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
THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF WAR SCIENCES
Proceedings and Journal
No 1/2024
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Which doctrine do we want?
Survey of Swedish officers' views on military doctrine
by Niklas Folkeryd

Sweden's national role in the Baltic Sea region
by Katarina Engberg

Interlocking zones – driving force in the development of joint multinational operations?
by Per Edling, Lars Helmrich and Jon Wikingsson

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Sweden in NATO

by Björn von Sydow

FOR NEARLY 200 years after the Napoleonic Wars, neutrality was the policy for our country in the event of war in our neighbourhood. Sweden leaned on various major powers – after the Second World War, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to open co-operation with NATO, together with Finland.

The full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022 changed Finland's security policy and then ours, in public opinion, government and parliament.

NATO membership with its collective basis will change defence policy and is already doing so.

Some things will change dramatically; others may remain, even affect others, such as technology and conscription. Civilian defence will have to be built up with NATO and the EU.

Not everything will be easy. What if Donald Trump...

We should speak and act in favour of freedom, human dignity and democracy. Everyone will need a rules-based world order, not least the major powers that want to develop in a troubled world.

The author is an associate professor, former Minister of Defence and Speaker of Parliament. He is the President of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

What can Sweden learn from a country that has been in NATO a little longer?

Inaugural speech in KKrVA Division II on 4 October 2023 by Jonas Hård af Segerstad

Résumé

As Sweden is on the doorstep of NATO membership, questions arise to the role that Sweden will be expected to take in the alliance, and how this will influence and form Swedish defence policy as well as its armed forces. The post WWII-Sweden based her defence on the understanding of having to fight alone, without allies, and is now about to enter an alliance founded on the very opposite idea – of collective defence. To look into this pivotal shift, I turned to neighbouring Germany, a country that, in contrast to Sweden, has built its armed forces and defence policy entirely on the role as a part of NATO's collective deterrence and defence. The comparison becomes even more interesting as the two North European nations will play similar parts as strategic staging areas, hubs or "turntables" behind the front states. What lessons can Sweden learn from how Germany has designed its defence and organisation, and what implications may it have on the future build-up? Is such a comparison relevant? These are the perspectives pursued in my inaugural address.

GERMANY AND SWEDEN are two countries with different histories. They are different sizes and in many areas our social systems are quite different. When it comes to defence, Germany is in most respects ten times as large as Sweden, in terms of personnel, budget, etc. A very important difference, and what I will mainly use as a starting point in this introductory speech, is that (the Federal Republic of) Germany has been a member of NATO since 1955, and has built up virtually everything in its defence based on its role as a NATO member. I would argue that Germany, for easily recognisable historical reasons, is also the NATO country that has been and is most compliant with NATO strategies, doctrines and plans. The country does not even have national defence planning, but sees itself only as a cog in NATO's deterrence and defence. At the same time, Sweden has built up its defence throughout the post-war period on the basis that the country was not a member of any military alliance. A possible paradox is that Sweden, but not Germany, will soon spend more than two percent of its gross domestic product on defence, but that is not the focus of this article.

At the time of writing, in the autumn of 2023, however, both countries may in the near future be NATO members and strategically be "countries just behind the front" in central and northern Europe respectively. Germany and Sweden will then have relatively similar operational roles, at the same time as they have defence forces that have been built up from completely different security policy, military strategy and defence

policy starting points. This is a contrast that is interesting to study.

Is it possible to make comparisons between the two countries? Can such comparisons really be relevant? I think so, and I will try to do so in this introductory speech.

I will look at our respective defence forces from a few different perspectives. I have briefly touched on the historical background in the introduction, and I will continue with geostrategic starting points. I will then study the relationship between the different branches of defence, manning in peace, war and crisis, and the view of and conditions for participation in NATO deterrence and collective defence. What conclusions have guided the design of the German defence and what conclusions can Sweden draw as a future NATO member? For this I will make a number of assertions.

Sweden and Germany have similar geostrategic conditions

My first claim is that Sweden and Germany have similar geostrategic conditions. These have even changed in a similar way since the end of the Cold War. During the period when NATO and the Warsaw Pact stood against each other in Europe, Germany was a front country. The then German-German border started at the Baltic Sea just east of Lübeck, and as a Swede it is interesting to sometimes look at the map and find that the whole of Sweden was well east of that border. Across the Baltic Sea from Sweden were the three occupied Baltic states, with extensive Soviet forces, whose first target could be Sweden, such as Gotland and areas on the Swedish mainland. So both (West) Germany and Sweden were once frontline states. We no longer are. The border between East and West has moved eastwards, as states have freed themselves from dictatorship and joined, for example, NATO and the EU.

Germany sees its new strategic role as a logistical ”hub” where troops and equipment from the West move, regroup and advance towards the eastern front. To this end, extensive preparations for host nation support have been made, including the NATO Joint Service and Enabling Command (JSEC) hosted by Germany. There is also a newly established (2022) Territorial Command, which is responsible for all military activities on German soil, as well as for civil-military cooperation. Sweden will have significantly similar conditions, based on our location and the needs that may arise in terms of the ability to move units across the sea to the Baltic States or Finland.

... and share some challenges

The conclusions that can be drawn for Sweden’s future membership are that the greatest difficulties may be in transporting or moving equipment or units. The very extensive rules that govern road and rail transport in Germany are a significant problem, and this is something that Sweden will also need to examine. An advantage that Sweden should have in this regard is that it is a central state, whereas in Germany there is not just one set of rules but often sixteen – different for each federal state. And something that is already complicated in peace always becomes more difficult in war. Another difference is that the Swedish view of total defence is that civilian defence should support the military and that our emergency legislation also has the task of facilitating defence. In Germany, it is much more sensitive to let the military ”stand above” the law.

The fact that Germany has set up new military structures, and that the territorial reserve units that are being set up have host

country support and escort among their main tasks, suggests that Sweden should not underestimate the complexity of operational transport through our country.

Germany is traditionally a land power

Germany is traditionally a land power, which is reflected in the relationship between the defence branches. A rudimentary quantitative comparison shows that of the soldiers and officers in the Bundeswehr, 80 000 are in the army (including the ground elements of the joint forces), 26 000 in the air force and 15 000 in the navy. Thus, the army is about twice the size of the other two branches of defence combined. The situation in Sweden is similar, but with the major difference that the proportion of employees in the Swedish army is much lower, as much of the Swedish volume is made up of conscripts. Of the above figures, in Germany all are employees. I will return to a discussion of what this difference may mean.

German defence is an alliance defence – there are no plans for national defence

A central part of Sweden's view on how the country should be defended is stated in the Military Strategic Doctrine from 2022, according to which we should be able to "... alone sustainably contest an attacker's control or break the enemy's attacking power together with others." In an earlier edition from 2016, long before Sweden's NATO application, the same thing was expressed as "together with others win the war or individually avoid losing." This view is of course based on the legacy of the neutrality era, when Sweden chose to officially stand alone. It is well known that even during the Cold War we counted on support from the same "others" as now, but the defence was nevertheless built up to be able to fight alone and with defence planning based on this.

In Germany there are no such national defence plans. Although there is talk today of a return to national and alliance defence, Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung, it is primarily a geographical return to the core area of Europe and NATO that is being discussed. German defence planning is their part in NATO's defence planning. The idea that Germany would fight a war in Europe without NATO being involved is unthinkable, and something that is completely taboo to even mention. Planning for such a war is therefore out of the question.

The German defence force planning, i.e. the plan for how the Bundeswehr is to be designed, is completely adapted to NATO's four-year planning process NDPP. There is no equivalent to defence decisions, made in the way we do in Sweden, but the political control that is to be translated into defence capability is derived from the capability goals established by NATO. One could object that this applies to all NATO countries, which is formally correct. My point is that Germany has designed its internal planning in a much more detailed way than any other NATO country, precisely because all the others to some extent compare their national needs with NATO's capability requirements. But Germany does not want to go its own way. "Kein Alleingang", as they put it.

I think two things are important to take away from this reflection. The first is that Sweden must decide how our defence management and defence policy should relate to NATO's planning. Sweden is sometimes a strange country in multinational contexts. We often oscillate between the extreme position of trying to be the best in the world and the country that everyone else would like to be, to being completely self-destruc-

tive and without blinking an eye throwing out something tried and tested nationally as soon as we sense that some multi-national organisation thinks otherwise. There are some discouraging examples of how we implemented NATO interoperability in the years from membership of the Partnership for Peace (PFF) onwards. There will certainly also be a few special interests that Sweden puts forward with the justification that this is exactly what NATO wants. Sweden needs to form a clear opinion and decide how these new processes should be handled, including the national opinions that NATO expects each member state to have.

The second is our relationship with Germany. It is not only a neighbouring country, but also one of the most important in Europe. We are close in economic terms, but in many other areas we are surprisingly far apart. In the field of defence, a fresh look at the map is enough to understand that we need to get closer. And here it's important to understand the German caution, that the Germans don't want to do things alone and that they don't want to appear too offensive. Sweden will be able to be a regional partner to take joint initiatives with. The potential is great, and underutilised.

How to staff an organisation for peace, crisis and war?

As a main comparison, I now come to the area of organisation and personnel. Here Germany and Sweden differ quite markedly. The interesting question is why our two countries, as mentioned, are moving towards having increasingly similar roles in NATO, but at the same time have completely different ways of organising and staffing. Whether or not this is a problem remains to be seen. There are several ways to solve the same task, but as a Swede not to look at a country that for decades has done what we will soon begin to do, would of course be less wise.

As I have illustrated earlier, the German defence system has been designed since its foundation in 1955 to be part of the collective defence of NATO. From a principled point of view, Germany and Sweden are relatively similar, which is of course due to the great influence that German, and previously Prussian, warfare has had on Sweden. The similarities lie in our view of how units are put together. On the ground, the German system of divisions and brigades is very similar to our Swedish one, where both countries have the same idea of what is available at divisional level, for example, and the same view of how tanks, armoured vehicles and light vehicles are mixed or not mixed in the constituent battalions. German and Swedish army officers recognise themselves here. And it is essentially the same in the navy and air force, with the possible exception of the German naval infantry battalion (Seebatallion), which has completely different capabilities and tasks than the Swedish amphibious battalions. I will not go into the enormous material deficiencies that 20 years of harsh cuts and lack of stability have led to, but content myself with noting that there is a painfully high level of recognition in this area.

The Bundeswehr is a professional army

The big difference is that the Bundeswehr is a professional defence force. When we see that the German army has nine brigades in three divisions, we might think that it is "only" a little more than twice as much as Sweden will soon have. It may even sound paltry for a country with a defence budget of the equivalent of SEK 800 billion per year. But in the nine German brigades, there are only enlisted soldiers and officers, while our

counterparts will consist of continuous duty, occasional duty and a large proportion of conscripts. Germany also had conscripts for a long time as a complement to employees, but when the Bundeswehr was downsized in 2011, the conscript component was shelved. The need for a 'mass army' on the German-German border was over, and, as in Sweden, foreign operations became the norm.

In Germany, professional defence is a prerequisite for NATO tasks

The difference lies in the fact that Germany sees professional defence as a prerequisite for carrying out its tasks in NATO. Germany has always been a loyal NATO member whose strategy is to stand up, as its own defence is based on everyone else standing up. After February 2022, Germany is also committed to taking an even greater responsibility in NATO's deterrence on the eastern flank, and currently has a battalion battle group in place in Lithuania and a brigade on standby in Germany, as well as being responsible for the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). At the time of writing, Germany is deploying a new armoured brigade that will be permanently stationed in Lithuania from 2025. In Slovakia, anti-aircraft and tank units are rotating. At sea, Germany is continuously represented in the standing naval forces, and always active in NATO Air Policing. This is possible due to the system of employed soldiers.

Reserve units for volume, replacement and territorial defence

Germany is also building up territorial and other reserve units, which are the elements that will not be permanently part of the Bundeswehr. Up to 100 000 reservists will be part of these units, which are intended to remain on German soil after the field army has left. Manning will be voluntary and former contract soldiers will be given a wartime placement for six years in the unit reserve or in a territorial unit after the contract has expired, similar to the Swedish principle of transfer units.

Germany divides its reservists into three categories: unit reserve (Truppenreserve), territorial reserve and a personnel reserve.

The unit reserve reinforces the field army with:

- reinforcement elements for the regular units, such as extra platoons and companies in battalion units,
- individual reinforcement positions in the units,
- replacement personnel for losses in field units.

The territorial reserve:

- is structured with regional security and support companies (RSU-Kompanie) for disaster protection in peace and HNS in war.
- produced at regional Heimatschutzregimente (formerly Landesregimente).
- is led from the respective federal Landeskommando, which in this respect is subordinate to the newly established Territoriales Führungskommando in Berlin.
- can also provide replacement personnel for field units.

The personnel reserve includes, as in Sweden, all other reservists who could be called up in case of high readiness, but who are not placed in either of the first two.

All start as contract staff

Here it is also worth mentioning a significant contrast. In the German armed forces, all employees start as contract workers, on contracts lasting between two and twenty-five years. The exception is officers, who always start with a thirteen-year contract. At the end of the contract period, non-commissioned officers and officers can apply to become permanent employees, working until retirement. It is among these officers that selection for the General Staff is made. Approximately one third of Bundeswehr employees are permanent employees, the rest serve on contract.

For those who fulfil their contracts there are relatively extensive benefits, such as paid training, salary guarantees, priority for other government jobs, etc. The system has certain advantages, but is based on principles that are far from the rules of the Swedish labour market. A benefit system that favours contract soldiers who choose to stay longer in their employment was proposed in the 2015 personnel supply inquiry and could be an interesting option for Sweden to try.

German brigade permanently to Lithuania

A major novelty this year is the decision to permanently station a brigade in Lithuania, as Germany has never had units stationed abroad. All units have so far been based on rotation or on standby in their home garrisons. The challenges do not lie in finding a brigade with permanently employed personnel, but rather in the infrastructure that needs to be in place in Lithuania in order for the brigade to be able to train, exercise and take care of its equipment to maintain its wartime capability. They also concern civilian necessities for soldiers and their families who move there, such as housing, schools, jobs for family members, etc.

Planning for a permanent station also raises other issues. If it is an existing deployment, should all staff be ordered to move to Lithuania? If not, to what extent should it be voluntary? This is important because a unit that is deployed to the front in peacetime must also be used there in the event of war. Then parts of the unit cannot be replaced. Units must also fit into the regional plan for the area, as NATO's latest Strategic Concept emphasises. Where you have a brigade in peace, you are expected to have a division in war. This is exactly the reasoning of Germany, which sees the newly deployed brigade as the vanguard of the armoured division planned for the same area in war.

Why is this important for Sweden?

If Sweden is to participate actively in NATO's deterrence and defence, we must also consider how we put together our units. For deterrence, we will probably only be able to use units with employed soldiers. The extent to which we can use reserve officers and temporary duty personnel remains to be seen, but if we intend to do so, we have to think about the temporarily assembled units from foreign operations and the unspecified units in various force registers. They will not be interesting because it is the regular units that are expected to be used, i.e. numbered units with their personnel and equipment. This will be easier for the blue parts of the Armed Forces, which are often already organised in this way. But for the Swedish army, it means that a) we know which units are required in the deterrence role, b) we can man and equip these units in a way that simultaneously allows for readiness at home and enables grouping on the eastern

flank, c) the unit elements are in line with NATO's regional plans, d) our force growth in defence (Article 5) is logically linked to the elements that were already active in the deterrence role.

Is this the case today? Without risking going into secretive questions about how the Swedish war organisation is structured, I will content myself with stating that it has not been developed on these premises. This is not about whether it is the right kind of unit, which is another question, but about freedom of action and availability of the units we have. Today in Sweden, we are still too much influenced by the 20th century's "porridge roll doctrine": where the organisation is formed based on the basic training year, and the war units are not at the centre in the way that is often talked about, but are something more abstract in the background.

The Swedish Armed Forces' latest orientation (FMSI) shows that from an availability perspective there are three types of war units: standing, mobilising and home guard units. In the standing units, the personnel are employed. The commander has them at his disposal, at least in theory as far as reservists are concerned. The mobilising units are available at the earliest in the event of high alert (I assume that the only reasonable solution will be that conscripts in military service can be used outside the country's borders).

Germany has solved this by only having standing units, but Sweden must decide what we want, what we can do and what this means for our organisation and the composition of our personnel. It also needs to make sense from a production perspective. It would probably be irrational for all soldiers to be employed in one garrison but included in another. But how should they be distributed? Should a brigade have a core, e.g. two battalions, of continuous service, two battalions of occasional service and then the rest conscripts? Or should each part of the unit have a little bit of each category: a group has two professional soldiers, two temporary duty soldiers and four conscripts, and so on up to brigade level? Or should such a division start higher up? In that case, are we prepared to move people within the units so that they are manned according to the availability requirements?

Germany's reasoning is that where you have a battalion in peace, you have a brigade in war, and that a brigade in peace grows into a division in war. How will Sweden view this? If we have a battalion unit in place within the framework of NATO's deterrence, will we add the rest of the brigade if the situation develops towards collective defence? Or do we bring the unit home when the shit hits the fan? Or do they stay and the brigade at home is left without a unit? Depending on how we answer these questions, we must also design our organisation.

A third option would be to look at how Germany chooses to have the entire field army standing, while the territorial units are mobilising reservists. For Sweden, this would roughly mean that the number of employed soldiers would need to increase, but perhaps not by much more than the approximately 17,000 that was the target in the previous defence decision, but which we never achieved. The important thing in the near future is to decide what role Sweden wants to play, determine what this means for the war organisation and then realise it. Here we can learn a lot from our southern neighbour.

The author is Captain (N) and serves as our country's defence attaché in Germany. He is a member of The Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences and The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

Which doctrine do we want?

Survey of Swedish officers' views on military doctrine

by Niklas Folkeryd

Abstract

While military organisations commonly use doctrines to guide decision-making and planning, little is known about how military practitioners think doctrine should be formulated. Drawing on previous research on doctrine developers' views, this article investigates Swedish officers' perspective on military doctrine. This is done using Harald Høiback's model on the anatomy of military doctrine focused on the theory element. The result suggests that the officers primarily consider doctrine as a framework for improvisation, rather than a set of fixed rules. Furthermore, the results indicate that this view is strengthened with increased experience.

DOCTRINE, FROM THE Latin *doctrina* (teaching, learning), is a doctrine or set of teachings intended to guide practical action.[1] Doctrines are used particularly in military organisations, for example to unify thinking and support the development of strategies and plans.[2] The debate about the nature or otherwise of doctrine, and the appropriateness of formally prescribing what works in war, has been long and wide-ranging. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, there is no common understanding of what doctrine is and how it can be used.[3] The Swedish Armed Forces state the purpose of their military strategic doctrine as

> It describes how the Armed Forces will use military force to achieve the security policy objectives decided by the Government and Parliament, and how we will defend Sweden with available resources.[4]

It is conceivable, however, that knowing the *stated* purpose is not enough; how the messages in the doctrine are formulated could also affect how they are perceived by the military organisation that has to deal with them. A Swedish entry into NATO means that the Defence Forces' doctrine will have to be reformulated.[5] By better understanding how to formulate doctrines that are positively received by the organisation, it is reasonable to assume that the probability increases that it will be perceived as intended and can be implemented effectively. Peter Thunholm and Anders Palmgren make the assumption that the view of the purpose of the doctrine among the representatives of the military organisation affects the demands they place on the doctrine and how it should be assessed.[6] Without knowledge of the organisation's position, it is thus difficult to evaluate the doctrine and to develop an effective doctrine. It should reasonably be more effective if there is agreement between the doctrine developers and the representatives of the military organisation using the doctrine.

This article therefore aims to investigate how Swedish officers relate to the doctrine and the military theory that the doctrine conveys, and secondly, to compare their

views on the subject with those of doctrine developers. This is done by starting with an overview of what previous research says about what doctrine is, what it should contain and can aim for, what is required for effective implementation and problematising how doctrines can be evaluated. The research overview leads to the concretisation of the research gap the study highlights and develops the purpose of the article in relation to previous research. This is followed by the empirical part of the article, which consists of a questionnaire survey, and the article is rounded off with suggestions for further research.

What is military doctrine?

The academic debate on military doctrine has centred on whether doctrine as a concept should be based on a rationalist or constructivist perspective. In other words,

> Whether doctrine is an outcome of objective factors, for example a response to threats, or an outcome of subjective factors, such as a military culture.[7]

As an example of the objective perspective, Barry Posen, for example, argues that doctrine is a set of institutionalised principles on how to fight.[8] This can be compared to Jan Ångström and Jerker Widén's constructivist perspective that doctrine should be seen as a set of beliefs about what works in war, from which the military professional identity is created.[9]

Harald Høiback notes that there is no universally accepted definition of doctrine, but a number of elements are recurrent, and he summarises these in his definition:

> Institutionalised beliefs about what works in war and military operations.[10]

The definition is comprehensive, which certainly contributes to the fact that the features are recognised from the above sketchy description of some different positions and should thus be valid, regardless of whether one adopts a rationalist or constructivist perspective. In order to more clearly distinguish *doctrine* from the plethora of other governing documents that exist within a defence force, Høiback also uses NATO's definition:

> Doctrines are authoritative documents military forces use to guide their actions containing fundamental principles that require judgement in application.[11]

This can be compared to the Swedish Defence Forces' definition:

> The Defence Forces' doctrine consists of military strategic doctrine, doctrine for joint operations (DGO) and doctrine supplements for command, intelligence and security, logistics and military strategic communication. As a complement to the Defence Forces' doctrine, application at the tactical level is developed in regulations and manuals.[12]

Thus, the Swedish Armed Forces do not provide a more detailed definition of the concept, but only indicate which publications are included in the doctrine. However, it is clear that the Armed Forces' doctrine is narrower than Høiback's (and NATO's) starting point, which includes all texts that should *guide action* and that *require judgement* in their application. Based on this definition, the Defence Forces' regulations at the tactical level are also included in what Høiback means by "doctrine". Within the framework of this article, which is largely based on Høiback's work, the term doctrine is used in its more general sense and is understood as institutionalised notions of what works in war, formalised by an authority. After this brief description of what a doctrine can be considered to be, the question of what a doctrine needs to consist of follows.

What should doctrines contain?

Høiback argues that doctrines must relate to three elements to be effective: theory, culture and authority.[13] This view of the anatomy of doctrine has been argued to be appropriate because it brings 'analytical clarity' to doctrinal studies.[14] Høiback summarises the development of the theory element throughout history in three different approaches, which he calls doctrinal scepticism, doctrinal foundationalism[15] and doctrinal coherentism, which will be developed further below.[16] Related to culture, Høiback says that doctrine needs to be adapted to the culture of the users and reinforce their expectations.[17] In this way, the doctrine can become more convincing and also contribute to the creation of meaning.[18] In Høiback's model, authority is based on the relationship between a military doctrine and the political level. The influence of politics on doctrine is both direct and indirect; through political control and through a conscious or unconscious bias of the doctrine developers to please the politicians.[19] In doctrine development, there needs to be an awareness of political influence so that it does not take over, while at the same time not completely separating doctrine from political considerations.[20]

Høiback's model has formed the basis for a similar trinity in the theoretical model for successful implementation of new doctrine developed by John Nisser. According to Nisser's model, cultural conformity, authority and credibility need to exist for a new doctrine to be implemented effectively. Culture here means that the doctrine must be consistent with the organisation's assumptions, ideas, norms and beliefs about the world around it. Authority means that the doctrine is authorised from a high level and is binding in nature. The third aspect, credibility, means that the concepts in the doctrine are believable, either because they have been proven to work in action or because they seem reasonable in relation to the evolution of the organisation.[21]

The main difference between the two models is thus what is included in the concept of authority. While Nisser focuses on the authority *within the* military profession, Høiback sees the authority that comes from outside, something that has been studied by Deborah Avant, who uses structural factors in civilian institutions as an explanatory factor for adaptability in relation to doctrines.[22] However, the two meanings do not contradict each other but have different focuses, which can be explained by the different purposes of the models. For this study, it is sufficient to note that a doctrine, in order to be effective, needs to contain some form of authoritarian element. However, the two models seem to agree on the cultural aspect. What Nisser calls credibility is also somewhat similar to Høiback's description of theory. This means that what the doctrine prescribes is reasonable and theoretically anchored. In the following, the concept of culture will first be developed somewhat and later the theory element in doctrine will be developed in more detail as a theoretical basis for the empirical investigation.

As noted above, the notion of doctrine formation as an effect of cultural influence can be seen as an expression of a constructivist approach. However, this is not the whole truth and there is disagreement in the research community as to whether strategic culture should be seen as a *context that shapes behaviour*, or whether it can be studied individually, as an *independent variable that influences behaviour*.[23] Studies on the influence of strategic culture on doctrine development have shown, among other things, how Germany's specific strategic culture has

contributed to the fact that the country did not have a doctrine for joint operations for a long time and that once it was developed, it was influenced by Germany's strategic culture in its design.[24] Furthermore, a study by Elizabeth Kier shows how the strategic culture influenced France's choice of doctrine during the interwar period.[25] In addition to these few examples showing the support for the view that strategic culture influences state behaviour, it also highlights how previous research has focused on culture as a factor in the development of doctrine, rather than from a user perspective: what is the culture to which the doctrine needs to be adapted?

In addition to what is referred to as strategic culture, operating at a national level, culture can be viewed from several other perspectives, such as organisational culture. Organisational culture can be said to consist, among other things, of beliefs and values, which can be reflected in how doctrines are formulated, and of underlying fundamental assumptions; assumptions about, for example, "the nature of reality and truth".[26] The importance of culture is further demonstrated in Nisser's study on why the American AirLand Battle doctrine was implemented while the Active Defence doctrine was not. The study indicates that *cultural compliance* is the most important factor, second only to authority. That is, it is not the concepts (theory) per se that are decisive, but rather how well they match previous perceptions and how well they fit into the prevailing organisational culture.[27] So much for the content of doctrines, but why they are even needed is another question.

What is the purpose of doctrines?

Høiback identifies three purposes for military doctrine; three purposes that can be seen as ideal types but hardly exist in their pure form. According to these, doctrine can be seen as a tool for either *management*, *change* or *training*. The ideal types relate to the model of the anatomy of doctrine in that the three elements are given different emphases, as explained by Høiback:

> As a tool of command, doctrine says authoritatively what to *do*; as a tool of change, it says authoritatively what to *be*; and, as a tool of education, it says and explains *why* we do what we do and are who we are for the time being.[28]

With Sweden as a member of NATO, one could argue that a new Swedish doctrine, written in line with NATO's, would need to be a tool for change, with a focus on authority and culture. On the other hand, Sweden has already been relatively adapted to NATO before the application, which has been demonstrated by a high degree of previous institutionalisation, for example through exercises and military-technical cooperation.[29] In addition, Høiback points out that NATO doctrines are mainly aimed at training and standardisation, and not at change.[30] Regarding doctrine as a tool for training, focusing on its theory and culture elements, there has been a change in the extent to which this has played a role in Sweden. Over the past twenty years, it has gone from being an unusual element to doctrines becoming a central component of education.[31] A more comprehensive approach to purpose is taken by Posen, who believes that doctrines can fulfil several functions, but that all functions ultimately aim to reduce organisational uncertainty.[32] Ångström and Widén also conclude that doctrines can be seen as aiming to reduce uncertainty and provide security on the battlefield. However, they come to this conclusion from a different starting point, based on rejecting Høiback's

utilitarian purposes.[33] This forms the basis for their perspective on the evaluation of doctrines, a topic that will be touched upon in next section and which also concludes this review of previous research.

What is ”good” doctrine?

The different views on what doctrine is, what it should contain and what it aims at, naturally make it difficult to measure what is a good doctrine. For example, Nisser's view of ”good” doctrine can be implicitly interpreted as one that is positively received by the organisation and implemented.[34] Ångström and Widén argue, as mentioned above, that a rationalist and utilitarian perspective, which is the most common approach to doctrine, is insufficient as a basis for measuring quality. The purposes described by Høiback cannot therefore be used to measure the quality of a doctrine, as there is no feedback mechanism. That is, how is the quality of the doctrine measured without it being tested in a real war; and how can one know in advance that it is a good doctrine for future wars?[35]

Ångström and Widén conclude their article by identifying a research gap on how to measure the quality of doctrine and suggest that the problem should be approached by measuring subjective perceptions of quality.[36] This identified research gap, on how to evaluate doctrine, is addressed by Thunholm and Palmgren who examine the views of doctrines among those who formulate them.[37] Their study is based on Høiback's classification of three different ways of looking at the role and possibilities of the theory element.[38] The contradiction in using theory rejected by Ångström and Widén to fill the gap they have identified is not further justified. It can certainly be interpreted that they are investigating a measure of subjective perception of quality, even if it is not explicitly stated that this is the intention.

Research gap

Ångström and Widén argue that there is little research on doctrine, or at least that it is not commensurate with the importance that military organisations attach to it.[39] Without placing further value on what can be considered as much or little research, it can be stated that too little attention has been paid to how the users of military doctrine see the role it should fulfil, and this has been the starting point for this article. Thunholm and Palmgren's view is that the perception of the intended effect of doctrines reasonably affects how they should be assessed.[40] This is extended here to the assumption that it is not enough to know how those who developed it view it; the question also needs to include those who are intended to use the doctrine. Furthermore, it is assumed that the officers' view of the doctrines' intended effect is part of the organisational culture in which they operate. There is no direct contradiction in the fact that such a study is based on Høiback's theory, while at the same time it relates to Ångström and Widén's view of the purpose of doctrines and how they can be evaluated. This is because Ångström and Widén's view of the purpose of doctrines can be said to fit within the description of cultural conformity made by Høiback and developed by Nisser. It may, however, be worth mentioning Jack Snyder's reservation about culture being a causal fallback that tends to be used to explain things that cannot otherwise be explained.[41] However, the ambition of this article is not to seek explanations. The hope is rather to contribute a small piece of the puzzle for the understanding of a limited part of the military culture, in line with the statement that ”opinions among officers are likely to reflect underlying beliefs”.[42]

By examining how officers view the role and purpose of doctrines, we hope to be able to contribute knowledge about the attitude towards both the theoretical (explicit) and cultural (implicit) elements of the anatomy of doctrines. These two elements should also be of greatest interest linked to the role of doctrines as a support in the education of officers, which is perceived to be an important role for doctrines in Sweden. The result can also be compared with a preliminary perception of the doctrine developers' view; if there seems to be a large difference in perception between developers and users, it would be an interesting question for further research on how doctrines can be implemented. Based on Nisser's previously stated conclusion that the most important thing for an effective doctrine implementation is how well the content appeals to the recipients, the main contribution to the research field is thus to try to add new knowledge in order to ultimately understand how doctrines can be implemented effectively. First, a slightly developed argument about the theory elements of doctrines before we move on to the empirical study that explores this.

How doctrine mediates theory

As described above, Høiback argues that doctrine needs to consist of theory, culture and authenticity. Theory in this case refers to how doctrine prescribes what we need to do, and Høiback suggests that the view of theory can be divided into three types of arguments about the role, strengths and weaknesses of doctrine: scepticism, fundamentism and coherentism.[43] The three approaches can be summarised by the fact that sceptics believe that doctrines do not serve any real purpose as it is not possible to come up with a relevant theory of warfare, while fundamentists and coherentists are both positive about doctrines, but from different starting points. For fundamentists, there is "real knowledge" that can be used as a basis for military doctrine, while coherentists tend to believe that it is indeed possible to theorize about military theory, but that there are no eternal laws to start from.[44]

Doctrinal scepticism

The doctrinal sceptics argue that it is hardly possible to say anything certain about war. The main risk with doctrines, according to the sceptics, is that they inhibit creative thinking and that doctrines, through their prescriptive nature, lead to rigidity.[45] Further arguments are that since every war is unique, it is not possible to regulate in a doctrine how they should be fought, especially since experience will always be based on previous wars.[46] Furthermore, doctrinal sceptics find arguments in the reflexivity of warfare: that the opponent, by studying our doctrine, can adapt to it.[47]

Doctrinal fundamentalism

The arguments of fundamentism can be understood starting with what Høiback refers to as the foremost doctrinal fundamentist, Antoine-Henri Jomini, who argued that the task of military theorists is to discover recurring principles of warfare that can then be systematised and elevated to law.[48] Subsequent fundamentalist military theorists, Høiback says, differ from each other in the areas from which they consider the "sure knowledge" to be drawn: military historicism, operations analysis, game theory and axiomatic foundationalism.[49]

The most common way to argue in favour of doctrinal principles and their legitimacy is through military historicism, where studies

of past wars form the basis for logical conclusions about what works and what does not.[50] As an alternative means of deriving true knowledge, operations research has emerged in the twentieth century, a set of methods all based on mathematical modelling to support military planning, necessary, according to its proponents, to ensure that decisions are not based solely on emotion and intuition.[51] Closely related, but deductive rather than inductive, is game theory, which assumes two or more parties (players) whose various possible strategic choices can be quantified and calculated.[52] The fourth category of doctrinal foundationalism, axiomatic foundationalism, is a collection of theorists whose starting point is assertions that must be accepted but cannot be proven. This subcategory includes religious and ideological starting points for military theory.[53]

Doctrinal coherentism

If Jomini is the founding father of foundationalism, Carl von Clausewitz is the father of coherentism.[54] The attitude of doctrinal coherentists can be summarised by Clausewitz's oft-quoted argument that

> The theory should educate the intellect of the future commander, or rather help him in his self-education. It does not follow him on the battlefield.[55]

That is, it is possible to formulate theories about what works and what doesn't in war, but they are not eternally valid. Rather, theory aims to provide a basis for creativity and improvisation, while a sound doctrine ensures that creativity remains within some kind of reasonable framework.[56]

Thus, unlike the foundationists, the coherentists do not see the theories underlying the doctrine as immutable; existing as an independent reflection of reality. Rather, they see that the theory element is more of a construction that can change over time, but that the strength comes from choosing to relate to the theory.[57] The doctrine then becomes an "effect-enhancing coordination tool", to use Thunholm and Palmgren's formulation.[58]

What do officers think?

In his description of the three approaches to doctrine, Høiback reviews the arguments put forward throughout history by different proponents of each "school", and which can thus be said to be associated with each position. This has formed the basis for the data collection for this article: a survey measuring attitudes towards the theory element in military doctrines. The questionnaire is largely based on Thunholm and Palmgren's previous study, where they developed a set of statements, formulated according to the arguments summarised by Høiback.[5y] Statements (arguments) in line with the respective approach to the theory elements of the doctrine thus form three scales: the doctrine scepticism scale, the doctrine foundationalism scale and the doctrine coherentism scale. By examining the extent to which people agree with these arguments, conclusions can be drawn about which attitude is dominant. A strong agreement with arguments linked to an attitude is interpreted as one's attitude going in that direction, and on the contrary, a rejection of arguments is interpreted as not having a current attitude towards doctrine. The three attitudes to doctrine are not mutually exclusive and it is therefore possible to agree or disagree with arguments linked to all three attitudes at the same time. However, by linking several statements to each attitude, tendencies

can be perceived, such as being more coherent than fundamentalist.

Thunholm and Palmgren's original survey was supplemented slightly for the new context in which it was used. The statements were translated into Swedish and one statement was deleted because it was not deemed relevant in a Swedish context, while another statement was slightly clarified.[60] In order to investigate any differences in responses, the questionnaire began with a number of background questions concerning gender, age, rank, length of service, main organisational background and military training background. Furthermore, a question with three statements about how familiar the respondent considers himself to be with the doctrine of the Swedish Armed Forces and whether he considers the doctrine of the Swedish Armed Forces to be useful in professional practice and in education.

As stated, the interest in the survey concerns the attitude of Swedish officers. However, because of the difficulties in generating and communicating with a random sample of Defence Forces employees, another route had to be taken to select the respondents. Some experience as an officer and employee of the Armed Forces should be required to have any relevant understanding of what the doctrine is and how it could possibly be applied. Furthermore, at least the secondary target group of the Armed Forces' doctrine is stated as "officers in training for service at the operational or tactical level".[61] For this reason, the sample was determined to be Swedish participants in the Higher Officer Programme at the Swedish Defence University at the time of the current survey, autumn 2023. A comparison with the Armed Forces' personnel statistics showed that the respondents were relatively representative in terms of gender, age and organisational background, but with a certain overweight towards the Navy and the Army at the expense of the Air Force. An online questionnaire was sent out to the participants by e-mail and when the data collection was completed after just under three weeks, 66 per cent of the 285 questionnaires sent out had been answered (N=189). The responses received were relatively evenly distributed between the different respondent groups, which indicates that the external non-response is random and thus should not affect the representativeness negatively.

Agreement with the statements was indicated on a scale from 'strongly disagree' (1) to 'strongly agree' (6), with the additional options 'don't know' and 'it depends'. The statements for each scale were merged into three new variables by averaging, which means that the results are reported with decimals. These are interpreted as: <2.50 = 'disagree'; 2.51-4.50 = 'undecided'; >4.51 = 'agree'. The proportion of responses that were not on the scale 1-6 and non-responses to each scale's statements are reported as non-response. In order to present and analyse the results, the data was first prepared for analysis and then central and dispersion measures were produced for each statement individually, and weighted together for the three scales. Furthermore, a number of statistical tests were carried out to look for statistically significant relationships and differences between background questions and different opinions. In the following, the results are presented in parallel with a description of the methods and analyses used.

Officers' attitude towards military doctrine

Based on the three scales that measure the attitude towards military theory in doctrines, it turned out that the respondents overall agree most with the doctrine coherence scale and thus to the greatest extent believe that the doctrine should support independent action (see *Table 1)*.

Table 1. Combined results for agreement with the three scales.

	Means	SD	Min	Max	Losses
Doctrinal scepticism scale	3,72	0,73	1,98	5,78	8,9 %
The Doctrine Foundation Scale	4,02	0,65	1,86	5,86	9,2 %
The Doctrinal Coherence Scale	4,79	0,62	3,00	6,00	7,0 %

Table 2. Agreement with the statements on the doctrinal scepticism scale.

		M / SD
1.	Doctrine tends to develop into dogma and instead of making you agile, it makes you predictable and inflexible. Indoctrination risks jeopardising your flexibility and pragmatism.	3.32 / 1.25
2.	The nature of contemporary wars/armed conflicts is so diverse that it is very difficult to regulate in a doctrine how they should be fought.	3,40 / 1,38
3.	It is likely that any doctrine will be at least partly inadequate and misleading because it is inherently based on the experience of past wars.	3,87 / 1,33
4.	To prevent the doctrine from becoming too restrictive, it should only tell you how to think, not how to do.	4,53 / 1,31
5.	Military theory is relatively underdeveloped compared to, say, medicine. There is seldom more than personal experience to rely on and it is insufficient to develop a doctrine from it.	3,12 / 1,25
6.	Military theory is a social science with a high degree of reflexivity involved. If a law or theory of warfare is 'discovered', the adversary can adapt or counteract it.	4,08 / 1,26
7.	There are no scientific 'laws' or general 'principles' governing strategy or warfare.	3,60 / 1,46
8.	Warfare is a very complex phenomenon and is largely determined by chance and opportunism, not by scientific laws.	3,88 / 1,24
9.	Initiative, willpower and pragmatism are more important to a commander than knowledge of military theory and training.	3,66 / 1,15

Table 3. Agreement with the statements on the doctrinal fundamentalism scale.

		M / SD
10.	There are principles and scientific laws of strategy and warfare that can be discovered using the scientific method in scientific studies.	4.01 / 1.07
11.	Theories on strategy and warfare that have emerged from scientific studies can be developed into hypotheses that can be tested by analysing past battles and wars.	4,36 / 1,14
12.	Randomness and frictions occur in war but often affect both parties equally and combat is therefore as deterministic as any other human activity.	3,44 / 1,39
13.	Especially at the lower (tactical) level, it is possible to find principles on how to best fight.	4,39 / 1,08
14.	It is possible to identify general principles of warfare through careful (scientific) analysis of (military) history.	4,16 / 1,10
15.	Game theory aims to use mathematical models to describe strategic interactions between rational decision-makers. Analysis based on game theory is useful to better understand strategic behaviour.	4,06 / 1,08
16.	Basically, combat can be understood as a duel between two fighters, and general principles of combat can be derived by analysing such a duel.	3,70 / 1,17

Furthermore, the results indicate that the officers in the survey are more doctrine fundamentalists than doctrine sceptics, although the difference between these two scales is small. This means that the two scales associated with a favourable attitude towards doctrines received more support than scepticism. To illustrate what lies behind the mean values of the scales, the results for each statement in the three scales are also presented below.

As with the scale as a whole, respondents were mostly undecided about the individual statements on *doctrinal scepticism (Table 2)*. Statement 4, that doctrine should tell you how to think, not how to do, stands out with higher levels of agreement, and this was the only statement that respondents agreed with, albeit by a narrow margin. The least agreeable of all the statements in the survey is that military theory is relatively underdeveloped and that there is nothing more than personal experience to build it on (statement 5).

Although the respondents are doubtful about all statements on the *doctrinal foundation level (Table 3)*, a lower level of agreement can be noted for statement 12, that chance affects both parties in combat equally, while the spread is greatest here. A couple of respondents indicated that they believe that the effect of chance and friction can be compensated for by quoting Ingemar Stenmark in a free text response: "I know nothing about luck. Only that the more I train the more luck I have." A certain preponderance is also noted for statement 13, that principles for how to fight can be found particularly at a lower (tactical) level; overall, however, there is still doubt about this.

In addition to the fact that the degree of agreement is higher for the statements at the *doctrine coherence level (Table 4)* than the others, the spread is also generally lower;

Table 4. Agreement with the statements on the doctrinal coherence scale.

		M / SD
18.	Although there are no objective principles or scientific laws governing strategy and warfare, we should not rely blindly on intuition and opportunism. We can still agree on a strategy or on principles of how to fight and this agreement will reduce the impact of the uncertainties and frictions of war.	4,62 / 0,97
19.	The main purpose of lower (tactical) level doctrine is to create a common understanding of concepts, terminology and approaches to reduce uncertainty and friction.	4,83 / 0,98
20.	Military theory is not coherent enough to provide a unified understanding of what constitutes good strategy or how to fight, but we will still need to make decisions about strategy and how to conduct military operations. Doctrine is necessary to choose which strategy and principles to follow.	4,36 / 1,07
21.	A well-known and well-implemented doctrine is a good starting point for improvisation.	4,84 / 1,08
22.	The process of developing doctrine can itself help us shape definitions and concepts.	4,93 / 0,82
23.	Having a unifying doctrine is particularly important for coalitions.	4,88 / 0,92
24.	A doctrine can stimulate both internal and external debate and thus contribute to the development of theory.	4,97 / 0,92
25.	Lower (tactical) level doctrine can be a good tool to establish useful experience-based rules of thumb and common approaches that reduce friction without making us inflexible.	4,51 / 1,09
26.	A clearly formulated doctrine is a good tool for training officers and units.	4,66 / 1,06
27.	The advantages of having a doctrine are greater than the potential disadvantages.	5,26 / 0,88

that is, the same pattern as at the scale level. The only doctrinal coherence statement that did not receive an overall agreement is the statement that doctrine is necessary to choose a strategy (1y), where the respondents are overall hesitant, although with a relatively high spread. The absolute highest level of agreement in the survey is given for statement 26, that it is better to have a doctrine than to be without one, and here the agreement is also among the highest.

Høiback points out that doctrines can also fulfil a role as a starting point for academic debate, which can be seen as particularly important for nations whose strategic culture does not take doctrine very seriously.[62] This description could be seen as fitting well for Sweden, whose relatively short tradition of formal doctrine means that we do not really attach as much importance to it as might be necessary.[63] The fact that the respondents showed strong support for the statements that there are benefits to the doctrine development process itself (statement 21) and that doctrine can fulfil a role as an internal and external debate stimulus (statement 23), thus supports previous research.

Homogeneous group

So far, the results for the entire group of officers surveyed; in the following, results are presented concerning whether attitudes to doctrine vary within the group surveyed.[64] Since previous research has shown the importance of an organisational culture for divergent perceptions and that the culture can vary even within an organisation, there was an expectation that the study would be able to reveal differences in the view of doctrine within the Armed Forces, depending on organisational affiliation. Organisational background is understood here as which branch of the armed forces or fighting force one has mainly served in, and the differences depending on this were examined through analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA). The result showed only minor statistically significant differences between the different groups, and this not at the scale level but for two statements on the coherence scale.[65] The identified differences depending on organisational background thus turned out to be both few and relatively uninteresting.[66] Differences depending on which basic officer training was completed were also examined by analysis of variance and while the differences were certainly found to be more numerous, they were still not at scale level and all differences were also relatively small (mean for agreement ±0.5).[67]

Previous experience in the Defence Forces doctrine

All the more statistically significant results were identified in correlations depending on different experience of the Defence Forces' doctrine. This was investigated through correlation analysis,[68] , but before the results of this, first the agreement with the three experience statements will be presented, as they also provide some understanding of the officers' attitude to doctrine. The degree of agreement for the three experience statements has been given on a five-point scale between "not at all" (1) and "completely" (5). The results in terms of mean and spread are presented in *Table 5*.

As can be seen, the participants on the whole are reasonably familiar with the content of the Defence Forces' doctrine, while no one was completely unfamiliar with the content. Furthermore, the officers feel that the doctrine has been more of a support in training than in their work. This varying experience of the Armed Forces' doctrine also proved to affect the officers' attitude

to the doctrine in general, as statistically significant correlations were identified between all three experience statements and the doctrine coherence scale (see *Table 6)*.

The results show that the more experience an individual feels they have with the doctrine of the Armed Forces, the more they agree with the coherence scale. Furthermore, a positive correlation was identified between previous experience of Defence Forces doctrine and all but two statements in the coherence scale.

Sceptical officers

Correlations were also identified between experience of Defence Forces doctrine and the statement on the doctrinal scepticism scale, both positive and negative (see *Table 7)*.

As can be seen, scepticism towards doctrines seems to diminish somewhat if one feels that one has benefited from the Defence Forces' doctrine in training. Admittedly, this is on the margin due to the impact on two statements, namely that indoctrination risks jeopardising flexibility (statement 1) and that contemporary wars are so diverse in nature that they cannot be regulated by doctrine (statement 2). This could imply that through education one learns more about the doctrine and its content, as well as how it can be applied and utilised. In other words, that scepticism towards doctrines is based on

Table 5. Results for experience claims.

		Average	SD	Dispersion
1.	I am familiar with the content of the Defence Forces' doctrine.	3,80	0,83	2-5
2.	The Defence Forces' doctrine has supported my work.	2,90	0,94	1-5
3.	The Defence Forces' doctrine has been a support in my education	3,48	1,05	1-5

Table 6. Statistically significant correlations between experience of the Armed Forces' doctrine and the doctrine coherence scale and statements on the doctrine coherence scale (Pearson's r is reported for the doctrine coherence scale and statements 17, 21, 25. Spearman's rho is reported for the remaining five statements).

	Coherence scale	Claim number							
		17	18	19	20	21	23	25	26
Familiar with content	0,144*						0,205**		0,148*
Support at work	0,225**	0,193**	0,160*	0,159*	0,158*	0,176*	0,171*		0,196**
Support in training	0,278**	0,172*	0,206**	0,185*	0,312**	0,256**	0,234**	0,213**	0,236**

*p <0,05
**p <0,001

Table 7: Statistically significant correlations between experience of the Defence Forces' doctrine and statements on the doctrinal scepticism scale (Pearson's r is reported for all four statements).

	Claim number			
	1	2	6	7
Familiar with content				0,150*
Support at work			0,153*	0,157*
Support in training	-0,154*	-0,217**		

*p <0,05
**p <0,001

preconceived ideas and that these can be at least partially overcome through education and experience.

