish Lightships Serving to guarantee the Safety of the Danish Straits Area Sea Routes 1820-1988”, *Studia Maritima*, vol. 32, 2019, pp. 163-82; Jakobsen, Björn M. and Rosborn, Sven: *Den sydsvenska sandkusten*, 2001.
67. Levensgood, Janet: *German policy towards Sweden 1939-1945*, MA thesis, University of Montana, 1965; Hägglöf, Gunnar: *Det kringrända Sverige*, P.A. Norstedt, Stockholm 1983, pp. 185-188; Grooss, Poul: *The Naval War in the Baltic, 1939-1945*, Pen & Sword Books Limited, Havertown 2017, pp. 4-5.
68. “Danske Territorialfarvande versus Internationale Stræder”, *Forsvarsakademiet*, 1971-03-09, RA, Forsvarsministeriet 7. Kontor, Journalsager, alfabetarkiv 1951-1973, 30, Fastlæggelse af dansk søterritorium; “Definition af svensk territorium”, June 1956, *ibid.*: 29, Udenlandske søterritorier.
69. RA, Marinestaben, A. Sagsarkiv 1950-1961: 1.
70. *Op. cit.*, Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, p. 509.
71. “Udkast, marinemeddelelse”, 1957, RA, Forsvarsministeriets 1. Kontor, Journalsager, afklassificerede 1950-1967: 8, 981.230-96. See also MoD to SVK, January 22, 1953, *ibid.*: 9, 981.237-18.

72. "Exercise LONG GRIND – Record of discussions", C-I-C RDN, May 3, 1962, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 16.
73. "FALLEX – 62, proposal to list of oceangoing merchant vessels retained in the Baltic", C-I-C, Royal Danish Navy, May 3, 1962, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 16.
74. "Danish Naval Control and Civil Direction of Merchant Shipping", February 17, 1964, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 20.
75. "Rapport vedr. SUM's deltagelse i øvelsen MORILD, 28.-30. april 1951", RA, Sundets Marine Distrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv: KC-1, Fortrolig kopibog 1951; Resume of DISKOS + exercise notes, 1952, *ibid.*: KC-1, Fortrolig kopibog 1952, Øvelse Main Brace, Møn, Køge; "Udkast til chefen for Søværnets indlæg under øvelse Viking Skjold", SVK, January 29, 1963, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946–1975: 18.
76. "Farvandspatruljen ved Stevns", 1955-05-27, RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv: KC-4, B-ordre, FTR 1955–1957.
77. "Direktiv for 'Kobbersmed II hvid', Sundets Marinekommando", June 20, 1953, RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv: KC-1, Fortrolig kopibog 1953, Øvelse "Kobbersmed", 1953.
78. "Ordre vedr. minelægningsøvelse i Sundet d. 18.dec. 1954", RA, SOK, Mineskibeskadren, A. Indgåede skrivelser 1942–1958: 8, 14/1954; "Rapport om minelægningsøvelse i Sundet den 18 dec 1954"; *Ibid.*: 9, 20/1955.
79. "Samarbejde mellem kystradarstation (KRS) og patruljebåde i søen", April 12, 1955; "Farvandspatruljen ved Stevns"; "Sundpatrulje Nord for Dragør", May 27, 1955, RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv: KC-4, B-ordre, FTR 1955–1957; "Forholdsordre for farvandspatruljerne ved Stevns og nord for Dragør", September 1954; *Ibid.*: KC-5, Fortrolig kopibog 1951–1961.
80. Exercise report "Vega", September 3-9, 1956, RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv, KC-2, Fortrolig kopibog 1956.
81. "Minelægningsøvelse GROVSMED III", May 4, 1957; "Analyse af GROVSMED III", July 5, 1957, RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv, KC-3, Fortrolig kopibog 1957.
82. "Direktiv for minelægningsøvelse i Sundet 16-18 maj 1957", RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv, KC-3, Fortrolig kopibog 1957.
83. RA, Forsvarsministeriet, Militærattachéen i Stockholm og Oslo, A. Indgåede skrivelser 1953–1968: A-27, 1956 III; 1957 I.
84. Conversation with Poul Grooss, August 5, 2024.
85. March 21, 1953, RA, Forsvarsministeriet, Militærattachéen i Stockholm og Oslo, A. Indgåede skrivelser 1953–1968: A-25, 1953; 1954; 55; June 18, 1962. *Ibid.*: A-31, 1962 II; March 18, 1968. *Ibid.*: A-36, 1968 I.