At the same time, it should be emphasised that two other statements on the doctrinal scepticism scale receive more support from respondents who consider themselves to have more experience of the Armed Forces' doctrine. Being familiar with the content of the Armed Forces' doctrine has a positive correlation with agreement with statement 7, that there are no general principles that govern strategy or warfare. This statement, like statement 6, that military theory has a large element of reflexivity, also receives higher agreement from those who to a greater extent consider that the Defence Forces' doctrine has been a support in their work. Again, these are small changes that have been discovered, but as regards at least the previous statement, it is something that from a sceptical perspective mainly speaks against doctrinal fundamentalism. As already shown, both officers and the Defence Forces' doctrine appear to be more coherent than fundamentalist. If one is familiar with the doctrine of the Swedish Armed Forces, there is some logic in being a little more averse to fundamentalist statements. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between experience of the Defence Forces' doctrine and statements on the doctrinal fundamentalism scale, which contradicts this reasoning.

Indoctrination?

The survey was complemented by some additional tests to investigate variations according to age and length of service and differences between genders.[69] In doing so, it identified positive associations between the coherentism scale (and individual statements in that scale) and both length of service and age.[70] However, no statistically significant differences in doctrinal attitudes by gender were identified.

The only investigated factor that has had an impact on the scale level is thus that more experience of the Defence Forces' doctrine tends to increase agreement with the doctrine coherence scale, while other statistically significant findings have been in relation to individual statements. It can also be noted that, as well as the doctrinal coherence scale being the only scale where influence could be demonstrated, it is also in this scale that most individual statements were affected by the background factors. The fact that more experience of the Swedish Armed Forces' doctrine seems to lead to increased agreement with several of the statements on the doctrine coherence scale can be compared with the findings for officer training, which show that those who have undergone previous training systems agree more with some of the doctrine coherence statements, which has also been shown for higher age and longer service time. In general, those who have completed earlier education systems are also older and naturally have longer service. At the same time, it is also reasonable to assume that they have gained more experience of the Defence Forces' doctrine. That is, all in all, there are four factors that play a role and that increase agreement with the coherence scale and its statements, but it is not possible to say how they relate to each other. However, it could be seen as an effect of indoctrination, meaning that the more one absorbs the Defence Forces' doctrine, the more one seems to believe the messages and the view of military theory that is directly and indirectly conveyed.

Views of doctrine users versus doctrine developers

In their study in which Thunholm and Palmgren investigate the views of doctrine

developers in the UK and the US on the role and purpose of doctrine, they conclude that doctrines are primarily seen as "effect-enhancing coordination tools in the military organisation as they reduce uncertainty and the impact of frictions".[71] Due to the limited scope of the study, they recommend caution in generalising the results to other countries, while they "*suspect* that the results fairly well reflect the view of the role, benefits and risks of doctrines in a larger Western officer community" (my italics).[72] Both the results and their reasoning about generalisability seem to be consistent with the stated purpose of the Defence Forces' doctrine, suggesting that it was written with a similar purpose:

> It [the Defence Forces' military strategic doctrine] should not be understood as a rigid framework but as a steady platform for initiative and pragmatic action that explains how we should think rather than what.[73]

It is therefore not possible, based on previous research, to say how *Swedish* doctrine developers view the role of doctrine, but it seems that they are similar to their American and British colleagues.

Compared to that result, it can be noted that the officers in the present survey on the whole agree more with the doctrine scepticism scale (US=2.74; UK=3.08; this survey M=3.72). Furthermore, the degree of agreement with the doctrinal coherence scale among the surveyed officers is less than what was shown in Thunholm and Palmgren's study (US=5.40; UK=5.50; this study M=4.7y).[74] Based on Ångström and Widén's argument that doctrine should be understood as "a religious text" that provides a military organisation with "ontological certainty".[75] So what does it mean if doctrine users are more sceptical of doctrines than doctrine developers and the purpose of the doctrine itself? One consequence could be that a doctrine that does not respond to the perceived need, as a subset of the organisational culture, is less likely to 'catch on' and be implemented satisfactorily.[76] "Ontological security" refers to the security a doctrine can be assumed to provide if it is perceived to represent a truth to be held under the severe stresses of war.[77] Thus, if a doctrine does not correspond to the perceived need, its potential security also fails. However, Swedish officers can still not be said to be doctrine sceptics. The difference with doctrine developers is also logically coherent in that it would be strange if someone who is sceptical of doctrines sought to develop them. On the other hand, it raises the same issue as mentioned earlier: the risk of indoctrination and increased belief in the content of the doctrine as one becomes familiar with it.

Conclusions

The purpose of this article has been to contribute with knowledge about the officers' attitude to primarily the theoretical element of the anatomy of doctrines. In addition, the study also aimed to compare the results with the views of doctrine developers on doctrine. The results show that the officers in the study to the greatest extent agree with the scale that measures doctrinal coherence, the doctrine as an effect-enhancing coordination tool, and that they differ from those who develop doctrine by being somewhat more sceptical of doctrines. The surveyed group is relatively homogeneous in their attitude towards doctrine. This is reflected in the fact that identified significant differences and correlations between background factors and doctrinal attitudes are weak, albeit numerous. Differences and correlations are also mainly identified in relation to individual statements, while the attitude at the scale level shows small differences with regard to the background factors

examined. This suggests that there are either other, unexamined factors that have more influence, or that there are not particularly large mutual differences. On the other hand, it seems to be the case that officers tend to further agree with the doctrinal coherence perspective as they gain experience. To round off this article, there now follows some reasoning about the strengths and weaknesses of the study and its generalisability, before suggestions for further research are made.

We have mainly ensured high conceptual validity by reusing the operationalisation made by Thunholm and Palmgren. Conceptual validity can also generally be said to be less problematic when the operationalised indicators are close to the theoretical definition. The fact that the survey has measured agreement with arguments taken directly from the theory should thus be seen as a strength. However, the statements in the questionnaire may have been perceived by some as long and complicated, which emerged from a few free text comments. This could negatively affect the reliability of the survey through internal dropout or incorrect answers due to misunderstandings. However, only a few individuals (n=10) answered ”don’t know” to more than four questions. In addition, it can also be seen as a control that the options ”don’t know” and ”it depends” were available, as it means that the respondents were not forced to answer in cases where they felt unsure of the formulation. That this is the case is confirmed a very low non-response rate due to non-response to the statements on attitude to doctrine. Overall, the validity of the results of the study is deemed to be satisfactory, albeit with some weaknesses as indicated above. However, these weaknesses are not perceived to affect the study’s conclusions to any great extent.

Since an unbounded random sample was not used to select respondents for the survey, caution must be exercised when generalising the results to the broader group of Swedish officers. The sample’s consistency with the total population of continuously serving officers in the Swedish Armed Forces and the fact that the study’s non-response appears to be random, however, means that it can be argued that the results of the survey can at least be generalised to all continuously serving officers at the opposite level. The generalisability to other officers at the same level increases further, as the statistically significant patterns identified are weak. However, the results of the study indicate that changes occur with increased experience and age, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that officers with a higher rank and service age differ more in relation to the studied sample than the differences that have been demonstrated within the sample.

The subject of military doctrine and its content are pressing issues, as evidenced not least by the free text responses received in the survey; comments which in some cases suggest that respondents have been directly provoked by what they consider to be statements that are in stark contrast to what they believe. In addition to revealing this extra-scientific interest in the subject, the survey also contributes to the field of intra-scientific research. It should be important that a doctrine is formulated in a way that corresponds to the perceived needs of the organisation and can be implemented effectively, regardless of the level for which the doctrine is written and regardless of whether it is done in a national context or within the framework of NATO's joint doctrine development. With knowledge of how users of military doctrine relate to the theory conveyed in it, future doctrine developers can more clearly formulate doctrines that can be implemented effectively. However, this requires further research into the mechanisms of doctrine implementation and the

meaning that users' perceptions actually have. This study provides a starting point for future research as, as far as is known, it is the first time that users' views on military doctrine have been investigated. In order to further increase knowledge about this, future studies should primarily focus on supplementing the survey to include a wider range of ranks, not least upwards, where more experience of the Swedish Armed Forces' doctrine is likely to exist, which has been shown to have a significant impact on doctrine attitudes. This population should also be of greater relevance as they correspond to the primary target group for the Swedish Armed Forces' doctrine: officers at military strategic level.

By conducting a more in-depth data collection than the superficial questions of the survey form allow, it would also be interesting to investigate the extent to which people really believe in the doctrines and their content. In this way, questions about the extent to which people are influenced by the content of established doctrines could also be explored; as an interaction between the organisational culture that the doctrine needs to appeal to and how the doctrine in turn influences it.

The author is a Major and serves in the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters.

Notes

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3. Høiback, Harald: *Understanding Military Doctrine: a multidisciplinary approach,* Routledge, Abingdon 2013, p 2.
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5. Ibid, p 11.
6. Thunholm, Peter and Palmgren, Anders: "Doctrine developers' views on the role and purpose of doctrines", *KKrVAHT,* No 2 2018, pp. 15-16.
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8. Posen, Barry: "Foreword: Military doctrine and the management of uncertainty", *Journal of Strategic Studies,* vol 3y, no 2 2016, p 159.
9. Angstrom, Jan and Widen, Jerker: "Religion or reason? exploring alternative ways to measure the quality of doctrine", *Journal of Strategic Studies,* vol 3y, no 2 2016, pp 205-206.
10. Op cit, Høiback, Harald, see note 3, p 1.
11. Ibid, p 22.
12. Op cit, *Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD 22),* see note 4, p 10.
13. Op cit, Høiback, Harald, see note 3, p 57.
14. Op cit, Petersson, Magnus; Slensvik, Thomas and Ydstebø, Palle, see note 7, pp. 175-176.
15. What Høiback calls "foundationalism" in English is sometimes referred to as "fun- damentalism" in Swedish text, but this can be seen as a mistranslation.
16. Op cit, Høiback, Harald, see note 3, p 63.
17. Høiback, Harald: "The Anatomy of Doctrine and Ways to Keep It Fit", *Journal of Strategic Studies,* vol 3y, no 2 2016, p 18y.
18. Op cit, Høiback, Harald, see note 3, p 128.
19. Ibid, p 129.
20. Ibid, p 143.
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22. Avant, Deborah: "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars", *International studies quarterly,* vol 37, no 4 1993, p 409-430.
23. See inter alia: Johnston, Alastair: 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International security,* vol 19, no 4 1995, pp 32-64; Gray, Colin: 'Strategic culture as context: the first genera-

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30. Op cit, Høiback, Harald, see note 3, p. 158.
31. Kronvall, Olof and Petersson, Magnus: "Doctrine and Defence Transformation in Norway and Sweden", *Journal of Strategic Studies,* vol 39, no 2 2016, p 290.
32. Op cit, Posen, Barry, see note 8, p 160.
33. Op cit, Angstrom, Jan and Widen, Jerker, see note 9, pp 204-205.
34. Op cit, Nisser, John, see note 21, pp 305-314.
35. Op cit, Angstrom, Jan and Widen, Jerker, see note 9, p. 204.
36. Ibid, p. 210.
37. Op cit, Thunholm, Peter and Palmgren, Anders, see note 6, p. 16.
38. Ibid, p. 19.
39. Op cit, Angstrom, Jan and Widen, Jerker, see note 9, p 200.
40. Op cit, Thunholm, Peter and Palmgren, Anders, see note 6, p. 15.
41. Snyder, Jack: "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor" in Jacobsen, Carl G (ed): *Strategic Power: USA/USSR,* The Macmillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke 1990, p 4.
42. Op cit, Nisser, John, see note 27, p 287.
43. The latter two concepts belong to the field of epistemology and are used to distinguish between two competing theoretical approaches to what knowledge is and how it can be derived. In this article, however, these labels are used only in Høiback's simplified sense of different views on military doctrine and the deeper epistemological divisions within epistemology are left aside.
44. Op cit, Høiback, Harald, see note 3, pp. 63-66.
45. Ibid, p 12.
46. Ibid, pp. 16-17.
47. Ibid, pp 58-60.
48. Ibid, p 67.
49. Ibid, pp 70-71.
50. Ibid, p 78.
51. Ibid, p 72.
52. Ibid, pp 74-75.
53. Ibid, pp. 85-86.
54. Ibid, p 90.
55. Clausewitz, Carl von: *Om kriget,* Bonnier Fakta, Stockholm 1991, p. 103.
56. Op cit, Høiback, Harald, see note 3, p 92.
57. Ibid, 97-98.
58. Op cit, Thunholm, Peter and Palmgren, Anders, see note 6, p 21.
59. Op cit, Thunholm, Peter and Palmgren, Anders, see note 6.
60. Thunholm and Palmgren's statement regarding doctrine based on concepts such as COIN and EBO was deleted. Their statement on game theory was supplemented with an explanation of what game theory means. This was because they noted a high non-response to the statement, which was interpreted as uncertainty among the respondents about what game theory is.
61. *Doctrine for Joint Operations (DGO 20), Swedish* Armed Forces, Stockholm 2020, p 13.
62. Op cit, Høiback, Harald, see note 3, pp. 155-156.
63. Nisser, John: "Aligning Tactics with Strategy: Vertical Implementation of Military Doctrine", *Journal of Strategic Studies,* forthcoming.
64. Differences and correlations have been examined depending on organisational background, educational background and previous experience of the Armed Forces' doctrine. The answers were sought through various statistical tests and the accepted risk level for statistical significance was set at $p < 0.05$, which is why only results below this threshold are reported.

65. Statement 19, that doctrine is necessary for strategy selection (F=2.59, p=0.027), and for statement 22, that doctrine is particularly important for coalitions (F=3.41, p=0.006). Tukey's post hoc test showed that for the former statement, those belonging to the navy agree on average more than those belonging to the command and intelligence units. For the latter statement, it is those belonging to logistics who agree more than both the air force and command and intelligence units.
66. The differences between the logistics force and others are certainly relatively large for one statement, but the number of respondents from the logistics force is small (n=5), which makes it inappropriate to draw any conclusions from this sample. Furthermore, it is difficult to draw any relevant conclusion that those who belong to the navy think that doctrine is necessary for choosing a strategy to any greater extent than those who belong to the command and intelligence force.
67. Tukey post hoc tests showed that for two scepticism statements (1 and 8), those who received their basic training on the officer programme agree more than those who completed the previous professional officer programme. For three coherence statements (17, 22 and 26), on the contrary, those who had completed the earlier education system (officers' college and the professional officers' programme respectively) agreed more than those who had completed the later education system (professional officers' programme and officers' programme respectively).
68. Pearson's r for the statements identified as parametric, and Spearman's rho for those found to be non-parametric.
69. Correlation analysis (Pearson's r and Spearman's rho) and t-test for independent measurements and Mann-Whitney U-test respectively.
70. Longer length of service as an officer increases agreement with the coherence scale (rho=0.174; p=0.017), while higher age increases agreement to almost the same extent (r=0.197; p=0.007).
71. Op cit, Thunholm, Peter and Palmgren, Anders, see note 6, pp 29-30.
72. Ibid, p 17.
73. Op cit, Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD 22), see note 4, p 11.
74. Op cit, Thunholm, Peter and Palmgren, Anders, see note 6, p 25.
75. Op cit, Angstrom, Jan and Widen, Jerker, see note 9, p 205.
76. Op cit, Nisser, John, see note 27, p 286.
77. Op cit, Angstrom, Jan and Widen, Jerker, see note 9, p. 206.
78. Op cit, Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD 22), see note 4, p 12.

Sweden's national role in the Baltic Sea region[1]

by Katarina Engberg

Résumé

Sweden's unique military geography stretches from the High North to the European continent. The Baltic Sea is a focal point for covering and integrating defence plans for the two different theatres. As a NATO member, Sweden will add a new dimension to NATO's defence planning for 'Regional Plan North'. It assumes a position simultaneously as a rear area for reinforcement of and as a participant in the defence of NATO's Eastern front. This gives Sweden a new continental role to ponder. Sweden's maritime forces possess valuable regional competence for operating in the Baltic Sea's shallow waters. While becoming part of a collective effort, it is essential that Sweden retains an independent capacity to reflect on its position and interests in the new allied context.

THE BALTIC SEA region is a strategic nerve centre: home to many tens of millions of people, characterised by the narrow inlet and outlet of the Baltic Sea: for everyone through the straits, for Russia the specificity that it can only be reached via the Gulf of Finland, except for the exclave of Kaliningrad. Ninety per cent of Finland's trade and half of Russia's goes through the Baltic Sea. Throughout history, the Baltic Sea has been an area of co-operation and communication, but also a recurring conflict zone.

At the same time, the Baltic Sea is part of a larger strategic context: too narrow to be an isolated combat zone in a potential conflict. It is bordered in the north by the North Atlantic and the Arctic, primarily the North Calotte. To the south, the European continent. The Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Bothnia, Skagerrak and Kattegat, the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean should therefore be seen in a military geographic context.

The fact that the Baltic Sea region is part of a larger strategic context is, of course, nothing new, but it takes on new significance given changing circumstances, such as climate, politics and military technology.

This article first discusses NATO's starting points and then Sweden's NATO role in various respects.

NATO's starting points

Politics first. Most important is Moscow's decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In response, Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership, which would create a coherent Nordic area of operations. The Baltic Sea would be surrounded by NATO members and Russia with the exclave of Kaliningrad and the outlet via the Gulf of Finland. This in a situation characterised by increased tensions between the West and Russia and an ongoing, large-scale war on the European continent, in Ukraine.

Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty already states that the members of the Alliance must be able to maintain their territorial integrity through their own defence forces. At

the same time, these form the basis of the integrated forces that can be used for deterrence and ultimately collective defence in accordance with Article 5 on solidarity in the event of an armed attack.

According to NATO's latest strategic concept, adopted in 2022, the Alliance has three main tasks: deterrence and collective defence, crisis management and defence cooperation. Following the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the emphasis has shifted from crisis management to collective defence. The strategic concept has been translated into a military concept called the 'Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area' (DDA).

With the destruction of pipelines at the bottom of the Baltic Sea, attacks on critical infrastructure, and thus total defence thinking, have taken on a central role, summarised for NATO in the so-called 'seven baseline requirements'.

NATO has created a dedicated 'Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure' under MARCOM in the UK. In October, NATO concluded an agreement on improved maritime surveillance from the seabed to space, the so-called 'Digital Ocean Vision', which Sweden joined.

According to the strategic concept, as well as the EU's corresponding strategic compass, attacks on critical infrastructure, if they reach a certain level, can activate Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty and the EU's corresponding Article 42(7) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). In this area, there is close cooperation between NATO and the EU, which holds many important instruments of significance for crisis preparedness and civil defence, for example in terms of food supply and protection of IT systems. EU decisions in these areas directly affect Swedish legislation and structures.

It is worth noting that the transformation of NATO from crisis management to collective defence will take time. In the long term, a force of 300 000 people with high readiness (less than 30 days, of which 100 000 with less than 10 days) could be deployed, most of them European. Defence and capability planning is underway, as are the implications for NATO command structures. The regional plans will be finalised early in 2024, but it will take several years to put concrete structures in place.

As for the Alliance's main tasks in Northern Europe, i.e. our part of the world, they can be summarised as follows:

- Securing the strategic balance and the Alliance's front line in the North Caucasus.
- Securing the supply routes across the Atlantic, through Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea in order to be able to
- defend the Alliance's front line in Continental Europe: including southern Finland and the Baltic States.

Sweden as a NATO member

During the Cold War, Sweden formed the border in the Baltic Sea region between the Warsaw Pact and the West, although much of the Baltic Sea is international water. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact gave Sweden a protected position behind the central and eastern European countries that had regained their freedom.

However, we gradually assumed responsibility for the security of the Baltic States, initially through massive transfers of equipment. Then through the aforementioned Article 42.7, which states that solidarity should be shown in the event of an armed attack on one of the other EU members. And with Sweden's own doctrine where we pledge to come to the aid of other EU and Nordic countries in the event of armed at-

tack and that we expect the same support if we are attacked. However, there has been little defence and capability planning to back up these commitments.

In the meantime, however, cooperation between the air defences of the Nordic countries has deepened and cross-border training has been developed in the north between Norway, Sweden and Finland. In 2014, Sweden signed a 'Host Nation Support' agreement with NATO. Increasingly far-reaching bilateral defence cooperation with Finland and the United States emerged.

Overall, this meant that Sweden's defence perimeter gradually shifted eastwards.

General

As a NATO member, the direction of travel is being pursued. Sweden's eastern defence perimeter coincides with NATO's, at the interface of the North Calotte and on the other side of the Baltic Sea, at the borders of Finland and the Baltic States. This gives Sweden a new continental orientation and role to play, politically and militarily.

As mentioned in the introduction, Sweden still has its own responsibility to defend its own land, air and sea territory. At the same time, these forces constitute a foundation for NATO's collective defence, which is based on existing regional forces, known as 'in place forces'.

We will be part of a larger operational area, 'Regional Plan North', with joint air defence, air and missile defence and integrated intelligence and command systems.

Defence forces are being integrated with NATO. Ground and air forces can be assumed to have a role in the North Calotte and the Baltic Sea region. Naval forces are assumed to have a role in Skagerrak and the Baltic Sea. The defence of Finnmark is improved with Swedish and Finnish NATO membership, as is the defence of Finland and the Baltic States.

Tasks

Sweden becomes the *base area* for Allied ground, air and naval forces to reinforce NATO's eastern border. Supply from the western Nordic harbours to the eastern front via Swedish territory is secured. This entails pre-stocking, infrastructure development and, in general, the need for improved strategic mobility, for which a special EU fund of €1.5 billion has been created.

Sweden will play *a* role in the *defence of* NATO's Eastern Front.

In the defence of the North Calotte, a multinational division or corps consisting of Sweden, Finland, Norway, the United Kingdom and the US Marines (advanced part of Norfolk) could be set up. The Swedish contribution may be drawn from the Norrbotten Brigade in Boden and a corps staff may be established.

Swedish forces, eventually a battalion, may be included in NATO's enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltic States. Possibly as a part of a mechanised brigade under Canadian leadership in Latvia. Participation in NATO's airborne incident response over the Baltic States will be considered.

Sweden is also expected to contribute to NATO's rapid reaction forces. Here the brigade in Skövde is mentioned as a possible base.

It will be a delicate task to create these resources from the strained army, from which most of Sweden's SEK 20 billion in aid to Ukraine has been drawn. This involves equipment, some of which would be converted, equivalent to half a brigade. In his military advice to the government, the Swedish Supreme Commander (ÖB) has previously announced that two mechanised brigades

will be set up during 2025-2030 within the framework of NATO's defence planning, while the others will be postponed. One mechanised battalion from these brigades can be deployed in the framework of NATO joint activities and defence. The growth of the other brigades will be delayed, and the reduced infantry brigade will initially consist of two stand-alone battalions and leadership capabilities. In 2031-2035, the third mechanised brigade will be completed. The reduced infantry brigade will be completed by adding functional units. These are ÖB's initial values. It remains to be seen what the politicians decide. Army growth was, as we know, a key point in the 2020 defence decision, just over a year before Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Baltic Sea and the defence of the Baltic states

- Sweden's membership in NATO improves the conditions for the defence of the Baltic States.
- The Baltic Sea gives Sweden a new kind of continental orientation and thus a new role to play.

After the Russian atrocities in Butya and Iprin in Ukraine, NATO decided that 'every inch' of Allied territory would be defended. Any thought of initially losing Baltic territory in a war was no longer considered acceptable. Or as representatives of the Baltic States said: losing Baltic territory would mean the end of our culture and civilisation.

With such a more forward-looking approach, something other than the traditional meet, stop, strike, Sweden will have an important role in the defence of the Baltic states. Sweden as a base for allied reinforcements has been mentioned, but with access to Swedish territory and Swedish capabilities, NATO also gains a flexibility of importance in grey zone problems and seabed warfare and rapid developments. As we know, the armed attack on Ukraine began in 2014 with the "little green men" in Crimea.

The conditions for NATO's operational plan for the Baltic region are improved by Swedish and Finnish NATO membership. Sweden and Finland are good at maritime control of the area. This capability will be valuable in avoiding a possible Russian naval blockade of the Baltic States and will facilitate the possibility of taking the lead in an amphibious operation in the Gulf of Riga to reinforce the defence or reclaim allied territory.

The Swedish Navy has specific comparative advantages. Its equipment, training and tactics are developed for combat in our neighbourhood. The navy has a high-resolution situational awareness and is used to operating in the special conditions of the Baltic Sea: underwater operations, naval operations in shallow waters constitute, in NATO language, so-called unique regional expertise.

The Navy will be integrated with NATO forces, as part of the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) on a rotational basis.

In this context, attention should be paid to the increasing strategic importance of the Gulf of Bothnia. Maritime activity here has traditionally been low, but could potentially play a role in NATO deterrence. The importance of demilitarised Åland is increasing.

Again, it may be worth pointing out that NATO's own planning for the Baltic Sea is being remodelled. For example, NATO's maritime strategy is out of date as it has been focussed on crisis management and expeditionary warfare.

Management structures

The defence chiefs of the Nordic countries have expressed a desire to come under the same command structure within NATO. At the operational, strategic level, there is the Joint Force Command (JFC), located in Norfolk, USA, a naval-heavy structure under construction. JFC Norfolk is responsible for the North Atlantic and what is called 'The High North'. This is actually a concept that corresponds fairly well to the 'North Calotte', although the USA has a wider area of operation than Sweden. The term constitutes a better delimitation than the too broad term 'Arctic' in this context.

Finland has been placed under Joint Force Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands, with responsibility for security in northern Europe. It can be assumed that Sweden and Finland will eventually come under Norfolk, while we can have troops under Brunssum. There is a third JFC in Naples, Italy. In a conflict situation, Joint Operations Areas (JOAs) and their command structures are adapted to the prevailing reality.

There is also the MARCOM tactical naval command in Northwood, UK, which in turn comes under Norfolk. Another issue of Swedish interest is the ongoing discussion about the creation of a sub-regional maritime command at operational level in the Baltic Sea, a so-called "Maritime Component Command" (MCC). MARCOM is said to be in favour of the idea and believes that there is no need for permanent facilities, but that a Commander Task Force (CTF) can be established if necessary.

There are different views on this and also several candidates. Germany has an international staff alongside its "Marinekommando" in Rostock, DEUMARFOR, which it wants to develop into a regional staff for coordinating NATO's naval activities in the Baltic Sea. The ambition is now not an MCC, but the level of CTF – 'Commander Task Force Baltic', which may be a more realistic ambition. It will be a question for Sweden whether, after accession and integration into NATO, i.e. in one year at the earliest, it should enter the competition for new command structures. Muskö has been mentioned as a suitable site, but this would require an investment that is partly jointly financed by NATO, otherwise a functional command would be closer at hand. However, even this will require investment. One possible solution is alternating responsibility, for example between Sweden and Germany.

Sweden's new continental orientation

This raises the question of Sweden's new continental orientation and our relationship with not only the Baltic States but also Poland and Germany. Poland will allocate 4% of its GDP, or just over €20 billion, spent on defence, which is essentially territorial in nature, given the friction with Russia and Belarus.

The under-invested German defence system will receive €75.5 billion next year, or 2% of Germany's GDP, making the country one of the top five in the world in terms of defence spending. The baseline remains at 1.5% of GDP, but a special fund of €100 billion is used to bridge the gap between budget years during the current government's term of office. Under the new national security strategy, Germany will be a cornerstone of NATO's conventional defence. A permanent brigade will be established in a few years in Lithuania. The lessons of the Ukraine war led Germany to propose an allied air defence cooperation, the 'European Sky Shield', which Sweden has joined.

Germany and Sweden have the longest shorelines in the Baltic Sea. They are significant Western maritime nations in the area, the only ones with submarine capabilities. Germany is not releasing its capability on the high seas, but the earlier tendency to almost abandon the Baltic Sea has been modified. The German Navy is returning to the Baltic Sea and is keen to co-operate with Sweden here. They see the Baltic Sea region, or 'Ostseeraum', as extremely important, both militarily and civilly. In the new security situation, the Baltic Sea is important for Germany's role in NATO, and the strategic depth of the Baltic defence requires control of the Baltic Sea.

Germany and Sweden share the characteristic that they will both be important base areas for the reinforcement of NATO's Eastern Front, with Germany stationing a brigade in Lithuania and Sweden potentially contributing to the eFP in Latvia.

Bilateral co-operation

Bilateral defence cooperation remains important even with Sweden as a member. They are easier to activate in a crisis situation and during a rapid conflict.

This includes continued Nordic co-operation, particularly important with Finland in the north. The agreement with the USA, the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA), and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a British-led framework that, in addition to the UK, includes the Nordic and Baltic countries and the Netherlands. The strength of the JEF is that it can be rapidly deployed in operations with tight time constraints. JEF is outside the NATO structure, but it has developed so-called 'Joint Operation Responses', options for operational deployment that can be integrated with NATO planning if necessary.

In various contexts in recent years, Russia has demonstrated the ability to rapidly assemble forces and conduct complex operations in its immediate neighbourhood without warning. New offensive weapon systems in Kaliningrad and western Russia have increased the importance of exercising the ability to co-operate militarily between the countries of the Baltic Sea region.

In the deteriorating world situation, we see regular exercises in the Baltic Sea as part of NATO's deterrence. These include 'Baltops' under US command, JEF's 'Joint Protector 24' under UK command and 'Northern Coast' under German command.

Closure

Finnish and Swedish NATO membership creates a coherent Nordic area that increases NATO's strategic depth. Sweden is an important piece of the puzzle, stretching from the North Calotte to the southern Baltic Sea and the European continent. Sweden will be both

base area for the reinforcement of the Eastern Front and part of its defence. It remains to be seen how NATO translates this specific military geography into concrete defence planning for the northern region.

Sweden becomes part of a larger context, which does not take away the need to reflect on this new reality and its consequences for Sweden. It is always good to be able to think with your own head. Even when cooperating with close allies.

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Note

1. An abbreviated version of this text was presented by the author in connection with a seminar in Karlskrona on November 16, 2023, which was the first part of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Studies' and the Royal Swedish Naval Academy's celebration of H.M. the King's 50 years on the Swedish throne.

Deterrence by Exposure?

A Study of Declassified Intelligence before Russia's Attack on Ukraine

by Olli Teirilä

Résumé

Western intelligence agencies declassified and released intelligence to the media on an unprecedented scale before the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022. The article examines the nature of the intelligence shared and the reasons for its publication, based on the idea of 'deterrence by exposure'. The Cold War saw the emergence of theories of deterrence as the concept focussed on nuclear weapons, first and second strike capabilities as well as mutual destruction capabilities. However, changes in the international security environment have affected the concept of deterrence. If the 'deterrence by exposure' plan had worked and prevented the Russian attack, the intelligence assessments on the attack would have been perceived as inaccurate and alarmist by the public, while the higher purpose would have been achieved. Thus, it remains for the theory to be able to demonstrate results. With the advent of information warfare, the concept of deterrence needs to be redefined, as does the intelligence component. "Deterrence by exposure" may become part of the possibility of achieving deterrence in the 21st century, while raising questions about its limitations and the possibility of overcoming the obstacles posed by the war for truth and authoritarian regimes.

WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES declassified and released intelligence to the media in a previously unseen manner before Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022. The article discusses the nature of the shared intelligence as well as the likely reasons for its publication; was the information shared to expose Russian intentions globally and to prevent the attack, or were there some other likely reasons? The study builds around an idea of Deterrence by Exposure. Comparisons to earlier cases, for example the preparations to Iraq War 2002–03, provide further depth to the analysis.

Analysis Paralysis – Introduction

An unprecedented phenomenon was seen rising in the months before the Russian attack on Ukraine in late-February 2022. Intelligence data and assessments were unclassified and shared publicly in the Western media unlike before. Surely, intelligence had been shared before, for example in 2002–2003 prior to the Iraq War. This time, the nature of the intelligence was, however, slightly different from the much-debated Iraqi WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction). The shared

information ranged from satellite data on troop and material movements[1] to actual assessments that Russia was likely to attack in the coming days.[2] Intelligence shared, for example in the US and Britain, was soon republished by media in smaller states, like Finland.[3] However, like in 2003, war was the chosen course of action, regardless of the published intelligence.

But what was the reason for this? What drove the Western powers, mainly the US and the UK, to share their intelligence in such a way, unlike before? Was the purpose of the public intelligence-sharing to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine by exposing its military manoeuvres and posture, as well as its strategic thinking? If a theory of deterrence by exposure was implemented by sharing the intelligence, why did the attempt to stop Russian aggression fail?

Writer and historian Garrett M Graff looked back at the events before Russia's attack:

> For nearly a year prior, U S and Western officials had signs of what was coming: a suspicious buildup of Russian troops, intelligence about the Kremlin's plans, statements from President Vladimir Putin himself. Those officials raised increasingly specific public alarms, some of which were based on a novel new strategy of rapidly declassifying and publicizing intelligence in near real-time, and made desperate attempts to avert a war, even as it became more and more clear that Putin was determined to invade.[4]

It is important to study the premises of "deterrence by exposure" and how the nature of shared intelligence was likely intended to support the approach, as well as probable causes for the failure of the theory in practice. Even though the initial purpose, to prevent the attack, failed, there are some other gains from these actions worth discussing. In the end, a failure is a failure only if we learn nothing from it.

Simultaneously with the published official intelligence, the build-up to the war saw also a notable rise in crowd-sourced open-source intelligence on military affairs. Numerous private think tanks, websites, and individual bloggers were collecting data and sharing their own analysis.[5] This article, however, concentrates on the official, state actor-oriented intelligence. Certainly, the other actors will be studied by the academia, sooner rather than later.

For coherence reasons, the timeline starts from early December 2021. That is when the *Washington Post* first shared U S intelligence that "the Kremlin is planning a multi-front offensive as soon as early next year involving up to 175,000 troops".[6] The timeline ends in the week of the attack in February 2022. There are multiple points of interest along the way, like the Russian Strategic Nuclear Exercise (GROM) mid- February etcetera.

In a wider perspective, the relationship between intelligence and media has been studied in abundance recently. Intelligence and the intelligence community, or communities, are more and more under public and media scrutiny as well. The publicly shared intelligence opens a new dimension for researchers, one that is highly likely to expand in the coming years.

The published intelligence and deterrence by exposure were not the only methods the West were using to prevent the war. Sanctions, threat of new more severe sanctions, and traditional diplomacy were some of the other ones. These, however, merit their own separate study.

Amidst the heightened tensions, there was an additional woe facing the governments. The past five or so years had seen the rise of a phenomenon, a contemporary challenge for information and science that

had been labelled the era of post-truth. The governments, in this case especially the active Biden administration, faced a public that might be likely to disparage facts and follow arguments based on beliefs and emotions.[7] Declassified intelligence released by the government would have to first break cognitive resistance, emotions that make people not believe what the officials are saying, and only then convince that the depicted threat is real.

Second Secretary of Canada's High Commission to the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Molly Graham has summarized that "More impressive than the abundance of open-source information during this most recent war in Europe was the rapid declassification of intelligence. These developments suggest society has entered a new era of transparent warfare."[8]

In a new era of information warfare, deterrence by exposure could form a part of 21st century deterrence. But what kind of limitations will it face, and can it really overcome the obstacles of post-truth era and authoritarian government?

Opposites Repellent – Deterrence by Exposure as a Theoretical Framework

Deterrence is an age-old theoretical guessing game: how much is enough to deter the opponent from acting or reacting, but not too much to cause an unwanted reaction – to become a self-fulfilling prophecy? Deterrence can be described as "the practice of discouraging or restraining someone — in world politics, usually a nation-state—from taking unwanted actions, such as an armed attack".[9] It is distinctively a preventive measure, opposite to using force.

The Cold War saw the emergence of deterrence theory. In those times, deterrence was concentrated on nuclear arms, first strike and retaliation capabilities, and the mutually assured destruction. However, the changes in international security environment have also affected the concept of deterrence. Situational understanding is of high importance, starting from the actors involved to the regional or even global strategic state of affairs. Intelligence is a major factor of successful deterrence. Deterrence theory itself already carries an intelligence problem: one needs to know the opponents' capabilities as well as assess correctly their will to use them. Deterrence also works differently in a non-crisis waiting game compared to an ongoing crisis, when actions are likely to have altered motivations. The nuclear deterrence involved mainly the great powers and a few other medium powers, but deterrence theory has been applied elsewhere also. In case of Finland, the publicly announced military deterrent is that the probable military aggressor's losses would be higher than the gains. By nature, deterrence involves a threat of some kind to keep an actor from doing something or to keep it continuing the previously chosen path that suits both parties. Nuclear arms, tactical and strategic, have remained at the centre of worldwide deterrence even after the Cold War ended and at the same time deterrence theory has remained alive in international relations.

Deterrence is a complex fabric of variables, whose motivations and interaction between each other are nearly impossible to predict. Deterrence also brews fears in the adversary. Fear, that often turn out to be stronger motivators than opportunism. Deterrence also runs a risk of misunderstandings and inconsistency if it is not properly calculated and based on clear strategic thinking. The theory also requires readiness for compromises and concessions, as well as the often-quoted possibility for an exit or way out for the

adversary. An enemy trapped in a corner is unlikely to behave rationally even to seemingly logical deterrence. In addition, an adversary intent on its actions or one perceiving an existential threat is nearly impossible to deter.[10]

In the case of West deterring Russia from attacking Ukraine, two theoretical perspectives are present. First, this is a case of so-called *extended deterrence*. Especially the U S is using deterrence to discourage a Russian attack on a third party, not itself or its own territory. This makes applying successful deterrence already more difficult, as an aggressor can easily understand a nation's willingness to defend itself, but strength of an alliance or partnership is much harder to assess. Second, the build-up to the Russian attack required an *immediate deterrence* as opposed to a long-term *general deterrence*. The need for bolstered deterrence, aggressive and urgent, poses many risks that are much easier to manage in a long-term deterrence effort. In a crisis, the aggressor might see fewer, if any, options left but offensive actions, and deterring it from acting might have become nearly impossible.[11]

An essential part of deterrence is its credibility. Without credibility the deterrence loses its footing, and the threatened aggressor will ignore the threats and continue on its chosen course of action. In crime prevention the same theory has two parts, getting caught and facing a punishment.[12] The shared intelligence would make sure that Russia would be "caught committing an act of war, a crime", but did it really believe in the surety and severity of a punishment?

Professor of public international law Alfred P Rubin (1931–2014) wrote about humanitarian intervention's moral and philosophical issues some twenty years before the war in Ukraine. He concluded that in cases of genocide and other similar horrors, like in former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, the best or even only cure is not a third-party intervention, "but deterrence by exposure and embarrassment". He elaborated that it is not necessarily the perfect solution, but "it is better than having one's own children dying in a struggle they do not understand, and becoming the despised "colonial" masters of a people bent on mutual destruction."[13]

The hypothesis for this article is that the Western states decided to share their precious, but probably not the most precious, intelligence publicly primarily in order to deter Russian leadership's from attacking Ukraine. Therefore, deterrence by exposure is the chosen theoretical framework. The exposure of Russian troop movements and assessments about the decision for use of military force, would, according to the theory, reveal their intentions and make deniability so difficult that president Putin and his administration would change their course of action, and not attack Ukraine. Continuous warnings from Western leadership to Putin to stop the plans or face consequences support this approach.

By studying the events and shared intelligence and statements in the months prior to the attack, it is possible to assess the likelihood of this approach. The outcome known now in hindsight gives also an opportunity to discuss what failed if deterrence by exposure was the theoretical framework for Western course of action.

Collision Course – The Publicly Shared Intelligence on Russian Activities

The public intelligence sharing on Russian preparations for a war against Ukraine started with the *Washington Post* article[14] on December 2nd, 2021. The newspaper quoted a US intelligence document it had obtained in

its report on "50 battlefield tactical groups" and other forces, including tanks and artillery in four locations near Ukrainian border. According to the article the U S assessment of Russia's actions was based on satellite images. The same details, the article revealed, were the backbone of U S Secretary of State Anthony Blinken's December 2nd statements[15] on Russian plans of aggression towards Ukraine and his warnings of severe consequences should Russia go ahead with the invasion. The article also quoted intelligence on tactical measures for higher readiness for Russian forces. "The Russian troops worked out the issues of creating strike groups near the borders of our state, mobilization measures, logistical support of groups, [and] transfer of significant military contingents, including by air," a U S official was quoted saying. The article also quoted the official saying, "Russian influence proxies and media outlets have started to increase content denigrating Ukraine and NATO, in part to pin the blame for a potential Russian military escalation on Ukraine." The intelligence shared was therefore not only military data but also a more comprehensive view and analysis on Russian preparations for the coming attack.

The *Washington Post* article was widely quoted around Western media. For example, BBC and *The Guardian*[16] in the UK, *Le Figaro* in France,[17] and *Helsingin Sanomat*[18] in Finland published articles on Russian activities quoting the *Washington Post* article as a source or reporting similar information. However, not all articles were as thorough or covering all the aspects as widely as the *Washington Post* article. To add, other *Washington Post* articles[19] frequently referred to the information shared by intelligence quoted in the December 2nd article. The focus was on Russian likely plans to attack and the widely quoted figure of the 175,000 strong invasion force.

Washington Post continued reporting on the theme in the following weeks by going deeper into details about the troops in the vicinity of the Ukrainian border and the Russian garrisons in the area. Detailed analysis on movements of material and troops in and outside of the garrisons was a mixed-source work, combining released official intelligence as well as open-source, like *Jane's,* satellite imagery and assessments.[20]

The media in different countries followed closely the troops gathering through the months prior to the attack. However, many of the articles were based on other sources than the released intelligence from Western intelligence services. For example, *the Guardian* and *Washington Post* published articles on joint Russia-Belarus military exercises mid-January[21] and a visual guide to troop deployments in mid-February.[22] There were, nevertheless, mentions of official intelligence assessments of the troop build-up.[23] Intelligence information on a possible Russian false-flag operation to justify Ukraine invasion surfaced around mid-January as well.[24]

Later in January, when covering European views on the ever-more-likely war, UK prime minister Boris Johnson was quoted as saying that "he had seen clear intelligence of 60 Russian battlegroups on the border", making a case for a likely swift attack to take out the Kyiv Government. In the same context, French officials were said to be optimistic about indications of Russian preparedness to de-escalate, but without certainties. It was loosely left for the reader to decide whether the French optimism was based on their own intelligence assessments or something else.[25] It is noteworthy, that late in March 2022 General Eric Vidaud lost his position as the head of French military intelligence,

reportedly for failed predictions and "inadequate briefings" regarding Ukraine, but also for some previous failings like the AUKUS pact that surprised the French.[26] He had started in his job only seven months earlier. The chief of French armed forces General Thierry Burkhard had stated soon after the attack that his intelligence community was not in accordance with the U S and British services that eventually assessed the situation correctly. According to Burkhard, the French services assessed the costs of an invasion to be too high and therefore Russia would still seek other options.[27]

Also, in the very last days of January, *the Guardian* published an article on Kyiv's sentiments about "Western alarmism". President Zelenskiy's calmness was based on having seen similar tensions with Russia for the past eight years. He was also afraid that signs of Ukrainian mobilization would have bad effects on the country's economy.[28] Some Ukrainians also believed this was all sabre-rattling between the U S and Russia, and the cost of invasion, waging war against their Slavic brothers, would be too high for Russia to execute.[29] The British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace and British intelligence officials were quoted on information that Russian military advance operations had already started in Ukraine and that in two to three weeks Russia would have an invasion force of more than 150,000 strong on Ukrainian border. Interestingly, the official assessment was backed up in the article with references to independent satellite imagery and open-source material.[30] This seemingly strengthens the credibility of Western officials, somewhat tarnished in earlier cases like the Iraqi WMDs and war in 2002–2003.

Western leaders' tone changed coming into February. The increasingly dire messages were backed publicly by intelligence:

> I will say that the way that he has built up his forces and put them in place, along with the other indicators that we have collected through intelligence, makes it clear to us that there is a very distinct possibility that Russia will choose to act militarily, and there is reason to believe that that could happen on a reasonably swift timeframe.
>
> Jake Sullivan, U S National Security Adviser[31]

Sullivan's warnings were widely reported. His announcement was reportedly backed by new intelligence concluding that there was over 130,000 Russian troops and major weaponry surrounding Ukraine on three sides, ready for an attack.[32] However, *Washington Post* reported that:

> Sullivan declined to discuss specific intelligence assessments, but he said that 'the intelligence community has sufficient confidence that I can stand before you today and say … there is a distinct possibility that Vladimir Putin would order a military action, an invasion of Ukraine, in this window,' potentially including 'the time period before February 20th.'[33]
>
> The intelligence community, he added, believes that 'everything I have just said is well-grounded, in both what they are seeing on the ground and what they are picking up through all of their various sources.'[34]
>
> Reminded of faulty intelligence that preceded the U S invasion of Iraq, Sullivan said there was a 'fundamental distinction' between the two situations. 'In Iraq, intelligence was used and deployed… to start a war,' he said. 'We are trying to stop a war.'[35]

The head of Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS, *Etterretningstjenesten*), Vice-Admiral Nils Andreas Stensønes, confirmed the information of 150,000 Russian troops around Ukrainian borders, adding that the decision to attack was president Putin's, and his alone.

All that is needed for an attack was already in place, waiting for the final decision and go-ahead from President Putin. An article in *the Guardian* mentions other western intelligence services largely agreeing with the assessment, without directly sourcing the information.[36] Another article in the same media shared that "[W]estern intelligence agencies believe that the most likely goal of a Russian offensive would be to surround Kyiv and force regime change."[37] The Guardian then had its own analyst describing the scenario further.[38] The profound intelligence cooperation between the Five Eyes countries (US, UK, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia) meant that they were also sharing more intelligence between each other than on other occasions, which lead to scepticism at the beginning. Especially the U S made further efforts to convince its other partners of their information and assessments.[39]

Around the same time, Russia was telling the world it was withdrawing its troops after an exercise near Ukrainian borders. Although no Western intelligence was directly quoted, NATO's secretary general Jens Stoltenberg and other Western officials confirmed that "[W]e have not seen any sign of de-escalation on the ground" and "[W]e see no sign of Russian de-escalation. [W]e see the opposite.", respectively. The comments on the matter also included a rare public statement confirming the same from Jim Hockehull, the chief of UK defence intelligence.[40] President Biden addressed the nation along the same lines, being very cautiously optimistic if it were true that Russian troops were indeed withdrawing.[41]

The UK Ministry of Defence took a new step in its information warfare by starting to publish abridged intelligence updates on its Twitter account. This started in mid-February. This was a notable change in British intelligence culture. The British have always been more cautious about their intelligence community, especially compared to the Americans, even though academically British intelligence and its services have been studied relatively thoroughly.[42] On top of trying to stop President Putin from launching his troops on Ukraine, the tweets were used to counter Russian narratives and hopefully reach even normal Russians, at least before the Russian officials restricted access to foreign media online.

A week before the start of the war, following a suspected Russian false-flag operation shelling a kindergarten, UK Foreign Minister Liz Truss reportedly said in another indication of, to quote ex-CIA employee John Sipher, "more savvy" use of Western intelligence that

> The west needs to wise up, and work together to discredit Russian arguments in public. We should use our intelligence strategically to challenge their narrative – as we did last month, exposing the Kremlin's plan to install a pro-Russian leader in Kyiv and exposing their military buildup on the border.[43]

Intelligence on the possibility of a false-flag operation had been made public approximately a week earlier by the White House. In the same article, *Washington Post* quoted Western officials, relying on intelligence, that Russia was in the final states of its war preparations and is just trying to create a reason to justify going to war.[44]

President Biden's statement on 18th of February, also a week before the Russian attack, was clear-cut. He said he had believable intelligence indicating that president Putin had made his decision to attack. However, he added that the war could still be "averted with further diplomacy":[45]

> We're calling out Russia's plans loudly, repeatedly, not because we want a conflict,

> but because we're doing everything in our power to remove any reason that Russia may give to justify invading Ukraine and prevent them from moving.

The Wolf I Feed – The Public Fight with Secrets

Washington Post published two articles in February discussing Biden administration's strategy of deterrence against Russia and the public use of intelligence. The first article begun with an assessment highlighting the use of intelligence in public:

> Since U S intelligence detected serious Russian planning for an invasion in October, the Biden administration has waged a campaign of deterrence in what the Russians sometimes call the 'information space'. To mobilize allies, U S officials have shared sensitive intelligence about Russia's moves; when they've detected Russian plots, they've disclosed them. These aggressive tactics have checked Russia's usual advantages of surprise and stealth.[46]

The same article also pointed to U S intelligence worries already earlier than December, in August 2021, about unusual Russian activities. For example, activation of the reserves.[47] The second article, about a week later, went along the same lines as the first one highlighting the unprecedented use of intelligence:

> Few things in geopolitical crises are more sensitive than intelligence. And yet, from the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, the Biden administration has been extraordinarily vocal about U S knowledge of Russian movements, tactics and planning. One analyst dubs it 'Biden's megaphone strategy'. Others say you need to go back years to find a similar crisis where a U S administration has shared this much information with this level of specificity this quickly.[48]

The former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine (2003–2006), John E. Herbst, supported this point of view by saying that "[T]his is unprecedented, even going back to before my professional life. Maybe you could compare it to the [1962] Cuban missile crisis … [or] the build up to war in Iraq." The writer pondered why officials are usually very careful about releasing intelligence bringing up reasons like safeguarding the sources. He also went deeper into the philosophical side of intelligence by writing that "[I]ntelligence gathering and processing is more art than science, a tapestry of secrets held together by analytical assumptions. Intelligence can be – and often is – spun, and can be – and often is – wrong." Last observation was supported by the example of the Iraqi WMDs. In bold letters, the writer noted that "[T]hat doesn't mean U.S. assessments are off now – or that the Russian bear won't claw its way into Ukraine. In fact, so far, the sense of Herbst and others is that the administration has gotten this right."[49]

The Guardian as well published an article on the public use of intelligence, although a bit later in mid-February.[50] *The Guardian* assessed that Western officials were attempting to deny president Putin the element of surprise if not completely managing to turn his head around. The article gathered that "[T]here have been regular briefings in Washington and London – sometimes from national security officials who do not often talk to the press – going into detail about potential Russian military tactics, regime change plots, and 'false flag' operations Moscow is allegedly planning to provide a pretext for invasion." The article also quoted Sipher who said that the West is getting better, and "more savvy on using intelligence in an actionable way". In Sipher's opinion, the West had always been

behind Russia in information warfare and according to him:

> …this information isn't meant for Americans or British citizens. It's meant for one consumer: Vladimir Putin, Sipher said. "He's the one who knows whether it's true or not. So, if we put out intelligence that the Russians thought was secret, and Putin knows it's true, he's got to decide how it has consequences for what he was trying to do, and how it's affecting his strategy."

President Biden's statement on 18th of February supports the earlier assessment and hypothesis that making intelligence on Russian plans public was intended to change president Putin's mind about starting the war. Interestingly, in the following days, there was some discord between the U S and its European allies. Some European allies were quoted as being frustrated that U S didn't share the intelligence it had, the intelligence that made them so certain that president Biden would give his February 18th statement.[51]

Washington Post published an article on the "intelligence war" just one day before the attack. It commended Biden administration's fight back against Russian with "aggressive use of intelligence", but warned of Russia's history of mind games and the use of intelligence before. The article also commended the U S intelligence community's, only CIA specifically mentioned, performance so far in the crisis. Examples were made of penetration into Russian military planning, the discovered false-flag preparations, and the plans for "targeted killings and kidnappings of Ukrainian leaders". This was believed to have effect on president Putin when seeing his state secrets out in the open, especially in Western media.[52]

> For weeks, Russian officials and commentators had strongly denied that the country was planning an attack on neighbouring Ukraine. At points, they ridiculed such claims from the United States and its allies as 'hysteria' and 'fairy tales.' That turned out not to be true.[53]

Biden was seen to have won the intelligence war, even though the start of the real war was eventually a loss for most of the world. The calculated risk of making intelligence public and sharing it with media was seen as risk that would pay off. The intelligence community would strengthen its position, especially in the public eye. In addition, reality of Russian claims and denials were seen, in hindsight, clearer than ever. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova's earlier jokes on the accuracy of Western intelligence and the start of the Russian attack on 16th of February were eventually erased from the list of the funny incidents and seen in the right perspective.[54] As it is with intelligence, sometimes the community's pleasure in being right is bittersweet.

Senior advisor Eric S Edelman, the former US ambassador to Finland and Turkey and undersecretary of defense for policy, scrutinized Biden administration's "deterrence by disclosure" strategy just days before Russia's attack. He described it as a chosen and safest strategy for when one is "playing with a weak hand". Edelman saw the shared information on troop movements alerting Americans and Europeans to an incoming political and military crisis. The disclosures on plots and provocations had, according to Edelman, disrupted Russia's operational planning. This same method had been used previously by the US administration against violent extremist plots in counterterrorism framework. As a consequence, Russian officials, especially President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov were seen denying

publicly any plans to invade. This is likely to have bought more time for diplomacy, albeit eventually for no successful outcome. At the same time Ukraine had more time to enhance its defences. Releasing intelligence has its risks. These include inadvertently exposing one's sources and ways of securing the information. Decisionmakers are likely to see this as an acceptable price to pay, if war is avoided. Long-term effects, on the other hand, are difficult to foresee.[55]

On the first anniversary of the war, *Politico* published a comprehensive retrospective on the U S administration's preparations for the war. The officials, like Director National Intelligence Avril Haines, recall seeing the Russian troop build-up near Ukraine having unusual measures already in Spring 2021, and the worries grew as the year went on. According to Blinken, the information gathered by US intelligence was not only about the troops, but also about Russian leadership's intentions on using them for an invasion. The decision to declassify intelligence was made by President Biden. It was a strategy supported by the DNI Haines, the Chief of CIA Bill Burns and National Security Advisor Sullivan, among others. According to Sullivan the declassification was done with cooperation by the intelligence community that helped by telling what information could be declassified and released. General Paul Nakasone, commander of United States Cyber Command and the director of the National Security Agency, concludes that "[T]his is the nation's intelligence. This isn't an agency or the intelligence community's or anyone else's intelligence. When it benefits our national security, why do we not do that?". The officials knew they were making a bold move, putting the U S credibility online. But they saw that not using the opportunity to challenge Russia in information space, and especially if it was lost to Russian narratives, would be even more detrimental. Deterring President Putin from launching his attack is not mentioned as a distinct objective for the release of intelligence, or at least it is not mentioned in the published quotes in the Politico article.[56]

When analysing the competition to control the information space, especially in hindsight, it is important not to over-emphasise or exaggerate the intentions, or worse yet, fall in the trap of retrospective illusion of necessity[57] that might be affecting assessments or memories of decision making. Successes or failures of earlier decisions and policies can affect recollections of those involved in the processes. Active control of the information space with declassified intelligence also served a prebunking objective. Early warnings of false flag operations are a good example of how an actor can prepare the public to encounter, recognise, and resist the coming disinformation. Just like vaccination, the people are inoculated to have better defence against something, in this case disinformation.[58]

Errors in the Signals – Conclusions

Intelligence and its interaction with the public eye are becoming a more mundane occurrence than could have ever been imagined. Intelligence is not only the object of growing amount of public activity, but also more and more a subject in the same dimension. The public use of intelligence data and assessments, as well as statements during the study timeline by official support the hypothesis of attempted deterrence by exposure. The primary purpose of published classified intelligence was to deny Russian control of the information space or even win it over from the beginning of the escalation of the crisis. A secondary goal, the strategically important

thing to attempt was to deter President Putin from attacking Ukraine. The frequency, the nature, and the amount of intelligence all support this assessment and the order of these objectives.

Thinking back to Germany in the 1930s and Argentina in the 1980s, there is always the possibility of misread or wrong signals, like the appeasement policy or lack of proper military capabilities.[59] In hindsight this should not have been the case with Russia and the deterrence it faced, even though the relatively mild Western response to the invasion of Crimea in 2014 is likely to have encouraged President Putin to proceed with his plans in 2022. Russia had its pieces of Clausewitzian strategic puzzle in place when starting the war: political aims to be achieved, and how to conduct the war.[60] Historians will undoubtedly tell the world in detail one day how this was not enough for a successful war.

The failure of the released intelligence, the exposure, to work as a deterrence is likely to have, at least in part, been due to one well-known and academically studied[61] bias: mirror-imaging. In many cases humans, analysts and decisionmakers, assume the opponent to think and act in the same way, and with the same rationale as themselves. To some extent, deterrence and, in contemporary world, much-used (economic) sanctions share the same philosophies, and pitfalls. Mirror-imaging is a considerable pitfall to avoid.

In this context, it is also interesting to think what kind of effects correct or incorrect published intelligence has if a decision has been made to attack or not to attack. If the actor is not attacking and incorrect intelligence is shared publicly, the actor needs to think if there is a need to convince anyone otherwise. An example of this is Saddam Hussein's attempts to convince the world that there were no WMDs in Iraq anymore. The published intelligence could be merely a reputation issue, which for some countries doesn't seem to matter that much, or it can be countered with disinformation campaigns. However, if the intelligence is correct, the actor needs to revise any existing plans and especially its operational security (OPSEC). This, depending on the strategic culture of the actor, could also pave the way for further negotiations. But then there are the cases when the actor has decided to attack. If the shared intelligence is incorrect the soon-to-be aggressor has reinforced confidence in itself and continued element of surprise. The initiative rests mostly, if not solely, on the aggressor. However, if the published intelligence is correct, it could enforce changes to schedule or even last-minute alterations to formation. This also means deficiencies in OPSEC and the need to fix them as soon as possible.

Russians, and especially President Putin knew the released intelligence to be correct. Hopefully the historians will one day have a chance to study if it had any of the effects theorized above. As said before, the declassified intelligence is likely to have played only a small part in the developments and attempts to stop the war.

As a likely lesson-identified, the Strategic Concept released at the June 2022 Madrid NATO summit called for significant strengthening of the Alliance's deterrence. The changes in the principles of deterrence were recognized and understood to need readjustments from the alliance.[62]

A year after the war started, the U S is contemplating, publicly, about releasing intelligence on Chinese arms transfers to Russia, again to deter China from continuing to reinforce its support to Russia.[63] This can be interpreted to support the conclusion, that regardless of the inability to stop a war, re-

leased and publicly shared intelligence has some desired effects so much so that it is a deterrence the West is trusting to use again. It might not completely deter from acting in a certain way, but it might postpone the actions or make one alter the initially chosen course of action. Both of these might prove precious, even paramount in hindsight.

The correct assessment of Russian plans has certainly polished the shield of Western intelligence community that took a huge gamble in sharing its information and assessments. Russia did not manage to surprise the West, when previous "failings" regarding for example Iraq and Afghanistan were still haunting the public image of intelligence services. For Ukraine, the alarms meant economic challenges even before the attack, as investors were getting worried and withdrawing from its markets. In hindsight, had there not been an invasion, this would have served Russia's objectives.[64]

If the plan to prevent the attack, deterrence by exposure, had worked, the intelligence assessments of the attack would have looked wrong and alarmist in the public eye, but the higher purpose would have been fulfilled. Unfortunately, at least from a humanitarian perspective, as inviting as it sounds, the theory and professor Rubin's vision remains to be proven effective. In a new era of warfare and war in Europe, there is also need to redefine deterrence, and what part intelligence will play in it.

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What is Multi Domain Operations?

by Ove Pappila

Résumé

The article contains a description on the implementation of Multi Domain Operations within NATO. The article points out the importance of cooperation with civilian counterparts that handles cyber and space and non-governmental organisations. There is a description on the new operational environment where the space and cyber domains have made the reach of the weapons they contain almost endless. In the article, problems within the concepts are described. One of the problems is for the army corps level to handle all the different domains, in order for the divisions and brigades to get access to all the domains simultaneously. Another problem is security classification and the handling of information. Our networks today are not built to handle the large amounts of data that we want to share with each other. There are also problems with the handling of any sensor and any weapon. There is a risk that this can stifle the ideas of initiative and mission tactics.

The article aims to increase understanding and build knowledge of the Multi Domain Operations (MDO) concept, where the author wishes to emphasise that Sweden must relate to the concept in capability development, doctrine development and training as both the USA[1] and NATO[2] have begun to implement the concept. This means that it will be the guiding principle for the next 20 years. The concept is not fully developed, but NATO has a strong focus on this. There are already exercises with all domains integrated, space and cyber have been added and the aim is to influence the opponent with all domains simultaneously so that he eventually loses control of his own implementation.

As members of NATO, we need to get used to the fact that our areas of interest and operations will be much larger than they are today. We will also have to get used to working for the common good instead of focusing on Sweden's needs. This will ultimately contribute to increasing Sweden's security. So far, the focus has been on the defence of Sweden and the hope that NATO will come to the rescue if we are attacked. This will no longer be the case; we are part of a much larger whole.

In terms of history, Multi Domain Operations does not have a very long history as the reader can see from the following quote:

> The Multi-Domain Operations concept began as a joint US Army and Marine Corps white paper in October 2016. It specifies that the crux of the problem statement is ground combat forces, operating as part of joint, inter-organizational and multinational teams are not sufficiently trained, organised, equipped or postured to deter or defeat highly capable peer enemies to win in future war.[3]

The quote comes from a collection of texts called the *Joint Air & Space Power Conference*

held in 2019. The quote shows that the traditional way of waging war, what we generally call joint operations, will not be sufficient in the future. NATO has now adopted what the US has been pushing for some years. NATO is pushing for both an understanding and development of the concept. There is also a definition of what the concept contains from NATO:

> The orchestration of military activities, across all domains and environments, synchronised with non-military activities, to enable the Alliance to deliver converging effects at the speed of relevance.[4]

What we can see from the quote is that interconnectedness and speed are important issues.

NATO organises conferences every year to highlight developments in this area, as the latest report indicates:

> In the broadest sense, NATO's concept for Multi-Domain Operations reflects the commitment member nations have to ensure the Alliance can combat future wars by collaboratively devel- oping solutions to help solve complex military challenges. The greatest benefit will come from being able to orchestrate combinations of activities across all five operational domains (Air, Land, Maritime, Space and Cyber). When nations can synchronize both Military Instruments of Power (the armed forces, equipment, training, and capabilities) and non-military actors (in- ternational organizations, non-governmental organizations, etc) more effective outcomes can be achieved across the physical, virtual and cognitive dimensions.[5]

The quote highlights the responsibility of the member states to jointly develop the concept so that we can solve future challenges together. The quote also highlights the importance of cooperation outside the military organisation and that there are now five domains.

What does the concept cover?

It is not about introducing two more domains and then continuing as we have done before with what is called joint operations. The purpose of the concept is to allow us to adapt to the new operational environment, which is mainly driven by China and Russia.

Overall, the concept means that you want to influence the opponent in all domains at the same time, e.g. from a Swedish perspective so that there is a much greater focus on cooperation between the Swedish Armed Forces and the civilian parts of total defence because both space and cyber are domains run by civilian companies. In our country, we have actors such as the Swedish Space Agency and the National Cyber Security Centre. We train cyber soldiers in cooperation with the Royal Institute of Technology, and we cooperate on these issues with other parts of the civilian parts of the total defence and NGOs.[6] It is about cooperation on all levels, both within Sweden and within NATO.

One of the key elements of the concept is the cyber domain, with the ability to establish worldwide networks where data can be encrypted and shared within seconds. Without networks, MDO cannot be realised. The cyber domain simultaneously contains both a threat of influence from external actors as well as the potential for global cyber-attacks.

The importance of space should be emphasised. In the article: "Space is an important security interest also for Sweden",[7] MEP Mats Helgesson argues that this domain should be part of the national space strategy and ultimately our national security strategy. According to Mr Helgesson, there are currently 3,500 satellites, which will be expanded by another 10,000 over the next ten years. This means, for example, that it will be more difficult to hide on the ground. A satellite looking for climate change one day

could be used the next day to find organisations trying to hide. There are also many other capabilities that are supported from space. Some examples are GPS, not just for military purposes, but for precise timing for our financial systems and, at a higher military command level, targeting for long-range missiles. If we take an American brigade as an example, it carries 3,000 components in its equipment that are supported from space.

In terms of communication, space has an important role to play. We can use the war between Russia and Ukraine as an illustrative example. What allows Ukraine to maintain its communications is Elon Musk's *Starlink*.[8] It's satellite-based and allows for internet access across virtually the entire globe. However, access to the internet in northern Sweden is limited, and it stops working a bit outside the larger urban centres. In military terms, this means that we must use the communication systems we have within the Swedish Armed Forces.

When our own communication systems do not work, the alternative is to use satellite communication from civilian actors. Several different systems can be used.[9] Since everything is networked to achieve a higher speed of action, communication is essential. The United States has ordered a satellite-based system to establish networks in the Arctic. Called *Starshield,* it is operated by Elon Musk and is used solely for military purposes. The network is protected by crypto and is said to be so user-friendly that it can be quickly utilised by US soldiers.[10]

When it comes to space and Sweden, we have had the Esrange space base outside Kiruna for many years. Here, the infrastructure for launching satellites has recently been expanded. We have access to space, both as a nation that can launch satellites and as an upload and download centre for data from them. Thus, important capabilities that allow us to not be completely dependent on others, plus access to space is increased by our membership in NATO.

What is now called Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) Systems is an acronym used by the US Department of Defense to describe how everything is interconnected. It used to be called Joint All-Domain Command and Control, but they now want to emphasise that the US is not doing this alone but has included partner countries in the development and implementation. Thus, all sensors, weapons, and related communication systems from all branches of the US armed forces, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and Space Force as well as allied partners in an integrated network. It should be noted that the Pentagon has a group working on the transfer of communications technology to NATO countries.[11]

According to the BAE website[12] , the purpose of CJADC2 is to:

- Understand the battlefield quickly, thoroughly and directly.
- Direct US and allied forces faster than the adversary can.
- Master all cyber and/or digital threats before they turn into a kinetic war.
- Rapidly coordinate combat activities in all domains.

What is stated on the BEA website is still true, the only difference is that the US wants to emphasise that development and implementation is carried out together with partner countries. From the above four points, we can deduce that we need to update and integrate into NATO's intelligence system. We must also, together with NATO, be a world leader in eliminating digital and cyber threats. We also need to be a leader in being able to rapidly redeploy our forces and likewise have a total combat system

that is faster than that of the adversary. So the speed factor is one of the major changes.

What does the future operating environment look like?

> When General Dempsey asked, 'What's after joint?' he was emphasising that at some point in time, the focus on joint operations will not be adequate to address the challenges of our emerging operational environment.[13]

The quote comes from 17 November 2011 and was given to the Military Education Coordination Council in the US. It is rather prophetic, but emphasises that it was already seen at the time that the future operating environment would entail upgraded requirements. One answer now could be that joint operations are being phased out and that we will instead conduct MDO together with NATO, where the new operating environment is an important part of the basis for the concept.

The new operational environment does not contain borders in the same way as before. It is not only physical weapons that count, but the new domains have ranges that go beyond anything we have experienced so far. Cyber covers the entire globe and space has no borders, and both domains have advanced weapons.

As for conventional weapons, these have ranges that far exceed previous systems. Some include integrated air defence systems, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, advanced attack aircraft, attack submarines and anti-space weapons.

Figure 1 describes in general terms what the future operational environment will look like, i . e. what a future actor must be able to deal with. The electromagnetic spectrum and the information environment and a number of other factors affect the operational environment, so there are many factors that a staff must be able to relate to. It is also important for the individual staff member to realise that the operational environment has expanded to the point where it is virtually infinite.

It is not yet possible to give a definite answer as to what the Swedish operational environment[14] looks like.

How are MDOs implemented in practice within NATO?

Firstly, two concepts used in the discussion of MDO should be clarified. The first concept is Integrated Fires Capabilities (IFC).


According to Margaret Palmieri, the IFC:

> Integrated-fires capabilities are a central part of the asymmetric advantage our Navy, joint, and coalition forces bring to a fight. They include capabilites that disrupt adversary command and control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; deliver electronic payloads that limit an enemy's freedom of manoeuvre and action; and enhance the ability of our own forces to place ordnance on target. It integrates lethal and non-lethal fires, underpinned by superior battlespace awareness and assured command and control, to provide commanders an expanded set of warfighting tools especially important in anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) environments, like Air-Sea Battle.[15]

We recognise that this refers to all types of weapons, both traditional ones and those in cyberspace.

The second concept is IADS according to the article "What is a Modern Integrated Air Defence System". The answer given is that:

Figure 1.



> An IADS is the "structure, equipment, personnel, procedures, and weapons used to counter the enemy's airborne penetration of one's own claimed territory," according to one Air Force intelligence expert. Rather than a single weapon or person, it is an amalgamation of elements, organised to minimise threats in the air domain. Thus, an effective IADS performs three func- tions-air surveillance, battle management, and weapons control. Of these, air surveillance alone includes five specific sub-functions: detect, initiate, identify, correlate, and maintain.[16]

In the article *NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence,* this is translated as NATO being able to deal with all types of airborne threats from light drones to hypersonic missiles.[17]

Moving on to how MDO can be realised. NATO, like the United States, has set the corps level within the army as the one that should possess many of the capabilities available for MDO. The concept also exists at lower levels, but the army corps level is the one that decides where and how resources should be allocated or used. In thinking about how an army corps prepares and trains for combat within the NATO framework, the operational tempo and momentum are identified as important dependencies. They are the measures used to gauge success in battle. The army corps must maintain an operational tempo such that the opponent is prevented from recovering.[18]

Pre-combat planning is required, with a planning horizon of 72 to 96 hours, which is the norm for an army corps within NATO. The planning is based on a constantly updated *Comprehensive Understanding of the Operational Environment* (CUOE) where all the enemy's expected actions and equipment are identified as well as the information environment and terrain. All avenues of co-operation must therefore also be established within NATO, including our country. The preparations, as well as the execution of the battle, must be characterised by speed, which in turn requires extensive training with the parts of the unit that are most time critical. It is also necessary to have practised carrying out actions in domains other than the traditional ones. Together with the more

traditional domains of sea, air and ground, cyber and space must be used to achieve effects against what is known as the *Integrated Fires Complex* (IFC) and *Integrated Air Defence System* (IADS). A key word in this is that actions must be carried out simultaneously with all domains. It is not enough to "dabble" with actions from a couple of the domains, but the centre must enable all domains to be involved at the same time.[19]

When the army corps is on its way to its battle area, it will need to protect itself from enemy aircraft and/or missiles using NATO IADS. Once most of the enemy's IADS[20] have been defeated, NATO can deploy a larger number of fifth-generation fighter aircraft. Then, when the opponent's IADS collapses, NATO can deploy more fourth-generation fighter aircraft against the opponent's ground forces. The corps combat command can also shift its focus to fighting the adversary's medium-range missiles and supporting its own divisions.[21]

When the corps advances to seize terrain or fight the opponent, it will have a "cover team" at the front for intelligence gathering. It is also important that the cover team tries to get the opponent to deploy his forces in preparation for an attack. During combat, the Corps will use important parts of the terrain to reinforce its defences, which will be spread out over long distances, the length of which cannot be determined as it depends entirely on the circumstances of each particular occasion. An important part of combat is the mobilisation of reserves to deal with unexpected developments.[22]

In the early stages of combat, NATO forces may be behind and there may be a need to be able to engage early and delay the enemy until sufficient forces have been assembled. When the corps is sufficiently assembled, it is used as the level to link all domains against the adversary.

The airborne brigade of the corps provides support by conducting operations in the depth of the enemy's grouping. Another important role is that of intelligence, which overlaps with the airborne brigade or the corps' combat system to provide a basis for combat throughout the depth of the corps.[23]

Many texts on MDO refer to the army corps as the level exercising MDO. This does not mean that the levels below the army corps do not exercise MDO, but they are part of the larger context and must be able to implement the requirements that are part of MDO and that the corps level imposes. One example is the time for the initial movement into the battle area. Previously, a division could move 30 kilometres in 2-3 days. Within the framework of MDO, the time has shrunk to 1-2 days. How do you achieve this at divisional level? It is the corps that has the combat systems that enable a window of opportunity to carry out the movement more quickly. In other words, you fight the opponent's long-range combat system with the means available at corps level.[24]

After completing the movement into the battle area, the division uses its own resources to find vulnerabilities in the opponent. Once these have been identified, smaller units are used to manoeuvre and attack the opponent's long-range combat systems. To do this, salvoes protected by medium-range air defence are used. In combating the opponent's defences, new opportunities will arise to attack other vulnerabilities.[25]

One of the problems encountered relates to advancing across large bodies of water, such as a river. There are many of these in Europe, which is an ever-present problem. If the distance from the front is 70-150 kilometres, there are two ways to solve the transition problem. Either there is a window during which a concerted effort can be made to carry out the crossing during 12-24




Figure 2: Image showing the fluctuations in the curves for the different domains.

hours, or multiple crossing points are used for different parts of the division.

During the experiments conducted, analysts have discovered that access to some of the domains available for conducting MDO fluctuates. This can range from access to satellites, closed networks or the need to refuel and recharge units. This means that commanders can use their resources in different ways. The first option is to concentrate forces for a short period when all domains are available. The second option is to use parts of the unit to utilise the sine curves that arise in the different domains and match the tactical efforts so as to have the advantage of available domains when actions are carried out.[26]

There are still problems with information management and related security classification. Our networks are not built to handle large amounts of data. What needs to be addressed is not only the situation we have today, but we also need to expand our information management capacity to cope with what is coming soon. These include quantum computing,[27] big data[28] and high-speed computing. As mentioned earlier, there is a group in the Pentagon that works exclusively on these issues.

Although MDO is being introduced in the US and NATO as a whole, there are still problems. Of the three main ones, communication is one, as described above. The second is dealing with short-range weapon systems at the tactical level. This requires bringing together as many capabilities at this level as possible and may require automation. The third problem is the idea of using any sensor and any weapons platform, which can

negatively affect the tactical initiative and the intentions of mission tactics.

Conclusion

The introduction of MDO will affect us on a number of levels as described above. In particular, the author wishes to emphasise that it is the new domains that have made the operational environment almost endless. Everything can be interconnected on the battlefield in a common network where the same situational picture can be shared in a matter of seconds, thus providing a faster and better basis for decision-making.

In cases where the adversary uses the air, the information can be utilised to use NATO's IADS to combat incoming aircraft and/or missiles. Space and cyber have important roles. Cyber is an enabler in this respect, while space allows us to maintain communication over large distances. There is also a large element of long-range missiles in both Russia and China, which NATO sees as threats to be countered in the early stages of combat.

When discussing how MDO is conducted, we also need to be reminded of the interconnectedness, simultaneity and speed as key concepts in MDO. Although NATO has started to implement MDO, there are still problems, but we must also realise that there are always problems when introducing a new way of thinking about and conducting war. Staying where we are now with joint operations is not enough. Even if the journey is difficult, there is no other solution than to get on the train.

The author is Lieutenant Colonel and serves at the Swedish Defence University in the Department of Joint Operations and he is a member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

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A work on IAMD and A2/AD

by Per Edling

IN THE AUTUMN of 2021, member Carl Bergqvist gave an appreciated introductory speech to the Royal Swedish Naval Academy under the title "A Swedish A2/AD concept – an opportunity through increased coordination?". Inspired by Bergqvist's thoughts and at the special request of member Peter Nordbeck, the leadership of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences' naval and air warfare science departments decided to carry out a joint project to study the possibilities of creating interlocking zones with existing Swedish resources and equipment. The members of the working group were Per Edling, Lars Helmrich and Jon Wikingsson.

In spring 2023, two seminars were held at the Swedish Defence University during which concepts such as A2/AD, IAMD (Integrated Air and Missile Defence) and exclusion zones were discussed and analysed from different perspectives. Member Per Edling updated the Academy on the progress of the work and the preliminary conclusions at the April meeting. After the summer of 2023, these conclusions were compared with the experiences from the war in Ukraine and tested through a war game with the help of the Swedish Defence Research Agency. After final preparation, the work was presented by member Jon Wikingsson to the Academy during the autumn symposium in October, which also included speakers from the Swedish Armed Forces' operations management, the Swedish Air Force, Saab and the US European Command (EUCOM). The symposium was organised with the support of Saab, for which the Academy is very grateful. Wikingsson's speech can be found in written form on the following pages.

One conclusion from the autumn symposium is that Sweden is currently exposed to three influential forces: openly aggressive opponents, changing military geography and becoming a member of a defence alliance. In order to cope with this force field, a mental change is necessary in the entire Swedish society, including the Defence Forces. Mental change does not come by itself, but there must be a broad and deep discussion in all contexts in our country. Ideally, security policy discussions should be held at all Swedish kitchen tables.

For this symposium, we also wanted to know whether A2/AD and IAMD could act as locomotives in the development of multi-domain operations. It has been made clear that they can be a driving force. The necessary integration between the different assets must include connectivity, ranges and other technical issues, but also methods, training and exercises. These exercises must be given high priority and conducted at multiple levels with units from all branches of defence. It is also clear that important issues such as protection of civilians and endurance need to be further analysed. Another conclusion from the symposium is that it can be questioned whether, from a multi-domain perspective, it is really appropriate that our academy is divided into six departments.

After introducing some of the arguments made during the symposium, the report was finalised, which follows on the next few pages.

The author is Captain (N) and Head of Operations Planning. He is a member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and The Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences.

Interlocking zones – driving force in the development of joint multinational operations?

by Per Edling, Lars Helmrich and Jon Wikingsson

Résumé

During 2023, the Academy's sections for naval and air warfare science have been studying the possibilities to create Swedish A2/AD-zones using existing assets and methods. In this edition of the Proceedings and Journal the study and its conclusions are presented. Equipment and doctrine are already in place and better surface to air systems are being acquired, but the Swedish armed forces need to improve the linkage between the different assets and prioritise complicated exercises.

WE LIVE IN new times. The Swedish security policy situation is changing rapidly for several reasons. Sweden needs to seriously address the demands of openly aggressive opponents, a larger area of operations and being part of a defence alliance. Our strategy needs to change. As part of NATO, Sweden becomes a serious participant in the game of North Atlantic security. NATO has three core tasks: deterrence and collective defence, crisis management and defence cooperation.[1] Sweden will participate in the fulfilment of all three. One of the cornerstones is that we must endeavour to control the world around us, instead of being content to contest the control of the opponent. This change raises questions and challenges many perspectives. One of these is control of the air domain, which is the subject of this article.

In Sweden, the operational level has long made it fairly easy for itself by allocating responsibility for the sea to a naval commander and the air to an air commander, in order to focus on the complex ground domain. Until now, this distribution seems largely adequate, as sensor and weapon ranges have been relatively short and air defence from the earth's surface has mainly been a matter of self-defence. We have also lived in peace, so the approach has not been tested in practice. As sensor and weapon ranges increase, the objectives, interests and capabilities of the different defence branches will overlap, clearly requiring the conduct of joint operations to throw the adversary into chaos.[2] Traditional capabilities and organisations are also affected by cyber and space warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles and faster decision-making supported by better situational awareness and artificial intelligence.

Throughout history, it is possible to identify several major changes or even paradigm shifts in the development of the art of war caused by technological developments, strategic changes or conceptual innovation in response to the experience of war. Examples of technological developments include the impact of the internal combustion engine,

the entry of air power into the battlespace, nuclear weapons and the digitisation that has been going on for some time, reinforced by artificial intelligence. At the strategic level, the fall of the Berlin Wall, 9/11 and Sweden's and Finland's application for NATO membership illustrate changes that have given rise to a reassessment of existing strategic assumptions. Even at the military conceptual level, major changes sometimes occur. One example is the US Army's AirLand Battle concept from 1982, which was based on conclusions from the Vietnam War. Another is the Swedish shift from 'meet, stop and strike' to 'protect, consolidate and act' that will result from the rapprochement with NATO.[3]

As we approach the middle of the 2020s, there is reason to carefully evaluate what the rapid development of technology means in parallel with the changed strategic reality where both Sweden's and Finland's NATO membership and the fact that Russia is disrupting the European security order are influencing factors. At the same time, the development and realisation of A2/AD concepts has been going on for some time in several places, as well as attempts to counter such concepts. In addition, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine provides unique and extensive experience in contemporary high-intensity warfare.

Method, purpose and organisation

In 2023, the Academy's Divisions II and III carried out a joint project aimed at contributing to a discussion on how Sweden should respond to the ongoing change in the military strategic conditions in our neighbourhood. The purpose of the work is to show examples of existing Swedish capabilities and methods that can contribute to creating a defence capability in our neighbourhood. The reasoning is developed within the framework of NATO's *Integrated Air and Missile Defence* (IAMD). The work is based on the fact that the army and navy will have a significant air defence capability in the coming years, that Sweden is part of NATO, the current doctrines of the Swedish Armed Forces, the ongoing development of technology and certain experiences from the war in Ukraine.

An important input has been Mr Carl Bergqvist's article "A Swedish A2/AD concept – an opportunity for increased coordination?". One of Bergqvist's main points is that Sweden should perhaps devote less energy to worrying about Russian A2/AD, and instead build its own existing components into its own A2/AD concept. Bergqvist states that the establishment of such zones requires long and complicated chains of action and relevant doctrines and methods.[4]

Two seminars were organised, during which a number of preliminary conclusions were formulated. These conclusions have been tested on three occasions. They have been compared with the structure of the air defence around an aircraft carrier force and current experiences from the war in Ukraine, and visualised with the help of a war game at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. During the course of the work, the idea was also born of seeing exclusion zones as a driving force in the development of joint multinational operations.

The article begins with a discussion of current and expected military geographic, technological and methodological starting points. It then defines important concepts for further discussion, such as IAMD and A2/AD, and adds operational perspectives. The work ends with a discussion in which the conclusions are validated, before the conclusions are formulated.

Military geography starting points

As an ally of NATO, our eastern defence border is moved about 600 kilometres east in southern Sweden and 300 kilometres east in northern Sweden. It will also move north to the Arctic, west to the USA and the southern border several thousand kilometres south. Several experts have expressed in different ways that the Nordic region and the surrounding sea areas are a coherent military strategic area. A broader perspective reveals a picture of a northern front and a coherent Nordic-Arctic-Baltic area – why not under the acronym NABO.

NATO membership means that – in addition to maintaining a capability to defend ourselves, protect our interests and participate in Alliance deterrence – we take on a collective responsibility to assist our allies. As a member of NATO, Sweden is at the centre of NABO, with short transport routes to our other allies in all directions. A good example already in peace is the protection of the flows of data, food, energy, inputs, spare parts, etc. that pass through us on their way to our neighbours in the east.[5] Large quantities of goods are transhipped in Sweden for onward transport to the Baltic Sea countries by air, road, rail and coastal shipping. It is reasonable that we should keep these flows open by being able to control them. Traffic intensity is likely to decline in the event of an armed conflict, if for no other reason than that insurance premiums will skyrocket.

The supply of consumer goods could be reduced without major impact on our societies or on our neighbours, but the common dependence on imports of fuel and food will be high. In addition, the ongoing and worldwide power struggle means that Sweden must protect its interests in the *global commons,* i.e. the global commons on the open sea and its bottom, in the air, in space and in cyberspace. Soon the map is not enough to describe the operational environment, so it is instead characterised by the domains of land, sea, air, cyber and space. The electromagnetic spectrum cuts through all domains, which are encompassed by the information environment.

It is important to remember that a domain is not the same as an armed force or a fighting force operating on the ground, at sea or in the air. The reasoning is not based on who is doing something, but where it is happening. A unit can act in one domain against an adversary in the same domain, but also against adversaries in all other domains. An operation can be conducted in one domain or in several domains. Some examples are that an anti-aircraft battalion is organised in the ground forces but operates in the air domain. Combat aircraft are organised in the air domain, but operate in the ground domain when conducting ground target engagement. Submarines are organised in the naval forces but operate in the air domain when fighting anti-aircraft frigates and in the ground domain when landing special forces. The term *multi-domain operations has* been used by the United States and NATO for some years and can be understood as simultaneously facing an attacker in the entire depth of operations.

Since today's rapid technological developments allow for increasingly better situational awareness at great distances and greatly increased weapon ranges with flight profiles that are much higher and faster than before, traditional deep defence with sequential methods and capabilities no longer works. Instead, the adversary must be countered at all times and in all depths with operations in all domains – multi-domain operations.

Technological starting points

Sweden currently has weapons and systems that can create effective A2/AD zones; S 102B, ASC 890, Robot103 Patriot, Robot 101 Meteor, RBS15 (from land, sea, air) and platforms characterised by endurance or response capability; submarine systems, corvette Visby, JAS 39C/D. The capability is reinforced with systems that are planned to become operational within the next 10 years or so; mid-term modification of the Visby corvette, the new surface combatant corvette type Luleå, submarine type Blekinge, JAS 39E, S 106 and brigade air defence, as well as the new joint naval targeting robot and long-range ground targeting. The Defence Forces are also expected to gradually gain access to space-based systems for intelligence gathering, navigation and communication.

The compilation and evaluation of the military technology starting points is based on data from NATO's Science & Technology Organization, FOI and the Swedish Armed Forces. It can be noted that the conclusions of the documents are well aligned. At present, nine areas of technology are considered to have so-called disruptive applications, i.e. technologies that have such a revolutionary effect or solve a problem in such a much more favourable way that they displace existing technology. Of these nine, big data, artificial intelligence, autonomy, space and hypersonic weapons are expected to be disruptive within 10 years. Quantum technology, materials, energy technology and biotechnology are considered to be disruptive within 10-20 years. All organisations believe that combinations of several of these areas could have the greatest impact. Information and communication technology (including AI, autonomy and cyber) can already be considered to be on the verge of becoming disruptive.

In summary, Sweden has access to several qualitative systems and a planned increase in capabilities as well as the introduction of new capabilities that provide a good basis for establishing a concept of exclusion zones in the Baltic Sea area. However, it is important that our current and future operational systems are able to cope with future technological developments. In order to understand and take advantage of the possibilities of development, consultation between research in several technology areas and a systematic approach to identifying the possibilities offered by technological development are required. In addition, the development of capabilities must be gradual and with a modular approach and be interoperable with NATO.

The Swedish defence industry group Saab presented through Carl-Johan Bergholm during a seminar on 12 April 2023 how it works with the needs arising from exclusion zones and breaks them down into different systems, both existing and future. The conclusions are that the main threats are from low-flying, ballistic and hypersonic missiles together with the underwater threat in the form of manned and unmanned underwater capabilities. Saab relies on internationally recognised models and principles. As an example, it utilises a "kill chain" approach to translate a "monitored" area into an agreed upon "impact" to describe how to understand required capabilities and capacities in all time perspectives, short, medium and long term.

Under "monitor", the challenge is not the technical realisability but rather the ability to design in line with legal and privacy aspects. Another conclusion that Saab has also drawn is that all domains with their inherent systems will be needed to realise A2/AD. The possibility of the realisation was described as a combination of long-range, short-range,

multi-static and passive/active sensors in the electromagnetic spectrum. Interconnecting and optimising the use of the included sensors will place new demands on management and its systems, many of which can be met with the support of technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning. Management will also need to rely on extensive communication that is both non-intrusive and resilient.

In the context of "effect", the major difficulty is to sort out the right target even in a measured or otherwise disturbed environment and to be able to switch targets quickly according to human or autonomous decisions. The need is accentuated by the short time available to meet hypersonic weapons, which thus becomes a dimensional issue. Another conclusion is that we must ensure more effective data exchange in the controlled bubbles than current NATO links allow, while all solutions need to be NATO link compatible.

Methodological starting points

In 2019, Robert Dalsjö MEP and others presented in "Bursting the bubble" that Russian A2/AD capabilities are overestimated. The report clarifies the difficulty of creating an A2/AD and that it is too easy to draw out nominal ranges for a weapon system to be claimed to be A2/AD. With the FOI report as support, it is reasonable to assume that it is not easier for Sweden or for Sweden in NATO to create exclusion zones. One way of tackling this challenge is to decide what you want and then coordinate activities that achieve that desire and take account of possible consequences. As a NATO member, Sweden will probably become a base and staging area for further operations and be tasked with securing logistics and reinforcement rounds to the Baltic States and Finland. Activities in support of this task are to challenge Russia's situational awareness and operational capability over the Baltic Sea. Russian capabilities must be forced eastwards and prevented from gaining access and freedom of action in our areas.

The question then is whether there is a method in the Defence Forces' doctrines and regulations that provides the conditions for conducting a joint operation? The short answer is yes. There is a common thread from the military strategic level down to the tactical level that enables the planning and execution of a joint operation. In addition, the Defence Forces' methods are largely interoperable with NATO's. This means that the Armed Forces' doctrines and regulations provide good conditions for Swedish staff personnel and Swedish combat forces to quickly be part of a multinational joint operation, which is necessary when we are NATO. But a method is not enough. There must be staff processes that make it possible to follow the method. Staffs at different levels of management must be faithful to their tasks. Therefore, the whole organisation needs to understand what decisions are made at each level and adhere to them. Furthermore, technical systems are required to enable the operation, ranging from staff support systems, data link systems to sensor and weapon systems. Technology is on its way, and in 2030 the technical conditions will be better than today. Therefore, it is important to learn the methodology and relate to it now. This is best done through common training, training and more training.

IAMD,[6] A2/AD and exclusion zones – what are they really about?

NATO's *Integrated Air and Missile Defence* (IAMD) is much more than just active air

defence in the form of 'bubbles', which is the subject of this article. The system uses political, military and civilian means to protect Alliance territory and interests. For example, an embargo may deny an adversary access to the components necessary to build cruise missiles. Counter-attacks with conventional or specialised units can deny the adversary the ability to fire their weapons. Active air defence can shoot down those missiles that are launched anyway. Dispersal, movement and fortifying protection are some of the key elements of passive air defence that aim to degrade the opponent's situational awareness and mitigate the effect of his weapons. Measures to increase the will to defend prepare the population for the possibility of war and to act appropriately when war is a reality.

It is about maximising the collective[7] ability to counter the adversary's ability to influence us. The collective intelligence service creates a common understanding of how the opponent's offensive robot system is structured, where the weapon carriers are located and how they can act. Sensor data from e.g. radar stations and satellites are collectively compiled continuously and give the collective defence the ability to act quickly. In the event of war, identified targets can be attacked in depth by the enemy grouping based on this knowledge, while own air defence in the form of fighter aircraft and ground and sea-based air defence combats incoming robots and drones. A submarine sinking a heavily armed warship is part of the air defence. The command prioritises shooting down threats to its own forces and society, while allowing misdirected weapons to strike unpopulated areas. The adversary's access to the inputs required to build advanced weapons is cut off. The population and critical national infrastructure are covered by shelters and robust structures, such as burying electricity and communication cables underground. In this way, the defender tries to combine his own long-range combat and the construction of a strong total defence to minimise the impact of the attacker's offensive.

As already mentioned, A2/AD is a controversial subject. According to Mr Carl Bergqvist, the origins of the A2/AD theory can be traced to a Chinese and Russian response to the American successes in the 1991 Gulf War.[8] There are different views as to whether A2/AD is only a possibility in the air domain, whether it is a purely military issue or whether it is an issue that encompasses all domains and can only be achieved by using and taking into account both military and civilian capabilities and aspects. An early conclusion is that we need to move towards a definition of the concept of A2/AD. Regardless of the answer to the question, it can be stated that no armed force can solve A2/AD on its own; it will require capabilities from other armed forces. Similarly, civilian capabilities or aspects will be involved – directly or indirectly. Therefore, A2/AD must be a joint operation, led from the operational level based on clear strategic objectives.

From a military theory perspective, it can be argued that A2/AD as a concept is not new. It has always been important to deny the opponent access to or freedom of action in a specific area. The definitions of A2/AD that can be identified today are usually based on that *Anti-Access* refers to denying an adversary access to an area while *Area Denial* refers to denying an adversary freedom of action in an area.

A2/AD as an expression is often used to describe the opponent's actions and whether it is possible to penetrate the opponent's bubble, which is why it is probably more




Figure 1: Interception zones with ambition level under the A2/AD umbrella (Graphic: Jon Wikingsson, RSAWS).

appropriate to use the Swedish concept of an exclusion zone and define the concept as the ability to prevent an opponent's access to or freedom of action in an area. If a level of ambition is also set for the exclusion zone, it becomes clearer what is to be prevented. In turn, this provides the conditions for identifying, coordinating and harmonising the capabilities required to prevent the opponent's access or freedom of action.

Setting a level of ambition for an interlocking zone thus allows for variation and also makes it possible to use interlocking zones in more domains than the air domain. An interception zone against ballistic missiles and cruise missiles is an area in the air domain, an interception zone against the opponent's ground mobility is an area in the ground domain and an interception zone against the opponent's IT attacks specifies an area (IT system) in the cyber domain. The simultaneous establishment of these zones requires a multi-domain operation. In order to strike a balance between ambitions and available capabilities, the interlocking zones should be defined at the strategic and operational management levels.

Operational perspectives on interlocking zones[9]

Some possible operational purposes of exclusion zones may be to deny an adversary freedom of action (geographically, temporally or in terms of certain activities), to protect strategically important areas or activities for a longer period of time, to conserve own resources or to send strategic and operational signals to an adversary. A deeper discussion of the purpose of establishing an exclusion zone can be facilitated by asking the questions – what is operationally and strategically important for me, my allies and the adversary? By answering these questions, one can identify key criteria that should underpin the operational planning of an exclusion zone.

Current and future technology in combat means that no threat can be linked to a single domain, but that several domains

are affected simultaneously. Consequently, each threat can also be met in several domains, meaning that capabilities from several armed forces are required. Therefore, an interlocking zone cannot be handled by a tactical dimension, but requires a coherent command through the operational level. Weapon systems, intelligence systems, command systems, etc. must be coordinated and combined in a network at a higher tactical and operational level in order to achieve the greatest possible joint effect of the tactical capabilities. This applies nationally and with partners and allies. Modern and cost-effective technology facilitates the creation of exclusion zones, as exemplified by earth observation via satellites and information gathering by unmanned systems in all domains. The decision on the extent and ambition of the exclusion zone must also be seen from a military geographic perspective, so that the geography supports one's own desire to, for example, influence the opponent's mobility and collection capability. Furthermore, all of society's protective values are taken into account so that e.g. population protection, emergency services and evacuation benefit from the exclusion zone.

Discussion

During the seminars, games and discussions held, the unanimous view was that Sweden to a large extent has both the technology and methods to coordinate several different systems in order to create its own A2/AD capability, even if the functional chains are long and complicated. This possibility is highly dependent on the right decisions being made at the respective management level and access to a common management support system. Agreed procedures must be developed to bridge the cultural management differences between the centralised air forces and the more decentralised naval and ground forces.

Another result of this work, and especially the link with the war in Ukraine, is that air defence is very important. At the same time, we have to understand that there are no impenetrable shells and that our resources have limited endurance. A few UAVs or missiles will penetrate no matter how strong a shell is, which requires that the military system can absorb some hits, that society as a whole is prepared and infrastructure ready, and is psychologically prepared for missile hits. Circumstances such as contributions from total defence in general and the system's endurance, but also psychological factors such as fear and mental fatigue, will need to be taken into account when concepts and ideas are translated into regulations, exercises and live capability.

The very purpose of exclusion zones is also important. What is actually to be protected, and why? The assessment is that Swedish territory will largely be a logistics hub and a deployment area for NATO troops moving from south to north or from west to east. This means protecting critical infrastructure, transport by land, sea and air, and managing the delicate stage between unloading and a unit being deployed (RSOMI – reception, staging, onward movement and integration). An exclusion zone is also about creating your own freedom of action, not just limiting the enemy's access to an area. Perhaps we should talk about area-access and about anti-access.

Broadening the concept so that A2/AD as a method covers more than the air domain and talking about exclusion zones with levels of ambition is perceived as a reasonable way forward. A common concept for the measures taken to prevent the adversary's access, deny the adversary freedom of action or provide better conditions for their

own freedom of action and mobility can then cover all domains. Critical information systems are protected against cyber-attacks in the cyber domain, a protection zone allows the law to regulate unwanted and unauthorised activities in the land domain and a blockade regulates unwanted movements in the maritime domain. The list of possible exclusion zones is long and together they require a multi-domain operation to provide the desired effect and ensure that exclusion does not hamper the operation. The need to create interlocking zones may be the driving force behind the development of multi-domain operations. Perhaps a suitable way forward is to pre-define a number of levels of interlock zones, e.g. level 1 against all types of cyber attacks, level 2 against ballistic missiles, level 3 against subsonic air attacks and adversary ground mobility.