86. May 19, June 12, July 6, 1965, RA, Forsvarsministeriet, Militærattachéen i Stockholm og Oslo, A. Indgåede skrivelser 1953–1968; A-33, 1965 I; June 9, 25, 28, 1967, July 3, 1967. *Ibid.*: A-35; 1967 I; November 14, 23, 1967. *Ibid.*: A-36, 1967 II; November 15, 1967, RA, Forsvarsministeriet, Militærattachéen i Stockholm og Oslo, C. Udgående skrivelser fra Stockholm 1953–1967: C-6, 1967.
87. *Op. cit.*, Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, pp. 361, 506.
88. "Øvelse HORN BLAESER", November 27, 1954; "Øvelse HORN BLAESER, serie 1. Grundlag", January 1955; RA Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv 1951–1961: KA-2, 1955, Øvelse Hornblæser 1955.
89. *Op. cit.*, Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, p. 118.
90. Bork, Jørgen and Nørby, Søren: *Åbent hav: mit liv i søværnet 1945–1990. Viceadmiral Jørgen F. Borks erindringer*, Gyldendal, Copenhagen 2010, p. 92.
91. *Op. cit.*, Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, pp. 94-95, 496-500.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 513.
93. Conversation with Poul Grooss, August 5, 2024.
94. *Op. cit.*, Bork, Jørgen and Nørby, Søren, see note 91, p. 92.
95. *Op. cit.*, Dalsjö, Robert, see note 1, pp. 191, 238; *Op. cit.*, Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, p. 193.
96. *Op. cit.*, SOU 1994:11, see note 2, p. 15.
97. RA, Forsvarsministeriet, Militærattachéen i Stockholm og Oslo, A. Ind-/udgåede skrivelser 1946–1952: A-15, 1951 000 til 015, Malmö marina bevaktionsområde.

98. May-September 1952, RA, Forsvarsministeriet, Militærattachéen i Stockholm og Oslo, K. Fortroligt arkiv 1945-1952: K-3, Main Brace; July 26, 1956, RA, Forsvarsministeriet, Militærattachéen i Stockholm og Oslo, C. Udgåede skrivelser fra Stockholm 1953-1967: C-1, 1956; May 5, 1961. Ibid.: C-3, 1961.
99. February 14, May 18, 1957, RA, Forsvarsministeriet, Militærattachéen i Stockholm og Oslo, A. Indgåede skrivelser 1953-1968: A-27, 1957 I; November 1, December 17, 1957. Ibid.: A-28, 1957 II; April, 4, May 4, August 5, September 3, 9, 1960. Ibid.: A-29, 1960 I. February 4, 1961. Ibid.: A-30, 1961.
100. RA, Forsvarsministeriet, Militærattachéen i Stockholm og Oslo, A. Ind-udgåede skrivelser 1946-1952: A-13, Neddykket sejlads med ubåd.
101. The word "secret" is misspelled, the actual spelling being "hemmelig". This could be on purpose, as "hemlig" is closer to Swedish spelling of the same word.
102. RA, Forsvarsministeriet, Militærattachéen i Stockholm og Oslo, A. Indgåede skrivelser 1953-1968: A-27, 1956 III; 1957 I.
103. "RAPPORT...", May 26, 1955, RA, Sundets Marinedistrikt, KA. Fortroligt Sagsarkiv 1951-1961, KA-2, 1955.
104. Op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, see note 2, pp. 485-486.
105. Ibid., pp. 485-499.
106. Op. cit., Dalsjö, Robert, see note 1, pp. 234, 238.
107. Op. cit., Holmström, Mikael, pp. 497-498.
108. "Minelægning i skandinaviske farvande", RA, Marinestaben, V. Atlantpagen, 1, 1950-1951.
109. "Nyordning af dansk forsvar - skitse V", SVK, March 14, 1958, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 7.
110. "COMBALTAP's overtagelse af det operative ansvar", FMN 11. kt., February 14, 1962, RA, Forsvarsministeriet 1. Kontor, Journalsager alfabetarkiv 1951-1973: 6, COMBALTAP II Opbygning 26-25B/61-64.
111. "Bemærkninger vedrørende øvelse FALLEX-64", SVK, November 21, 1964, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 21.
112. "Doktriner for indsættelse af søværnet", SOK, June 11, 1969, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 26.
113. "Command and control of Maritime Forces", CICRDN, August 29, 1966, RA, Marinestaben, KC. Hemmelig kopibog (afklassificeret) 1946-1975: 23.