Although the Swedish Armed Forces have or will soon have many of the components mentioned to create their own basic interlocking capability, there is a very great need for further development and qualified exercises. For example, exercises such as Aurora 23, with 26,000 participants, must include practising the establishment of exclusion zones. Such an exercise does not have to interfere with the tactical exercise objectives because it is at the operational level that the interlock is defined. If the zones are created at one of the highest system levels, it is sufficient to make minor adjustments to the respective exercise elements, but several command levels and units from all branches of defence must exercise simultaneously. In the end, the basis for the creation of a Swedish interlocking capability is primarily a matter of will. Better coordination between systems from all branches of defence and armed forces is required for the capability to be realised. Most of this is already in place, provided that we have a common command and control system, can cope with endurance and really want to create our own interlocking zones by coordinating the subsystems through command and control and increasing system readiness and training.

Given that Sweden is a member of NATO, it is important that the Swedish command and control system is interoperable and that Swedish interception zones can be integrated into NATO's counterparts. It may be necessary to choose NATO-compatible support systems, even though they may have lower transmission speeds and are not as flexible as Swedish-developed systems. An absolute minimum is that Swedish systems work in federated networks.

Approaches to validate the results

In order to try to validate the reasoning, three external perspectives have been used. At the beginning of the work, the preliminary theses were compared with the organisation of air defence in an aircraft carrier force. Towards the end of the preparation, the results of the work have been compared with current experience from the war in Ukraine, and in addition, the board game Operational Warfare System (OWS) has been used to highlight, under FOI's leadership, some particularly interesting aspects of the coordination between the available resources.

Carrier Strike Group Operations – a Danish perspective

In the discussion on an integrated Swedish air defence, Commander Ken Nielsen, who is the Danish liaison officer to the Chief of Operations at HQ, gave a presentation on US operations with the Carrier Strike Group (CSG). The presentation was made against the background of the Danish participation

in this operation and aimed to inform about how the defence around a CSG is established.

The defence of a CSG is built on the principle of layer upon layer. A CSG is composed of several essential subsystems, all of which must work together and be integrated. Together, these different subsystems provide more than a single part. The subsystems are broadly comprised of the aircraft carrier, the various flight systems, submarines, associated escort vessels and their support systems, the on-board command and control, and an advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system. It is these subsystems, together with the use of appropriate doctrine, procedures and external support, including communications, navigation and surveillance satellites, that provide the force with a robust defence. In addition, the C2 (command and control) structure of a CSG is established following a clear line of command and allocating responsibility for the different domains to designated managers.

When a CSG participates in joint operations or operates with other aircraft or ground-based air defence, activities are coordinated. This is done by using tactics, techniques and procedures developed according to an established doctrine. It is made clear who is supported and who is supporting, so that management is simple and clear. To achieve the best possible coordination, a naval coordination element is established at the air operations centre and corresponding elements reinforce the command in the CSG.

Lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine[10]

The need for air defence is enormous based on the experience of the war in Ukraine, both for protection against advanced weapons such as hypersonic weapons and against simpler and cheaper weapons systems such as suicide drones and patrol robots. Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to detect and counter Russian long-range assets such as cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. The challenge with hypersonic threats is that they entail shorter retention times and the need for faster countermeasures. It is often these advanced threat systems that determine the development of air defence, but even today, simpler weapon systems such as suicide drones are used more frequently and cause great damage if they cannot be countered.

The above experiences highlight the need for a balance between simple and lightweight systems with high mobility and advanced heavy air defence systems where protection of critical infrastructure can be ensured. The effectiveness of protection is based on a combination of early warning and response capabilities. Mobility also provides protection. Our weapon systems for air defence from the ground, surface and air should therefore not exclusively focus on using qualified munitions to combat advanced targets.

Games in OWS[11] at FOI

The game was conducted on 2023-10-11 based on the operational objective of creating an interlocking zone over the Baltic and the Baltic Sea in order to create the conditions for reinforcing and supporting ground forces in the Baltic and influencing Russian forces in the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Initially, Russian A2/AD capabilities were neutralised through a multi-domain operation whereby the use of cyber-attacks, satellite reconnaissance, telecommunications jamming and special forces significantly increased our own ability to counter Russian forces from our own air, sea and ground forces. Long-range combat capability was

very effective, especially in a rearguard situation. Subsequently, own air and sea forces could be moved forward and grouped near the Baltics, whereby joint air, sea and ground combat was carried out. At the same time, the joint combat reinforced the joint protection of the various armed forces. For example, ground targeting was carried out by air forces based outside the Baltics while they were air defended by naval and ground air defence – an interlocking zone had been established. In parallel with these activities, the ground forces were reinforced in terms of personnel and logistics by air and sea transport across the Baltic Sea from Sweden and Germany, for example.

Validation results and conclusions

The defence of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) consists of a system of systems, an unambiguous command and control structure and personnel who have insight into doctrine and an understanding of their own and others' roles. The arrangement outlined in this work is very similar to the air defence of a CSG, indicating that the difficulties are mainly about overcoming the problems of creating a command and control system that sufficiently effectively links sensors, weapons and decision-making.

The war in Ukraine clearly demonstrates the need for effective air defence in modern warfare. For long periods of time, Ukrainian air defence has been essentially ground-based systems, as the country's air and naval forces were largely countered. The supply of air defence equipment from the West has so far been mainly to the ground domain. The Ukrainian armed forces have impressively managed to integrate many different types of sensors and weapons with warning procedures and decision-making.

The game in OWS clearly visualised the benefits of a multi-domain operation. The outcome of the game itself may not have been entirely surprising, but our preconceived notions about the need for multi-domain operations by different armed forces were at least not falsified. Creating an interlocking zone in an aftermath mode requires a good supply of long-range combat capability. The important issue of persistence, which we have been grappling with throughout the work, could not be highlighted by this gambit.

In the current and future operational environment, geography is simplified by viewing the battlefield in domains. Forces operating and fighting in one or more of the domains must be coordinated in a system of systems, in a multi-domain operation, by the operational command level in order to achieve the desired effects and objectives. One method for setting boundaries and changing the geography is the use of exclusion zones, which support one's own activities and needs from a total defence perspective and increase the possibilities of influencing the possibilities of bringing the opponent into chaos.

To succeed in this, a clear command structure is required, built on a network that can share the right and desired information throughout the command structure. Like a CSG, Sweden, as part of NATO, must be able to be part of and contribute information, operational capability and command in such a network with all the capabilities of total defence.

The technology required to establish exclusion zones already exists today and will become even better in the coming years. Similarly, methods exist and these can continue to be developed as more materiel is added. Both technology and methods are basically compatible with NATO, so the conditions are favourable for creating a solid and functional system that meets future needs.

Interlocking zones as a method can be used in all domains and by setting a level of ambition in an interlocking zone, regardless of the domain, realistic targets are set. It should be noted that setting a target that embraces an absolute condition of creating an impenetrable bubble – full A2/AD – is naïve. The experience from Ukraine shows that it is impossible to meet all the options that can affect an interlocking zone. Sweden currently has capabilities that can create an exclusion zone, which is defined by a level of ambition that specifies what should not have access or freedom of action in an area, provided that we lead the activity in a joint multi-domain operation.

This in turn requires coordination of capabilities from several branches of defence. The establishment of interlocking zones in national operational planning and implementation together with Swedish integration into NATO IAMD will be a driving force for the development of our defence capability.

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Notes

1. *Strategic concept – adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO summit in Madrid 29 June 2022*, NATO, 2022, p 1, *https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept*, (2022-12-31).
2. See, for example, Edling, Per and Wikingsson, Jon: "Operativ ledning och svenska sjöstridskrafters roll i Nato", *KKrVAHT*, No 1 2023.
3. HQ: *Försvarsmaktens reviderade underlag inför kommande försvarsbeslut*, FM2023- 23092:14, Appendix 2, p. 9.
4. Bergqvist, Carl: "Ett svenskt A2/AD-koncept – en möjlighet genom ökad samordning?", *Journal i Sjöväsendet*, No. 6 2021.
5. Rask, Bo: "Säkerhetspolitisk och strategisk utveckling i Sveriges närområde – marina implikationer", *Journal i Sjöväsendet*, No. 2 2022.
6. The section on IAMD is based on Edling, Per: "Vad är IAMD, egentligen?", *Vårt försvar*, No. 1 2024.
7. Collective means national military and civil defence and our national defence together with other countries or organisations.
8. Op cit, Bergqvist, Carl, see note 4.
9. Mats Helgesson, Member. Minutes of the A2/AD seminar on 12 April 2023.
10. Ur *Försvarsmaktens lärdomar från kriget i Ukraina*, OPL J7, 2023.
11. Quinn, Thomas: "The 'Agile' Wargames that Can Test Force Design, Part 1", *Proceedings*, Nov 2022, *https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/agile-wargames-can-test-force-design-part-1*.

A2/AD in combined joint multi-domain operations

by Jon Wikingsson

SECTION III, AIR Warfare Studies and Section II, Naval Warfare Studies, of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences have conducted, in close cooperation, a study with the scope:

- To enhance the understanding of the concept Anti-Access and Area Denial in multi-domain operations
- To enhance the knowledge of how the Swedish Armed Forces are able to contribute with capabilities within NATO and how to use A2/AD as a concept within national warfighting

Preconditions

Sweden has a long tradition of being neutral and defending the nation's borders and interests alone. The defence was built up by dividing the Swedish territory into military regions and equip each region with military capabilities needed to defend the specific region. The basic strategy was to have a linear defence throughout the operational depth with a strong core from the borderline and inwards in each region. The military forces trained accordingly and thereby specialized, or limited, in the specific region.

Longer weapon ranges, high velocity weapons, sensors with longer range and more accurate measurement, increased information flow and faster communication are a few examples of the evolution of warfare that have changed the battlefield. The consequence is that throughout the operational depth there are constant activities. War is no longer a linear movement and the core is something else than forces along a geographical line or point.

Sweden's former regions do not fit within the multi-domain thinking and with the Swedish membership in NATO the theatre of war changes geographically. A multi-domain operation in NATO means that the enemy will be attacked in all domains and in the whole theatre of war at all times – as will NATO by its enemy.

Conclusion

The technologic evolution relocates the conduct of war towards multi-domain operations where the core is coordinated attacks in time and space in all domains throughout the whole theatre of war.

The term A2/AD

A2/AD means to deny the enemy the access to the theatre and to deny the enemy the freedom of action within the theatre. Some argue that the definition only is applicable in the air domain and the air battle has always strived for air superiority. However, if we use the definition together with multi-domain

operations, we argue that the mind-set or the will of A2/AD is needed in all domains. Therefore, in order to reach A2/AD, joint operations are necessary. As an example, you have not reached A2/AD fully by denying all the opponent aircrafts in the theatre, if the opponent can use all other forces and capabilities in the air domain. This demands a clear understanding through all command levels in order to fulfil the strategic objective in each domain, supported by the objectives and actions decided by the operational and tactical level.

The strategic level needs to promulgate distinct strategic objectives to deny the enemy his freedom of actions. The operational level needs to orchestrate all forces and capabilities to maximize the effects on the battlefield in order to reach the strategic objectives. Finally, the forces of the tactical level are to conduct coordinated actions in time and space in order to achieve the effects asked for which demands integration and full connectivity between the branches.

To allocate A2/AD to the air domain limits the benefits of multi-domain approach. Instead, the mind-set should be to use A2/AD as a method within all domains. An integrated tactical force, orchestrated by the operational level will have the preconditions needed to conduct coordinated attacks in time and space to support the distinct strategic objectives in each respective domain.

By breaking down the definition of A2/AD to interdiction zones, all domains are able to contribute. We compose a number of interdiction zones where each interdiction zone can relate to a domain and together it will render in a model where A2/AD is the umbrella for all interdiction zones. This method makes it possible to relate a strategic objective to the orchestration of the capabilities of the forces in a joint operation. Thereby 1+1 becomes 3. Establishment of military restricted areas on the ground and a blockade of the enemy's harbours could be the correct measures to support air superiority. Breaking down the definition also gives the preconditions to detail and balance the objective for A2/AD. Have you reached A2/AD in the air if the enemy still has the capability to launch ballistic missiles? Yes, to some extent, if you from the beginning e g include civilian bomb shelters to minimize the effects of the missiles and military restricted areas and checkpoints on the ground to hamper intelligence gathering that support the attacks. The ambition of the A2/AD can vary pending on the strategic objectives for the multi-domain operation.

Conclusion


Breaking down the definition of A2/AD to interdiction zones supports the process to define why, where and towards what threat the A2/AD zone is established. It will set the ambition of the strategic objectives. Likewise, it supports the orchestration of the forces by the operational level and clarifies the integration needed at the tactical level.

Wargaming

With the support of the Swedish Defence Research Agency, we have conducted a war game using the Operational Warfare System (OWS), developed by USMC.

The intent of the game was to visualize a multi-domain operation with the objective to regain control over the Baltic Sea and the Baltic states, and if possible, falsify or verify our hypothesises.

In this scenario, Russia builds-up forces in Kaliningrad and in its Western military district. Belarus supports the Russian initiative with one armoured division in order to have



Picture 1: At startex – an escalated situation in the northern part of Europe (Graphics: Swedish Defence Research Agency).

a strong combined joint force. Russian Air Defence assets are very powerful, especially in Kaliningrad oblast. Russia has the initiative and the objective is to take control of the Baltic States and northern part of Poland.

NATO, with Sweden as a member, counter the Russian escalation by mobilizing all military forces in the Baltic states, Poland and Finland. Sweden contributes with approx. 30 percent of its air capabilities, including ground based air defence, 30 percent of naval capabilities and 1 mechanized brigade in Lithuania. Germany contributes with approx. 30 percent of its air capabilities, including ground based air defence, 30 percent of naval capabilities and 1 light armoured division in high readiness. The objective in this phase is to gain situational awareness in all domains and withhold the readiness needed to encounter further escalation.

Using all capabilities within assigned NATO forces will be sufficient to uphold the situational awareness in the theatre, but the precondition to succeed is integrated forces – combined and joint.

Russia attacks the Baltic States, with the intent of connecting Kaliningrad oblast with the Western Military District. NATO responds with an attack on the air defence systems in Kaliningrad. This strike is supposed to degrade the Russian air superiority. Initially sensors and C2-nodes are targets for NATO Cyber operations, EW-jamming and Special Forces.

The Russian forces are blinded and the neutralization of air defence units with Tomahawks and various land attack missiles cracks the Russian air superiority. All attacks are coordinated in time and space using capabilities from air, sea and land

forces in ground attacks – a combined joint operation.

The next step was to attack the Russian navy operating in the Baltic Sea using air, naval and land forces – again a combined joint operation. Actions taken force the Russian air force to retreat eastward. NATO ships and air forces can operate along the coastline in the eastern Baltic Sea, establish an own A2/AD-zone to support and protect the ongoing land battle with sensor data, naval gunfire support with artillery and missiles, combat air patrol and close air support to the land forces.

The air space over Kaliningrad Oblast is in practice under blockade and Russian naval forces are under blockade in Baltijsk. NATO has established an A2/AD zone in the Baltic Sea and in the air space over the Baltic Sea and in the western part of the Baltic states. The zone prevents Russian naval assets, manned and unmanned fixed and rotary wings but not ballistic missiles and not to some extent cruise missiles. Although, NATO's capability of situational awareness towards attacks of Russian ballistic missiles and cruise missiles has increased. NATO has an early warning towards the threat but cannot take actions to prevent the attacks of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, including Russian Cyber and EW attacks.

Conclusion

Early actions to reduce the Russian capabilities on the ground to support their air superiority followed by advancing own forces air domain capabilities forced the Russian



Picture 2: Members of the Academy at D+2 – NATO A2/AD established (Graphics: Swedish Defence Research Agency).

forces to retreat. This gave the preconditions to establish an A2/AD zone, but not to the extent that it prevents all actions from the Russian forces. The Russian retreat reduces their capability to act with ballistic missiles and cruise missiles since the missiles now are launched 300-500 km further to the east.

Summary by bullets

The study of A2/AD in combined joint multi-domain operations gives the following conclusions:

- Multi-domain operations front modern warfighting and encounter a non-linear and unpredictable theatre.
- Combined Joint operations are key to fulfil the objective to control respective domain.
- Integration of forces and connectivity of information is key in combined joint operations.
- Define the ambition of the A2/AD zone – the perfect untouchable zone is just a theory.
- The enemy's capabilities need to be reduced prior establishing own A2/AD zone.
- Cyber, Electronic Warfare, PSYOPS etc enhance and complete all traditional effects on the battlefield.
- Sweden has capabilities and will have an increased palette the next coming years to contribute to A2/AD, but better coordination between the branches is a precondition for success.
- Allocate time for qualified exercises and increased training in all branches of methods and procedures of combined joint multi-domain operations, coordinate objectives, branches and functions by command through all command levels and increase readiness in all branches in order to have the preconditions needed for a swift encounter of all threats.
- The important field of endurance and sustainment remains to be analysed.

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Lack of air defence

A challenge for Sweden also as a member of NATO

by Roger Åhfelt

Résumé

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Sweden has applied for a NATO membership to strengthen the national defence. A membership obliges a country to be able to defend its own territory and at the same time support other allies. This article debates Swedish and NATO Air Defence abilities to fulfil the intent of the NATO Strategic Concept. Reductions of Air Defence capabilities have been ongoing for years, at the same time as Russia has developed a strong offensive missile capability. Russia's missile attacks against Ukraine demonstrate the importance of credible and robust Air Defence. To meet the increasing air threat NATO has introduced the establishment of an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), which now is highlighted as a Swedish priority to join. The thesis of this article is that the limitations of Air Defence capabilities, in both Sweden and in NATO, will hamper the possibilities for Sweden to defend national assets and at the same time support the alliance. NATO allies will similarly have limitations to support Sweden. The only reasonable solution right now for all members is to increase the numbers of Air Defence units to be able to defend their own and allied nations' operations within range of Russian missiles.

sweden has applied for membership of NATO in the wake of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Membership provides greater security policy certainty and is also binding. "As a member of NATO, Sweden is covered by the mutual defence guarantees arising from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and our defence capability will, according to Article 3, form part of collective defence."[1] Collective defence is ultimately about being able to give and receive military support.[2]

Russia's extensive missile strikes against both military and civilian targets in Ukraine demonstrate the importance of strong air defence.[3] The Commander-in-Chief's Military Council, ahead of future defence decisions, prioritises air defence and inclusion in NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD).[4] Air defence capability will be increased, but at a degree and pace that seems insufficient given that it is from a historically low number and within range of the Russian missile threat.

The article is based on the thesis that the proposed air defence capability is not sufficient for national defence needs and thus also not for providing support to others. The lack of air defence within NATO is significant, which means that Sweden should not expect air defence support for our national needs either. The purpose of this article is to provide a perspective on Swedish air defence development as part of NATO's integrated air and missile defence.

Background factors

Experience in Ukraine

The Defence Committee intends to pay particular attention to experiences from Ukraine in the basis for future defence decisions.[5] The need for air defence has been identified by both the Defence Committee and the Armed Forces. The question is what is required to be able to both protect one's own territory and support the alliance. To provide a perspective on the need for air defence, some experiences from Ukraine are described below, which the Defence Committee discusses in its security policy report, *Allvarstid*.[6]

The war in Ukraine demonstrates Russia's ability to attack from the air across the entire depths of Ukraine with a mix of drones, aeroplanes and helicopters, as well as with long-range assets such as cruise and ballistic missiles. Ukraine's air defences have been surprisingly strong and persistent, which has so far been crucial in preventing greater use of air power. Air defence has reduced the impact of missile attacks on friendly forces, essential services and the civilian population. Defence against drones has gradually become central. However, we receive daily reports of new losses as it is simply not possible to protect everything under attack with air defence. Ukraine's air defence is now in dire need of continued Western support with additional missiles and air defence systems.[7]

The scale of the Russian air attack in the first three months of the war has been estimated at more than 2 000 cruise missiles fired from ships in the Black Sea and from aircraft in Russian airspace. Around 240 ballistic missiles were fired in the same period against around 160 targets. Attacks were initially directed mainly against air defences but have increasingly targeted strategic objects such as oil depots, refineries, railways, ports and electricity supplies, as well as directly against the population.[8]

NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) programme

The integrated air and missile defence consists of both defensive and offensive means aimed at preventing an opponent's air attack capabilities. The aim is to integrate the sensors, firing units and command and control systems of all armed forces in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of defence capabilities and deterrence.[9]

The objective of air and missile defence is to protect the Alliance's territory, military forces and population from air attack. Air defence should provide sustained protection until the Alliance's offensive assets can counter the adversary's ability to conduct air strikes.[10] Integration of different air defence systems aims to meet a complex and all-encompassing air threat. No single air defence system can deal with the full range of air threats demonstrated in Ukraine; several different air defence systems are required to work together. The drone threat requires customised systems that can provide effective and economical surface protection.

NATO's development of an integrated system began in the 1960s. Baseline air and anti-aircraft units along the Iron Curtain were coordinated under joint command with the support of NATINADS (NATO Integrated Air Defence System).[11] After the fall of the Berlin Wall and general disarmament, large parts of NATO's air defence were dismantled, as the threat from The Soviet Union disappeared and air defence was not considered necessary in NATO's new, more expeditionary orientation. The consequence is that there is currently a very large shortage of air defence within NATO.[12]

With regard to strategic missile defence, NATO decided in 2010 to develop a joint strategic missile defence (Ballistic Missile Defence) to meet an increasing threat from mainly Iranian long-range missiles. The strategic missile defence is therefore not adapted or designed to counter tactical short- and medium-range missiles from Russia.[13]

Experience from the war in Ukraine has led to the development of NATO's integrated air and missile defence systems are prioritised in the Alliance's strategic concept from 2022.

> We will significantly strengthen our deterrence and defence posture to deny any potential ad- versary any possible opportunities for aggression. To that end, we will ensure a substantial and persistent presence on land, at sea, and in the air, including through strengthened integrated air and missile defence.[14]

Air defence capabilities are thus prioritised in the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Several countries have decided on major procurements of ground- and ship-based air defence systems.[15] Below is Sweden's proposed air defence development.

Military Council of the Commander-in-Chief

Since the 1990s, the Swedish Armed Forces have reduced the number of military units by 80-90%, making it more challenging to defend Sweden and contribute to the alliance.[16] The Swedish air defence system contains only two battalions. The units have been given the ability to combat ballistic missiles with the 103/Patriot air defence system for the protection of, for example, a base area, population centre or priority gateway. The protection of brigades today consists of older air defence systems that have limitations against today's threats. The Navy's corvettes currently lack anti-aircraft missiles, which were prioritised away in times of cutbacks. Air bases can possibly be protected by air defence battalions or rely solely on their dispersal concept. Sweden's air defence capability today can be compared to the situation in 1936, when an uncertain world demanded reinforced air defence.

> The defence decision of 1936 meant that an additional anti-aircraft regiment was to be established and financial resources were allocated for the acquisition of equipment [...] The total number was determined to be about 44 batteries that would cover the needs of the field army, the fortresses, Stockholm and a number of air bases. There was thus a shortage for most of the country's cities, infrastructure and supplies [...] The 1937 war planning contained a priority list of 90 objects that would gradually be provided with anti-aircraft protection. These included cities, airfields, power stations and major bridges.[17]

What the Commander-in-Chief now proposes is that the upgrade of the army's two air defence battalions will continue to strengthen the capability against ballistic missiles, which has already been completed and is ongoing. New brigade air defence is being procured to meet modern fighter aircraft and cruise missiles. The ability to protect against unmanned systems is being developed to protect the air force's main bases. A decision has recently been taken to add anti-aircraft missiles to current corvettes and is proposed for future corvettes.[18] The original 2022 Military Council proposed the acquisition of a divisional air defence battalion, which has now been removed in the revised Council.[19]

The implication of the proposal is that two brigades and five corvettes are provided with qualified protection. No additional

air defence is provided for the protection of strategic objects, population centres or air bases beyond the current two battalions. Air defence for new corvettes may eventually contribute to the protection of coastal targets.

Why is more air defence needed?

The main argument for developing a strong Swedish air defence capability, for both national and alliance needs, is the Russian threat that is demonstrated daily through missile attacks against civilian and military targets all over Ukraine. Developments indicate that the threat from the air is becoming even more extensive with longer ranges and increasingly advanced weapon systems, such as hypersonic weapons.

Experience from Ukraine must be translated into Swedish conditions for national defence and operations in support of others. Sweden's geostrategic position will be more favourable in NATO as other member states together with the Baltic Sea provide a buffer. As regards the air threat, however, Sweden and our national vulnerabilities are within Russia's reach.[20] The air threat can thus be directed simultaneously against Swedish units deployed abroad and against critical targets in Sweden.

Is it necessary for Sweden as a NATO member to be able to provide air defence support? This is debatable as the contribution to the alliance can be other capabilities and be adapted based on, for example, capability specialisation.[21] However, if Sweden contributes other capabilities to the alliance, responsibility for the protection of its own territory does not cease, which is why the air defence must still be reinforced.

> Swedish armed forces from all branches of defence must also be able to participate in the defence of NATO's eastern flank and in other operations in accordance with NATO's overall tasks. Sweden still has a responsibility to defend its own land, air and sea territory.[22]

It is obvious that Swedish forces deployed abroad must have air defence protection against the air threat that exists there. This protection has been reduced or removed during the drawdowns and must now be re-established. Only two air defence battalions are available for the protection of national vulnerabilities, and these are the most sought-after capabilities for the protection of Alliance priorities. If we protect the alliance, the protection of our own national vulnerabilities is reduced, an obvious dilemma.




Figure 1: Possible range of ground and cruise missiles from Russian territory (Author).

As described, NATO has limited air defence capabil-

ities. However, the Alliance has repeatedly supported members, for example with Patriot units, without activating Article 5. Since 2012, Turkey has been supported along the border with Syria, and when Russia attacked Ukraine, Patriot units were deployed early on to reinforce the Alliance's eastern flank. A few NATO countries have ground-based air defence with the ability to combat ballistic missiles, so these units are regularly used. Swedish Patriot units will certainly be a welcome and requested reinforcement within NATO.

It is possible that in an operation in Sweden, such as a major basing operation, NATO considers it such a high priority that anti-aircraft protection would be provided. However, a reasonable assumption is that more frontline states are more vulnerable and more highly prioritised. It is therefore unlikely that Sweden will receive air defence support for our national needs. If we want to protect Swedish cities, or important objects, we must ensure this ourselves.

Thoughts on future air defence capabilities

Integrated air and missile defence is a method of increasing the Alliance's effectiveness against a complex air threat, but does not automatically protect either the Alliance or individual countries' vulnerabilities. Integration of systems can provide great synergies but can never compensate for insufficient numbers. The desired effect of integrated air and missile defence can only be achieved if Sweden, like other countries, rebuilds an air defence capability commensurate with the air threat that is now a reality. Decades of reductions have meant that the situation is now troublesome. Restoring air defence capability will be very costly and take a long time as it involves advanced technical systems that most countries now see an urgent need for.

For Sweden to be able to meet both national and alliance needs for air defence protection, air defence capability must be prioritised considerably higher than in the Commander-in-Chief's proposal. Decisions also need to be made quickly if we do not want to be last in line with an already strained defence industry. If Sweden thinks it can compensate for its own lack of air defence through membership in NATO, it is probably a major miscalculation.

Sweden's two anti-aircraft battalions are highly qualified and provide the Alliance with effective capabilities for protection against cruise and ballistic missiles. However, their numbers are so limited that they hardly fulfil either national or international needs based on the threat and the amount of possible protection values. The number of Patriot capabilities should be increased to allow protection of more targets and provide tactical advantages such as increased mobility and protection in more directions. For longer international operations, each deployed unit requires at least three additional units in order to be able to produce, train and recover units simultaneously within the framework of a rotation.

A clearer focus on integrated air and missile defence would be to reinstate the proposal to add one, preferably several, divisional air defence battalions, which could provide the necessary protection for priority air bases, ports of entry or the alliance. In addition, the anti-aircraft units for the two brigades that have now been postponed should be procured separately. These can be utilised independently for both national and Alliance needs and provide material redundancy for unit training.

As previously mentioned, no single air defence system can meet the entire spectrum

of the air threat. The future divisional and brigade air defence system must therefore be supplied with several different types of air defence systems which, through combined weapons, can meet a composite air threat consisting of attack aircraft, helicopters, drones of various sizes and cruise missiles.

Conclusion

Should Swedish air defence be used to protect national vulnerabilities or the alliance, military objects, strategic and socially important functions or protection of the population? Is protection of Stockholm, for example, more important than Gothenburg, Trondheim or Riga? Are NATO's activities in Sweden so prioritised that the Alliance contributes air defence for support? These questions will be answered the day we become members and integrated into NATO's operational plans. The assumptions are that we in Sweden, regardless of Article 3 or 5, do not have the means to protect ourselves against the Russian missile threat and that the Alliance demands air defence resources rather than sending air defence support.

The current lack of air defence in Sweden and in the various countries of the Alliance will make it difficult for a long time to both provide and receive support. Sweden and other nations will have to prioritise. That is, whether to protect their own vulnerabilities and their own populations or those of the Alliance. A dilemma that Sweden and other member states can only deal with by taking a conscious risk or counteracting it by acquiring considerably more air defence units.

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Notes

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Some reflections on Swedish mission tactics as described in Reglemente Armé Tactik 2023

by Ola Palmquist and Niklas Wikström

Résumé

In recent years, there has been a debate concerning *Auftragstaktik* (mission command) in the Swedish Army. This debate seems to have achieved some impact on the 2023 edition of the Army Field Manual, where the text about *Auftragstaktik* has been expanded significantly compared to the previous edition from 2013. However, with a more critical examination of the text it seems more likely that the expanded text has been added with the purpose of retaining the present methods and giving more of an aura of *Auftragstaktik* than actually changing anything. The firmly rooted assumption is, however, still control in order to limit the freedom of action of subordinates. The Swedish application of *Auftragstaktik* can of course never be a carbon copy of the German original, but it has to be an internally consistent com- mand concept. The problem with the concept presented in the new Field Manual is that there is no clear idea how the different parts of the concept are interconnected; some statements are so general that you could find them in any private or public organisation, and there is also a general ambivalence towards the need for personal initiative and responsibility compared to relying on conditions that facilitate *Auftragstaktik*. This ambivalence is further underscored in the methods for tactical planning and execution, where the task remains central instead of the intent and mission, as in the German concept. The remaining question is whether the new manual is a stepping-stone towards a more German oriented concept, built on the latest research, or a further step towards a more control-oriented concept. Only time will tell which concept the Swedish Army will choose.

MANY ESSAYS HAVE been written at The Swedish Defense University over the years where students have investigated whether Sweden applies mission tactics. The essays are usually based on text analysis by searching for certain key words and phrases. For example, the phrase ”failure to act is more to blame than an incorrect choice of course of action” can be interpreted as a mission tactic. As Wikström and Palmgren, working at The Swedish Defense University, pointed out, Sweden had come a long way in the development of mission tactics during the early 1900s, but during the 1920s and onwards it was increasingly influenced by French, and later American, influences. These led to an increasingly diluted mission tactic. Independent initiative, responsibility and focus on the intent of the battle were replaced by an increasing focus on the execution of

predetermined plans, mandatory orders and distributed objectives.

However, many of the concepts of mission tactics remain in our regulations and manuals, even if the content has gradually been watered down more and more with restrictions, modifications and new interpretations of the concepts. For those looking for mission tactical *buzzwords*, they are there.[1] If one does not critically analyse the context in which they appear and the actual methods in manuals and practices, it is easy to be led to believe that Swedish mission tactics are and have been "alive and kicking" since the late 19th century.

There has been a debate about the presence or absence of mission tactics in the Swedish army in recent years. The authors of this article have themselves participated in this debate and can note that the debate has had some impact on the new edition of *Reglemente Armé Taktik* (R AR Taktik 2023). When reading the regulations, it is easy to get the impression that mission tactics are alive and well in our country. The text on mission tactics has been greatly expanded compared to its predecessor *Arméreglemente Taktik* from 2013. It contains many of the concepts associated with mission tactics and much, indeed most, is entirely relevant and completely correct. The purpose of the battle, this central concept in mission tactics, is used very extensively. On a more critical examination, however, the added text seems to be mostly aimed at justifying the state of things, and further embellishing them to give them a mission tactics gloss.

Basically, the view remains that control is the order of the day in order to limit the subordinate's room for manoeuvre, or what is often referred to in colloquial language as "the gentlemen's free ride". This language says a lot about the prevailing culture and approach as it is important to distinguish between discretion and arbitrary decisions not based on the overall objective. The use of a strongly normative negative term for autonomy means that autonomy is almost equated with arbitrariness. "Positive reporting" is another term with the same purpose as we will return to below.

Swedish mission tactics will probably never be able to replicate the German ones of the first half of the 20th century. Sweden today is very different from Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, which means that the conditions are different.

What is the current state of knowledge about German mission tactics? In 2014, Marco Sigg published a thesis on mission tactics in the German army between 1869 and 1945 – appropriately titled *Der Unterführer als Feldherr im Taschenformat; Theorie und Praxis der Auftragstaktik im deutschen Heer 1869 bis 1945 (Subordinate Commander as Field Commander in Pocket Format)* – which captures the intent of mission tactics. Sigg's study is based on previous research and detailed studies of German regulations, directives and contemporary journal articles.[2]

According to Sigg, the basis of German mission tactics was to increase military efficiency and was based on seven interacting components: collective action, the leadership process, judgement, independence, determination, offensive spirit and obedience. It is not possible within the framework of this article to fully develop Sigg's model, but we can state that a very thorough knowledge of German mission tactics has existed for ten years.

However, some of the aspects of the different components need to be emphasised as they are not normally associated with the Swedish version of mission tactics. Concerted action meant unified action towards a common goal, which included coordination through command, but also that the methods needed to

be adapted to the situation and the importance of leading from the front in order to be able to quickly make judgements, make decisions and move the troops along.

As for the command process, it was designed to support the other components, which meant that it emphasised the ability to make situational assessments, rapid decision-making and giving orders, while the ability to assess meant that all forms of templates and schematism were to be avoided. Effectiveness in every situation was key. Furthermore, autonomy meant room to act on one's own initiative within a given mission, but also to act without a mission or to deviate from a given mission depending on the situation. However, freedom of action was not the same as arbitrariness, but actions should be directed towards achieving the common goal. Mission tactics presuppose also included determination and moral factors such as boldness, courage, vigour and responsibility. A sense of responsibility meant the willingness to act on one's own responsibility, ultimately to deviate from the given assignment in order to achieve the intention of the senior manager, and was thus strongly linked to judgement, independence and room for manoeuvre.

Offensive spirit meant being forward-looking and having a fighting spirit, as well as constantly striving to be in advance in order to facilitate one's own actions by having the enemy come afterwards. Finally, obedience had a functional meaning, above all the ability to familiarise oneself with the superior's situation and be able to comply, or in Swedish terms to act in the spirit of the boss.

The somewhat surprising thing about these seven interacting components that made up the German mission tactics is that they do not appear to be particularly time-bound, but that in the authors' judgement they would essentially still be useful in formulating a coherent Swedish management concept. The central feature of the German version is concerted action towards a common goal, underpinned by independent, discerning, energetic subordinates who willingly accept responsibility for their decisions, even if they ultimately mean deviating from a given assignment. Moreover, unlike the untested and largely incoherent Swedish version, the original version has proved successful in wartime conditions.

It is, of course, not possible, nor likely, nor appropriate, to try to achieve an exact copy, but at the same time the Swedish version cannot differ too much from the German one without becoming a different phenomenon with different effects. This is even if the prestigious concept of mission tactics is used. In a comparison between the German and Swedish versions, it may be worth recalling that according to the German operations study, in the event of an attack on Sweden in 1943, the risk of a Swedish counter-attack with strategic reserves could be ruled out because it would require performances that the Swedes were not capable of, namely rapid decisions, great speed in execution and great flexibility at all levels of command.[3]

Only Sweden has Swedish forms of expression

So what does the new tactical regulations for the army have to say about mission tactics? Already in the introduction on mission tactics in R AR Tactics 2023, the contemporary Swedish starting points become clear:

> The Mission Tactics are based on a permissive culture and well-trained personnel, as well as on our leaders and soldiers getting to know each other and building trust and confidence. Mission tactics lead us to take responsibility and dare to take initiative.[4]

The text above could just as well have been in Region Västra Götaland's document for the introduction of trust-based leadership in healthcare, if "mission tactics" is replaced by "trust-based leadership". It is not wrong that a permissive culture, trust and confidence, well-trained staff and personal knowledge are important in the context of mission tactics, but it is interesting that these softer aspects are emphasised and not aggressive, independent and decisive managers at all levels, which should be the characteristic of a mission tactic system. This means that the first section describing mission tactics places the responsibility for its functioning on the system as a whole, i.e. on nobody, instead of making it clear that managers at all levels are expected to act aggressively and independently.

The word responsibility is used without further specifying what is meant. In German mission tactics, responsibility was central. Managers were expected to act aggressively, and to take independent initiative by, when they saw fit, not only changing their approach but also taking on a different task from the one they had been given. This on their own responsibility. The joy of responsibility was thus directly linked to independence and judgement, a central quality in mission tactics that is not mentioned in the Swedish text, but without which responsibility becomes a meaningless cliché, a positively charged word with no real content.

In the Swedish version, it is the word mission tactics, without any real content, which leads us to take responsibility and dare to take initiative. This is a total misunderstanding of how mission tactics work, a reversal and misunderstanding that undermines the whole concept. Mission Tactics can be written any number of times, but it does not lead to managers taking initiative and responsibility for their actions. It consists of managers at all levels independently taking the initiative and thus taking responsibility for the whole without orders. Mission tactics arise from the power of decision and action, not a set of prerequisites that allow it to arise by itself. It requires certain conditions, a mission tactics culture, but it does not automatically lead to mission tactics. The Swedish mission tactics should clearly just work by themselves, without us as individuals feeling any real responsibility for it.

The description of mission tactics is watered down, anaemic and adapted to management. It also misses the central point of mission tactics. The individual's responsibility to critically examine the situation to determine whether the current task is still relevant and, if necessary, to take on another task on his or her own responsibility, is replaced by the idea that if we have a permissive culture and well-trained staff, things will work out automatically. Permissive culture certainly sounds nice, but permissive for what? To act independently according to one's own judgement, to deviate from a given assignment, to take responsibility for one's own actions? Similarly, what does well-trained mean? In mission tactics, the concept of well-trained personnel is strongly linked to the ability to make independent judgements and put oneself in the position of a superior, but also to moral factors such as boldness, courage and determination that enable the individual to take responsibility by taking initiative and acting independently. In mission tactics, the individual is expected to take initiative and act on his or her own responsibility. It is therefore not only authorised. It is also about the unit's training level and interaction between managers.

Colonel Axel Gyllenkrok (1888–1946) chose to characterise the battle as a continuous series of improvisations, which requires a completely different training approach at

unit level and cannot be replaced by individual knowledge. It is like comparing a symphony orchestra with a conductor who plays a predetermined piece from a score for all the different instrumental groups, to an improvising jazz orchestra, which has no conductor, no sheet music and no predetermined piece. The analogy with the symphony orchestra is common in Sweden to describe how tactical management works, but it does not reflect mission tactical management, but reflects the French-Anglo-Saxon view. The improvising jazz orchestra is actually the one that best describes mission tactics. It is hardly a coincidence that the French Marshal Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929) used the analogy of the supreme military commander being the conductor while everyone else was just a member of the orchestra. This analogy lives on in the American management concept of *orchestration*.

It is not surprising that the text on mission tactics in R AR T 2023 looks the way it does. It largely follows the Swedish tradition of mission tactics since the 1930s, where aggressive independent action under responsibility has been replaced by disciplined execution of the assigned task and the individual's responsibility for the whole has thus been toned down. The choice of words *permissive culture and well-trained personnel, as well as the fact that our leaders and soldiers get to know each other and can build trust and confidence* is so watered down and generalised that it is completely meaningless. Can we imagine that it would say that we should have an exclusionary culture, untrained staff or not know each other?

The longer section on management philosophy digs a little deeper, but the text does not dare to go all the way.

> The basis of our management philosophy is that trust and confidence should enable us to give and take responsibility. With responsibility comes opportunities to take initiative and an acceptance that we take initiative. The mission approach requires creativity and independence of thought and decision-making.[5]

Again, the first sentence emphasises trust and confidence. Not bad, but if you think this is enough to make mission tactics work, you will be disappointed. The following sentence is very telling of the Swedish attitude. Initiative is a possibility to be accepted. Together with the last sentence in the quote, the wording is deceptively close to what one would expect from a text on mission tactics. But the words opportunity and acceptance bring it all down. Responsibility (again, the text is vague about what responsibility is really about) and initiative are not just opportunities to be accepted, but something expected that should be actively encouraged, it is actually even an obligation under Swedish law during war. This is because it requires that in combat they promote warfare to the utmost, which means undertaking combat actions on their own initiative when neither regulations nor specific orders provide guidance.[6] The legislation does not appear to have kept up with developments and is still formulated in the spirit of the early 20th century.

The text thus represents a restrained form of mission tactics in line with a very limited room for manoeuvre. However, mission tactics are precisely about giving subordinates room to identify and exploit unforeseen opportunities on the battlefield by allowing them to act against the intention of the battle, but under responsibility. It is also about choosing the method of command according to the conditions and situation. The fact that the Germans also led the battle with a tight rein *(straffe Führung)* with a high degree of

coordination from one section of terrain to the next is not a contradiction, but rather a proof of their emphasis on goal-oriented leadership with regard to the current situation. If we use the analogy of letting the dogs run free and calling them in when needed, that is exactly what the Germans did. We have them more leashed at half distance over time. The text above clearly shows the split we fall into when, as prisoners of our tradition, we cannot bring ourselves to let go of control, to give subordinates room to act independently, while still liking formulations of mission tactics. So we use key words that strongly qualify the message, but which do not seem particularly remarkable on a casual reading. Especially when they are in line with the tradition we have lived in and learnt is mission tactics.

> Assignment tactics are therefore an approach to other people that enables them to feel confident in managing and developing their assignment. This security and the courage to try things out leads to the development of an ability to act with order in a chaotic situation.[7]

This formulation is also very Swedish in its emphasis on security. A little rallying, almost like a Swedish ”snuttefilt”. It sounds nice and soft, something everyone can agree on during peace negotiations. There is therefore a point to using the word, but the problem is that when mission tactics are to be realised on the battlefield, security is hardly the word that best describes the decision-maker's situation. A description that emphasises the demands placed on commanders to, despite fatigue, fear, self-doubt and uncertain decision-making, decide on the spot and on their own responsibility to leave the given task in order to achieve the purpose of the battle would probably be more appropriate, significantly better in the chapter ”The manager”.

The draft *AH Tactical Management 2020* therefore included the following paragraph:

> People are the unit's most important asset. They are the source of both success and failure. A person under stress may exhibit irrational behaviour, for example by making wrong decisions at a critical stage of a conflict, which may lead to devastating consequences for all parties involved. Fear of death, of being injured or maimed, fear of social isolation and lack of self-confidence particularly affect the combatant. Lack of education, training, experience or information can also be decisive and limiting factors that result in failure. These factors cannot be compensated by, for example, more advanced technology but should be linked to the individual's capabilities.[8]

Purpose and objectives

The phrase ”acting with order in chaos” describes quite well the Swedish attitude that order, structure and method are the way forward. There is certainly no room for independent action here! One could argue that the wording was borrowed from the German general Hermann Balck's book *Ordnung im Kaos*, and that the Germans did indeed want order in chaos. Yes, but they did not create order by trying to impose order on chaos with a method and structure from a higher authority, which is the French approach, but by utilising the chaos and allowing subordinates to take the initiative in order to provide the higher authority with an order from below and thus be in advance. The use of the quote, if deliberate, again indicates a fundamental lack of understanding of what mission tactics actually are.

The next three paragraphs of the text on management philosophy are unproblematic, but with one exception:

> Mission tactics put the mission with its objective and purpose at the centre and are based on the nature of the battle.[9]

Mission tactics put the intent of the battle, or purpose if you will, at the centre. The introduction of "objectives" shows how incapable we are of recognising the importance of the management process and the consequences of the erroneously celebrated objective for mission tactics.[10] Alternatively, we consider these consequences to be desirable and accept that Swedish discovery tactics focus not on intent or purpose but on distributed, detail-driven, pre-determined objectives, making them essentially different from German mission tactics.

The paragraph below, which concludes the text on management philosophy, also seems unproblematic at a glance. It is also completely in line with Swedish tradition. And also highly problematic from a mission tactical perspective.

> The use of mission tactics as a management philosophy requires a well-trained officer corps with a comprehensive understanding and a willingness to take responsibility. Above all, it requires trust between commanders and units. Mission tactics therefore require the right selection of commanders, training, independent thinking, trust, confidence, experience and courage. Mission tactics also require mission discipline with an understanding of the purpose of the mission and the battle, as well as positive reporting.

The insidiousness of this text, which is essentially good, is the concept of positive reporting. From the point of view of mission tactics, the concept is not positive at all, even though it sounds good, even positive.

So-called positive reporting means that when an opportunity arises on the battlefield, you report it and suggest what can be done to capitalise on it. The commander then has to evaluate this in relation to the whole and authorise or reject it. German mission tactics consisted of taking the initiative, at one's *own discretion and* on one's own responsibility, in order to achieve the purpose of the battle, even if this meant departing from the original task, i.e. *acting* without requesting permission in advance or *"dialoguing" with a superior. So not positive* reporting, *but positive* action!

The normal procedure in Sweden is not to wait passively for permission if a favourable situation for a counterattack arises, for example. It is not really that bad (most of the time), but the commander prepares by regrouping units to utilise the wait positively. However, there is a great risk that it will take so long to get permission to attack that the opportunity will have passed and the enemy will have had time to take countermeasures, such as organising a response. The whole idea of mission tactics, that managers who see the opportunity to favour the battle against the objective, make a decision on their own responsibility and act independently to take advantage of the opportunity before it passes, is torpedoed by the addition of the concept of positive reporting. Lost time means lost opportunities leading to lost combat, lost soldiers and lost materiel. Combat can be combat over terrain, which can be lost, but combat is always combat over time that cannot be regained.

Under the heading Mission Tactics in the Army, the meaning of mission tactics and how they are practised is developed.

> An assignment is a mutual agreement between the assigning manager and the receiving manager. Mission tactics develop our managers to act decisively in chaotic situations on a limited decision-making basis with an understanding of the tactical context. It puts the why of the mission (the

> purpose) at the centre, together with objectives that clarify what is to be achieved. Both individuals and units must always understand the context of the mission, as it is the context that will change during the fulfilment of the mission. The commander who has been assigned the mission chooses how the mission is carried out, depending on the context, the mission's purpose and objectives, and the given guidelines.
>
> A well-developed mission tactic allows subordinate commanders to develop their mission in a rapid and dynamic sequence of events and, if necessary, to take on a new task that supports the purpose of the battle.
>
> When managers and subordinates exchange their perceptions of the situation and develop the mission, it is called a mission dialogue. The mission dialogue must be sustained over time, especially in implementation. Managers on the side and in depth must be able to relate to the given mission and the need to adjust the mission based on the development of events.[11]

Again, there is much that is basically good and could have been taken from a German text from the early 1900s. Perhaps they should not have used the term agreement, which feels remarkably unmilitary. However, it is not completely out of place in the context and the more it is considered, the less it is disturbing. But again, there are words thrown in that limit and lock mission tactics into a far too small cage. The purpose should be at the centre, controlled, but then there are objectives that clarify what is to be done. Apparently, the purpose is not expected to be enough to create this understanding, but it must be broken down into concrete objectives, as in a target image? There the purpose falls flat. "The purpose of the battle is to .... But what you should really do is A, B and C". Then A, B and C will be what guides the recipient's thoughts and the purpose becomes a lip service to a concept that is not applied.

It is interesting that the word task is not used in the text of R AR T 2023, but mission. However, simply renaming the task to mission does little more than provide a veneer that gives the impression that mission tactics are being applied. If mission has a different meaning than task, and that the established tasks as such have been removed, it would have been an unexpectedly large step towards a mission tactic worthy of the name, where the intention is the focus of control, not detailed tasks. But why, then, has it been decided to retain the combat tasks with the same meaning as before, at the same time as the objective appears to have remained? In addition, it is stated that the mission statement "expresses in a concrete way what is to be done to achieve objectives and goals".[12]

Furthermore, if necessary, the manager can take on a new task if this is counterproductive. This could have been revolutionary and could have been the equivalent of a manager being expected to independently change tasks on his or her own responsibility without dialogue with a senior manager. But in the next paragraph it is made clear that the task dialogue, the exchange of situational awareness between the manager and his/her supervisor, must be maintained over time and not least during implementation. Nothing is done here without the approval of a senior manager! The similarity with the American expression *disciplined initiative* (a contradiction in terms!) is striking. It is so important to be a mission tactician, but for God's sake we must not lose control! Imagine what they can do if we give them the finger!

The point of mission tactics is that a manager should have an obligation to change tasks on his or her own responsibility, without asking permission or engaging in dialogue,

if the manager considers it more appropriate to achieve the purpose of the battle. This restriction, which is now given a positively charged concept of its own, mission dialogue, is again a sign of either how shallow the understanding of mission tactics actually is, or that mission tactics are actually undesirable, but we want to retain our self-image and bask in the gloss of meaningless concepts.

Management and leadership

Under the heading 'Trust, responsibility and initiative', there is again a very good mention of mission tactics. What we consider to be a particularly important 'innovation' is that leadership is again seen as an integral part of management, and not as a separate phenomenon, as it was described in AR Tactics 2013. The text emphasises the importance of a leader sharing the danger of subordinates in battle as a pioneer, but without using this rather central word, which may be strange as it is a positive concept, firmly rooted in Swedish tradition. The traditional formulation in Swedish regulations has been that a manager should lead the battle where he can see what happens when it happens. This is true in itself, but since the modern battlefield is quite large and often unmanageable, it may be even more important for the commander not to see the battle, but to be seen in the battle where the danger is greatest, in order to instil courage and will in his subordinates, or in an earlier formulation, to "pull the troops along", however unfashionable that may sound. In critical situations, such as a setback or the failure of an attack, the commander's personal influence is more effective than a lot of orders.

In addition, the importance of leading from the front was an integral part of German mission tactics to enable commanders to make independent judgements, act quickly and personally influence the troops. According to Hasso von Manteuffel, all commanders up to the divisional commander would choose their staging area where they had the best overview of the terrain and communication with the units in the direction of the force.

> I was always located where I could see and hear what was going on "in the front" that is, near the enemy, and around myself – namely at the focal point. Nothing and nobody can replace a personal impression.[13]

Erwin Rommel has also emphasised the importance of leading from the front in order to personally get the best possible understanding of the situation:

> This is particularly the case when the situation develops the outcome of which cannot be es- timated. Then the commander must go up to see for himself; reports received second-hand rarely give the information he needs for his decisions.[14]

In his graduation speech at the Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt, Rommel further emphasised that

> Be an example to your men both in the service and in your private life. Never run away, and let your men see that you do not, in exhaustion or hardship.[15]

The importance of leadership is central to mission tactics, and the view expressed in the text is a welcome return to the message of AR 2 Tactics 1994.

The draft *AH Tactical Management 2020* included the following paragraph on leadership and management (where leadership was deliberately placed before management):

> Leadership and management are two sides of the same coin; where management consists of planning, coordinating and ordering to achieve a certain intention or objective. Leadership means being able to manage

> human relations during an implementation. Management is the process responsible for what is to be done and leadership is the ability to make it happen. Leadership manages the relationship between people in an organisation linked to the activities they have to carry out. Leadership thus constitutes a part of the management capability which itself is based on mission tactics. The purpose of leadership is to motivate and inspire those around them so that the units achieve the intent of the battle regardless of the complexity of the situation. It should not be forgotten that it is also a question of making and implementing decisions that are unpleasant for subordinates when necessary. The value of personally meeting your subordinates and being able to see and interpret their body language while strengthening motivation and decision-making through personal leadership is difficult to overestimate. Leadership aims to coordinate human behaviour and resources of different kinds in complex and dynamic situations so that own and superior goals are achieved.
>
> Management and leadership are exercised in parallel and simultaneously in symbiosis by the manager and in practice are often difficult to separate. Successful leadership is based on well-developed communication between leaders and followers – mutual trust. To be able to communicate well, face-to-face interaction is essential. This means that during combat, military leaders must be able to move in a complex combat environment in order to directly influence and support the units they are assigned to lead. The commander is a role model and should see and be seen at the forefront where the danger is greatest.[16]

Some of the text in R AR Tactics 2023 in the chapter "Management and leadership" is influenced by, or even taken from, the above draft, which is of course seen positively by the authors.[17] The chapter "The manager" also contains formulations from the above text. However, as before, there are formulations that first give the impression that subordinates are expected to act independently and take responsibility for achieving the goals and objectives of a senior manager and then limit their freedom of action.

> The engagement dialogue must be sustained over time, especially in implementation.
>
> *and*
>
> Monitoring aims to maintain order in the whole.[18]

All that remained was a thumbprint.

That "order must be maintained" intersects rather sharply with Clausewitz's theses on the frictions of war, what distinguishes the plan from the real war to which we formally subscribe. Here the French, the methodical, comes out clearly. This is a text that we cannot recall being so clearly written in AR Tactics 2013. All this text emphasising initiation obviously needs to be moderated. Otherwise, someone may decide to make up something that is not desirable. The Swedish ambivalence is clear. On paper, we want managers who thrive on responsibility. But even more important, in line with French doctrine, is "order in the house" and being in control. These two perspectives are obviously not compatible with each other. It is not even compatible with combat or war at all, which was the very purpose of mission tactics in the first place.

Objective without intention

The text under "Application" is also good, but again a problem emerges. It is a fundamental problem that has to do with the Swedish view of mission tactics, namely that mission tactics means that you can solve the assigned task in the way you want. Here,

for safety's sake, we refer to the *Military Strategic Doctrine* 2022:

> Mission control means that senior managers set objectives for subordinate managers to achieve, but it is the subordinate manager who chooses the means and methods.[19]

For safety's sake, the doctrine's description of mission tactics has clarified that it requires task discipline and the ability to take responsibility for the fulfilment of the task and added that subordinates should be *given the opportunity* (emphasis added) to take initiative.[20]

This is the traditional approach since the 1930s and is a fundamental difference from the German original where the senior commander set the purpose of the battle and the subordinate commander chose the means and methods. The decomposed objectives, which are not unlikely to be expressed in a mission statement, limit the possibility of going outside the senior commander's plan by ensuring that initiatives are taken not against the intent, or purpose, of the battle, but against sub-goals according to the commander's plan. Initiatives will thus be aimed at implementing the superior's plan. The intention is diluted!

The currently applied Swedish "mission tactics" have a clear focus on solving the assigned task by achieving certain objectives expressed in a target image. The task is often linked to a piece of terrain. We talk about the importance of the purpose, but in the method it is the task that is transformed into a target image where the final position is nailed down, usually linked to certain terrain, even before implementation has begun. This means that we lock in how the task is to be solved early on, instead of being flexible and able to react to the development of events in order to exploit the opportunities offered by the unpredictability of combat. Indeed, purpose has no real impact in our command process and therefore does not support mission tactics. This is reinforced in the 2007 *Battalion Command Methodology Manual* where "task" is mentioned over 120 times, while purpose comparatively appears only 13 times.

Unfortunately, this arrangement of the role of purpose in practice remains in R AR Tactics 2023 despite the fact that the word purpose is used extensively, so extensively that one wonders whether it is not a smokescreen to prevent criticism of the subordinate role of purpose in our method. In the chapter "Management – Planning" the following is stated.

> Planning aims to shape the direction and create the conditions for implementation management based on senior management's orders and direction. This is done by formulating and communicating decisions on
>
> - what the unit should achieve (objective)
> - why the unit should achieve this (purpose)
> - how the unit can achieve this (implementation idea).
>
> Planning is carried out by the commander with the support of the staff and must lead to a plan for how the mission can be solved and a basis for orders to subordinate units.[21]

The most important thing comes first, the broken down objectives. Only then comes what should be the most important part of mission tactics: the purpose. At the end of R AR Tactics 2023 there is, as usual, a model for tactical judgement, in this case, unsurprisingly, the PUT template. It equates objectives with targeting. Perhaps the most important part of a mission tactical assessment, the questioning of whether the order received is still relevant in the current

situation, is missing when it should be the first thing that happens.

It is then the target image, and therefore the task (as emphasised in step 3 of the template), and not the intention or purpose, that forms the basis of the implementation idea (how the *plan* will be implemented and the target image achieved, i.e. the task solved). To this is added a monitoring plan (are we following the plan as intended?), a decision support plan (what do we think will happen, and what do we do then? And when must we give orders in order to keep up, i.e. anticipate the development of events) and an intelligence gathering plan to support the decision support plan? The risk that intelligence gathering is sub-optimised to more narrowly support our predictive plans rather than more broadly trying to find out what is actually happening is obvious. Plan piled on plan piled on plan. As well as taking up time and labour, planning locks in thought and inhibits initiatives that deviate from the plan. An odd arrangement, to say the least, as we are constantly reminded in regulations, manuals and exercises that "no plan survives the first combat contact".

The target picture is emphasised as being favoured by mission tactics as it lets the battalion or company commanders know where to go and facilitates initiative towards the task. And taking the initiative to solve the task is the core of how we define mission tactics in Sweden. This type of target image indeed favours initiative towards the task and fulfils its role in the Swedish method and approach. When initiatives are taken to solve the task received, my cog in the superior's plan, the initiatives serve to implement the superior's plan. But that is precisely what was not the idea of the German mission tactics.

The target picture assumes that it is possible to predict in advance how the task will be accomplished in fairly great detail even though the enemy will reasonably do everything possible to prevent it from being achieved. Otherwise, a graphical end state in a certain terrain cannot be specified. This locks the plan to that particular way of solving the task, which risks locking us mentally and sub-optimising the operation towards the desired course of events rather than flexibly using the dynamic event to find alternative ways to achieve the purpose of the battle that could not be foreseen from the beginning. Alternative ways of achieving the purpose from other terrain risk not being recognised. As the target image is produced with the task, our part of the higher commander's plan, in focus, the effect of any initiatives against the target image is that the higher commander's plan is pushed through rather than being left open to utilise unforeseen opportunities to achieve the purpose, which by definition cannot be planned for.

Decomposed objectives, usually expressed in a mission statement, are one of the biggest obstacles to applying mission tactics worthy of the name. All the beautiful theoretical text, untouchable and insightful as it appears to be, on mission tactics in R AR Tactics 2023 falls flat when it clashes with what we actually do. Since we obviously do not intend to change our methods, the central elements of mission tactics need to be moderated, fenced in and finally watered down to, again in the good Swedish tradition, provide our French methods with a mission tactical facade.

The chapter "Art of War" with its text on the nature and flexibility of war, and the chapter Battle with its text, are consistently good. So good, in fact, that one wonders how they could have ended up restricting mission tactics as they did, rather than setting them free with such a view of war at the core?

Is R AR Tactics 2023 disappointing?

For those who expected it to be a complete reversal and a wholehearted embrace of a more German-style mission tactics, it probably is. Although the description of mission tactics is now more in line with the philosophical ideal, and has been expanded in quantity, it also contains wording that seems to have been added so that the management methods that have been developed do not have to be changed. The scenery has been freshened up, dusted off, repainted, added more and higher scenery, but the actual content is the same. It is also clear that the regulations are not based on the new and in-depth knowledge of German mission tactics since the publication of AR Tactics 2013.

But how realistic is it to expect a complete re-evaluation and a revised and consistent Swedish version of mission tactics based on the latest research? That would probably be more than legitimately naive. It has taken us 100 years of gradually moving away from mission tactics and sliding towards a Franco-American control mentality to get where we are. To think that this can be reversed "overnight" is wishful thinking. Many people are too firmly rooted in the culture we grew up in, it works well in that culture and we see no reason to change it. The similarity with Mats Alvesson's "The functional stupidity" is striking. Is R AR Tactics 2023 a sign that a shift towards mission tactics has begun, but that it is taking one step at a time? Is it a deliberate first step to get the organisation to reflect on what mission tactics really are and increase the receptivity to future practical changes in methodology, in order to change the methods in the next step? Or is it a way of trying to avoid criticism of the most obvious signs that we are not applying the management philosophy we claim to be doing? The problem is that if there were some logical problems with the common thread between the theory and ideals of mission tactics and our practical methods as before, it is now worse from that point of view as the theory text has been improved, but the methods are unchanged.

The result is another ambivalent regulation. R AR Tactics 2023 could be a first step on the road to mission tactics, but it could also very well be another shovel in the Franco-Anglo-American trench. The future will tell which way the army chooses to go.

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Rethinking Military Planning for Modern Warfare

Transitioning Towards Agile Decision-Making

by Mathias Wallin

Résumé

The article addresses the critical need for adaptive military planning and decision-making in the changing dynamics of modern warfare. It emphasises the importance of flexibility and intuition, and addresses the limitations of current comprehensive planning models, which, while effective in peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations, are inadequate in the fast-moving environments that initially characterise armed conflicts between equal actors. The article proposes three main measures to develop a higher operational tempo and improved responsiveness relative to the adversary: increasing the speed of decision-making in combat by strengthening the role of military commanders, ensuring that the application of mission tactics permeates all levels of command, and further developing the Swedish model of planning under time pressure (PUT) for broader tactical and operational use. The proposals are in line with Sweden's strong tradition of mission tactics and rapid decision-making, and can position Sweden as a potential pioneer in the development of military planning methods adapted to the challenges of current and future warfare.

AS A MILITARY planner at operational and tactical levels in various nations, the imperative for adaptability in military planning and decision-making processes has consistently emerged as a critical element. This need is particularly acute in state-to-state or alliance-to-state conflicts where the operational tempo and the agility to seize the initiative quickly are paramount.[1] This text argues for a transformative approach towards more agile and intuitive decision-making in modern warfare, addressing the limitations of current planning models in meeting the demands of high-stakes, fast-paced conflicts.

The Challenge of Current Military Planning Models

Current planning models, such as NATO's Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), Sweden's "Svensk planerings- och ledningsmetod (SPL)", and Tactical Planning For Land Forces (APP-28), can be well-suited for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in complex environments.[2] Although thorough, these models, emphasizing elaborate planning and extensive coordination, fall short in the face of conventional warfare's fast-paced dynamics

among peer or near-peer adversaries. In such scenarios, the necessity for rapid decision-making becomes paramount, driven by clear yet demanding challenges, resource scarcity, and the urgency of immediate action. This situation highlights the shortcomings of existing models in adapting to operations where maintaining a higher operational tempo than the adversary is critical.

Distinguishing between planning for war and command in battle is crucial. Analytical planning lays the strategic groundwork, preparing for various scenarios.[3] Yet, in high-intensity conflicts, command must pivot to an intuitive mode, driven by the rapid succession of events and decisions. This shift is imperative; unlike in low-intensity conflicts, high-intensity warfare demands immediate, decisive action, leaving little room for developing new plans. Military leaders must be adept at intuitively commanding within the existing framework, adjusting on the fly, and responding with agility and insight to avoid risking orders that are too late and too long.[4]

Proposing Transformative Solutions

I propose three initial ways to adapt our approach to address this challenge.

Our first step should be transitioning back to a decision-making process in battle that places commanders at the forefront, leveraging their experience and intuition to make critical decisions swiftly. This can involve commanders actively leading the planning process by verbalizing their thought processes, analyses, and tentative decisions in a collaborative war council setting. This 'thinking out loud' approach utilizes trusted advisors and key staff members, encouraging open dialogue, diverse perspectives, and collective problem-solving.[5] It allows for immediate feedback, insights sharing, and expertise pooling, facilitating quicker information synthesis and prompt action through developing clear statements of intent. Complementing this shift, a reduction in headquarters size becomes essential. Smaller and more streamlined headquarters would expedite communication and decision-making and significantly reduce bureaucratic delays.[6] Consequently, this restructuring would also pave the way for greater autonomy for lower command levels, thereby nurturing a more dynamic and responsive command structure.

Second, the practice of mission command is essential across the organization.[7] The military's overall agility and effectiveness are enhanced by embedding a culture where decisions are not just top-down directives but are informed by a comprehensive understanding at every level. This fosters initiative and flexibility at all echelons and emphasizes a narrative-led execution, guiding the mission through a cohesive story that communicates purpose and context. It involves creating a unified sense of direction and fostering a shared understanding and initiative among all levels of command. Clear communication of intent and end-states from higher echelons empowers subordinates to make informed, proactive decisions aligned with the mission objectives without awaiting direct authorization. Such a culture of mission command, integral in peacetime and wartime operations, entrusts individuals with the responsibility to fully apply their judgment and creativity. Instilling this philosophy throughout the military structure ensures preparedness for swift, effective responses in dynamic situations, maintaining alignment with strategic goals and operational coherence.

Third, the Swedish Planning Under Time-pressure (PUT) model, predominantly uti-

lized at lower tactical levels, offers a highly intuitive and quick decision-making process.[8] Research has shown that intuition in decision-making is the ability to rapidly recognize patterns based on past experiences, facilitating practical and sensible decisions.[9] This is more than instinct; it is an informed, rapid synthesis of situational awareness built upon extensive knowledge and experience. We can leverage its speed and intuitiveness by enriching the PUT model to cater to higher tactical and operational levels and integrating parallel planning to enable mission command. Training officers through scenario-based exercises and simulations enables them to make swift yet well-informed decisions under pressure, effectively utilizing intuition as a powerful, experience-informed decision-making tool.

These acknowledgments do not diminish the value of more systematic planning processes in specific contexts. It is important to note that reality in military operations is often a spectrum of shades of gray rather than stark black and white. The complexity of multi-domain operations calls for analytical planning to facilitate efficient joint effects. In sustained operations, where resource allocation and logistics are critical, a flexible approach to planning is essential to adaptively conducting operations. Furthermore, in a protracted conflict where a stalemate has been reached, these detailed methods can aid in identifying nuanced opportunities or vulnerabilities within an adversary's approach or the operational environment. Yet, amidst these varied hues of planning, the essence of swift and decisive decision-making remains a constant necessity, pivotal in turning the tide of battle and ensuring operational success.

Toward Agile and Intuitive Military Command

In conclusion, while comprehensive planning models like COPD, SPL, and APP-28 might offer valuable frameworks for certain military operations, they may not be the best fit for the dynamic nature of conventional state-to-state conflicts. This text's proposal for a paradigm shift toward more intuitive and flexible command methodologies aims to address this gap, ensuring our forces can maintain the initiative and effectively respond to changes in these fast-paced environments. By revitalizing the decision-making process, expanding mission command, and adapting the PUT model for complex scenarios, we can better meet the demands for swift action and responsiveness on the contemporary battlefield.

The time has come to reassess and possibly streamline our planning and decision-making models to better suit modern conventional warfare's realities. Sweden's strong mission command and rapid decision-making tradition uniquely position us to lead this transformation. As we align our military practices with those of NATO, it is crucial to leverage these inherent strengths rather than sacrifice them at the altar of interoperability. We should aim to contribute our unique capabilities to the collective, enhancing responsiveness and effectiveness. By doing so, Sweden can play a crucial part in shaping future military doctrines and strategies, leading the development of agile and effective military planning and decision-making models suited to the challenges of the 21st century.

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Are we getting lost before we start?

Reflections on Swedish culture and doctrine development in the run-up to NATO membership

by Lars Greko

Résumé

Sweden's NATO membership requires careful consideration of the country's own identity and approach to military culture. The article emphasizes the importance of maintaining and defining Sweden's military philosophy, instead of blindly trying to adopt a presumed NATO homogeneous organizational culture that might be based on beliefs and misconceptions rather than facts. The article highlights some of the cultural variations that exist among current NATO members and the importance of mutual trust based on individual contributions rather than organizational unity. Drawing parallels with a study on cultural differences among a number of NATO countries as well as Sweden, I suggest that a country's inclination towards independent decision-making in uncertain situations may differ between countries. Adopting or trying to imitate another nation's military culture requires comprehensive changes at multiple levels, so much that a failure to do so is likely, thereby starting a path not towards progress, but towards a loss of identity. Sweden must approach its NATO membership with a clear understanding of its own culture, values and capabilities. Thereby, Sweden offers its unique contribution and embraces the advantages of alliance membership without compromising its identity.

SWEDISH MEMBERSHIP OF NATO is complete. Geographically, economically and in terms of population, Sweden will be one of the larger of the smaller Member States. As a strong industrial nation with high technological expertise and several sought-after military capabilities, we have the opportunity to become a security producer rather than a security consumer. To become the credible and stable member we aspire to be, and to enrich an alliance with our uniqueness and excellence, the author believes that we must first define what we want and who we are, rather than trying to imitate someone else. There are trends today that indicate that instead of defining our own will and starting point, we try to adopt parts of an organisational culture and a way of thinking that we believe exists (NATO) and make it Sweden's as well. As a nation that has worked closely with the organisation but has not been part of it, we don't really know what it means, or even if such a homogeneous organisational culture exists to the extent we think it does. The article discusses who we are and what defines us, namely culture and management-philosophy in a military context.

Background

NATO is an intergovernmental organisation with many member states. Although

the members are geographically located in Europe and North America, there is still a great deal of cultural variation. The success of a larger organisation or coalition requires strong cohesion. Creating that cohesion relies on the existence of strong mutual trust. This trust is often based on the contributions and importance of one or a few of the nations involved, rather than on the organisation itself.[1] This is demonstrated by the importance many of the nations in NATO attach to bilateral agreements, certainly as part of the work within the organisation, but remarkably often weighted at least as highly as membership itself. From the Swedish side, we have made several tentative attempts in recent decades to adapt to what we perceive to be a homogenous method or a standardised model of what it means to be compatible with NATO. It may well be that this formally exists in many cases, but the reality shows that the written word often does not correspond to the practical application.

NATO has existed as an organisation for 75 years. Several nations have thus been members since the reconstruction of their defence forces began after the Second World War. This means that in many cases there is no thought of security policy before or after NATO as we see in Sweden. It also means that many similarities between the countries arise, while national differences remain and become a natural part of the coalition. One example among many is the view of what a military doctrine should do. At the joint force level, it should explain basic principles that guide military units, although the purpose of the doctrine varies between countries from a more educational role to a guide for action. The scientific basis is generally downplayed in the writing of a doctrine, in favour of proven experience. This is where it gets interesting, because what is reflected is each country's proven experience in its geographical and cultural context, not someone else's.[2]

Argument

We should carefully consider what changes we make based on where we come from and where we want to go, or as a wise neighbour to the east proclaims:

> There are major cultural differences between us and NATO, as well as within NATO. Doctrinal changes and changes in training take time. First we need to know what is required and what it means to be a member. Only then can we change.[3]

In an extensive study, researchers in the field of culture and organisations investigated how similar or different people with similar social and educational backgrounds are depending on both their country of origin and, also as part of the study, people working in the same international companies and thus with the same corporate culture. The study showed, among other things, how people from different countries and different cultural backgrounds face uncertain and unpredictable conditions, and how hierarchically dependent they are. The differences lead to the propensity to look for written or unwritten rules to follow when conditions are not fully known, compared to those of those who are more culturally inclined to make their own decisions and continue to operate independently, even with uncertainty.

In relation to the countries that currently belong to NATO, all countries from Southern and Eastern Europe were on the part of the scale where they were culturally more inclined to seek rules and formality in connection with uncertainty. Interestingly, this includes France. Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US and the UK are, as the chart




Figure 1. Based on data from Hofstede Gert, Cultures and Organisations, Software of the mind, Part II, 3rd edition, McGraw-Hill Education, 2010.

shows, in the centre. Among the countries at the absolute extreme, with the least need for rules and formalised decision-making in uncertain situations, were Denmark and Sweden.[4] If we transfer this to a traditional conservative context, such as a mid-literate context, we can see that there is both historical and doctrinal support that confirms and reinforces this view.

If we look at the military side and our heritage, we can see, using our country as an example, that the issue is not as simple as an either/or when it comes to positioning or historical influence. The Swedish approach to leadership is based on both a German and a French heritage. The French heritage is linked to the renaissance of the Swedish army when Sweden got an heir to the throne of French origin, the future King Karl XIV Johan (formerly Jean Baptiste Bernadotte). This followed a long period of decline in the Swedish army and the loss of Finland a few years earlier.[5]

Organisational theorist Allan Wilkins argues that a nation or large organisation can only implement a major cultural change such as that which occurred with the Swedish army in the early 19th century in one of three ways. Either the nation must change externally by being fundamentally defeated, like Germany after the Second World War. It can also happen through fundamentally transformative internal events, such as the French Revolution or the trauma Sweden experienced after the loss of a third of the empire in 1809. The third way is through imitation of another country or organisation. However, it requires an all-encompassing approach where skills, tradition, institutional memory are changed and, perhaps most importantly, the individuals in the organisation must be willing to adopt the new culture. This must then be practised and trained over a long period of time.[6] If this is not done, the implementation will not succeed, and the organisation risks being caught between the old and the new, resulting in a loss of identity and no successful imitation.

The historical Swedish example of imitation of the French approach succeeded because the conditions existed with the loss of Finland and, because of that, an organi-

sation in partial disintegration, not because the cultural conditions existed. This soon came to compete with German influence in the mid-19th century. These two approaches are an incompatible mix, the aftermath of which we are still living with today. Now that we have joined NATO, there are several indicators that we are about to repeat the historical mistakes of trying to adopt foreign approaches.

An example of how a shift occurs in the present can be seen from how we currently conduct doctrine in Sweden. In an earlier study by the author, it was found that there is a profound difference between how Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD) 16)[7] relates to mission tactics and centralised management versus how the Doctrine for Joint Operations (DGO)[8] chooses to operationalise the management philosophy stated at strategic level (it does not). This work is a few years old, and today we have a new Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD 22).[9] An equally comprehensive analysis has not been carried out of this. However, a general review can show that not only has the volume of the doctrine increased by 50 per cent, but also that the content seems to have been watered down in some sections. While the writing in MSD 16 is dry as a bone and extremely clear in conveying the essence of the fundamentals of mission tactics, a marked shift can be discerned in MSD 22.[10]

The starting point seems to be that mission tactics should be seen as an approach, rather than a culture. This suggests an approach that deviates from the original way of seeing management philosophy as all-encompassing. Instead, it is more akin to the Anglo-Saxon approach to *Mission Command,* which is more like a methodology.[11] Whether this is due to the preconception of the authors of the doctrine or a conscious choice, it is a clear shift. We are moving away from the basic criteria that make up what we currently see as mission tactics and instead see it as something that can be "switched on and off" as needed.

As Allan Wilkingson argues, this risks leading to a Swedish placement between what is our tradition and culturally appropriate and an attempt to adopt something we are not and will hardly be able to be. National characteristics have always existed within NATO and continue to exist today. It is something that fundamentally strengthens the Alliance with its diversity and cultural understanding, while nations recognise the higher purpose of cohesion.

For Sweden, the hard work of working within the alliance should begin with an understanding of who we are and where we want to go. Only then can we fit our small but important piece of the puzzle into NATO.

This reinforces the main argument that one cannot simply adopt a nation's management philosophy or doctrinal approach and expect to achieve similar results. On the contrary, something that fits in a Greek or Polish context may be directly counterproductive in a Nordic environment and vice versa. Does this mean that we can assume that the path chosen by Denmark as a smaller NATO country is the right path for Sweden? The answer to this question is of course no, despite cultural similarities. The choices Denmark made when it joined NATO and during its subsequent membership have been the right ones based on how they view the maximisation of security policy based on their country's context. Just as the United Kingdom, for example, despite being one of Sweden's most important security policy partners, has completely different conditions than we do and is therefore suitable for study, but not imitation. Thus, there is much to learn from it, but lessons that should be carefully placed in our context.

For Sweden, which is entering a completely different era and with completely different geographical and historical conditions, other premises apply.

Conclusions

In conclusion, it is crucial for Sweden to reflect carefully on the way forward, within the framework of NATO membership, and not to lose itself in the process. Each nation brings something unique to the Alliance with its distinctive character. NATO as a fundamentally political organisation is based on structures and forms of co-operation created by the will of its members. Without this will and co-operation, the Alliance would not exist. It is therefore essential that the nations themselves are clear about their long-term goals as well as their identity.

In light of cultural and doctrinal differences between countries, it is important not to imitate blindly, but rather to undergo a process of adaptation and adoption that respects and preserves national specificities. Historical examples, such as the Swedish link to both German and French traditions, show that cultural change takes time and must be anchored in the national context. Even then, special conditions are required for them to succeed. Imitating a nation's management philosophy without understanding and adapting it to its own context leads to both a loss of identity and a loss of capability.

As a responsible and reliable alliance partner, Sweden must first and foremost be clear about its own values and capabilities. Sweden in NATO should not be a process of adaptation to something alien, but rather to offer the unique and valuable contribution that Sweden has to offer and welcome all the benefits the Alliance offers.

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Security and defence – how are they related?

by Anna Körlof and Martin Waern

Résumé

This article examines the relationship between the legal framework of protective security and the legal framework of the Swedish total defence, two legal areas that, respectively, regulate the security of Sweden as a nation. Sweden's military defence, civilian resilience and protective security is, not least after the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, a new political priority after almost two decades of "time out" in the nation's defence planning. The article argues that nearly twenty years of societal development with no significant defence planning has left a gap – not only in necessary supplies, equipment, personnel resources, and collaboration structures – but also in consistent working methods, knowledge and general "experience-based sense" of the subject. As a result of this gap, the term "Sweden's security", found in section 1 paragraph 1 of the Protective Security Act and section 15 paragraph 2 of the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act has generated uncertainty, if not confusion, in the determination of the law by Swedish authorities as well as private operators. One serious consequence of this may be a wrongful legal application, which entails an imminent risk of irrelevant protective security measures, large financial costs and unnecessary restrictions in constitutional rights and democratic functions. The analysis concludes with a few examples of wrongful reasoning, as well as a modest list of guidelines on how one may think instead.

TOTAL DEFENCE AND security protection are increasingly mentioned in public discourse. This is not surprising – the development of security policy and the resulting resumption of total defence planning, based on total defence legislation, is currently attracting and demanding attention from the whole of society. The application of the new Security Protection Act is also driving debate and discussion. Occasionally there are references to total defence and security protection in relation to each other, but rarely in a way that is explained in detail. Both regulations concern Sweden's security and our existence as a nation. But how are total defence and security protection related? Let's take a closer look at this question.

We are in a turbulent time where past truths are rightly questioned and the European security order as we knew it is consigned to history. Sweden is now a member of NATO, something that was a political impossibility not so long ago, and we have a level of conflict between the West and Russia that we have not had for a very long time. The threat to Sweden has increased and we have to get used to statements that it is no longer unlikely that Sweden could end up in a war.

Starting around 2011, new security legislation was developed to address some of the new threats. During the course of the investigation, Russia carried out its illegal annexation of Crimea, which gave new relevance to total defence and, fortunately, to

security, more space in the report than was perhaps originally intended. In the same year that the report *A new security protection law*[1] was presented (2015), there was also a new start for total defence planning through the same year's defence decision.[2]

But the start was slow in both areas, not least in civil defence. For almost 20 years, the knowledge of total defence that existed during the Cold War about responsibilities and powers during high alert for war had not been maintained. This has led to major gaps in knowledge about total defence. In addition, there were, and still are, many widespread misunderstandings about what various legal rules in total defence legislation stand for and what the meaning of concepts in the area actually means. These two decades without active total defence planning have, in our opinion, unfortunately led to a loss of sensitivity to what constitutes Sweden's security in terms of civil defence. As far as security protection legislation is concerned, the failure of the Swedish Transport Agency's IT operation marked the start of extensive changes to the security protection regulations. Total defence planning was not given a basic structure to build on until 1 October 2022 through the Ordinance (2022:524) on state authorities' preparedness. Still the basic preparedness responsibilities of municipalities and regions are being investigated.[3]

Because of the common denominator of the two areas – Sweden's security – it is natural the areas are linked in texts and in debate. But how do these areas relate to each other? In shorter texts of a programme nature, it is sometimes stated that "effective security protection lays the foundation for total defence"[4] , which can easily contribute to the idea that total defence is based on security protection. But is this really true? Could one not argue the opposite – that security protection should be applied to, at least parts of, total defence activities? A notion that total defence is based on security protection can lead to an incorrect application of both security protection legislation and total defence legislation.

According to the authors, the debate is characterised by a partly justified criticism of an overly extensive interpretation of the security protection regulations, which leads to them being applied where they should not be. At the same time, we believe that security protection is unfortunately still lacking where it should actually be applied. It can be argued that the reasons for this skewed application are insufficient knowledge of security protection. The reason is probably also another lack of competence, namely that of total defence.

Total defence has traditionally been, and still is, one of the main interests worthy of protection under the Security Act. When the new Security Protection Act was drafted, war, and thus also civil defence, was perceived as a kind of crisis management issue – albeit of greater magnitude than a forest fire in Dalarna, the storm Gudrun or the sinking of the *Estonia*. Thus, war was considered to be managed with the same methodology, principles and resources.

There was also a widespread belief that war in Europe would not happen and that Sweden could hardly be threatened by war. Total defence was seen by some as an outdated idea from the Cold War and something that would entail unnecessary costs to rebuild. As a result of these perceptions, there was also a perception that a significant part of security protection is not related to total defence.[5] In reality, however, it is likely that only a small proportion of the societal activities covered by security protection are not related to total defence.

What is total defence?

Total defence is defined in the Act (1992: 1403) on Total Defence and High Readiness. It states that total defence in peace is the activities needed to prepare Sweden for war.[6] During the highest level of preparedness,[7] total defence is all the societal activities that must then be carried out.

It is argued in some quarters that total defence does not exist in peace. This is an incorrect perception. The contingency planning carried out by the authorities in the form of setting up wartime organisations, deploying personnel for war, carrying out resource planning and contingency plans, as well as exercises for war, is total defence in peace.[8] If the government were to decide on the highest level of preparedness in the near future, total defence would be all the societal activities to be carried out, i.e. the resources that are then needed and available. However, planning has not yet reached the government's goals. Total defence exists, and it exists in both peace and war.

The idea behind Swedish total defence is that modern war is total and affects the whole of society. Therefore, the defence of Sweden must also be total and include all the activities needed for our survival. Total defence consists of both military defence and civil defence, which must work together.

Military defence consists of the Swedish Armed Forces and the military activities of the authorities associated with the Armed Forces. It also consists of the companies that supply supplies and war material to the Armed Forces.[9] The main task of military defence is to defend Sweden against armed attack in accordance with international law.[10] It must be able to safeguard Sweden's freedom and national independence by asserting Sweden's territorial integrity even in peace.[11]

Civil defence consists of the public and private activities that carry out civilian activities that are necessary and essential for our survival in the event of war.[12]

During high alert, civil defence should have the objective of protecting the civilian population, maintaining essential activities, promoting the will to defend and supporting the Armed Forces.[13] This means that civilian organisations must plan for this. In order to achieve this goal, they must be able to transition to wartime organisations that are able to work effectively among themselves and with the Armed Forces in a different way than in peacetime. Civil defence must then be able to prioritise and rapidly restructure resources within and between activities towards what is most important for the defence of Sweden. Defence planning in civil defence therefore includes building robustness (strength), redundancy (back-up and alternatives) and resilience (recovery capacity) in the activities that are important for the defence of the nation. This may mean that certain activities need to adjust their production for the defence effort. Total defence during high alert can therefore be said to be Sweden prepared for war – our total national war organisation.

During wartime, the government and the authorities have extensive powers to re-prioritise various societal functions and also to relocate and temporarily close down activities that are not absolutely necessary to cope with the war. The government also has, through authorised representatives, completely different powers than in peacetime. Even if these constitutions need to be modernised, it should, in our opinion, also be taken into account that the background to them is based on important principles and lessons from our neighbours during the Second World War, which may still have considerable relevance.

The legislation governing public responsibilities and powers during high alert may involve significant changes compared to what is possible in peacetime. During a high level of preparedness, the government can decide to give authorities far-reaching powers with restrictions on some of the constitutional freedoms and rights that we have in full in peace. In addition, the government can decide on major reorganisations and priorities in the state administration.[14]

In peacetime, however, there are different peacetime regulations for crisis management that govern different competences. Examples of this are the Act (2003:778) on protection against accidents, the Health Care Act (2017:30), the Police Act (1984:387), and the Ordinance (1982:756) on the Swedish Armed Forces' interventions in the event of violations of Sweden's territory during peace and neutrality, etc. The resilience needed in various important parts of society in both peacetime and during war, such as cyber security, is also largely governed by the various regulations of EU law. According to the Ordinance (2022:524) on State Authorities' Preparedness, the collaboration structures that are built up must be able to be used for both peacetime crises and heightened preparedness. According to Section 2 of the Act (1992:1403) on Total Defence and High Readiness, defence resources shall be designed so that they can be used to strengthen society's ability to prevent and manage severe stresses on society in peacetime as well.

If there is a war in Sweden, we must all help to manage the defence effort. That total defence is a matter for the entire population is established in the portal paragraph of the Act on Total Defence Obligation. The adult population in Sweden is therefore subject to total defence duty.[15]

As we can see, total defence includes Sweden's population and significant parts of our peacetime social activities. Isn't all this important for Sweden's security? At least some of this planning includes activities or information that, if it falls into the wrong hands, could allow an attacker to harm Sweden. If an activity is important for Sweden's security, it is defined as a security-sensitive activity in the security protection legislation[16] and must be given relevant security protection under the same legislation.

What is security protection?

The security protection legislation is relatively new and has undergone major changes during the short time it has been in force (from a legislative perspective). The main reason for this change is undoubtedly the Swedish Transport Agency's procurement of IT operations and the subsequent investigations.[17] The deficiencies identified in this procurement have resulted in a new supervisory regime, extensive consultation obligations and penalties for operators who do not fulfil some of the requirements of the legislation.

The purpose of security legislation is to protect security-sensitive activities and classified information against essentially antagonistic threats. The classified information is information that relates to security-sensitive activities and is therefore subject to secrecy under the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400) (OSL) or would have been subject to secrecy under that Act if it had been applicable.[18] The latter refers to activities that, without being covered by OSL, can still handle security-sensitive activities and classified information. Examples of such activities are carried out by individual operators in essential services.

The security-sensitive activities and classified information must be given appropriate protection against the antagonistic threats

that may be directed against the activities. The model prescribed by the legislation is that a security protection analysis must be carried out in which the need for security protection is investigated. The security protection measures are then categorised under the main headings of information security, physical security and personnel security. The requirements for each security measure are set out in the Security Ordinance and implementing regulations, but also in the needs arising from the security analysis. The intellectual challenge of the legislation is to determine what is of importance to Sweden's security in different sectors and industries. The travaux préparatoires provide some clues,[19] but much remains to be clarified by the application of the law. For the question we pose in this article, however, we can content ourselves with noting that total defence is an activity that, by its very nature, fits well within the concept of Sweden's security.[20]

Security protection in total defence

In the 2015 defence decision, the government stated that Swedish total defence planning would resume after a time-out. Since then, several investigations, changes and updates to the total defence regulatory framework have taken place. However, the actual planning of most civil defence activities only started in earnest after the Russian offensive against Ukraine, which began at dawn on 24 February 2022.

Security protection in the resumed total defence planning is sometimes mentioned in general terms, such as "an important part of civil defence",[21] "a cornerstone of civil defence"[22] or "security protection is the foundation of total defence".[23] In our opinion, total defence does not necessarily constitute security-sensitive activities and consequently not all total defence planning requires security measures. We will return with an example later in the presentation.

The basis for total defence does not consist primarily of security protection, but mainly of robust wartime organisations, functioning and adequate cooperation and coordination structures between authorities and with companies, well-prepared and sufficient contingency resources in the activities important to total defence, preparation for production conversion, prioritisation ability, a strong and adequately equipped military defence with support from civil defence, and a high level of willingness to defend oneself and a sufficient constitutional readiness to secure resources even during war. Not least, total defence consists of all of us in Sweden and the knowledge and lessons we learn during exercises, the preparation of contingency plans and other total defence planning activities. Security protection is of course just as important for total defence, but we think that a more accurate picture is to see it as the protective shell that should surround the most sensitive activities and information rather than a prerequisite for its existence.

A typical example of an incorrect application of the security protection regulations in total defence is that a wartime posting, which is certainly of importance to Sweden's security, would automatically require placement in a security class. Assume that an authority in its total defence planning comes to the conclusion that all employees must be placed in a wartime position. Assume further that in this analysis, the authority concludes that the wartime posting is of such importance to Swedish security that the position must therefore be placed in a security class. Then you have an analysis that, where the result of each step seems relevant, means that all employees at the authority must be securi-

ty cleared. Perhaps the same analysis concludes that the positions as such are covered by defence secrecy?

You can then multiply the consequences by the number of authorities in Sweden to get an idea of how quickly things can go wrong. A not insignificant consequence of such a decision is that the follow-up security screening of all employees takes a considerable amount of time to complete. And that the employees' work tasks, probably with the same analysis, include classified information that must be protected with secure information systems and approved signal protection systems. It is not possible to select some parts of the security measures and exclude others.

Since total defence covers large parts of our society and is also a concern for the entire population[24] , not all total defence planning can automatically entail a requirement for security protection – on the contrary, the same caution with security protection should be taken into account as secrecy in relation to public access. Conversely, it is also usually argued that security protection legislation should not be applied only to activities of importance to total defence planning.[25] However, a good example of this could be an exhibition. Sometimes objects for security or surveillance measures[26] for physical security or risk and vulnerability analyses for peacetime purposes may be so worthy of protection that they are covered by the security legislation. This is a common way of looking at security protection in those sectors whose activities consist partly of physical objects, such as electric power and telecommunications. However, the resources and activities that are needed in peace are almost exclusively needed for high readiness and thus in total defence planning. If physical objects are of importance to Sweden's security and should also be included in total defence planning,[27] these are not good examples of things that require security protection but are not included in total defence planning.

Similarly, it is difficult to argue that the resources and information surrounding certain aspects of the police's peacetime crime fighting, such as terrorism, or the protection of the judiciary, would not be of importance to Sweden's total defence planning and thus be the particularly clear example we are looking for here.[28]

We asked the Chatbot at AI Chat infinite creativity (GPT) for an example of something that could be subject to security requirements but not related to total defence. The answer was:

> Facilities that handle dangerous forces. These installations can pose a serious risk to society in case of sabotage. Therefore, they may in some cases be subject to security protection requirements.

The example shows what the Swedish Security Service categorises as activities that can cause damage to other security-sensitive activities. This includes dangerous forces such as nuclear activities or dams (both of which are also relevant in the war in Ukraine). Since these resources should have a strong link to total defence[29] , we conclude that artificial intelligence may have some way to go in developing its skills in both areas.

In their planning, the actors should distinguish the resource issue from the total defence legislation which, during high preparedness, gives the government powers to decide on other management and response powers than in peacetime and the authorities' powers to dispose of, focus and prioritise resources in a way that is not possible in peacetime. As mentioned above, we have not found a single good example of activities or resources that are exclusively needed

to deal with a peacetime crisis and that are not needed in total defence. However, the reverse is possible.

Total defence in peacetime is the activity needed to prepare Sweden for war.[30] However, total defence *resources* must be designed so that they can also be used to strengthen society's ability to prevent and manage severe stresses on society in peacetime.[31] The total defence resources must also be able to be used for forest fires, pandemics and storms. Therefore, the authors' view is that if we build a good total defence with stockpiling, trained personnel, evacuation plans and cooperation and communication structures for war, we will have good peacetime crisis preparedness in the bargain.

Problematisation of defence secrecy in Chapter 15, Section 2 of the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act

In total defence planning, as noted above, only a subset of the information should be covered by confidentiality. In addition, it presupposes that there is damage in the event of disclosure. According to the wording of the secrecy provision, information covered by defence secrecy can never constitute anything other than classified information. As a consequence, information subject to defence secrecy must always be surrounded by security measures.

It is therefore necessary to think carefully before making a confidentiality assessment. If a piece of information cannot be disclosed because it could harm Sweden's security, it must also be possible to ensure that the same information can be protected by relevant security measures that prevent exactly what you want to avoid through secrecy. And, if one concludes that the information cannot be given security protection, one should, in line with this reasoning, ask whether the information should really be covered by secrecy. Otherwise, the protection of the data risks being inconsistent.

It should also be noted that defence secrecy contains a straightforward harm requirement. The legislator has thus assumed a presumption of openness regarding information relating to national defence unless it "can be assumed that disclosure of the information will harm the country's defence or otherwise endanger national security".

The first part of Chapter 15, Section 2 contains the wording that secrecy only applies to "information concerning activities for the defence of the country or planning or other preparation of such activities or which otherwise concerns total defence". This wording reflects the provision in Section 1 of the Act (1992:1403) on Total Defence and High Readiness: "Total defence is the activity needed to prepare Sweden for war. [...] During the highest level of preparedness, total defence is all societal activities to be conducted at that time". The provision raises a further question regarding the concept of total defence. Both the legal and other language now contains several different concepts, such as socially important activities and civil preparedness, to also emphasise peacetime crisis preparedness. Total defence activities are those activities needed to prepare Sweden for war in accordance with section 1 of the Act on Total Defence and High Readiness. In order for defence secrecy to be applied, the information must relate to total defence. These new concepts can therefore cause confusion, not least in the application of Chapter 15, Section 2 of OSL.

Total defence, which is the concern of the entire Swedish people, should not be largely classified or covered by security protection. The entire Swedish population between the ages of six and seventy cannot be placed in a security class simply because those of this

age are to be regarded as having a duty of total defence. The system must not become a self-playing piano, because then neither the goal of total defence planning nor security protection will be achieved. Both total defence and security protection have Sweden's security as their overall objective. The risk, however, is that this similarity leads to errors in thinking and unnecessarily extensive interpretation of the security protection legislation.

An excessively extensive application of defence secrecy, and thus also security protection legislation, can lead to unjustified restrictions on the principle of public access, unnecessary and significant costs for security protection and unwarranted interference with personal privacy. In addition, criminal liability for, for example, unauthorised use of secret information may be applied too broadly, with associated consequences for the individual.[32]

It's complicated, but the issue of security protection in total defence deserves at least an attempt at some analysis, not least for those who, after a long time-out in total defence planning, have the tricky task of re-applying such a legally elusive concept as Sweden's security. In order to be "on the safe side", it may be that when it comes to various activities, people prefer to invoke secrecy rather than risk making public information that should be protected. This development is of course unfortunate, even if the aim is good.

Here are some examples of what can go wrong if you think that all total defence is covered by security protection.

Preschool Smultronet

Assume that the municipality of Solköping decides in its planning that pre-school activities in the Smultronet pre-school should continue during high alert and also have the capacity for double activities around the clock for at least three months, in a different location than the regular one. To this end, the pre-school staff (and others who may be needed for the expanded activities) will be deployed, the contracts with the caterer and the contracted cleaning services will be rewritten to ensure that deliveries can be maintained even during high alert. A warehouse for some consumables and supplies is also being set up and an alternative site with an escape plan is being prepared in case Solköping is threatened by hostilities. So far, so good. But to equate this with security-sensitive activities and thus also place the personnel in a security class is both unnecessary and incorrect. In line with such an assessment, cleaning and catering should be covered by security protection agreements. Perhaps physical security needs to be reviewed so that parents who leave in the morning need to fill in a visitor's notice? And the pre-school children also participate in the security-sensitive activities and may therefore need a security clearance. Someones parent might have thought that *this* particular measure would have been appropriate to get rid of some of the worst storms, but the purpose of the example is instead to show the danger of taking the link between total defence and security protection too far.

How should you think? It is already clear from statutes and a number of open policy documents from the central government that childcare during high alert is a municipal responsibility. The fact that the municipalities carry out total defence planning is not in itself associated with security protection. The fact that everyone in Sweden is obliged to perform military service in times of heightened preparedness, and an obligation to go to their regular workplace in the event of war, is not a secret either. The information about a wartime placement with a report-

ing point at the preschool should therefore not be covered by defence secrecy. A simple mobilisation exercise for the kindergarten need not be associated with security protection either. For the staff, such an exercise may involve going to work and quickly preparing the children for evacuation according to a plan and waiting for instructions. For parents, it may mean packing a bag for the children to stay overnight for a longer period of time. It is difficult to see these as tasks that could damage Sweden's security if they fall into the wrong hands.

Here it is important to try to identify who actually needs to know what, so that security protection is not overused unnecessarily. The person who has a function in the municipality to lead the evacuation of the childcare centre in the event of war probably needs more detailed information about Solköping's evacuation plans, contingency plans and cooperation with various authorities. This planning may include security classified information. It is therefore probably sufficient that those who are to lead the evacuation are familiar with these plans. And that it is therefore only these positions that should be placed in the security class.[33] As we can see, a further negative consequence of extensive security classifications is that too many people risk gaining access to information they do not need, with an increased risk of disclosure.

The grenade launcher

In the Swedish Armed Forces, all conscript positions are classified. Historically (during the previous period that we had an activated conscript defence), only a few conscript positions were placed in a security class. When conscription was suspended and the authority switched to professional defence, the authority reasoned that the significantly longer average length of service for group leaders, soldiers and sailors could justify placing all positions in a security class. This relationship can of course be discussed in the light of the criteria set out for placement in a security class in the Security Protection Act.[34] After the reactivation of conscription, this perception of the need for security classification seems to have remained, despite the fact that conditions are more similar to the previous period of conscription.

The Government notes in the bill Security clearance of conscripts etc.[35] that the authority in its security protection analysis has come to the conclusion that *all* conscript positions should be placed in a security class (without further clarification of this premise). The result is that the authority has to spend a lot of time on security clearance interviews instead of training the soldiers in their main task. The grenade launcher is certainly given time to reflect on concepts such as loyalty and transferred vulnerabilities during the interviews, but unfortunately this risks being at the expense of elite exercise and skills training. Furthermore, the time spent waiting for the register check process means that valuable training time can be lost. Without having read the security protection analysis, we would nevertheless go so far as to say that such a conclusion would be wrong. Can it really be in line with the purpose of the new security protection law that, for example, a conscript grenade launcher during his military service – even if it extends to the soldier's 47th birthday – is considered to fulfil the criteria necessary for security classification?

This has also led the government to decide that conscripts should be placed in a security class for the entire duration of their wartime deployment. One reason cited was that the time for register checks is so slow that there is no time for them before, for exam-

ple, a call-up for refresher training. Inbuilt shortcomings in a system should not affect security classification. A renewed analysis – with a result that only a few conscript positions should be placed in a security class – would probably give an operational effect to Sweden's defence, and thus benefit Sweden's security, that far exceeds the risks of not security testing all conscripts in Sweden. This example clearly shows our concern that security protection can sometimes have the effect that the security protection measures are not commensurate with the need for protection.

Staff lists

A common request for disclosure of a public document is a request for a list of personnel employed by an authority. The nature of the activity plays a major role in assessing whether such a list is covered by defence secrecy under Chapter 15, Section 2. A real case in point is Region Blekinge, which recently chose, in a disclosure decision, to subject a list of all doctors in the region to defence secrecy.[36]

If there is a war in Sweden, doctors will obviously be a very important total defence resource. If we were to reason that there is a risk of an antagonist targeting doctors, we also need to reason in the same way with regard to nurses, ambulance drivers, judges, preschool staff, customs staff, employment agencies and rescue service staff. All of a sudden, a large number of lists of publicly employed personnel in Sweden will be subject to defence secrecy, with possible restrictions on the principle of public access as a result. The fact that these persons may run a particular risk is a security issue, but in our opinion not a security protection issue.

It is of course not impossible that a list of personnel employed in a certain activity with high protection values may be covered by defence secrecy. Such examples could be personnel employed by Säpo or Must. As mentioned above, information covered by defence secrecy is always classified information. The consequence of defence secrecy is that Region Blekinge needs an information system for handling information about doctors that meets the requirements of the security protection legislation for such information systems.

A further similar example on the same theme could be that a public sector operator makes staff payrolls subject to defence secrecy so that an antagonist cannot map out salary inequalities, and thereby try to recruit spying on employees who are likely to be unhappy with their employer.

Even if the aim of preventing enlistment is a good one, it is difficult to argue that pay setting in a workplace should be part of the organisation's total defence planning. Furthermore, since defence secrecy means that the information in question is classified, it must be processed in approved information systems. Those who need access to the information in their position must be security cleared. This means that at least all managers in the workplace, all finance and HR staff and all trade union representatives must be cleared and possibly classified.

If an individual wants the payroll in order to negotiate their salary, it cannot be disclosed unless the individual is also cleared for this purpose. As we can see, the consequences of such reasoning are unreasonable.

A well-functioning workplace represents a lower security risk than a poorly functioning workplace. We can assume that the antagonists who pose a threat to Sweden try to map us and our vulnerabilities in various ways. This applies in particular to those who work in particularly security-sensitive activities. However, the answer is not to impose defence secrecy on everything that can

contribute to such mapping. That would mean a large and unjustified intervention in the principle of public access to official records without contributing to any relevant protection.

Instead, we can protect ourselves against vulnerabilities in the form of dissatisfaction with employers by complying with both labour law and other legislation and by having good personnel management. An employer should educate staff about the threat and conduct follow-up security clearance interviews where any dissatisfaction is picked up by employees who have access to classified information. When setting salaries, an employer can ensure that there are no unfair disadvantages. So the answer is not, in the vast majority of civil defence activities, to put defence secrecy on payrolls. The above does not preclude that there may be other secrecy for the information, such as the personnel administration secrecy in Chapter 39, sections 1 and 3 of OSL.

Conclusion and some advice along the way

Here are some simple tips that we hope will help.

1. Make sure you have a well-conducted security analysis in place, which shows how vulnerable the organisation really is, and above all, which parts of the organisation are actually security-sensitive (and which are not). Get help from industry colleagues and similar actors in the same sector if necessary.
2. Do not start from security protection in total defence planning, but instead determine which parts of the activity are needed during high alert. *Then* analyse which part(s) of the planning of these activities could cause damage to Sweden if disclosed to an antagonist.
3. Analyse whether a particular security issue is also a security protection issue. Does the information relate to Sweden's security? Can it be reasonably concluded that an antagonist could use the information in a way that could have harmful consequences for Sweden? If the answer to these questions is no, security legislation should not be applied, but other security measures (for example for the security of the organisation or the individual) may of course still need to be taken.
4. Avoid a "slippery slope" in reasoning. When using defence secrecy in confidentiality assessments and in extradition decisions – consider carefully whether, and if so how, the information at *hand* needs security protection. If it seems clearly unreasonable to be able to apply security protection to the information in practice, this may indicate that the basis for secrecy is not correct. And vice versa, of course – if the justification is indeed correct, the costly and inconvenient consequences of security measures must also be accepted.
5. Do a "reality check" – are the proposed security measures reasonable in relation to what they intend to protect? In the area of personnel security, one can consider how to conduct an adequate security clearance when the number of positions in the security classification increases, as a completed register check form does not mean that a security clearance has been carried out. Is it possible to reduce participation in security-sensitive activities and access to classified information and instead concentrate personnel security work on fewer positions?

6. When requesting disclosure of documents – read not only Chapter 15, Section 2 of OSL properly, but also the Act on Total Defence and High Readiness. Does the information really relate to total defence? Explain how the disclosure of the information can cause damage to national defence. Pay attention to the straightforward damage requirement in the provision. Also consider that there may be other confidentiality provisions that are more relevant to the information.
7. In the case of a request for disclosure of a public document, there is room, within the framework of the urgency requirement of the Freedom of the Press Act, to delay a few days if this is necessary for the confidentiality assessment to be correct. In order to make a correct assessment of confidentiality, information from different employees and departments at the authority may need to be taken into account. In some cases, disclosure may take even longer if the request concerns extensive material.

With this review, examples and attempted advice along the way, we hope to provide thought-provoking models for those officials who have the complex and important task of making decisions on security measures, defence secrecy and total defence planning.

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Notes

1. SOU 2015:25.
2. Government Bill 2014/15:109 *Defence policy direction – Sweden's defence 2016-2020*.
3. Dir. 2023:51. The assignment must be reported no later than 29 March 2024.
4. *Yearbook of the Security Police 2021*.
5. This idea can also be discerned in the investigation directives for the *inquiry into the security protection law,* Dir. 2011:94, p. 4 f.
6. Section 1 of the Total Defence and High Readiness Act (1992:1403).
7. Ibid.
8. 1 § 1 item. Act (1992:1403) on total defence and increased preparedness.
9. "Without the industry, there is no defence" said NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg during his keynote address at the NATO Industry Forum, which took place for the first time on Swedish soil on 24-25 October 2023.
10. See 2020 defence decision (Prop. 2020/21:30), section 6.3.
11. See the Ordinance (1982:756) on the Swedish Defence Forces' interventions in the event of violations of Sweden's territory during peace and neutrality, etc.
12. Ordinance (2022:524) on state authorities' preparedness 6 § 2 p.
13. See 2020 defence decision (Prop. 2020/21:30), section 6.4.
14. See Chapter 15 of the Instrument of Government and the so-called "authorisation laws", e.g. the Act (1988:97) on the procedure of municipalities, administrative authorities and courts during war or wartime danger, etc. and the Authorisation Act (1978:262). For a complete list of the authorisation laws, see section 13 of the Ordinance (2015:1053) on total defence and increased preparedness.
15. Section 1 of the Act (1994:1809) on total defence obligation.
16. Chapter 1, section 1 of the Security Protection Act (2018:585). The legislation includes the Security Protection Ordinance
17. (2021:955) and implementing regulations.
18. Ds 2018:6 and SOU 2018:82.
19. Chapter 1, section 2, paragraph 2 of the Security Protection Act (2018:585).
20. See for example Prop. 2017/18:89, p. 36 ff and SOU 2015:25, p. 267 ff.
21. A SOU, p 294.
22. *Civil defence – basics and current information,* Version June 2018, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *https://www.msb.se/contentassets/4e4c3024260d4612a12bf171392ff9a9/civilt-forsvar-grunder-aktuell-information.pdf*.
23. *Structure for increased resilience* (SOU 2021:25), p. 147.
24. "Förändrad hotbild utmanar totalförsvaret", *Säkerhetspolisen,* 2022-01-10, *https://sakerhetspolisen. se/ovriga-sidor/nyheter/nyheter/2022-01-10-forandrad-hotbild-utmanar-totalforsvaret.html*.
25. See section 1 of the Act on total defence obligation.
26. See Waern, Martin; Degerfeldt, Emma and Leeman, Dan: *Security Protection Act: A Commentary*,
27. Norstedts Juridik, Stockholm 2022, p. 33 et seq.
28. See Chapter 18, Section 8 of the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400).
29. Cf. Section 1 of Act 1992:1403 on total defence and increased preparedness.
30. Ibid, "[...] all societal activities to be conducted at that time". Both the police and the courts are very important activities even during a war.
31. See Section 24 of the Defence International Law Ordinance (1990:12).
32. Ibid.
33. See Section 2 of the 1992:1403 Act on Total Defence and High Readiness.
34. See Chapter 19, Section 7-8 of the Criminal Code for the offence of unauthorised use of secret information.
35. Provided that the information reaches the level of confidentiality or higher.
36. Chapter 3, sections 6-8 of the Security Protection Act.
37. Prop. 2022/23:87, p. 30.
38. Case No 2256-22, Administrative Court of Appeal in Jönköping.

Conspiracy theories and *Estonia*

by Björn Körlof

Résumé

In the aftermath of the *Estonia* catastrophe, it was obvious that many conspiracy theories started to spread. In this article the former Director General of the Psychological Defence Administration, which under a long period was intensely engaged in the different information problems pertaining to the catastrophe, analyzes the special circumstances under which conspiracy theories start to spread. Very often it has to do with shocking news, large scale disasters etc. where different authorities fail to give quick, complete, and correct information about what has happened and its causes. In such circumstances a kind of "information vacuum" occurs in which rumours find ground. It is often very difficult to get rid of conspiracy theories after they have started to spread. This is due to the misunderstanding of what is likely the truth and what is unlikely the truth. Solid evidence is often the sign of what is likely, which means that if such evidence does not occur with the conspiracy theories, they are in fact very unlikely. The likely way in which *Estonia* sank is described in an objective manner and shows that the conspiracy theories are very unlikely answers to what in fact happened. The article ends with suggestions of better education in schools and in the media and also with some ideas of how the government should react when obviously false conspiracy theories occur in media belonging to other nations.

DURING THE 1990S, the older authority, the Swedish Agency for Psychological Defence (SPF), was for a time, through government assignments, involved in issues relating to the Estonia disaster that took place on 28 September 1994 when 852 people tragically died, including large travel groups from the same place. The government's request to the SPF was based on the fact that the conclusions of the Accident Commission were early on expressed in various quarters. This distrust of the official explanations was also expressed early on in alternative causes and explanations for the disaster. Claims that included these alternative causalities also gradually took on forms and patterns that are usually referred to as conspiracy theories.

A major research effort was made by the agency on various aspects of government information. SPF quickly recognised a conspiratorial pattern in many of the claims made. The purpose of an independent research with renowned researchers was, among other things, to investigate the reasons for the pronounced distrust of government and authorities that arose after the disaster. It turned out to be very difficult to dispel the distrust that had arisen early on, not only among relatives but also in some cases in the media and in many parts of society in general.

Despite the fact that the analyses of the accident and sinking process carried out by the Accident Commission and Admiral Frank Rosenius (on special assignment from

SPF) have a very high degree of relevance and probability, it has been difficult to get these analyses fully accepted. Especially the extremely rapid and dramatic sinking process is important to clarify because the rapid sinking of the ship has been the basis for claims that it collided with a submarine or was blown up. However, the course of the accident and sinking has been clearly demonstrated from the outset to have causes that make collision or blast a highly unlikely explanation. The accident with the bow visor and the ship's rapid water intake on the car deck, combined with the hull construction, which shows a lack of stability when loaded with water intake in the lower decks, are the only reasonable explanations for the accident and not least the rapid and dramatic sinking, which to a large extent led to so many people not being able to get to safety but following the ship into the depths.

The reasons for the emergence of conspiracy theories

After the Estonia disaster, a situation arose in which the issue of salvaging the ship, or alternatively disposing of the bodies of the dead after various diving operations, was hotly debated. Initial statements from the incoming Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson indicated that such ambitions were being carefully considered in the Government Offices. Naturally, such statements from the highest political level were perceived by many as promises or pledges that survivors would be able to bring the deceased home for burial. Especially when it emerged that an official assessment had been made which meant that a salvage of the ship was technically possible, it was perceived by many as the removal of a, perhaps even decisive, obstacle to salvage.

When, on 15 December, the Government decided not to salvage the ship, nor to carry out diving operations to try to recover the dead in the ship, and instead to cover the wrecked hull with the dead remaining in the ship's hull, and to turn the site of the sunken ship into a graveyard, a debate arose that the Government had basically failed to keep more or less explicit promises. The government's decision to cover the wreck with stone and concrete was also widely and vehemently criticised as an unethical and offensive decision. The criticism of the government in this respect led to the wreck not being covered.

The reasons against salvage that were put forward by the government were that the conditions for being able to salvage the large number of bodies, take care of them and identify them were judged to be difficult to manage, both in terms of exposing salvage personnel, i.e. divers and forensic personnel, to the risks and stresses that this would entail, but also because it appeared to be uncertain what condition the bodies would be in after a relatively long stay in the water. These reasons were, however, considered by many relatives to be only a pretext for avoiding a probably very costly salvage operation and care process that would result from a positive decision on salvage.

The State Accident Commission became the object of considerable anger and distrust on the part of the relatives' organisations, where the report on the causes of the accident was subjected to extensive criticism. The mistrust was compounded by the resignation of the Commission's Director General after making a minor mistake in the recording of a document held by the agency, which was (wrongly) perceived by many as an attempt to conceal important information about the shipwreck. Added to this was a difficult-to-understand and legally tangled

discussion about the ship's formal seaworthiness and classification documents, etc., which to a large extent created frustration among relatives about how responsibility could be claimed for what has happened and how they could hold any institution or company accountable and how damages could be recovered.

Some important information/psychology explanations can be discerned as to why conspiracy theories about the Estonia disaster took such shape and have tended to persist for so long. For example, explanations for what caused the disaster could not be quickly, correctly and completely demonstrated in an unambiguous way. An information vacuum emerged that began to be filled with speculation and rumours. When the Accident Commission's analyses were later presented, various alternative explanations had spread and the official analyses were perceived as incomplete and the conclusions flawed. An early government promise to salvage the wreck and the bodies was considered to have been made but then broken. The reasons for the government's decision not to salvage – and not least the decision to cover the wreck – were seen as ethically untenable and "must" be based on something to be concealed. Rumours circulated that the accident was due to "secret" conditions that the government was trying to hide. The fact that the government and the defence authorities, for reasons of secrecy, could not account for the transport of donated Swedish defence materiel to Estonia, thus became an argument that the sinking of the *Estonia* must have been due to an attack, explosion, collision, etc. The conspiracy theories were thus fuelled by opinions that claimed that the government, through its decision, actually wanted to hide the supposedly "real" causes of the wreck. "Ambiguity", "deceit", and "secrecy" would thus be important psychological explanations in which conspiracy theories were fuelled.

What is of interest here, however, is not whether the government's decision was reasonable or whether the failure of the Commission's analysis was correct. Without the seeds of conspiracy thinking that have been present for almost 30 years, with various elements of debate or journalistic, in some cases heavily biased or even disinformative, investigations that displaced demands for truth and relevance. This was thus linked to the delay in obtaining prompt, accurate and complete information and to perceptions that the government and authorities were trying to hide important information related to the fact that the causes of the sinking were to be found in completely different causes than those identified by the accident commission.

What do we know about conspiracy theories?

Conspiracy theories are present in social debates in many countries and draw on many different narratives and cultural, historical and political conditions. They are highly effective methods in the propaganda war and in influence operations. They have been a very visible part of the Russian 'arsenal' of influence methods against the domestic population and the West for many years. There are several studies on conspiracy theories mainly in an American context (e.g. Daniel Pipes, *Conspiracy* from 1997 and Michael Barkun *A Culture of Conspiracy* from 2003; the latter commented on in an underlined article in *Svenska Dagbladet* 2004-06-06). The latest study translated into Swedish is Stephan Lewandovsky and John Cook *Konspirationsteorier. a handbook* with an extensive bibliography of mainly American studies.

Since science is often – and usually rightly – highly trusted in Western societies, it is with concern that research misconduct appears to be increasing. To the extent that the fact that further research or conclusions are based on falsehoods in research raises the question among the public whether scientific results and conclusions can be trusted.

Someone who wrote about and warned about this early and clearly in 2000 was the professor of physics, Robert Park in the USA *(Voodoo Science. The Road from Foolishness to Fraud)*. A leading figure in the USA for an approach with a *sceptical* belief in various claims and, not least, serious attempts to clarify where various idiosyncratic "theories" came from and how they were spread is Michael Shermer, PhD in the history of science in the USA, who in 1997 wrote the often-praised book *Why People Believe Weird Things*.

The referenced studies strongly indicate that conspiracy theories can gain credibility in a certain historical and cultural context where trust in governments and authorities, but also in science (not least in medicine) has been undermined by various misjudgements or misrepresentations, but also have their basis in events and developments, often with dramatic or fascinating elements, which cannot be immediately explained with full certainty and confidence and therefore often start with various forms of rumour-mongering.

Conspiracy theories are present in social debates in many countries and draw on many different narratives and cultural, historical and political conditions. They are highly effective methods in the propaganda war and in influence operations. They have been a very visible part of the Russian "arsenal" of influence methods against the West for several years now.

When do we know that these are conspiracy theories?

Conspiracy theories can gain credence in a particular political and social context where events and processes, often with dramatic or fascinating elements, cannot be immediately explained with complete certainty and confidence. The event giving rise to conspiratorial reactions appears almost inexplicable and often has far-reaching political or social consequences. The social institutions that are supposed to be able to provide rapid, complete and accurate information about what has happened, and to explain the event in such a way that the explanation appears unobjectionable, fail in this role. Thus, conspiracy theories often arise after an unusual event that shocks or upsets many people, while at the same time undermining confidence in government and authorities through various misjudgements or misrepresentations.

In the time that elapses between the event and the social institutions' attempts to find causes and explanations, an information vacuum arises, which in connection with serious events constitutes a significant breeding ground for the spread of rumours. Many hard-to-explain conspiracy theories have their origins in early rumours. When, after some time, social institutions present a reasonably valid and plausible explanation for the event, it can rarely appear completely unobjectionable. Alternative explanations that have already been put forward may appear to many to be perfectly reasonable or at least not implausible. A previously established, or now emerging, distrust of important social institutions arises, where their trust is more or less seriously damaged.

Distrust of an official explanation for a serious event tends to linger in the form of conspiracy theories that are difficult to de-

finitively falsify, despite the fact that explanations of the event can eventually be explained with very high probability by completely different, and often simpler, or purely random circumstances.

Key characteristics of conspiracy theories

Studies on conspiracy theories, as shown above, are mainly based on an American context. The studies reveal important identifiable psychological patterns. These patterns are so frequent and so significant that it is often possible to make a reasonably plausible "diagnosis" based on them. They can be summarised as follows.

A common such character of conspiracy theories is that they do not want to attribute importance to any trivial circumstance and believe that extraordinary events must have extraordinary explanations and cannot be due to chance or have natural explanations (e.g. that *Estonia's* bow visor was flawed and did not hold in the rough sea).

They therefore assume that what happened must have a major and serious underlying cause and that an official explanation is more or less deliberately misleading, even after various elements of the conspiracy theory have been undermined. Often there is a shocking or dramatic event as the underlying cause, which is perceived to have to be caused by some large and serious malevolent "conspiracy". This is evident in the case of the assassination of President Kennedy.

It leads to what is sometimes called hypercritical thinking, which means being sceptical or intensely critical of official explanations and not accepting any facts or arguments that do not fit the conspiracy theory. That authorities and official explanations in fact have even insidious intentions are therefore also present.

"Factual resistance" is therefore the name given to an attitude of not being influenced by facts that contradict one's own beliefs and an unwillingness to accept a truth or something that has been shown to be highly probable, even if there is good evidence for it. Sometimes the factual resistance is taken so far that any evidence that contradicts the conspiracy theory is perceived as part of the conspiracy itself, often indicating a tendency for conspiracy theories to be self-confirming.

Conspiracy theories often do not recognise their own inconsistency in argumentation, but stack arguments on top of each other that cannot be brought together into a consistent coherent argument and therefore often tend to be self-contradictory.

In connection with this way of arguing, conspiracy theorists often make a seemingly thorough examination of the facts, but in fact only those facts or circumstances that support their conspiracy theory are selected. This often leads to the conspiracy theory focusing attention on and magnifying smaller, often completely or partially irrelevant factors, in the belief that these are the decisive circumstances.

This often involves the selection of certain supposedly scientific studies or scientific studies that have been shown to be grossly inaccurate and have been rejected by the scientific community.

In a debate with a conspiracy-minded individual, it is not uncommon to engage in what is known in rhetoric as 'moving the goalposts', an idiom that refers to changing the terms of a debate or conflict after it has begun and constantly demanding further support or evidence as one's arguments are refuted.

Many conspiracy theorists often feel persecuted and describe themselves as martyrs because they are criticised for their views in

the media, for example. The feeling of powerlessness and threat is therefore often the basis for a social climate where such theories thrive among a minority.

Events in the past are characterised by non-contradictory factuality

In the case of past events described in conspiratorial terms, it helps the mind to realise that all such events can only have occurred in a definite and uncontradicted way. Events in the past therefore have what is known in philosophy as "factuality". According to commonly accepted logic, every unequivocal statement of factuality is true or false and there is no third possibility. The law of contradiction and the law of the excluded third point in the same direction, namely that two contradictory statements about the same thing (and a third is not given) cannot be true at the same time (the coherence theory of truth). Thus, a statement of factuality can never be first true and then false. So what is relative in this context is not the truth itself (the factual) but what is the probable.

Thus, a statement about what is factual must, ideally, be consistent with that factuality if it is to be a true statement (the correspondence theory of truth). However, an ideal truth is usually not available, as inductively given conclusions can never be logically completely valid. Empirical evidence cannot make such absolute claims, and moreover, language complicates ideal descriptions of reality. An ideally unobjectionable description of what has happened – and thus also an explanation of it – is therefore something that cannot be logically definitive, but is likely with a high degree of probability.

Difference between true and probable

One difficulty in conclusively rejecting conspiratorial claims is therefore often that a well-supported description or explanation cannot always at the same time completely reject or exclude other grounds for explanations, even if these seem unlikely or even unreasonable. This has sometimes been expressed in epistemology as the impossibility of falsifying non-events, e.g. the impossibility of proving that gnomes do not exist. A possible opening to provide another explanation with empirically available knowledge often constitutes the only support for the conspiracy theory, despite the fact that the evidence for the probably correct explanation is completely overwhelming and that several of the claims on which the conspiracy is based have actually been falsified.

These conditions therefore mean that empirically accessed knowledge, based on reliable data and valid inductive conclusions, can achieve a very high degree of probability for a statement of factuality, with a simultaneously high demand on how it is expressed linguistically, i.e. to achieve a very high probability that a description of an event can be essentially correct. Claims that say something else then become correspondingly much less likely.

Thus, another "logically possible" explanation is due to the scientific view that empirically accessed knowledge is only to varying degrees likely to be correct, as opposed to so- called "scientific" knowledge, truths that are logically true, such as mathematical truths. The error in thinking that often occurs with conspiracy theories is that they give their own explanation or claim an almost equal or even higher probability value than the one they seek to disprove. Instead, it is usually the case that the conspiracy the-

ory's evidence is weak compared to the other theory. The different probabilities of the positions will therefore, depending on the values of reliability and validity, be very different. Reason should then adhere to what is most probable and not put faith in what is less probable or even improbable.

The sinking of the *Estonia* is based, beyond reasonable doubt, on circumstances that are clearly shown in the analyses of the Commission and Admiral Rosenius and confirmed by recent diving investigations of the hull of the *Estonia*. Now that these further investigations at the wreck of the *Estonia have been* carried out and show that the initial descriptions and explanations of the accident are almost certainly correct, most of the conspiratorial allegations should now be conclusively shown to be almost entirely implausible. At any rate, if a reasonable mind adheres to the sound idea that one should not believe anything that there are not very good reasons to believe.

Why did the *Estonia* sink so quickly?

1. The vessel lost the bow visor in very heavy weather with the bow ramming hard against high seas and at high speed as a result of inadequate attachment and strength of the structure. The visor then slammed heavily into the side of the hull and sank to the bottom where it was later found and recovered a few kilometres from the ship's sinking site.
2. The loud bangs heard and recounted by some witnesses therefore have nothing to do with collisions or explosions, but with the impact of the bow visor on the hull side when it came off.
3. The loss of the bow visor meant that the bow ramp in the bow of the boat behind the bow visor was completely free and unfolded, whereby, as a result of the heavy seas and the accompanying wave breaks in the car deck, large amounts of water flowed onto this deck.
4. The inflow of water was then greatly increased by the fact that the ship continued to run against the waves for several minutes at high speed and did not stop until it became clear on the bridge that there was serious damage to the ship's bow, which meant that there was a risk of total collapse.
5. The ship had since stopped moving forward and had instead become sideways in the high waves, sending out MayDay signals.
6. In this state, the vessel then began to heel sideways in the strong wind and high waves, with the large masses of water on the car deck beginning to "slosh" in massive and increasing waves in this space, causing the risk of increasingly severe vessel heeling as the masses of water and the boat's heeling in the sea interact and reinforce each other. Passengers did not initially observe these oscillations as dangerous or serious as they were not perceived as worse than those that would naturally occur in the rough seas that existed at the time.
7. Due to a lack of initial stability (including an insignificant keel), the vessel had, as a result of the increasing water masses, an increasing amount of movement on the car deck, suddenly lost its final stability and capsized on one side. The capsize thus occurred because the masses of water on the car deck, together with the combined energy of sea movement and wind, acted on one side of the vessel, which, after the speed had ceased, was in the direction of the wind.
8. There are several witness accounts of this sudden and very violent capsize,

which resulted in the tyres suddenly becoming walls and furniture suddenly hitting the walls of one side of the ship with great force.

9. In this capsized condition, the heavy water masses on the car deck as a whole have become rocking and heavily weighted on the side facing the sea, and this water weight caused the vessel to lose all possibility of regaining stability.
10. The ship was then very quickly filled with water through the wide-open ramp roof by the incoming hard sea and broken windows on the seaward side, and the sinking process then took place at great speed.
11. Upon impact with the seabed and rock formations there, the ship's hull side has been damaged and various holes have appeared in the hull, which have now been identified with such a damage pattern that no other explanation than a strong impact against a rock in the seabed can be proven.

The media have a special responsibility

The rules of behaviour just described in relation to serious events are particularly important for the media. A serious approach should characterise the media when serious events affect society. The failure of some media to fulfil this responsibility with regard to the Estonia disaster is a cause for reflection. How to counter conspiratorial claims while maintaining conditions where arguments and claims can be seriously tested requires responsibility, judgement and competence on the part of those managing the opinion-forming process. The media have a major responsibility in this regard.

The German journalist Jutta Rabe's disregard for the peaceful burial of the *Estonia* *and her* diving of the wreck and subsequent publication of information that the wreck showed holes in the hull that could not have a natural explanation such as the hull being damaged by the impact on the bottom after the sinking is a typical example of a conspiracy theory. Such theories have been revived by the Swedish (remarkably award-winning!) film 2022, which also seeks to reveal unexplained holes in the hull of the *Estonia* and is therefore considered to point to other explanations for the sinking than those initially put forward by the accident commission.

Awarding the Grand Prize for Journalism to a piece of journalism that contains speculation and outright conspiracy theories has been sharply criticised, which is a very healthy feature of the *Estonia* debate. It is easy to spread conspiratorial claims, but often difficult to falsify them with sufficient knowledge.

Sweden particularly vulnerable

Recently, our country has been hit by some particularly damaging influence operations with clear conspiratorial elements. These include the dissemination of claims that Swedish social authorities abduct children from Muslim parents and that Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson has made statements advocating genocide against Palestinians. The spread of these allegations can be clearly traced to the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera television station. But the Russian media also disseminate information with clear conspiratorial elements.

The world we live in, where elements of disinformation and conspiracy theories are often present, requires knowledge and counteraction from open democratic states. Research into the nature of conspiracy theories and the damage they cause to the so-

cial climate is neglected in our country. This also applies to research on the methods used more generally within the framework of influence operations. The new Agency for Psychological Defence (MPF) should therefore need large resources to build up knowledge and analytical capacity, which is required if the agency is to be able to make efforts in the form of early analyses of what is happening in the "conspiracy world" and how unlikely or unreasonable claims should be dealt with in a way that at the same time preserves the conditions for free opinion formation and for different opinions to meet in an open and testing debate where arguments and claims can be competently scrutinised. Responding to rumours or conspiracy theories requires considerable effort because it is often easy to make conspiratorially coloured claims but considerably more difficult to falsify the claim with a sufficiently good knowledge base.

Research on this, as well as on fraudulent information, influence operations, etc. should therefore be significantly increased. Knowledge needs to be built up, including through the MPF.

Different forms of counteraction must be considered

It is also clear that an active counteraction needs to take place. This needs to be done with three important focuses. The first concerns school education in primary and secondary schools, where the focus should be on creating knowledge about the meaning of true and false, what is likely and unlikely, and the basics of the approach to these terms, as well as teaching students to recognise the typical elements of conspiracy theories. The second is that the media need to be more vigilant and cautious in their reporting of events, especially during conflict-laden events, and thus require internal training within the media in addition to the basic training needed in journalism schools. The third is that the government needs to react when foreign actors or media outlets are demonstrably careless with the truth or spread conspiracy theories. With a factual and objective basis at hand, such as a white paper, the government should be able to react against a foreign ambassador stationed here whose country has a media that is guilty of blatant disinformation and ask him to forward the content to his country's government. It may also be possible to ask for our country's opinion on what is not correct information in, for example, a foreign television company of the type represented by Al Jazeera.

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Great Patriotic War 2.0 – correcting mistakes

by Vladimir Iserell

Résumé

To describe the ongoing war in Ukraine as the Great Patriotic War 2.0. is a theme belonging to one of the dominant Russian narratives that was used from the very first days of the war. This article explains how an offensive war is transformed by the Russian government into a defensive one, how collective memory contributes to this and establishes quasi-historical beliefs into this process.

VIEWING THE ONGOING war in Ukraine as the Great Patriotic War 2.0 is one of the dominant Russian narratives used from the very first days of the war. Considering that the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) was a defensive war, in which the Soviet state and its population fought for its existence, it seems to be highly remarkable that a war of invasion, which the current armed confrontation in Ukraine is by definition, is considered by Russian propaganda to be comparable to the existential struggle of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Even more interestingly, large groups of people in Russia not only accept this concept but also support and reproduce it. In order to explain how these two completely incomparable wars are made comparable, the Great Patriotic War as an ideological construct and its impact on today's political agenda in Russia must be elucidated.

The Great Patriotic War as an ideological construct

The Great Patriotic War is one of the most important events in Russian history. Kristian Gerner[1] points out that the history of the Great Patriotic War "is about Russia saving Europe from evil by (...) defeating Hitler", and that "this history entitles the country to play a leading role in world politics and to be the dominant power in Europe and Asia". The transformation of the war from a historical event into a myth, in turn, is due to the fact that the Great Patriotic War is the central component of the modern Russian collective identity.[2]

The war remains an unresolved collective trauma that all Russian citizens share and can relate to in a personal way. Some remember their grandparents who came back from the war disabled, others cherish the memory of their ancestors who were killed in the war or who died from hunger and hardship, either in German-occupied territory or as evacuees. Many also remember their own upbringing in the post-war devastation.

Besides these personal experiences, known facts should also be taken into account. A standard set of such facts might be as follows: the war began treacherously and without a declaration of war, lasted 1418

days and claimed the lives of about 26.6 million Soviet citizens; the material losses of the Soviet Union amounted to about 30 per cent of the total national assets, 1,700 towns and 70,000 villages were destroyed, and millions of people were forced to live in poverty and hunger.[3]

These facts are of great importance for understanding why the Russian power uses the narrative of the Great Patriotic War to legitimise its invasion of Ukraine, and why the broad masses of the Russian population accept this argumentation. Of no less importance are the already established historical beliefs in the collective consciousness, a phenomenon that will be examined more closely in this article. First, something about collective memory and historical revisionism in contemporary Russia.

Collective memory and historical revisionism

Historical beliefs and myths have a significant impact on the collective consciousness that shapes society's view of its shared history. The collective consciousness has several different types of sources on which it is based. Traditionally, scholars distinguish between the memory of 'living human consciousness'; material resources of 'sign information' together with the ways in which they are transmitted; and material objects not designed for information transmission.[4]

Historical narratives derived from collective memory are both subjective and selective in terms of the selection of facts and events on which they are based. With regard to character information sources, it should be noted that it is far from being only academic publications/theses, textbooks and curricula that contribute to the construction of the historical narrative. Equally important are the popular ideas of an alternative, mythical and revisionist nature that circulate in society. These conceptions are embodied in various types of quasi-historical publications, feature films and talk shows that exploit various alternative historical theories that have already gained widespread attention among the population, as well as through mass reproduction, which have become entrenched in the nation's collective consciousness.

This kind of alternative and revisionist quasi-historical conceptions, based on actual events on the one hand and built on myths and legends on the other, originated in Russia in the period of perestroika and is a by-product of glasnost politics. During this period, a large number of books and journals were published in the Soviet Union that challenged the official Soviet historical science. A countless number of previously unpublished documents, memoirs, novels and scientific treatises were showered on the Soviet public. Alongside these publications, which revealed the atrocities of the Russian Revolution, the extent of Stalinist repression and the real human losses during the Great Patriotic War, there were also a large number of publications belonging to this alternative history genre. Before that, the Soviet historical narrative, conveyed through official publications, textbooks and feature films, was seen as inauthentic and adapted to the needs of the communist regime, so various alternative historical theories were accepted as correct by broad sections of the population.

The concept of the missed opportunity

Among this type of popular and mass-consciousness quasi-historical beliefs, based partly on facts and partly on pure speculation, is the concept of the 'missed opportunity'. This concept in turn consists of several elements.

The first element is that of former GRU officer, defector, author and historical revisionist Viktor Suvorov who introduced the concept in his book *Ledokol*[5] in 1988. In it, Suvorov claims that the Soviet Union was preparing to invade Germany in July 1941. The concept became both well known and accepted by the public due to the book being printed in several mass editions.

In brief, Suvorov's concept is that a future military conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union became inevitable after Hitler's rise to power and both states were preparing for a future confrontation. Thus, both Germany and the Soviet Union were preparing for a war to be fought on the territory of the opponent. Analysis of Soviet and German troop groupings on 22 June 1941 was used by Suvorov as an argument in support of this hypothesis. Even the massive rearmament of the Soviet army with combat vehicles and weapon systems adapted for rapid advances on European motorways, i.e. suitable for a rapid offensive war, is seen by him as a preparation for a preventive battle. This type of argument also included the development of parachute troops as an independent branch of arms and the massive propaganda carried out through the production of feature films in the Soviet Union. In the current situation, only one question remained – which side would strike first.

Viktor Suvorov analyses Soviet warfare in 1941 and comes to the conclusion that the Soviet war preparations excluded the defensive phase of the war altogether. Thus, according to Suvorov, it was planned that the initiative would be taken by the Soviet side and that the first acts of war would consequently be carried out by the Soviet army.[6]

Another established historical notion concerning the early days of the Great Patriotic War, which constitutes the second element of the 'missed opportunity concept', concerns Stalin's supposed awareness of the exact date when German troops would cross the Soviet state border. The Soviet intelligence agent Richard Sorge is said to have telegraphed this information, but it was not taken seriously by Stalin. In reality, Richard Sorge sent several messages between March and June 1941 with information about the impending war. Thanks to the ongoing disinformation campaign by the German side, his information changed in the meantime and the last message of 21 June stated that the German attack on the Soviet Union was delayed until the end of June 1941.

Despite all the war preparations made in previous years and all the intelligence warnings of imminent attacks on the Soviet Union, the German attack on 22 June 1941 came as a complete surprise to Stalin. The Soviet commander Georgy Zhukov points out in his memoirs that Stalin refused to believe in the war until the very end, claiming that the Luftwaffe's bombing of Soviet cities was a provocation, and that Hitler certainly did not know this.[7]

The fusion of the notion of the Soviet Union's readiness for an open war on German territory, with that of Stalin's knowledge of the exact date of the imminent German attack on the Soviet Union and his failure to

act, gives rise to the concept of the "missed opportunity" for a pre-emptive strike. This would have saved the lives of millions of Soviet citizens, shortened the inevitable war and would have taken place on enemy territory. A concept that became accepted by the public and was reproduced an infinite number of times.

The correct version of the war

The mechanics of collective memory work by picking out individual fragments of the retrospective information reflected in today's agenda, transforming it and reproducing it in the mass consciousness. By drawing parallels between the present and the past, events are placed in their 'historical' context and the common man is left to cope with the modulated virtual reality characterised by a historical perspective and coherence.

The application of the mechanics outlined above can be seen in the narrative used by the Russian power from the first days of the war in Ukraine. On 24 February 2022, Putin's speech to the nation was published, announcing the so-called special military operation. After mentioning the eastward expansion of NATO and the expansionism of the West, Putin draws clear parallels between the current events and the Great Patriotic War, pointing out that the Soviet Union did everything possible not to provoke the "potential aggressor" Germany and had failed to take the most necessary measures to prevent the attack. This in turn meant that when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, it was taken by surprise and was unable to provide effective resistance to the aggressor, an inability that resulted in catastrophic human and territorial losses in the first months of the war. After this, Putin stated that Russia cannot make such a mistake a second time.[8] Logically, in view of the above, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is presented by the Russian power as "self-defence"[9] as well as a necessary action provoked by NATO's "military mastery"[10] of the Ukrainian territory and its transformation into a "bridgehead",[11] endangering the security of the Russian state.

The Great Patriotic War narrative was reinforced by the already developed rhetoric used by the Kremlin to describe the situation in Ukraine from 2014 onwards. The change of power following protests in May Square is referred to exclusively in terms of the "coup d'état", the Ukrainian government is referred to as a "junta", "neo-Nazi" or "pro-Nazi regime" and Ukrainian military personnel are referred to as "nationalists and neo-Nazis" fighting in "nationalist units" and "nationalist paramilitary battalions". Thus, Putin's postulate that Ukraine must be denazified fell into already well-ploughed ground and was accepted by a broad public.

In light of this, and taking into account the concept of the "missed opportunity", the ongoing war in Ukraine appears to be (according to the Kremlin's narrative) nothing more than the Great Patriotic War 2.0 – the right version of the Great War; a war that was started of a nation equipped for war; a war launched by a pre-emptive strike against an aggressive fascist state threatening its neighbour; a defensive war to save Russia's citizens and infrastructure, by moving the theatre of the inevitable war to enemy territory; a war to be fought in depth by rapid advances; a war to be quick, victorious and fought with minimal casualties. And Putin, in this case, is portrayed as the strong leader who, unlike Stalin, did not miss the opportunity to strike first and,

in doing so, saved the lives of thousands of Russian citizens. This creates a narrative that not only justifies the war, but also becomes easily digestible and accepted by the general public in Russia.

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The symbol of the new Russia?

The white-blue-white flag and its narrative

by Vladimir Iserell

Résumé

The Russian invasion of Ukraine gave rise to several different and new highly emotionally charged symbols used by the Russian government as a propaganda tool (Z and V symbols) and by the Russian anti-war opposition (the white-blue-white flag). The latter symbol is based on the ideological construct of the Novgorod Republic. The aim of this article is to examine this flag and its narrative as a possible basis for a new Russian liberal ideology, which could probably become an alternative to the contemporary one used by the Kremlin.

THE WHITE-BLUE-WHITE FLAG got attention soon after beginning of the invasion of Russian troops in Ukraine when it came to be used in anti-war protests in Europe and in former Soviet republics by Russian emigrants. The flag was created because it was necessary for Russian emigrants to distinguish themselves from protesting Ukrainians, and in such a way show that not all Russians are war-supporters.

It is not possible to determine exactly when the white-blue-white flag was used for the first time for this purpose, but it can be mentioned that the usage of this flag was proposed by Kaj Katonina (Кай Катонина) on 28th February 2022 (Медуза 2022). Probably the concept of the Russian's flag with changed colors (the red color is replaced with white on the flag) was not the product of one person. The idea of similar flag was proposed even on a twitter-account "Звуки Рыб" ("Zvuki Ryb" – "Fish Sounds") the day before Kaj Katonina launched her project (ibid.). However, on the website dedicated to the white-blue-white flag, they ascertained that the flag is the result of collective creativity (Whitebluewhite.info 2022).

The symbolical meaning of the white-blue-white flag has a several different explanations. The choice of flag's colors is explained on Whitebluewhite.info (2022) in several different ways. First of all, it is mentioned that the new flag is similar to the contemporary Russian flag, except the red stripe which became replaced with a white one. Because the red color on the contemporary Russian flag is associated, by the white-blue-white flag adherents, with the war and blood, its replacement represents the striving for peace with Ukraine, and demands respect for human rights in Russia. The colors of the new flag, according to its creators, have the following symbolic meanings: "The white color symbolizes peace, purity and prudence, azure blue is for truth and justice" (ibid.).

For the second, it mentioned that the white-blue-white flag reminds of the contemporary flag of Novgorod and the medieval

flag of the Novgorod Republic. This state was the center of northern Russia and was the only democratic state formation during all of Russians history.

It mentioned even that the composition of the flag reminds of composition of the white-red- white flag of Belarus which is used by Belarusians opposition. In such a way, usage of the white-blue-white flag shows the solidarity with "the people of Belarus, who are also fighting against illegitimate government" *(https://whitebluewhite.info/* 2022).

The white-blue-white flag creators, despite the basic idea that reproduction of the flag should be as easy as possible, are recommend to use another shade of blue than that which is used on contemporary Russian flag. It highly recommends using the azure blue color similar the color which was used on the first version of the Russian flag between 1991 and 1993.

Supporters of the white-blue-white flag proclaim it to be "a symbol of the future Russia, which does not parasitize on the symbols of the past" and as the "flag of free Russia" which is freed from "associations with imperialism, militarism and authoritarian leaders" (Whitebluewhite.info 2022).

Kaj Katonina points out that the white-blue-white flag can be associated with the Russian's paddy wagons colors too. But she does not see it as a problem. Instead, she says that this association can be compared with the cross which is a main symbol of the Christianity. In the same way as the tool of the Jesus Christ execution became the symbol of the religion, so can the symbol of state persecution be adopted by the opposition (The Village 2022).

It points out on Whitebluewhite.info (2022) that the white-blue-white flag should not be seen as a symbol of coming overthrow of the Putin regime. Instead, the flag should be interpreted as a "flag of peace and freedom" the tool for Russians abroad which help them to "express their anti-war stance and come out under a common banner" which is "not associated with the Putin regime" (ibid).

The symbol of the armed resistance

Despite the statement above, the white-blue-white flag became the symbol of the armed resistance movement against Putin too. This transformation came about through the adaptation of the flag by the "Freedom of Russia"-legion (Легион «Свобода России» / Легіон «Свобода Росії») – which is the unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, formed in March 2022 which claimed to be consisting of the former Russian soldiers and officers captured in Ukraine, defectors who are willing to fight against Russian forces on the Ukrainian's side with volunteers from both the Russia and Belarus. The legionnaires proclaimed as their goal not just defense of Ukraine but even liberation of Russia (Навальный LIVE 2022). On April 6th, 2022, the legionnaires got Ukrainian uniforms and unit's patches. The patch with the white-blue-white flag is used by legionnaires as a nationality mark on their uniforms left sleeves above the patch with the department's emblem. The "Freedom of Russia"- legion's Telegraph-channel defines the unit's symbol (i.a. the white-blue-white flag) as a symbol of the "new Russia" (Легион «Свобода России» 2022).

Because of the white-blue-white flag's strong anti-Kremlins character, the head of the committee on Safety and Anti-Corruption, Vasily Piskarev (Василий Пискарёв), sent an appeal to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation to ban this flag as an extremist symbol (Государственная Дума 2022) which probably will be done.

The white-blue-white flag and the narrative of the Novgorod Republic

Taking into account all this background information mentioned above, it seems most interesting that the usage of the white-blue-white flag has activated the narrative of the Novgorod Republic. The owner of the twitter-account "Звуки Рыб" explains that this kind of reference is particularly important during the ongoing war in Ukraine. That is because the usage of them shows one symbolic way that the rejection of encroachment, on the Southern or Kievan Rus' territory (i.e. Ukraine – V.I.), like the rejection of encroachment on any other territories which were included in the Russian Empire (Медуза 2022).

It should be pointed out that the narrative of the Novgorod Republic contains much more meaning than that mentioned above. The Republic which existed in the North of Russia between 1136 and 1478 seems to be the only democratic formation during all Russian history. Despite the existing dispute regarding reality of the existence of a democracy in Novgorod, it should be mentioned that it had developed some kind procedures of governance there, which included participation of people from all social classes ("Вече" – "Veche" –"Town meeting") which could both invite and dismiss the ruling prince.

It should also be mentioned that the Novgorod Republic, in contrast to the Southern-West Rus' (which gradually became incorporated, first into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and after that into the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth), and that the Vladimiro-Suzdalian principality (which gradually evolved into the Grand Duchy of Moscow) was never conquered by the Mongols during their invasion of Rus', and was minimally affected by the Mongol yoke. Thanks to that, the Republic had potential to make rivalry to the Grand Duchy of Moscow as a possible cultural and political center of Rus'. Seen in this light the Novgorod Republic can, until its fall in 1478 when Ivan III's troops conquered the city and tore down the Veche bell, be seen as an only one part of the true Rus', which preserved its primordial character.

According to A.V. Issatschenko's thought experiment the results of which were presented by him at the international Slavic Congress 1958, the concept of Moscow as the third Rome was nearly impossible in the almost democratic Novgorod Republic. In such a way, if Novgorod instead of Moscow would have become the center of power, the history of Russia would have been another direction. As a result of that, Russia would never have isolated itself from the rest of Europe and such ideological tendencies as renaissance and humanism would have influenced the development of country at the same time when they influenced the rest of Europeans countries (Nuorluoto 2012, 51). In such a way it seems that according to this narrative, if the Novgorod Republic would take the place of the Moscow in Russian history, should the output be different from contemporary Russia. Authoritarianism, backwardness and imperialism would be inorganic for this model of the Russia's alternative present.

In such a way the Novgorod Republic becomes in this narrative, not just a pure and real Rus', but even the embryo of the alternative model of Russia, the embryo which was destroyed by authoritarian Moscow in 1478. Seen in this light the usage of the Novgorod Republic's narrative (or mythologeme) can be seen as an attempt to return to this point of origin after which the history of Russia

had gone the wrong way, which excluded the country from the Pan-European development, and transformed it from an integrated part of the Europe into its antipode.

The three main Russians narratives

In such a way this narrative is quite different from the other three main narratives used alternately or simultaneously in Russian historiography and political discourse. Those three narratives are "Moscow as the third Rome", "Russia as heir of the Genghis Khan" and "Russia as the true Europe".

The first narrative appeals to the Russia's Byzantine heritage and in such a way connects modern Russia with not just a Byzantine but even with the Roman empire. This theological and political concept has resulted in an adoption and application of messianic and eschatological mindsets, both to the Russian state, and the Russian ruler. Bodin (1987:22) points out that the state culture of Byzantium perceived the emperor as an icon which personified not only the imperial title as such, but Christ as well. This perception contributes to the ritualization of power. In such a way, applying Russia together with other ideas belonging to the Byzantium heritage, this tradition has survived until today. It has survived not only the collapse of the Russian empire, but also communism, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. This perception of power is the steel shaping the political discourse on contemporary Russia.

The second narrative describes Russia as heir of the Genghis Khan and depicts it as a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional power existing on the nearly same borders as the Mongol Empire. According to this tradition Russia appears as some kind of super-ethnos, or as some kind of Eurasian civilization quite different from both the European and Chinese super-ethnos. If sacralizing power is the main point of the first mentioned narrative, should sacralizing territory be seen as a point of the second one. It is really interesting to note that this narrative is used even by Ukrainians when they talk about contemporary Russia. The Russian military forces are named in Ukrainian's media as a "horde" and the ongoing war in Ukraine been already characterized (for example by the Russian opposition politician Леонид Гозман / Leonid Gozman) as "the last battle between Kievan Rus' and Golden Horde" (Дом 2022).

The last narrative refers to Peter the Great and his attempt to modernize and Europeanize the country. Russia, as a diligent student became in the short term a part of Europe and even more – Russia became the true and pure Europe. According to this narrative, Russia became the only one country which saves the true Europeans values, while the rest of Europe is in the process of the losing them. Seen in this light, Russia is depicted as the only one state which has power to resist the moral decay that afflicts the Old World, and in such a way even as a country which can protect the rest of it from degradation. This concept is quite near the concept of Katechon (from Greek: "ὁ κατέχων", – "the one who withholds") which paradoxically enough is used as an ideological basis for a new wave of militarization and anti-Western sentiment.

All narratives mentioned above have been actual in the ideological vacuum which arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first years after its breakup have not resulted in the birth of a new liberal ideology. Instead, the ideology-less society has been proclaimed. This in combination with a longing for some kind of meaningfulness, and disgust for the shocking attempt to liberalize the Russian economy has paved the

way for old narratives which in turn were adopted to the post-soviet reality.

The Symbol of the new Russia?

In the current situation, like in the beginning of the 1990:s it seems that the last years' development of the country led Russia in the wrong direction, it became necessary to find both a new ideology and a point of origin to return to, which could repair the dramatic present in Russia. This alternative ideology also requires new symbols. It is not possible to foresee what the ideology and symbols should be like in the future. But, however, created (i.a.) by transgender Kaj Katonina, used by Russian emigrants on anti-war protest actions and by formed Russian soldiers fighting on the Ukrainian side, the white-blue-white flag stands for something completely different than what the official and non-official symbols used by the Russian government stand for. The same can be said also about the narrative lying behind this symbol. It seems to be that this narrative can be a perfect historiographic basis for a new liberal ideology which can be adopted in Russia, and which can make rivalry to the three imperial narratives widespread in the contemporary political discourse.

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Young officers' debate

For all professions, professional written discussion, identifying different problems and critically examining different relationships in professional practice, is central to developing the proven experience needed to solve the new problems facing the profession. This involves both the ability to apply the normally incomplete and contradictory rules of action inherent in practice, and the ability to reflect on the rules of the existing organisation, to break away from past practice, which is usually referred to as reasoning about practice. It is thus a social process of developing, through reflection, new thinking tools to address the limitations of the existing organisation's social patterns, attitudes and techniques.

Officers who follow and contribute to the development of knowledge early in their career are thus a prerequisite for increased military competence by being able to solve the problems that younger officers face in their professional practice. But it also means that the conditions for them to be able to reflect and reason about practice will increase. It also presupposes that managers at all levels actually reward a discussion that includes challenging information and new perspectives. The development of the Armed Forces' competence and ability to act under both peace and war conditions thus becomes a task for all officers and not something that can be limited to a few individual organisational units.

One of the objectives of the new Officers' Programme is that the officers themselves should demonstrate an ability to follow and contribute to the development of knowledge. If we go back about a hundred years in Proceedings och journal, we can see that it is not unusual for even younger officers to publish articles about the problems they themselves encountered in their professional practice.

The debate articles from ensigns who have recently completed the Officers' Programme, which follow in this part of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences' Proceedings och Journal, represent a selection made in consultation between the Swedish Defence University and the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

Tommy Jeppsson

Lieutenant Colonel, member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and editor of its Proceedings and Journal.

Niklas Wikström

Member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and lecturing war sciences at the Swedish National Defence College. He is Major in the Reserve.

Healthcare: De-prioritised but essential

by Albin Jönsson

Résumé

The Swedish armed force needs to ensure a well-functioning medical care chain, particularly in the face of evolving security threats. Although combat medics are vital during warfare, the function tends to be forgotten in military training. Swedish military units often rely on the combat medic specialist, rather than ensuring individual medic skills. This trend needs to stop. The number of trained medics will probably be insufficient relative to the expected injury outcome on the battlefield. The tactical issue arises when individuals lack the ability to carry out lifesaving measures in combat situations. Comprehensive healthcare preparedness is thus crucial to minimise casualties within own forces. The need for every soldier's ability to possess basic medical skills to provide initial care on the battlefield is essential due to known vulnerabilities and disregard for the laws of war by the enemy. A broader medical competence improves combat effectiveness, resilience and motivation among forces. Additionally, increased military medic training benefits the societal environment, as it can alleviate the strain on civilian emergency healthcare and contribute to public safety. Commanders need to prioritise medical training and incorporate the entire spectrum of casualty care in military exercise.

THE SWEDISH DEFENCE FORCES operate under constantly changing security policy conditions. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine shook the global world order, and the threat of an armed attack on Sweden is now the greatest since the Second World War.[1] In the event of war, the Defence Forces' primary task is to defend Sweden. On the battlefield, this means using military means to carry out acts of violence against a hostile actor; in the air, at sea and on land.

Soldier skills are the foundation

A common denominator of combat is the imminent risk of casualties. In an armed attack, it is therefore of the utmost importance that the organisation has a functioning medical chain with competent personnel to care for the injured. Despite the central role of medical care in war, the activity is often perceived to be de-prioritised during exercises and training. Continuous medical training is often seen as a waste of time, relying on each unit's medics rather than ensuring the capability of each individual soldier. This approach must change. The trained medic will probably not be able to be available in relation to the expected outcome of injuries to own troops. The tactical problem thus arises when an individual soldier is not sufficiently trained to perform life-sustaining measures on himself or a comrade. A broad and robust medical preparation is created before war breaks out, not during the war.

Basic military training normally consists of 9–15 months of service, the first three of

which are known as 'green service'. During this period, conscripts learn, among other things, basic medical care. Basic military medical care prioritises measures to keep injured soldiers alive until qualified medical care can be obtained. As severe haemorrhaging is the major treatable cause of death, great emphasis is placed on training with *tourniquets*.[2] In addition, conscripts are trained, among other things, in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, freeing the injured person's airways, preventing hypothermia and stopping bleeding from the body's major haemorrhagic reservoirs with haemostatic dressings.[3] Apart from direct life-saving measures, conscripts are trained in medical care of a less critical nature, such as wrapping a sprained foot or preventing blisters. Since this knowledge, like other military activities, is perishable, a lot of practice and repetition is required. Failure to maintain the ability to perform life-saving measures on each individual soldier will mean that injured soldiers are more likely to die as a consequence of our ignorance.

Health care in the battle

No matter how well developed our means and methods are in combat, there are always vulnerabilities that the enemy will exploit. Given the quantitative superiority of the opponent, it can be said that tactical success in combat will not be easy to achieve. It is therefore naive to believe that we will not suffer our own casualties. Furthermore, the Ukrainian war shows that the laws of war are often seen as suggestions rather than rules. During the invasion, Russia has repeatedly attacked medical personnel and facilities, which in turn has led to a huge shortage of medical resources in the country.[4] Just because the armed forces are subject to the laws of Crimea, it cannot be assumed that the opponent will do the same. It therefore becomes risky to rely on trained medics as the only care resource on the battlefield.

Based on this reasoning, two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that medical personnel should practice combat to a greater extent in order to be able to withdraw from a situation where the opponent does not respect the Red Cross symbol. The second conclusion is linked to the article's thesis and consists of the fact that each individual soldier must have a basic ability to carry out an initial treatment. This will determine the number of casualties in combat, especially when unit medics have to deal with unprovoked attacks in addition to their main duty.

In addition to the fact that broad medical expertise creates better conditions for good combat value and long-term sustainable units, it can contribute to increased motivation and willingness to defend. The knowledge that platoon mates, regardless of position, are capable of quickly and efficiently treating the injured probably creates a greater willingness to fight in the unit. The effect is thus that soldiers are more likely to fulfil their tasks in combat. Even though the fear of being injured or dying in combat will always be a key factor influencing our ability to fulfil combat tasks, the safety and security provided by medical care is claimed here to strengthen the will to perform on the battlefield.

Health care for society

From a broader perspective, there is also a societal benefit to training and exercising medical care to a greater extent in the Swedish Armed Forces. Swedish emergency medical care is currently heavily burdened. The waiting time for an ambulance has increased in more than 90 per cent of Sweden's municipalities, which means that people with

life-threatening medical conditions do not always get help in time.[5] The increased number of conscripts means that the Armed Forces now have a greater opportunity to positively influence the general medical competence in society. This is an opportunity that should be capitalised on. By putting more energy into training and exercising medical care in the Armed Forces, we create the conditions for life-saving measures, both civilian and military. In the long term, this will probably also lead to an increased sense of security among the population.

Lack of time and resources

A counterargument for not practising medical care to a greater extent is that time is taken from training and practising the primary tasks of the units. It can be argued that individual soldiers have received sufficient medical training during the basic training phase and that it would take expensive time away from command training or other important activities.

This is a distorted way of looking at military activities. Medical care should not be seen as something that takes time away from the main service, but rather a prerequisite for it. How long will a unit be able to operate with constant hostile action and lack of ability to care for the injured? Even if the commander does not consider that medical care is required, the war will.

Another counter-argument that can be used for not practising medical care is that it is too expensive, "We cannot spend money on expensive medical equipment for training purposes". This argument can be directly attributed to managers' apparent lack of knowledge and creativity on the subject. Medical exercises need not be particularly resource-intensive and rarely require expensive equipment to achieve the exercise objective. The unit's medical unit certainly has a good supply of exercise equipment that can be borrowed instead of wasting unnecessary expenses on the constant acquisition of new live equipment. In addition, with a little innovation it is possible to create very realistic scenarios with, for example, simulated blood and good acting. This would contribute to increased preparedness for the challenges of war.

Solution

In order to improve each individual soldier's ability to care for the wounded, the first step should be to increase the amount of basic medical care. Carrying out simple medical procedures once a week takes neither much time nor energy in relation to what it provides. Each platoon commander is responsible for realising this development. It should be in his interest that subordinates can take care of themselves and their comrades in case of injury, in order to maintain a high combat value of the platoon over a longer period of time. What can further contribute to a better medical preparedness is that each medical unit in the unit provides further training to other functions. The unit thus creates a more intertwined medical chain and reduces the risk of friction. Finally, what is of great importance is that we stop de-prioritising medical care from exercises. The initial care of injured personnel must be carried out by everyone, so it is of the utmost importance that this is also practised. The sequence of events from injury during combat to qualified medical care must be incorporated into exercises and carefully monitored by an expert exercise director. Only then can we improve within the framework of military professional development.

The loss of soldiers due to incorrect or inadequate initial care is not only deeply sad-

dening, but also unnecessary. It is high time that managers at lower tactical levels look at themselves and begin to realise that war requires medical care at all levels.

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By deception, we win the war

by Albin Malmenström

"Sun Tzu ... claimed all warfare can be boiled down to trickery and deception ..."[1]

Résumé

During the Cold War, the Swedish Armed Forces used specific methods to achieve deception. Since the Cold War ended, the concept of deception has continued to be a constant in war, although the Swedish armed forces definition of it, and possible methods of achieving it, has become more and more abstract. This article argues that deception through specific methods and technologies should be brought back, although in a modern context surrounding multiple areas and throughout both the electromagnetic, visual and audible spectrum. Through this the Swedish Armed Forces will be able to achieve elements of surprise which furthermore equalize the strength comparison on the battlefield in regards to Russia's abilities. In the end, this could enable the possibility of victory for Sweden in a potential armed conflict.

DURING THE COLD War, the Defence Forces used simple means to mislead the opponent. The opponent was considered to be materially stronger than us, so the importance of being able to conceal our units was a prioritised need. Misdirection could be achieved through dummy targets, for example by using a blowtorch to give the dummy target the shape of a Viggen-like aircraft, which in connection with aerial reconnaissance would mimic a real aircraft. This method disappeared after the end of the Cold War.[2]

In line with the disarmament of the Swedish Armed Forces, it seems that our own methods of misdirection have become increasingly abstract and are now very vaguely described in our doctrines. However, it is described that the opponent's use of misdirection should be considered an expected method.[3] For those who have followed the debate about the Defence Forces' rearmament and Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, the following statement seems obvious: We are numerically weaker than the opponent. The comparison of forces in planning probably leads to a conclusion similar to the above statement. Our technology and methods are what enable a change in the comparison of forces against Russia. It is obvious that misdirection should have a prominent role as a method also in our battle and therefore the reintroduction of old methods and at the same time the introduction of new ones and units should be a logical measure to be prepared to fight the wars of the future.

Military theory and Swedish doctrines

The military theorist Edward Luttwak has discussed the logic of paradox in war, which can be briefly explained by the example of

the choice of an advance route, one good and one bad. The problem lies in choosing the one that is least obvious to the opponent. But not making the obvious obvious is obvious and thus the obvious is no longer obvious and vice versa. A paradox logic that, according to Luttwak, can only be broken in one way, through surprise, and surprise itself is made possible partly by operational security and partly by misdirection.[4] The Swedish Defence Forces' doctrine for tactics describes surprise to achieve the goal of local superiority and concentration of forces.[5]

The operational doctrine also describes surprise as something the defence forces strive for. It also calls for the active use of misdirection to achieve this goal.[6] Luttwak argues that there has never been a war where misdirection has been completely absent, i.e. the wars have never been fully industrialised.[7] Given the prominent role of deception in warfare, Sweden should focus on deception as part of maximising our resources. But, how can we mislead the opponent if there are no methods and means to do so?

Simple means to effect

It can be argued that force comparisons can be considered to be mostly to our disadvantage when it comes to the comparison in quantity of equipment because Russia has more equipment than we do. So more artillery shells, more anti-tank missiles, more aircraft, more ground missiles, more air and sea missiles. Of course, Russia wants to fire these at targets that damage the capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces. The electromagnetic spectrum is a key factor for many of these modern weapon systems. Through the electromagnetic spectrum it is possible to achieve effectiveness, protection and information gathering. Sensors can identify targets, modern cameras can detect staging areas even in the dark, and the use of radio equipment can be detected at long distances.

It is here, especially when it comes to the electromagnetic spectrum and other sensors, that future deception should be based. Through simple means, the Defence Forces can deceive the opponent's sensor systems and receivers. This means that the opponent uses its advanced weapon systems on targets that it believes will damage the capabilities of the Defence Forces, which in reality have no direct effect. To illustrate this more clearly, a few different possibilities are discussed here:

1. In the ground arena, deception the opponent's units can be done both through the electromagnetic spectrum and through the opponent's other sensor systems, such as cameras. The defence forces can use small autonomous systems (e.g. radio-controlled cars) or small off-road vehicles equipped with radio systems. Through programming, the radio systems are controlled to transmit in a way that mimics a mechanised battalion/company/platoon. In this way, the opponent's tele-warfare system can be fooled into thinking that we have more units in an area than we actually do. This, combined with the fact that the real forces minimise their transmissions, forces the opponent to fight our fake units, which in the long run affects their logistics and enables us to fight in places the opponent does not expect. In this way it is possible to achieve surprise and thus the possibility of achieving local superiority.

   Further examples from the ground arena include the use of dummy targets in the form of inflatable vehicles and fake command centres. Thanks to power plants, hot plates and software-based radios, the defence forces' fake units can look like real units in cameras and pass themselves

off as real units in the electromagnetic spectrum. This is a development of the capability we once mastered but now seem to have forgotten.

2. In the air arena, misdirection can take place as described for the ground arena. This means that the opponent's flying system identifies fake units and forces the opponent to use weapon systems against our fake units. In the air, however, UAVs, military or simple civilian equipped with, for example, radio transmitters and reflective panels, can be perceived by the opponent as having more aircraft in the air than we actually have.
3. In the maritime arena, misdirection can be achieved by very simple means. The opponent can be misled into believing that we have units in places where they do not exist and that they are more numerous than in reality. For example, small boats equipped with radar, radio, sonar or reflective surfaces that in the opponent's telecommunications warfare and sensor system pretend to be other targets, such as high-value targets like corvettes, patrol boats, etc. In this way, we can force the opponent to use qualified weapon systems such as missiles and torpedoes to fight targets that in reality do not affect our warfare capability.

A cost issue?

The introduction of systems aimed at destroying the adversary can be criticised on the basis of cost considerations. This is achieved by claiming that the money should be utilised to achieve the highest possible warfare capability. It can be argued that the introduction of systems and materiel aimed at being destroyed by the opponent is not reasonable, as the money can instead be spent on buying, for example, additional artillery systems and thereby increasing warfare capability, at least from a kinetic perspective.

The technical and material solutions presented here are not ones that cost unreasonable amounts, at least not in comparison with the benefits. Why should the Defence Forces not introduce systems that significantly increase the likelihood of our real units avoiding combat? It is about forcing the opponent to waste his resources, but more importantly, it is about saving resources and above all lives!

The introduction of systems and equipment aimed at deception the adversary and creating confusion has another positive consequence. Through these methods, the Defence Forces can influence the adversary's decision cycle. Regardless of the quality of the false systems we use, they will continue to force the adversary to act on the information provided. Sun Tzu argued that if an adversary is forced to prepare throughout the operational area, he will be weak everywhere.[8] By implementing the methods outlined here, we can achieve the same effect. We can slow down the opponent's decision cycle, force the opponent to waste his qualified systems and, above all, we can face a weaker opponent who is continuously forced to react instead of act.

Closure

It seems fairly obvious why the need for units specialising in deception the opponent should be introduced at both tactical and operational levels. The proposed solution is to introduce the 1st Operational Misdirection Battalion, which specialises in using simple means to mislead the opponent in the ground, sea and air arena. It should be natural for the Defence Forces to use these simple means to confuse the opponent. In this way, we can achieve further synergies

in the battle, become locally superior and ultimately win the war.

The author is an Second Lieutenant in the Life Guards.

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Let the Electronic Warfare be fully practised

by Andreas Persson

Résumé

Electronic warfare is a neglected part of our exercises. This article argues for more training in order to better master a capability we know with certainty the enemy will use, as one of many tools to create friction for our units. It's foremost a question of willpower from our side and by using that willpower we can put ourselves in a much better position concerning our ability to operate in an environment infected by electronic warfare.

WHEN IT COMES to the role of cyber warfare in exercises, the capability is often sidelined. Despite solid training in liaison service on units, where the telecommunications threat is identified and countered by both passive and active measures, this is rarely applied in a context where the countermeasures are actually significant. Instead, various means of communication are used as much as possible to make it both easier and smoother for units to fulfil their tasks during exercises. However, this teaches a wrong behaviour in the use of the communications service and a wrong view of the telecommunications warfare capability. To counteract this, telewarfare should instead become a more integrated part of the exercises.

Actively choosing the simple path of communication by not subjecting it to interference or other influences during exercises is something that will have negative consequences in the battle against a future opponent. Therefore, the role of cyber warfare in exercises should not be hampered by too much friction in the exercise, but rather the opposite. The implementation of cyber warfare in the context of exercises is a golden opportunity for units to understand the effect the opponent's cyber warfare will have in the battle and thus minimise its impact.

> Combat in a telestroke environment will be the normal case when facing a conventional opponent.[1]

Telecommunications warfare is based on three main elements: electronic support (ES), which provides signals intelligence; electronic attack (EA), which is the jamming capability; and electronic protection (EP), which comprises the measures taken to reduce the impact of the adversary's telecommunications warfare. During exercises, it is mainly these capabilities that telecommunications warfare focuses on in the context of combat in the electromagnetic spectrum.

The purpose of cyber warfare at the tactical level is to reduce the opponent's ability to utilise command, intelligence and weapon systems in combat, while preserving the effect of the corresponding systems on one's own side. This means, for example, that a brigade should be able to be supported by the telecommunications warfare capability in a way that benefits its own battle, while

at the same time inhibiting the opponent's ability to conduct combat with freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum.

The adversary will behave aggressively and frequently with its tele-warfare capability

The Handbook on Ground Combat – The Opponent states that "Telecommunications warfare is an integral part of battle plans"[2] where the capability is used, among other things, to disrupt communications and sensors but also for self-protection. Thus, we should expect to encounter friction in the electromagnetic environment at the tactical level and in the context of, for example, brigade and divisional combat when the opponent tries to use it against us. However, this becomes a part of the exercises that is often overlooked because much of the focus is on the battle at the front.

Therefore, conducting exercises with a greater element of telecommunications warfare, in terms of both jamming and signals intelligence, would create better conditions for addressing the problem of telecommunications warfare operations impacting the battle in ways that are consistent with the doctrinal behaviour of the adversary. There are various reasons why this would favour the tactical level of warfare. One is that telecommunications warfare will have better conditions for participating in the tactical battle when the capability becomes a more natural part of it, instead of largely only conducting functional exercises that do not show how prominent telecommunications warfare will be against a thinking opponent who implements both active and passive measures to counter the telecommunications warfare capability. Another reason is that it creates better conditions for managers at all levels to act in a telecommunications-disturbed environment. They need to be able to implement countermeasures and make decisions in an environment where the reliability of communication systems is affected/limited. They need to be able to manage a remote environment in order to be able to continue to deliver effect in the battle despite an impact from both the jamming capability and the signals intelligence capability.

Necessary elements of the exercises

I do not believe that the exercises will be made more difficult in a way that is unnecessary, but on the contrary – the exercises are given a degree of difficulty that is realistic and necessary for capability development. The opponent's use of superior indirect fire to achieve success in combat is not considered an unnecessary element in the exercises, but an important part of the opponent's behaviour, which makes it important to practise the handling of indirect fire. The opponent's use of airdrops in the exercises is also not considered an unnecessary element since it is part of his doctrine. Therefore, commanders and units are trained to handle such situations. Nor is the opponent's use of massing, surprise, high speed of attack etc. ignored when our units are trained to fight against a qualified opponent.[3] This is how the opponent is expected to behave according to his doctrine and therefore training is based on these conditions, despite the fact that in many cases it creates friction.

All this points to the doctrinal behaviour of the opponent in battle, on which we currently base our exercises, in order to be able to deal with the different ways in which the opponent may behave. Why does the same not apply to the management of cyber warfare? As mentioned above, cyber warfare is

seen by the adversary as a natural and integral part of the battle in accordance with the rules of engagement doctrine. Why should this particular part of the attacker's doctrinal behaviour be ignored during exercises, just to make it more difficult for unit commanders to lead their units?

More practice for electronic warfare

The adversary's doctrine is very much about creating friction for our operations. Current exercises reflect this in combat by simulating the opponent's behaviour through either B forces or directives from the exercise command to create the frictions that the opponent will try to take advantage of. If we train to deal with these frictions, why not also train to deal with the frictions created by the opponent's telewarfare?

By integrating tele-warfare into our exercises, units will have a better understanding of what the situation will be like in a telecommunications environment. With practice comes skill. It is not surprising that many units see it as too much of a challenge to include telecommunications warfare in a major exercise when they have not practised measures to manage this capability. It becomes a vicious circle of not wanting to, or rather not being able to, deal with the frictions that tele-warfare entails, which leads to a reduction of its role in exercises. In the end, the consequence is that units become even worse at dealing with the tele-warfare capability, which will nevertheless be integrated into the opponent's battle plan, regardless of whether we choose to train for it or not. The frictions that arise from telecommunications warfare operations could have been dealt with by more exercises where the telecommunications warfare threat does not necessarily have to take centre stage, but which will nevertheless be part of the opponent's behaviour.

Integrating cyber warfare into exercises

There is an old motto that says "Fight as you train, train as you fight". We are expected to train to face a qualified opponent and most of the time we perform well in these exercises. If we are to train against a qualified opponent, why do we largely ignore the effects of tele-warfare in these exercises?

There is great potential for development here. We have the training, the expertise and the ability to deal with the opponent's telecommunications capabilities. So I ask myself why we choose not to do this during exercises, even though it is a type of hostile action that can create a lot of friction for our units. The only thing that stops us is the will. Integrate tele-warfare into more exercises, make the units more accustomed to dealing with this friction, and the result will make us better prepared to face a qualified opponent in the future.

The author is Second Lieutenant in the Signal Regiment.

Notes

1. *Handbook Army – Brigade, Swedish Armed* Forces, 2016, p. 154.
2. *Handbook Ground Combat – The Opponent, Swedish* Armed Forces, 2021, p 19.
3. Ibid, p 23.

We need to know why we fight

by Axel Fredriksson

Résumé

Two of the main principles that grant success in manoeuvre warfare are precision and tempo. Precision in the attacks and tempo in the decisions. The attacks should be aimed towards the enemy's "schwerpunkt". In Swedish army doctrine an analysis regarding the "schwerpunkt" is conducted on the tactical warfare level. The "schwerpunkt" is, in the current system, a part of the planning in units of battalion size or greater. In this article it is argued that in order to accommodate the need for tempo, the army should include planning regarding the "schwerpunkt" on the lowest tactical levels. This could increase the tempo of decision making, without a decrease in precision of the operations. There are counterarguments towards this change. It will likely increase the confusion on the battlefield. Furthermore, it could be argued that the "schwerpunkt" can already be understood with the current order system, also in the lower tactical levels. However, Sweden should focus on optimising it's maneuver warfare, as it is a country unable to win an attrition war against its likely enemy.

MANOEUVRE WARFARE IS based on taking risks against enemy weaknesses and aims to achieve success with little loss. However, this comes at the cost of high risk-taking, where you risk losing battles and wars in a short time. But which risks should be taken and at what level should risk-taking decisions be made? Is it possible that our own lead times are too long to maintain the pace required in manoeuvre warfare?

Victory through manoeuvre warfare is achieved by creating system collapse in the opponent. However, this collapse requires striking selected targets with high precision and maintaining a high tempo of battle.[1] In order to achieve precision and tempo, the risks to be taken should be understood at a low tactical level. Otherwise, there is a great risk that the tempo will slow down because only senior managers can make decisions, or that the initiatives taken will be towards the wrong end goal and precision will decrease. Both a reduced tempo and a lack of precision reduce the likelihood of successful manoeuvre warfare. Unsuccessful manoeuvre warfare is associated with a quick loss or the fighting turning into mere attrition. Both of these outcomes would be very negative for us.

The *Reglemente Armé Tactik* states that the enemy's centres of gravity must be found through analysis. These consist of capabilities that are vital to the achievement of objectives. The enemy's centres of gravity that we can influence constitute critical vulnerabilities. It is thus clearly defined what the risk-taking is expected to target. The same regulation also states that the analysis should not be done at lower levels, to avoid splitting forces.[2] At lower levels, the analysis should instead only concern the enemy's strengths and weaknesses. At company level, neither critical vulnerabilities nor centres of gravity are mentioned. Instead, it is the goals and objectives of the battalion that determine what the battle should achieve.[3]

To achieve a higher tempo, without sacrificing precision, the critical vulnerabilities should also be part of the company's fight. In practice, this could mean that in addition to the purpose of the tasks assigned to the company, critical vulnerabilities should also be specified in a battalion order. Furthermore, these should be seen as superior to the company's task, as they are crucial to the battle in general and vital in manoeuvre warfare.

This would mean that companies are more able to act, on their own initiative, towards tactical and possibly even operational objectives. If "forward" commanders are able to make decisions to strike at the opponent's critical vulnerabilities when situations arise, lead times disappear. Shorter lead times lead to higher tempo, and higher tempo increases the likelihood that manoeuvre warfare will succeed.

The price of manoeuvre warfare

However, giving "front-line" commanders this increased responsibility reduces senior commanders' control over the battlefield. It is likely and desirable that greater initiative is taken at a low level, but it introduces greater uncertainty. An uncertainty that can lead to chaotic situations. So it means more risk-taking with less central control when lower managers make big decisions.

Attempting to conduct low-risk manoeuvre warfare goes against the nature of the concept and removing the risk seems impossible. Manoeuvre warfare is based on taking risks against enemy weaknesses. So you have to take risks against what leads to the collapse of an enemy system. Attempting to limit risk-taking increases the risk of losing the required tempo and being forced to resort to attritional warfare. If circumstances allow lower units to exploit critical vulnerabilities, both the knowledge of these and the mandate to combat them should be at that level. Not giving the ability to strike critical vulnerabilities to the lowest level, in order to increase control for higher commanders, seems counterproductive from a manoeuvre warfare perspective.

Don't we already understand why we are fighting?

It can also be argued that in the Swedish system there is already some understanding of how to act in order to bring about system collapse. Everyone should understand the battle plan two levels up and the tasks for the units should include objectives. Since all tactical levels above the company level concern critical vulnerabilities, these plans should include how to combat them. The plans themselves should aim to strike at the enemy's critical vulnerabilities. Based on this reasoning, it seems that the army already has a system for lower units to operate against critical vulnerabilities.

The purpose given in the order is often linked to the combat task the unit is given, and thus the link to the critical vulnerabilities is weaker. Trying to understand what the critical vulnerabilities are, in orders one or two levels up, seems to be complicated and time-consuming. Thus, it is not certain that company commanders in time-pressured situations can find out what the critical vulnerabilities are. Therefore, if one wants the lower levels of the army to be able to act directly against the critical vulnerabilities, they should be included in the orders, even further down the system.

Another potential risk of lower levels having to interpret the orders of higher levels is that the critical vulnerabilities can be misinterpreted. The room for interpretation must be minimised, so that the precision in com-

bating the vulnerabilities does not suffer. In summary, the possibilities provided by the current order system are not sufficient to be able to attack critical vulnerabilities at lower levels in the army. Being forced to read over orders from organised units to understand what the critical vulnerabilities are will be an extra motivation that is likely to be rarely met and carries the risk of misinterpretation.

Critical vulnerabilities – complex or necessary?

Another argument that can be raised for not including critical vulnerabilities in lower level orders is that the centres of gravity and critical vulnerabilities may be of an abstract nature. Higher levels of warfare involve more abstract objectives, so enemy vulnerabilities at the tactical or operational level may be too abstract for a company to operate against. There would simply be no value in allowing lower units to participate in critical vulnerability assessments. An account of critical vulnerabilities would only be an irrelevant supplement to the orders.

However, it is unlikely that all critical vulnerabilities identified are of an abstract nature. If they are all abstract, the damage to manoeuvre warfare as a method is less if they are communicated to the lower levels. The lower units may not be able to affect the critical vulnerabilities, but it increases the understanding of the battle at higher levels. Increased visibility of the battle always increases the ability to act, even if not directly against the abstract targets. Furthermore, it reduces the risk of companies making their own analyses of critical vulnerabilities and thereby fragmenting the higher units. This risk is mentioned in Arméreglemente *Armé Tactik*.[4]

To summarise, it is argued here that the army should include the critical vulnerabilities from higher units' analyses in lower units' orders. This would enable a higher tempo in manoeuvre warfare and thus increase the chance of achieving system collapse in the enemy. While this would increase uncertainty in our own warfare, manoeuvre warfare cannot be conducted without risk. The increase in information about the purpose of the battle would be significant, especially by clarifying what risks are expected to be taken. This means that the precision of manoeuvre warfare is not significantly affected, but the decision to take risks can be made at a lower level. If the decisions are made at a lower level, the tempo of the battle increases. The increased information at a lower level may create some friction, but the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Sweden is not able to get stuck in a war of attrition with a nation like Russia and must therefore rely on manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre warfare must also be effective as the balance of power is clearly to our disadvantage.

Manoeuvre warfare is more effective when we know why we are fighting, at all levels!

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Notes

1. Ångström, Jan and Widén, Jerker: *Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war,* Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon 2015, pp 113-114.
2. *Reglemente Armé Tactik,* Defence Forces, 2013, p 38.
3. *Handbook Ground Combat – Company, Swedish* Armed Forces, 2016, p 42.
4. Op cit, *Reglemente Armé Tactik,* see note 2, p 38.

Infantry brigades, the missing link in the modern division

by David Andersson

Résumé

The article argues for strengthening the division by organizing infantry brigades. Modern infantry units are more mobile than armoured units and able to be in first-hand positions, taking up a mobile defence and increase the posibility for armoured units to defeat an enemy. Infantry and mechanised brigades in the division will also give the commander a more flexible instrument compared to a division consisting of only armoured units as the hammer.

IN 1948, IT was decided that the Swedish Armed Forces would be reorganised into brigades, thus abandoning the previous organisation of field regiments. To defend the country, 29 infantry brigades and 6 armoured brigades were organised, with around 6 000 soldiers and officers in each brigade.[1] The trend of this strong preponderance of infantry brigades among manoeuvre units continued throughout the Cold War. Most of the infantry brigades were phased out around 1991-2000.[2] The defence decision taken by the Swedish Parliament in 2020 states that the Swedish Armed Forces will now establish three mechanised brigades at I19, P7 and P4. In addition to these, a reduced infantry brigade (the Yellow Brigade) will be re-established at Livgardet, whose main task will be to protect the capital.[3] A reduced infantry brigade is not enough. It is the infantry units that enable the armoured units to defeat the opponent and decide the battle. Three modern mechanised brigades make a great hammer, but without a robust anvil, the power of this hammer will be significantly reduced. Sweden needs to organise more infantry brigades with the task of forming this anvil, which the hammer can then exploit with its full power.

Experiences from other countries

During the war in Ukraine, Ukrainian infantry units have repeatedly demonstrated that the unit type is well suited to counter Russian mechanised attacks. The Ukrainian infantry has been successful in forming a resilient defence where the Russian attacking force is worn down by continuous fire and three-dimensional combat, despite a superior opponent.[4] This type of combat then enables heavier armoured units to strike at the opponent's extended lines and its support units, such as logistics and indirect fire.

Operational mobility

From a Swedish perspective, the Swedish Armed Forces have always trained for a scenario where the opponent lands and/or airdrops units somewhere along the Baltic Sea coast. In an event where the opponent lands in Oxelösund, for example, it takes a long time for all three armoured brigades to reach this area of operation. This may give the enemy welcome time to establish a bridgehead and then begin their attack into Sweden. Through its operational mobility, a motorised infantry brigade can advance to the area of operations much faster. In accordance with the Army Regulation's tactics, it is precisely a high tempo when advancing to the land-based enemy that is a vital success factor in order to achieve an advantageous position for the defensive battle.[5] The infantry brigades can begin to fight the enemy by delaying action while waiting for the arrival of the divisional attack force in the form of the mechanised brigades.

Manoeuvre warfare

The aim of manoeuvre warfare in the Armed Forces is to concentrate available resources against the enemy's weaknesses, which in turn should lead to system collapse.[6] Such manoeuvre warfare will not be effective if only a single armoured brigade is used to concentrate forces against the enemy's weaknesses. This system collapse is created by the infantry wearing down the opponent's combat value and willingness to continue the battle, so that the armoured units can then strike at the attacker's weaknesses and achieve a decisive result.

An important part of manoeuvre warfare is to take and maintain the initiative in combat and to maintain a high tempo of decision-making.[7] To do this, the Defence Forces use common objectives and the management philosophy of mission tactics. This allows lower-level managers to take advantage of favourable opportunities that arise on the battlefield. They also allow unnecessary time losses and frictions to be avoided or managed more effectively. This would be further reinforced if the armoured brigades had clear offensive tasks. If a clear overall division of combat tasks can be made between the armoured and infantry brigades, lower-level commanders can more easily act in the spirit of the commander and lead the battle in a way that realises the higher commander's objectives. At present, the armoured brigades are the "multi-tool" of the Armed Forces, which should be able to solve all tasks, as there is no one else to give the tasks to. Such a distribution of overall tasks for the brigade types would probably have had further positive outcomes in terms of prioritising training time and equipment. Overall, the distribution of tasks will provide a clear self-image and spirit to each brigade, transforming the "multi-tools" into two high-quality, cutting-edge tools that complement each other.

Combined arms

Armoured and infantry units achieve different effects depending on the terrain, due to their different capabilities for mobility, action and protection. Today's division is confined to settlements and covered terrain with a limited road network, such as in parts of Norrland. If the division contains infantry brigades, this problem can be better managed. The infantry can carry out operations in built-up areas with support from the armed forces heavier armoured brigades. Just like taking a house at platoon level, a sub-support group with heavier weapon systems supports the lighter

groups attacking into the house and taking ground. The division should work in the same way, but on a much larger scale. Due to the current organisation, the Swedish division should be considered extremely predictable, as it contains three brigades with exactly the same capabilities. The infantry brigades would have added another dimension for the opponent to deal with. If the brigades are deployed in terrain appropriate to the unit type, the adversary must constantly deal with different dilemmas, resulting in a loss of tempo and initiative. This cannot be achieved if we only have access to identical units with identical capabilities. Meeting a Swedish division on the battlefield must be more difficult than that.

Counter-arguments and problems

What might argue against the inclusion of infantry brigades in the division are the relatively newly created local defence battalions. It is not unreasonable to argue that these battalions are the most likely to be the first to respond to an attack, wherever it occurs in the country. However, these battalions do not report directly to the divisional headquarters, which could lead to problems in coordinating units for operations in the same area. Furthermore, it is unlikely that these battalions would be able to create the same synergy effects as a number of infantry brigades reporting to the division commander.

NATO membership may have significant implications for how the Swedish Armed Forces choose to organise the division. Depending on the tasks and needs of the defence alliance, Sweden could probably station units in other NATO countries, as our neighbours Denmark and Norway already do. In such a scenario, it can probably be assumed that the army abandons the idea of invasion defence and instead focuses on integration into NATO and support to allies such as Finland and the Baltic countries. This would mean that infantry brigades partially lose their function as argued above. Membership in NATO or not, we should be able to defend our national interests and territory regardless. We do this through a combination of armoured and infantry brigades in the division.

It is possible that financial constraints may affect the realisation of a stronger division containing infantry brigades. The purpose of this text is to generate debate and thoughts about whether we can create a stronger division, not a plan for exactly how to get there, which will be a later discussion.

Closure

A division containing both armoured and infantry brigades would have created synergies for its own units, which can be used to operate in all types of terrain in the country. Because of its operational mobility, the infantry had been able to meet the opponent early, and then provide the conditions for the heavier brigades to defeat the opponent. This had created uncertainty for the opponent, presented him with dilemmas and made it easier for the division to take the initiative in the battle. It is time to use the hammer and anvil to hit the opponent. It's time to give the division commander infantry brigades!

The author is Second Lieutenant in the Life Guards.

Notes

1. Braunstein, Christian: *Sveriges arméförband under 1900-talet,* Statens försvarshistoriska museer, Stockholm 2003.
2. Ibid.
3. Prop. (2020/21:30), *Total Defence 2021-2025*, Ministry of Defence, Stockholm 2020, p 102.
4. Anderson, Michael G: "How Ukraines Roving Teams Of Light Infantry Helped Win The Battle Of Sumy: Lessons For The US Army", *Modern War Institute – At West Point,* 2022-08-17.
5. *Arméreglemente tactics, Swedish Armed* Forces, Stockholm 2013, p 142.
6. Ibid, p 37.
7. Ibid, pp. 41-42.

Tracked artillery systems – an important complement to get more effect from indirect fire

by Olov Scherling

Résumé

The Swedish artillery currently prides itself in its highly advanced ARCHER artillery system. Rightfully so, the ARCHER is one of the most advanced modern self-propelled guns (SPG) developed and currently in use. It possesses the ability to quickly deploy and fire within 30 seconds. Within 1 minute it can complete its fire mission and quickly redeploy. What the ARCHER lacks is a guarantee for tactical maneuverability, a guarantee that it can follow the mechanised assault in rough terrain that has been altered by the effects of the battlefield making maneuverability harder, especially for wheeled vehicles. One solution for this would be a tracked artillery system ensuring that the mechanised assault will have indirect fire support wherever the assault is taking place.

THE SWEDISH DEFENCE Forces are developing their artillery capability. This includes more ARCHER systems and possibly a new carrier for the artillery system in order to find and interest international buyers. The new carrier is an 8x8 truck called the ARCHER 8x8. The idea behind this is good because it can significantly reduce the price for the Swedish Armed Forces to acquire more systems. Acquiring more systems will fill the shortfall in the number of artillery pieces currently in the Armed Forces.

Mobility

If more systems are acquired, it is possible that it will be the ARCHER 8x8 (lorry cage). With that system, the problem of tactical manoeuvrability becomes very clear. During exercises it is already difficult to drive lorries off-road. The ARCHER 8x8 will have problems with grouping sites and everything that is part of the tactical grouping of artillery systems because of the weight of the piece.

The Defence Forces' doctrine is largely based on surprise. The ARCHER system currently used by Sweden already has a limited ability to deploy in difficult terrain, such as covered terrain. ARCHER 8x8 will find it even more difficult to group in such terrain. With these problems, we lose a large part of the surprise that we want to achieve with the artillery's behaviour. That the enemy will be fired upon by artillery is not a surprise, it is expected. What is not expected is where they are fired upon by indirect fire. Open fields with adjacent forest edges, areas with good road connections and road loops provide good grouping areas. A com-

petent opponent will look for these areas on the map to predict our grouping areas and prepare targets for artillery fire.

This means that in channelled terrain such as that in Norrland, it becomes much easier to predict the grouping locations of firing units. We already miss some of that surprise with our ARCHER 6x6 artillery system and that surprise will be significantly reduced with the ARCHER 8x8.

An alternative that allows greater freedom in the choice of grouping areas is a tracked artillery system such as the South Korean K9 Thunder artillery system currently used by both Finland and Norway. With this example of a tracked artillery system, it is possible to achieve greater surprise for the enemy regarding the areas we choose for grouping our firing units. This can reduce the threat of artillery countermeasures for our own systems because we are operating in less vulnerable locations. A goal often pursued in artillery is to try to group in the most difficult areas possible, in order to minimise the risk of becoming predictable by grouping near large open areas. With a banging artillery system, it is possible that this becomes a normal case. This is because such a system can perform centre turns and has good terrain accessibility. Therefore, a tracked system can more easily advance in covered terrain and retreat before enemy artillery fire can affect the grouping area.

Tactical mobility is a high priority for the Swedish artillery. This is because we have few pieces and we know that we will not win protracted artillery duels with a country such as Russia. We must prioritise mobility for our own survival and effectiveness. Without mobility, we cannot provide effective indirect fire to support the delaying action, keep up with the attack and support the counterattack.

Terrain already affected by the battle will not be favourable to our advance or retreat. This can severely hamper the ability to support the manoeuvre units of a brigade artillery battalion. A tracked artillery system allows for the possibility of following mechanised forces in the same or adjacent lines of advance, which is most likely not possible for a wheeled artillery system.

Flexibility

More effective action should be achieved with a banging system like the K9 Thunder compared to the ARCHER in the covered channelling terrain that characterises northern Sweden and Finland. A system like the K9 Thunder can carry 48 grenades compared to the ARCHER which can carry 21. With this more than double ammunition capacity, greater flexibility can be achieved in what can and needs to be fought. The system can generally carry more basic flow grenades but also a larger proportion of hard target grenades and precision grenades.

Depending on the artillery system that the artillery battalion receives, it can be given more specific tasks to focus the action. ARCHER is a very good artillery system for fighting prioritised targets such as command, logistics and various valuable systems that the enemy possesses. Artillery suppression of enemy artillery systems is also something that ARCHER can achieve given its fast speed, grouping time, rate of fire and

redeployment time achieved by the system. Both artillery systems provide great flexibility for our artillery capabilities, but in different ways. The K9 Thunder can more effectively support and accompany the mechanised units in combat because it has better terrain accessibility and armour for survival. However, the ARCHER can, with greater freedom, concentrate its efforts on combat-

ing and destroying vital systems for the opponent. This provides better conditions for mechanised forces to accomplish their task.

Challenges of two artillery systems

The use of two artillery systems that are to some extent very different from each other can present challenges. This includes the logistics for maintenance, repair and salvage, which can offer challenges that are nevertheless deemed manageable.

The problems should therefore not be exaggerated. Ukraine has several different systems that co-operate to achieve high effectiveness. There are currently seven different Western 155 mm artillery systems used in Ukrainian artillery units – in addition, there are over 50 indirect fire systems used by Ukraine. Therefore, logistical constraints should not be an obstacle to utilising two different systems. The cost of acquiring, training and equipping artillery battalions with a new tracked system is the main reason why this has not been done. The benefits of such a system are not currently considered to outweigh the costs of an additional artillery system.

Combination of artillery systems

Cost is something that is important to consider, but the benefits of a tracked artillery system must also be taken into account. ARCHER is an important system that is effective in solving some tasks, but a tracked artillery system like K9 Thunder covers up where ARCHER fails. Namely, almost guaranteed tactical accessibility and the ability to more effectively follow the mechanised units in battle. The two artillery systems complement each other well by allowing both systems to focus on the task they are best at solving.

A tracked system like the K9 Thunder would be very suitable for a brigade artillery battalion, while the ARCHER with both a dumper and a lorry would be ideal for a divisional artillery battalion or as part of an artillery brigade.

The ARCHER has very good operational mobility, which is rare among modern artillery systems, and it fires NATO standard explosive shells and precision shells. This makes the system a very useful resource for NATO in any future conflict. Regardless of whether the operation takes place in a NATO or national context, it means that we can quickly deploy artillery systems because of the high degree of operational mobility. With one wheeled and one tracked artillery system, we meet all the requirements to effectively support the mechanised advance and combat. These two systems can also be combined to present the opponent with multiple threats at the same time, thus presenting the opponent with multiple dilemmas. Supporting the manoeuvre units' combat is the Swedish artillery's main task and with a tracked system as a supplement, this task will be solved with greater efficiency and the divisional artillery can


focus on high value targeting. This means fighting the enemy on multiple fronts and facing multiple dilemmas while favouring the achievement of our mission.

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The biography of collection

by Gustaf Lewander

TITLE:
A Swedish Leijon
A life in the world of intelligence
AUTHOR:
Jan Leijonhielm
PUBLISHERS:
Medströms Bokförlag



THE FIRST TIME I read about the East Economic Bureau (ÖEB) was in a paraphrase of Thede Palm's autobiographical account *T-kontoret – Några studier till T-kontoret's historia,* in a passage about Jan Rydström and the internal unrest that took place at the office in the 1950s. The paragraph was characteristic in that ÖEB is indeed mentioned in several works dealing with Swedish intelligence during the Cold War, including SOU 2002:92, *Det grå brödraskapet – en berättelse om IB*, but rarely more than extremely briefly, schematically and often inadequately. The lack of literature on the organisation and its work has been striking, despite the fact that its activities were already evaluated in SOU 1979:51, *Betänkande av utredningen om Öst Ekonomiska Byrån.*

Even if the existence of the organisation was thus demonstrably not a secret, it can hardly be said to have been generally known. The story of the Information Bureau (IB) and of Swedish intelligence up to the present day, as told in previous works, cannot therefore be said to have been complete. For this reason alone, Jan Leijonhielm's book *Ett svenskt Leijon: ett liv i underrättelsevärlden* fills an obvious gap in intelligence literature.

Other works on the subject published in Swedish have often revolved around technical intelligence activities (for example SIGINT, signals intelligence, and IMINT, imagery intelligence) or more generally dealt with the organisations that formed the backbone of Swedish military or police intelligence and security services. The disciplines that are the focal point of Leijonhielm's account have not been described as often, and rarely in detail, other than anecdotally in biographies written by those involved. Perhaps this is because they are much less presentable as collection disciplines. HUMINT (human intelligence) and OSINT (open source intelligence), i.e. human or person-based intelligence and open source intelligence respectively, are difficult to describe in a way that does not become either too abstract and general, or too intrusive.

The lack of adequate descriptions of how these disciplines were practised in practice during the Cold War has certainly been due to reasons of secrecy. However, the fact that

the systematic descriptions have been so few, or have been so characterised by their biographical intent, has contributed to an incomplete picture of how Swedish intelligence actually functioned, how it was structured, and by extension also ignorance of how Swedish security policy was conducted in practice. The author himself writes in the book's introduction that the work aims both to provide a picture of his professional career and the organisations he worked in, and to provide a more detailed insight into how the intelligence services of the Cold War worked with these particular disciplines.

A Swedish Leijon cannot be said to fill all previous gaps in knowledge, but it provides many new perspectives and clearly shows that person-based and overt collection had an important role to play in foreign-oriented intelligence activities (in practice, primarily against the Soviet Union) throughout the Cold War.

The book consists of two parts, with different structures and purposes. The first part is a combined account, in chronological order, of Leijonhielm's career and of the authorities and organisations in which he worked and which he largely helped to build and manage. Roughly speaking, Leijonhielm's description of the organisations he worked in can be said to be divided into four phases, based on the author's own biography. The description begins with his personal background and first period as an assistant and analyst at ÖEB 1965-1970, then continues with his time at IB 1970-1981, then back to ÖEB as director, then on to FOA (later FOI) and the work with various forms of organisational structure and adaptation to reality after the end of the Cold War.

Leijonhielm's career began immediately after completing his university studies with a position at ÖEB, whose existence occupies much of the first part of the book. Like the Information Agency, ÖEB was a somewhat odd, but nevertheless typically Swedish intelligence organisation, existing in the borderland between state and private, security policy and commercial policy. The organisation was originally a breakaway from the T-office under the leadership of Jan Rydström, who led the operation until he was succeeded by Leijonhielm in 1981. While T-kontoret was primarily a military-oriented organisation, and later Informationsbyrån mixed military and political intelligence in a hybrid organisation where parts of the Social Democratic Workers' Party were in practice integrated into the operation, ÖEB was a collaborative project between the state and business organisations.

ÖEB's production focused on economic intelligence analysis, gathering information on, analysing and delivering conclusions about the economies of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, often limited to different sectors and market areas. Unlike other Swedish intelligence organisations, ÖEB's clients also included the business community; for a fee, they could subscribe to both customised material and ongoing monitoring of economic developments in the target area. As is often the case in open intelligence gathering, the source material was varied, ranging from BBC media coverage to their own observations, reports from travellers and information from partner organisations in other parts of the Swedish and foreign intelligence services. By providing the clients with a continuously updated picture of economic developments in the east, free from day-to-day political polemics and similar considerations, ÖEB probably played an important role as a complement both to other intelligence organisations and to the purely civilian intelligence community analysis carried out by industry and government departments.

In addition to producing strategic intelligence material for its various subscribers, ÖEB acted as a hub for government and business knowledge of economic developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The agency also acted as a personnel and information bank for other parts of the state administration. Unfortunately, Leijonhielm does not go into the design or content of the products in greater detail, perhaps for reasons of confidentiality, but most of what is given is both new and clear and interesting. He himself admits that it is difficult to assess how big a role ÖEB actually played, and how much value its activities actually had for various subscribers. Nor was the organisation formally very large. Nevertheless, despite Leijonhielm's modesty in the matter, it seems clear that ÖEB filled an important niche in the Swedish intelligence system (which, as the author also admits, was confirmed in the aforementioned SOU 1979:51).

Leijonhielm does not have much to add about the organisation and operational focus of the Information Office, although he spices up the account with several interesting observations, and at a number of points both refutes and confirms certain claims made about the organisation in other works. Instead, a large part of the narrative is devoted to discussing source management and how they worked with person-based, human intelligence. Like the aforementioned description of ÖEB's collection activities, the description of human-based collection is both technically interesting and relatively detailed. The author gives the reader direct insight into the intelligence craft, even if he (for understandable reasons) is sparing with explicit descriptions of its application in concrete cases, with a couple of very interesting exceptions.

Leijonhielm also offers the reader an insight into how the Information Office dealt with the IB affair, giving his view on how it was handled by and affected the political level of the state administration, and how the affair related to certain influential cultural figures and the general spirit of the times. At the IB, Leijonhielm was personally involved in ensuring the organisation's competence and capability regarding the Soviet orientation.

In 1981, when the Information Office was reorganised and became part of the Joint Intelligence Bureau (GBU), Leijonhielm returned to ÖEB as its director. Leijonhielm then remained at ÖEB until the end of the Cold War and ÖEB's incorporation into SITE *(Stockholm Institute for Transition Economics),* now operating at the *Stockholm* School of *Economics*. The final section of the first part of the book takes the reader into the final stages of the Cold War and our own time, when Leijonhielm worked at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOA, now the Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI). The transition to FOA helped to maintain continuity within the system, and the author himself was actively involved in passing on previous expertise and personnel to FOA's new function for Russia analysis.

In the later part of his career, Leijonhielm seems to have worked actively with the question of continuity and competence-building measures. He returns several times to the courses in intelligence analysis at Lund University (led by Stevan Dedijer and later Wilhelm Agrell, among others), to the courses offered by the Swedish Defence University, and to the Interpretation School's training in Russian. Leijonhielm also provides examples of the importance of relevant, personal contacts with the outside world, and gives a couple of interesting examples of how it can be to listen to and learn from former adversaries in the Cold War.

In the second part of the book, Jan Leijonhielm reflects in a series of essays on issues and problem areas for Swedish intelligence. The essays cover themes such as 'Cyber war', 'Politicisation of intelligence services', and 'For and against NATO, a lengthy debate'. The author repeatedly refers to events and experiences he described in the first part of the book. Among the author's more interesting points is the need for forums and organisations that can act to synthesise intelligence and conclusions from different parts of the security policy ecosystem. Leijonhielm refers to both Swedish and foreign experience; for Sweden, at FOI and the National Centre for Terrorism Threat Assessment (NCT) and the Centre for Asymmetric Threat and Terrorism Studies (Cats); for foreign experience, such as MI5's *Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)*.

These fusion centres – Leijonhielm himself uses the term "*fusion centres" – are* presented by Leijonhielm both as a solution to pure efficiency problems, such as the question of how to achieve effective cooperation between different parts of the intelligence system, and as a way of avoiding what Leijonhielm considers to be unnecessary politicisation of intelligence and security policy issues. The latter, Leijonhielm argues, again with the support of both Swedish and foreign experience, is one of the recurring problems of intelligence activities. According to Leijonhielm, such politicisation was the basis for the misleading of both domestic voters and the international community through a tendentious use of the *Curveball* source, prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Leijonhielm also uses as an example the Soviet leadership's micromanagement of the KGB's intelligence activities to try to prove what they were convinced was an inevitable, upcoming NATO invasion. Leijonhielm returns to this theme in several essays, and seems to regard the fusion scene as an important tool for achieving national consensus, through the creation of a process where expert opinions can prevail.

Leijonhielm also often returns to transparency as a related need, only through sufficient openness within the system and towards political decision-makers can sufficient effectiveness be achieved; again using the experience of NATO as an example. It is clear that Leijonhielm has also been influenced here both by the discussion on the value of open sources and by his own experience in this area, and the reopening of the discussion is very welcome, especially in light of the security policy situation that has arisen after the Russian Federation's invasion of the Republic of Ukraine in 2022. The book concludes with a reflection on the current security policy situation, followed by a final word, effectively a set of recommendations, and two appendices, one an article on the role of the Russian security service FSB in today's Russian governance, and the other a programme outline for higher intelligence education for crisis management decision-makers (HNU-KL) held in 2013.

Despite the book's many and great merits, there are a few points that a critical reader may find objectionable. The first point is also the least serious: from time to time there are some minor factual errors (such as the claim that the Estonian town of Viljandi is in Latvia), but they do not really interfere with the reading and can easily be ignored as accidents of labour. The reader should be more puzzled by the fact that Leijonhielm, if I understand him correctly, in principle seems to see only advantages in reducing the influence of political considerations on security policy analysis, and in using security policy expertise to move the analysis of the world outside the domain of political debate as far as practically possible.

Large parts of the assessment of security policy problems, including intelligence problems, should after all be dependent on the political starting points from which one works. The political objectives and ideological frameworks from which one starts out determine both how one should interpret information and which alternatives for action are desirable given a certain decision-making basis. For one's own security policy analysis, for example, it is crucial whether one perceives the Soviet Union's behaviour as threatening, which in turn depends on how one views its ideological framework and political objectives. The analysis may also depend on whether one considers it more important, for example, to appear to be a loyal ally of the United Kingdom and the United States than to question their interpretation of the intelligence material presented. The position of the Swedish state on these issues also proved to be a highly political choice, affecting which intelligence issues were relevant.

As a reader, I find it difficult to see how it would be possible to combine American or British-style expert committees with Swedish political parties in a practicable way without ending up back in the problem we started with, but with 'experts' in the role of politicians, and with greater difficulty in demanding political responsibility for the judgements made. Leijonhielm's presentation of the solution is certainly good, but I miss the further discussion of implementation with regard to such conflicts of objectives that could have made the presentation truly convincing.

The most difficult questions that arise when reading Leijonhielm's book have to do with how his arguments should be developed, rather than the arguments themselves. For example, the author's discussion of the relationship of personal networks and politics to intelligence activities could easily be linked to the current public discussion on securing and testing competence, and appointments to positions in the intelligence community. This discussion, which has now been going on in the press for a long time, will not be reviewed here, but a further development of Leijonhielm's reasoning would have been welcome against this background.

The author also repeatedly emphasises the importance of a broader infrastructure for education and competence building, as well as knowledge transfer to younger generations, for the intelligence community's general level of competence. However, most of the institutions that Leijonhielm describes as important both for his own and his colleagues' personal competence, as well as for the authorities' ability to assess developments in the East, are today either virtually defunct, or on the verge of dying due to a long series of administrative mistakes. The open courses in intelligence analysis have either been discontinued or taken a chance; neither war science, economics nor Slavic studies have produced many notable specialists on Eastern Europe and Russia for years.

One consequence of this is that the ecosystem that spans FOI to university institutions today largely comprises the same people as it did at the end of the Cold War. The expertise within the system is getting older and older, and there is no question of a large-scale regrowth. Many of the other talents who study and speak publicly about the area neither speak the necessary languages nor have been in place for any length of time, other than exceptionally as government envoys. With the international sanctions against the Russian Federation and subsequent demands for trade boycotts, Sweden is also in the process of completely losing the sensor and source of knowledge that the business community, including through


collaborations such as ÖEB, and because of the interrupted contacts, even the still existing academic expertise risks being seriously eroded. It would have been a great service if Leijonhielm had touched on how he thinks the problem of competence supply can be solved, especially in a time when all cooperation with and studies of Russia (for certainly well-founded reasons) are regarded with the utmost suspicion.

A Swedish Leijon: a life in the intelligence world is, despite the wide range of areas that Leijonhielm tries to cover, easy-flowing and articulate prose of the highest order. Leijonhielm has a subtle, Chancellor Swedish tone which is unusual today, but which suits both the subject and the presentation well, and which I find myself missing in presentations of facts in other subjects and by younger talents. It is a work with undeniable merits that provides answers to several old questions about how the Swedish intelligence system actually worked and works. It is rather to be regarded as a good deed that the work also gives rise to *new* questions, even though it does not provide all the answers. In this way, the intelligence cycle is continued, and both authors and readers can be very satisfied that this work now exists.

The reviewer works as a consultant and market analyst.

A well-documented profession

by Lars-Göran Tedebrand



TITLE:
The officers of the Swedish archipelago fleet 1756-1824
AUTHOR:
Lars Otto Berg, Esbjörn Larsson & Hans Norman
PUBLISHERS:
Nordic Academic Press, Lund, 2023

THE 500TH ANNIVERSARY of Gustav Vasa's election as King of Sweden in 1523 has been celebrated in many ways. In this review of a new book published during the anniversary year about the officers of the Swedish archipelago fleet, it may be justified to recall the role of the founder of the kingdom as the initiator of the Swedish fleet.

To discourage Danish revanchism after the dissolution of the Union and to secure trade relations with the continent, the king purchased some small warships from Lübeck. During the war with Russia in 1554-1557, he built a number of galleys to travel up the Neva to Ladoga and Gothenburg. From this beginning, Sweden built up an impressive Baltic Sea fleet during the Great Power era, which in 1700 consisted of 15 large ships of the line with a total crew of 15 000 men. The naval station in Stockholm was supplemented at the end of the 17th century by one in Karlskrona. The task of the fleet was to secure relations with the Baltic provinces and to transport soldiers to the wars on the continent. One of its main tasks was to keep Russian warships away from the Swedish-Finnish coasts.

During the final stages of the Great Northern War, Russian galley squadrons were able to roam freely in the Swedish and Finnish archipelagos. On Saturday 18 September 1714, a Russian galleon squadron went up the Umeälven river into Umeå and burned down the city. In 1719, the same fate befell mansions and geldings along the east coast of Sweden. Sundsvall was attacked in May 1721. When Sweden lost the Baltic provinces at the Peace of Nystad in 1721, the threat from Russia became even more pronounced. Russia's penetration of the Baltic Sea and ravages there meant that the Swedish naval forces were reorganised to be able to operate in the archipelago. The focus was therefore on smaller, shallow-draft vessels with amphibious tasks and the ability to co-operate with army operations. From 1756 the new archipelago fleet was called the army fleet. In 1824 it was merged with the naval fleet, which thus operated both in the archipelago and at sea. After the 1812

policy, the heir to the throne, Marshal Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, turned his attention to Norway and did not prioritise naval defence in the east.

The archipelago fleet was discussed in a 1933 doctoral thesis by the Turku historian Professor Oscar Nikula. This notified book is a joint venture between three researchers from Uppsala, Lars Otto Berg, Esbjörn Larsson and Hans Norman. Berg, now deceased, was a national archivist in Uppsala, an honorary doctor at Uppsala University and one of the initiators of the project. He has published several articles on the ships of the archipelago fleet. Esbjörn Larsson is professor of educational history at Uppsala University and defended his doctoral thesis on cadet training at Karlberg Castle in the 19th century. Hans Norman is professor emeritus at Uppsala University with a large production in Swedish emigration and family history and urban history behind him. He has also written several works on naval history, including editing an anthology on the archipelago fleet and a biography of Admiral General Johan Puke. He has also authored the large marine archipelago guide *Sjöfärder i* Österled. *A journey in history*.

Lars Otto Berg was our foremost contemporary expert on the ships of the archipelago fleet. His meticulous review of the fleet's structure is illustrated with a large number of drawings and paintings of the warships. The Russian naval armaments made it necessary to strengthen naval defence, especially in the Archipelago Sea and the Gulf of Finland. Units from the naval fleet at Karlskrona were brought to the capital and a Stockholm squadron was created, consisting of galleys and other ships. However, after the failure of the Hats' war against Russia in 1741-1743, it was found to be inadequate. With the help of French subsidies, 44 new galleys were built. However, equipped with only a few crude cannons in the bow, their firepower was insufficient. New ship types had to be designed.

The most important person in the creation and organisation of a special archipelago fleet was its first commander, the highly talented Major General Augustin Ehrensvärd (1710-1772), who was also the head of the artillery school and secretary of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. He was born in Kungs-Barkarö parish in Västmanland and was given a monumental tomb at Suomenlinna. However, it was not until the master shipbuilder Fredric Henrik Chapman (1721-1808) was given the main responsibility for the further development of the archipelago fleet that it could increase in size and power. Chapman came from an old tenant family in Yorkshire, England. His father was a naval officer and moved to Sweden in 1716. After studying abroad for seven years, F. H. Chapman returned to Sweden in 1757. In 1764, he became master shipbuilder in the archipelago fleet. In 1781 he was appointed 'director of labour' at the shipyard in Karlskrona. Over the next four years, ten ships of the line and as many large frigates and a large number of smaller frigates, gun sloops and gunboats for archipelago battles were built, all to Chapman's designs. The crews of the archipelago ships consisted of native boatmen but also soldiers from the regiments. Special artillerymen took care of the artillery. For his great services to the Swedish navy, Chapman was knighted by Gustav III in 1772 as af Chapman. In 1791 he was appointed vice-admiral.

The two main stations of the Archipelago Fleet were in Stockholm and Suomenlinna. The Finnish squadron at Suomenlinna was the largest and most well-equipped. Gradually, the number of esquadron stations was expanded to include those in Gothenburg, Turku, Stralsund and Landskrona. For a short

time there was also one in the northern Gulf of Bothnia. The archipelago frigates designed by Chapman were given Swedishised Finnish regional names such as Udema (Uusimaa) and Pojama (Ostrobothnia), Captured Russian galleys and frigates were also incorporated into the Swedish archipelago fleet.

The well-equipped Swedish archipelago fleet proved its mettle during Gustav III's war with Russia in 1788-90. The Battle of Svensksund on the north-eastern coast of the Gulf of Finland on 9-10 July 1790 between the Swedish and Russian archipelago fleets was a major Swedish victory. The Russians lost more than 50 ships and 9 000 men, many of whom were prisoners. Swedish losses were limited to six ships and about 300 men. The successful Swedish archipelago fleet had thus created a favourable situation for the start of peace negotiations, which resulted in the peace of Värälä in August 1790 without land concessions.

A decisive factor behind the Swedish victory at Svensksund was that the officers of the archipelago fleet were very well trained and that many had experience from service mainly on English and French warships. Several took part at sea in the North American War of Independence. Many also had experience as commanders of trunk ships in England, the Mediterranean and as far afield as the Caribbean and the East Indies. One naval officer who was particularly honoured for his efforts at Svensksund was Colonel Viktor von Stedingk of the Turku Archipelago Fleet. He received a sword of honour from Gustav III and was honoured with a poem by C M Bellman. Another officer, Henrik Johan Georg af Trolle, was appointed governor of the Swedish colony of St Barthelemy for the years 1795-1800. Even later, several officers from the archipelago fleet were governors there.

Most of the book, just over 290 pages, is devoted to biographical information about the officers of the archipelago fleet. It also describes their vederlikar, a term that goes back to an Old Swedish word meaning equal. These were officials in the army's fleet such as auditors, doctors, clergymen, shipbuilders, etc. The biographies are mainly based on military rolls and calendars as well as on the army's fleet's merit band. The information included is the officers' years of birth and death, places of birth and death, fathers' occupations and spouses' names and backgrounds. Officers' military appointments, promotions and promotions, as well as off-duty and post-duty occupations are also included. The authors leave it to genealogists and others to browse through the biographies, which are of great social-historical interest, not least in illuminating the dissolution of the Swedish gentry.

The aristocracy in Sweden has long enjoyed extensive statutory and hereditary privileges, including priority access to state offices as officers. Engaging in military service developed into a tradition within the noble families. During the Great Northern War, over 90 per cent of the armed members of the Swedish nobility performed active military service. Many died on the battlefield or were captured. An increasing number of freehold properties were given to non-freeholders. The aristocracy's exclusive right to freehold land was openly ignored. Many unmarried officers moved into the old estates. During the many years of war, career paths opened up for the commoners. Regimental commanders were forced, with or against their will, to promote unmarried officers to higher positions as well. By the time of Charles XII's death, the nobles were in a minority against the commoners in the officer corps, 1 300 nobles against 2 600 commoners. The new nobles were so numerous that even farm-

ers' sons were awarded shield letters, as the Uppsala professor Sten Carlsson noted in two groundbreaking books in 1949-50.

The nobility regained their former positions after the end of the Great Northern War, which is why, at the outbreak of the Pomeranian War, there were 1 400 officers in Sweden, of whom only 400 were commoners. However, the trend pointed towards a circulation of Swedish estates and the dissolution of the estate society.

What was the distribution between nobility and commoners among the officers in the archipelago fleet? Augustin Ehrensvärd had realised the importance of a professional officer corps suitable for fighting in coastal and archipelago environments, and emphasised the importance of officers having an eye for the sea and knowledge of arithmetic, geometry, navigation, fortification and artillery. This officer corps, which represented a new and dynamic type of weapon, therefore attracted people with specialised skills. Qualifications rather than birth were often decisive. Initially, officers were recruited from various branches of the armed forces, both those who had previously served in the army and the navy. Gradually more and more young aspirants were recruited, many after qualifying for non-commissioned officer positions, others after a period of university studies and quite a few already in their childhood via the ship's boy schools. The majority came from the upper classes, many of whom were officers' sons. Many also had fathers who were senior officials, priests, mill owners or traders.

There were also some who came from less well-off families. As Esbjörn Larsson showed in a special study of the army's naval officers, only half of them had a noble background in 1780. The social composition changed further during and after the war years 1788-1790 and 1808-1809. This was due to a large recruitment of civilian officers and sceptics from the merchant navy. These were constituted as ensigns and served as commanders of the many smaller ships, mainly gunboats and gun sloops. After Gustav III's war, the proportion of nobility had therefore fallen significantly, and in the war year 1809 the proportion of unmarried officers was as high as 70 per cent. A development similar to that during the Great Northern War was thus the result.

One of the noble officers of the Archipelago Fleet, Vice Admiral Carl Olof Cronstedt, is forever inscribed in Swedish-Finnish history. On 3 May 1808, as commander of Sveaborg (now Suomenlinna), he surrendered both the fortress, the 'Gibraltar of the North', and the large Finnish squadron of the Archipelago Fleet to the Russians. Suomenlinna was not only a fortress but also a cultural centre. Prominent artists from Sweden and Finland portrayed the officers there, and balls and musical soirees were held on a regular basis. The reason for the unexpected surrender has remained a mystery. The very next day he was dismissed from the service of the empire and sentenced to death in absentia on 11 February 1809. Cronstedt never entered Russian service and died in 1820 at his country house Hertonäs on the outskirts of Helsinki.

No Swedish professional body in the final stages of civilisation has been documented as extensively as the officer corps in the archipelago fleet in this book. It will be an indispensable source for both naval historians and genealogists and for anyone who wants to know how brave Swedish men from oarsmen to ship commanders stood up to the threats of the hereditary enemy in the east.

The reviewer is Professor Emeritus of History at Umeå University.

Read about Russian submarine operations

by Magnus Haglund



TITLE:
Russian submarine operations against Sweden and the Nordic region
AUTHOR:
Nils-Ove Jansson
PUBLISHER:
Nils-Ove Jansson

PUBLISHED IN MARCH 2023, the book spans the post-Cold War period from 2011 to 2022 and is, in its own way, a follow-up to the book *Impossible Submarine* by the same author, published in 2014.

The security environment has changed significantly during the period covered by the new book, and Putin's authoritarian rule of Russia has already had consequences for the outside world. The Warsaw Pact's strategic plan from the late 1960s has apparently been modernised by Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov in a national Russian version, possibly indicating a Russian strategic interest in Gothenburg, Gävle and the Bråviken area. That this update can also be perceived is shown in the book, even if today's Russian planning is stated to be a defence against an attack from NATO and not a large and all-encompassing attack over all of Europe, including Sweden, as the old plan included.

The book also contains an update on the "U-137 Incident", to which the reviewer may add that Russian nuclear-armed warships have a special manager on board for the use of nuclear weapons called the "Oldest on Board" (Starshiy nabarto) and it is not the commander who decides on the operation.

What has now been mostly concealed in Sweden is the existence of underwater activities that may indicate preparations for a more modern form of attack we have not yet considered in Sweden. Here, public reporting is perhaps of particular importance. Unfortunately, I cannot review the rather complicated and specialised evaluations, but it is quite clear that specialists are needed for this purpose. If there has been a decline in our analytical capacity, it is high time to rebuild the marine analysis department. In recent days, it has also been made clear in our cooperation within JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force) that it is analysis and defence against underwater attacks that we need to develop. The book also provides examples of violations in our Nordic neighbour countries, where the events may not have been questioned and therefore treated lightly, as

in Sweden. Now we are dealing with grey zone attacks. Recently, the hijacking of submarine links between Finland and Estonia has attracted attention, and in Finland this is apparently perceived as a first attack on NATO membership.

The book fulfils an important role for readers in Sweden and is well and richly illustrated. It also contains a special chapter on naval spetsnaz and many details on how observations were handled during the period.


The chapter on the changing nature of our defence is well worth reading and should perhaps also have policy implications.

The reviewer is a Commander and a member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

Strategic leadership

by Lars Wedin

TITLE:
Mastering the Art of Command. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific
AUTHOR:
Trent Hone
PUBLISHERS:
US Naval Institute



THE BOOK HAS received much praise in the international trade press. It is worth it! It should be compulsory reading on the Swedish Defense University higher course.

Trent Hone is a historian as well as an expert in leadership and organisational science. His previous book, *Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945*, published in 2018, has also received much praise.

As its title suggests, the book is about Admiral Nimitz and how he turned the disaster at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 into victory against Japan in 1945. The battles in the Pacific are treated relatively summarily as a necessary background to Nimitz's actions as a strategic leader.

There are four aspects in particular which the author, in the opinion of the notifier, highlights and which are also of general strategic interest:

1. Offensive when opportunities arise despite being outnumbered
2. Ability to adapt
3. The importance of appointing the right manager for the right occasion
4. The controversy with MacArthur.

A common theme is the ability to create order out of chaos on one's own side and turn order into chaos on the enemy's side. An idea that Hone got from John Boyd.

If Nimitz had followed the doctrine taught to the informer at the MHS in the late 1970s, prioritising the enemy's most dangerous course of action, Nimitz would have initially opted for a defensive strategy with the main task of defending Hawaii and the sea links with Australia. Instead, he chose to carry out a number of offensive operations to seize the initiative, unsettle the superior Japanese and thereby boost morale on his own side. The result was the more or less inconclusive Battle of the Coral Sea (4-8 May 1942) and the turning point at Midway (4-7 June 1942).

There was also an internal background to the early offensive. The Chief of Naval Operations, King, was suspicious of Nimitz, who had been the Navy's chief of staff and

was thus seen as more of an administrator than a warrior. It was only when Nimitz proved to have the necessary sacrifice that his bosses in Washington gained full confidence in him. Here he was greatly assisted by the aggressive Admiral 'Bull' Halsey and his carrier force.

Under Nimitz's leadership, the Pacific Fleet went from being a severely demoralised force that had suffered heavy losses to a formidable war machine that eventually enjoyed almost uncontested supremacy at sea. This required continuous adaptation of its leadership. During the war, significant naval and army units also came under Nimitz's command. Perhaps the biggest challenge was the logistics of making this war machine work despite the vast distances in the Pacific, with the war being fought from the Aleutians in the north to Australia in the south and China in the west. All this demanded ever greater staff resources under ever better management. An important step was taken in 1944 when Nimitz decided to delegate administrative tasks to Admiral Towers while retaining strategic direction. When Nimitz moved the strategic staff from Hawaii to Guam, Towers stayed on to manage the day-to-day operations of the fleet.

The expanding Pacific Command also needed new leaders. At the same time, many commanders proved unable to handle the pressure or lacked the necessary offensive spirit. Some commanders could not adapt to the new conditions and buried themselves in details instead of leading the war. Nimitz himself preferred decentralised management and was careful to maintain a set routine and ensure that he had sufficient relaxation. Appointing the right managers for the right time and replacing those who were not up to the job was thus one of Nimitz's most important tasks. The fact that, as a former personnel manager he knew the navy's senior officers, was of course a great help. The question of management was also a constant agenda item in Nimitz's meetings with King.

Nimitz's two most important subordinates were Admirals Halsey and Spruance. The latter was a relatively unknown cruiser division commander with Halsey when the war began. But when Halsey fell ill after the Battle of the Coral Sea, Spruance was put in charge of the great victory at Midway. He then became Nimitz's chief of staff for a time. These two admirals came very close to each other, which meant that Spruance was able to understand Nimitz's intentions in a completely different way than Halsey, who had not served so closely with Nimitz. In order to increase the pace of the operations and provide an opportunity for recovery, Halsey and Spruance then took turns – one led the current operation while the other planned the next one.

As you know, the Pacific War was fought on two fronts. Nimitz advanced through the central Pacific while General MacArthur went north from Australia through New Guinea. They met in the Philippines. Then the leadership in Washington had to get these two flagmen to fight the rest of the war in co-operation. This was not easy as they had very different personalities and leadership styles.

MacArthur was rather egocentric and surrounded himself with a relatively small group of senior officers. His management style was centralised and he preferred defence branch management. Nimitz, on the other hand, preferred a decentralised command across the defence boundaries. He closely followed major battles but rarely intervened to issue directives. Instead, he ensured that the tactical commander received relevant intelligence. MacArthur, on the other hand, preferred intelligence that was consistent with his judgements. It was therefore difficult to bring these two togeth-

er in one structure. The solution was that MacArthur was given command of all army combat operations forces and Nimitz over naval forces while the overall command was conducted from Washington.

Nimitz and MacArthur also had diametrically opposed views on how the war could be brought to final victory. The latter favoured an invasion of Japan – Operation Olympic followed by Operation Coronet which would lead to a decisive victory in the Tokyo area. American losses were estimated at over one million men. Nimitz saw this as unreasonable and preferred to use the blockade of Japan to bring the Japanese leadership to its knees. As is well known, the nuclear strikes against Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the deciding factor.


The book is generally easy to read and the balance between the main story of Nimitz's strategic and operational leadership on the one hand and the resulting battles on the other seems appropriate. For those unfamiliar with the geography of the Pacific, it is useful to have a map at hand. One problem in reading is that the various operations are referred to by code words. The reader therefore needs to make a list of these code words and their main meaning (area, time).

In summary, this is a very readable book that contains many ideas that should be of use to the Swedish defence leadership now that Sweden's defence is to grow and become part of NATO.

The reviewer is Captain (N), member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and The Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences and an associate member of the Académie de marine (Paris).

The war in Ukraine examined

by Tommy Jeppsson



TITLE:
The war in Ukraine
EDITOR:
Tormod Heier
PUBLISHER:
Fagbokforlaget, Oslo

THIS IS A very knowledgeable anthology for readers, with nineteen authors who are well qualified in their respective specialities. The content reflects a broad, factual and analytical approach to the war which, at the time of writing, has passed two years and where an end is hardly in sight.

The large-scale and unprovoked Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, in violation of international law, fundamentally changed the security situation not only in our part of the world, but contributed to global deterioration. The war in Ukraine has generated many questions and continues to do so. The central one is about why Russia invaded Ukraine and cannot be understood without knowledge of Russian values, which are fundamentally different from, for example, their counterparts in the Nordic countries.

Another question that immediately arises when reading the book is about the Russian counterparts and what lessons can be learnt from them. Here it is important for the reader to remember that the book was published last year, which means that the various chapters were written before we had begun to recognise the effects of Russia learning from what has not worked, as well as the signs that the overall Western support may become more heterogeneous.

The Russian way of conducting combat operations shows a brutalisation that has clear links to previous wars. The Russian warfare in Ukraine is characterised by blatant violations of international law, armed attacks on hospitals, schools, civilian infrastructure and residential areas, abuse of the civilian population in the form of murder, beatings, rape of women and kidnapping of children. The question that arises is whether there is reason to believe that we in the West would be treated differently in the event of an armed conflict with Russia. The answer seems obvious. In the specifically Swedish case, we are labelled by the Kremlin as a nation hostile to Russia, which is why the absence of pious hopes linked to Russia seems important.

The book has a logical structure, comprising four parts, which provides a very good basis for the reader to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the complex of problems associated with Russia's attack

on Ukraine. The first part, 'The framework conditions of the war", provides a number of valuable perspectives on how the war can be understood. It provides different perspectives on why Russia started the war at the end of February 2022, as well as a more global outlook. It also deals with the Russian values that characterised Russian society before the outbreak of the war. The crisis management perspective is also highlighted, i.e. the attempts made to stop what became the tragic result, the first major war in Europe since 1945. An elucidation of the international law aspects of the war feels like a very well-motivated conclusion to the first part of the book.

The second part of the book, 'Russia's War', looks at a number of aspects of the conduct of the war within and outside Ukraine. It describes the domestic and foreign policy challenges faced by the Kremlin leadership as a result of the war, followed by an analysis of the decision-making processes that led to Vladimir Putin's decision to launch a military attack on Ukraine. The relationship between political objectives and military outcomes as the war unfolded makes for very interesting reading, as does the subsequent text on how Russian military strategy and the operations based on it evolved. This part ends with an interesting review of Russian air operations.

The third part, 'Europe and Transatlantic Cohesion', provides an EU perspective as well as the German reaction to the war and its relationship with the US. Also worth reading are the chapters on the importance of Western arms aid and the one on Finnish and Swedish NATO membership.

The final part of the book, "The Defence of Norway", discusses the potential significance of the war in Ukraine for Norwegian defence, which is thus also of high relevance to a Swedish readership given the nature of Scandinavia as a coherent area of operations. For the same reason, the thoughts on the strategic importance of Finnmark for the defence of Norway are highly relevant for a Swedish readership. The book ends with reflections on what we can learn from the war in Ukraine.


One thought that struck the reviewer in connection with the reading is based on a possible war between Russia and NATO involving the Nordic countries, with the associated question of the possibility of support similar to that given to Ukraine. Doubts about this possibility seem more realistic than its opposite. Hence the importance of investing in factors such as willingness to defend, numbers and endurance.

The different chapters of the book, written by highly qualified authors, together with a well thought out and logical structure make The *War in Ukraine a* recommended read.

The reviewer is a Lieutenant Colonel, member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and editor of its Proceedings and Journal.

On war

by Tommy Jeppsson



TITLE:
Warfare: How wars are planned, conducted and won
AUTHOR:
Harald Høiback
PUBLISHERS:
J M Stenersens Forlag, Oslo

THE BOOK HAS the advantage of being read by the more initiated as well as by those who want to acquire basic knowledge and an overview. To cater for this broad field of readers is demanding for the author, something that Harald Høiback manages gallantly. His background, a solid military education and service, and his academic training and experience are crowned by a particularly good ability to analyse and reflect, and thus the ability to think outside the box. The lieutenant colonel has a master's degree in history and a doctorate in philosophy, which according to the reviewer is a very useful combination of knowledge when dealing with such a wide-ranging subject as war.

Høiback has published a number of books over the years, the predecessor of the one reported here being a superb biography of Carl von Clausewitz, whose common denominator is a high degree of reading value based on the author's breadth of knowledge and insights. The fact that Høiback, in addition, not infrequently includes humorous passages in his literary production, which covers extremely serious subjects, may be considered an achievement and an ability in the relevant genre that is considered to have little competition and thus to be the privilege of a few authors.

Krigføring is a continuation of a high-quality production and contains the breadth that results in a knowledge boost for the reader. The reviewer makes this statement on the basis of the fact that most people have deep knowledge in a limited area while few can be counted among the crowd who have both an overview and insight into the subject of war and warfare. The book undoubtedly provides breadth and overview as well as real-life examples, not least with regard to decisions taken at the highest level and their consequences, which enhances the reading value.

The topics of strategy, operations and tactics, war on land, at sea and in the air, special forces and military freelancing, cyber, robotics and big data, nuclear warfare and war against civilians, as well as how the experience of war and the trauma that can be the aftermath of war are treated in a balanced way.


The author appears to be somewhat modest when he states in the book's preface that it is written for a readership that lacks military knowledge. Undoubtedly, this part of the readership is offered an excellent journey of knowledge. At the same time, those who already possess knowledge and insight into the subject are recommended to spend the time in the armchair that the book requires, given the benefit of the way in which its various parts are treated and exemplified by linking the arenas in which war is played out. In addition, the initiate also needs to be reminded of the foundations of war from both the human aspect and the capability aspect. The reader is reminded, among other things, that military personnel and capabilities are rarely confronted with and evaluated on the basis of the realities they are there to solve, and that the inherent self-dynamics of war result in a genuine unpredictability, which can be linked to the fact that wars are started, conducted and ended by people.

Reading Warfare is a positive experience. Despite the heavy subject matter, the book is educational and easy to read. For those who are fed through the media with elements from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as from potential powder kegs in other parts of the world, the book provides additional perspectives as a basis for a more comprehensive understanding. This, from a historically very knowledgeable author whose deep knowledge of philosophy provides, to return to the book's subtitle, perspectives on how wars are planned, executed and won.

The reviewer is a Lieutenant Colonel, member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and editor of its Proceedings and Journal.

From the Blue-Yellow War

by Christian Braw



TITLE:
The Blue-Yellow War
AUTHOR:
Alex Voronov
PUBLISHERS:
Volante förlag

IT IS THE colours of the Ukrainian flag that have given the book its title. The author was born in Ukraine and grew up in Sweden. Here he works as a journalist for the Liberal News Agency, which supports the opinion pages of liberal newspapers throughout the country with texts. Alex Voronov is a journalist whose job it is to provide accurate, summarised and interesting information on current events. The author fully lives up to that mission.

The Ukrainian war is one such current event, which has dramatically changed the security situation in Europe and Sweden. For Sweden, it means that 200 years of successful neo-liberal policies have been abruptly abandoned. Alex Voronov takes his readers into this event by focusing on the Swedes who have been involved on the Ukrainian side, both humanely and militarily. We thus enter the event through a number of concrete personalities. This is also a journalistic approach. People want to read about people. Alex Voronov has, as he says, sought out engaging stories.

What is the cause of the Ukraine war? Alex Voronov answers: "The Russian ruling class has never accepted Ukrainian independence." He is right. The subjugation of Ukraine took its most dramatic and tragic turn in the Holodomor, the Moscow-organised famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933, which claimed the lives of 3-10 million people. The memory of the Holodomor is an essential factor in the Ukrainian will to resist.

Alex Voronov gives a detailed description of the International Legion formed by foreign volunteers in Ukraine. The selection, testing and training that Voronov describes gives a serious impression. The largest groups of soldiers are American, British and Polish. Alongside this legion, roughly a reduced brigade, there are a number of nation-based units, such as the Georgians. In addition, there are volunteer-organised units, including the Hospitaliers battalion, made famous by the Swedish medic known

as Sten. This unit now has 360 medics and 50 ambulances along the entire front.

Voronov was interested in the Swedish volunteers' reasons for their efforts. The answers he has received all point in the same direction. It is conscience that has spoken to the volunteers. The female doctor, Elly, a humanitarian worker, says: "I was ashamed of what Russia did. The strong must help the weak, and this was too much to bear. Ukraine is close." Paramedic Sten says: "I was torn between what I knew was morally right and what was best for my career." For him, it was his conscience that had to speak. Alex Voronov has also sought out Sten's father, who initially tried to prevent him from travelling to Ukraine. Now the father says: "He has a strong sense of justice. I supported him once he decided to go. I'm actually quite proud of him." Sten himself emphasises that the military training he received in Sweden is relevant and allows him to function as a medic in a combat environment.


Another Swedish aid worker is Tilde, who got into the work through horse riding. Initially, it involved evacuating horses and riders to more protected areas. Since then, her tasks have grown, including delivering military protective equipment to Ukrainian units. This too is an independent person. Her mother says: "Tilde has stepped on many toes, and I am very proud of her for this. Because these are toes that needed to be stepped on."

Alex Voronov has done a very thorough journalistic job with his book on the Blue-Yellow War.

The reviewer is an associate professor at Åbo Akademi University, a priest in the Church of Sweden and a former chaplain at Ing 2.

It's all about logistics

by Tommy Jeppsson



TITLE:
Balls and Fixers
AUTHORS:
Torkel Karlberg with 22 co-authors
PUBLISHERS:
Books on Demand, Stockholm 2023

THE BOOK IS written by men and women who worked in the field. Most of them were in a logistics position, as well as a few company commanders and staff officers whose ability to fulfil the task was highly dependent on the material and physical resources being in place over time, regardless of whether it was a live operation or ongoing routine activities, often overlapping within a unit.

It is now three decades since the first Swedish battalion in Bosnia, BA 01, carried out an operation that has been recognised as highly successful. A battalion whose focus was on solving the task and where success was based on a good unit spirit and trust in each other, which in turn characterised the implementation of the mission where mandate and trust applied, regardless of rank and position. Thus, mission tactics in their practical application during a live operation. The authors testify that it worked…lessons that are as relevant now as they were then, which means that the book should not only be seen as a "cavalcade of memories", but more as an experience bank to learn from.

The foreword is written by the battalion commander, Ulf Henricsson, MP, who emphasises the qualities of individual initiative, creativity and responsibility, which are just as important for personnel whose main task is combat as for those responsible for maintaining the unit's combat value. The latter category includes logistics officers and soldiers who plan and deliver supplies, repair damaged equipment and ensure the delivery of replacement equipment. Material security is one thing, but ensuring that there is a competent medical organisation is highly decisive for the personnel's confidence and willingness to carry out the task, not least with regard to the risk-taking that is part of every live operation.

The commanders and soldiers of the logistics units also live in a vulnerable environment and, not to mention, carry out a live operation. Transport movements in an operational area mean exposure to combat, and every logistics installation must be perceived as a potential target for the adversary. The consequence is logistics soldiers

who need good combat training and the armament necessary to protect themselves and their activities. It was true then and, as a function of technological developments, it is at least as true today.

Several of the authors of the book are among those who have made sure that the resources are in place where and when they are needed. Their story is the story of long hours, sleep deprivation, camaraderie where "team before self" becomes something much more tangible than just a buzzword and where the ability to think and act outside the box often results in success rather than its opposite. It is officers and soldiers who live in an environment where the only constant is recurring changes, challenges that have only one acceptable outcome, the working solution. This is because it is these people who are the creators of the tactical and technical combat operations. At the same time, these are officers and soldiers whose importance is not emphasised, either very often or clearly, in the history of different military units.

The reviewer's background as a military officer means that many situations in the book's various descriptions are recognisable. That the conscription system, provided that the training is of high quality, is also suitable for live operations, was proven by BA 01, as well as proven both earlier and later in connection with the deployment of Swedish units in international missions. That a logistics soldier with civilian work experience is an asset is very clear in the book. The consequence is that the diversity of experience from civilian working life in a logistics unit creates an unbeatable range of expertise that strengthens the military capability, something that is also made clear in the book.


Logistics planning is firstly that it must be carried out by competent and experienced people. Secondly, that the planning is synchronised with the battalion commander's plan, in the cases covered in the book, and thirdly, that it is anticipatory, since logistics is very much characterised by "the devil being in the details". The battalion's logistics chief, then Major Torkel Karlberg, very much lived up to his task of being the battalion commander's capability creator.

The large number of authors in the book means that the linguistic quality varies. This must be considered far less important than the wealth of experience for logistics personnel, but also for those to be supported, that Kuggar och Fixare represents. Lieutenant Colonel Torkel Karlberg is worthy of praise as the initiator and co-author of the book.

The reviewer is Lieutenant Colonel, a member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and editor of its Proceedings and Journal.

Helping to build resilience

by Tommy Jeppsson



TITLE:
Total defence for managers
AUTHOR:
Freddy Jönsson Hanberg
PUBLISHERS:
Ekerlids Förlag 2023

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF total defence, not least its civilian parts, requires commitment and knowledge, where senior managers as well as those working at the middle level, and management groups and staffs are key players in achieving success in the work. Knowledge of one's own organisation's role in a total defence context is the foundation, which needs to be supplemented by a more comprehensive overview of our total defence model. Freddy Jönsson Hanberg's book is a great help in acquiring this knowledge at the individual level, and the book also provides thoughts and advice on how the work of building a piece of the puzzle in total defence, for example at the company level, can be approached.

The author has not only solid and comprehensive knowledge but also insight into total defence issues. He has achieved this through dedicated work as chairman of the Total Defence Foundation and board member of the Civil Defence Association, and as an advisor to companies, authorities and political representatives. He has also acquired a wide range of experience through his participation as an exercise leader in regions and in civilian areas, military regions and within NATO. In addition, he is a reserve officer with extensive service in the Swedish Armed Forces, not least at central level.

The bank of knowledge and experience accumulated by the author is definitely of great guiding benefit to the target group. This is because security, risk management, business continuity planning, information security, business intelligence and geopolitical influence are not issues that have traditionally been on the agenda of a management team or board meeting. In the highly unpredictable world we live in, these issues are taking their rightful place in conference and boardrooms.

The book provides guidance on issues such as what total defence is, which actors are involved and the expectations, or even better the demands, on the organisations and companies that have a role in total defence. The reader gets a good overview of the war-organised Swedish society that is a prerequisite for the survival of the Swedish state. The book is, in this respect, very well

suited as a reference book, since the dense factual content is less well suited for reading in a single sitting. This applies in particular to the chapters on governing documents, all actors of total defence and regional division and cooperation.

This reviewer recommends that the book be used as a basis for workplace-related discussions/seminars with the aim of providing broad knowledge. The next step is to proceed with concrete contingency and war planning, which then needs to be tested in games and exercises. Only then can an organisation/company be considered to have basic preparedness. It is the aforementioned, purposefully implemented preparations that generate substantial and credible capability where involved individuals feel secure in their role.

The author is careful to state that the content reflects a current situation, which is a wise warning to the reader given that change is more likely than its opposite. At the same time, the author perceives the book will have a structure that allows for regular updates and could thus take on a role as a recurring and thus up-to-date knowledge bank.

The reviewer's limited knowledge of management theories may lead to errors based on the questioning of their relevance to the subject. Can it be assumed that the target group has sufficient knowledge in this area to get started with what is perceived to be the main message of the book, namely the importance of continuous planning and practice? Not in the distant future, but now! This leads to the view that the page devoted to management theories could advantageously have been replaced with concrete tips on the organisation of contingency and war planning work as well as games and exercises.

The subject of the book is extensive, so the content is wide-ranging; anything else would have been strange given the author's objectives. Linked to the above-mentioned view of the theories of manoeuvre and the possibility of replacing this page space with practical operational advice for the work with the contingency and wartime organisation, the need for a section with concrete advice for the top managers who are expected to drive the work towards their organisations/companies to develop a credible role in total defence becomes apparent. Based on his knowledge and experience, the author is well placed to provide this.

In summary, it is easy for a reviewer to have views on parts of the content that are perceived to have development potential. What is essential to emphasise for the book reported here is that it fulfils an important role, provides a great deal of knowledge and is thus a foundation for initiating the necessary contingency and war planning in organisations and companies. The author is to be commended for his work and the results achieved, as well as for his generosity in donating the profits from the book to Ukraine.

The reviewer is Lieutenant Colonel, a member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and editor of its Proceedings and Journal.

Literature review

TITLE:
China's Law of the Sea: The New Rules of Maritime Order
AUTHOR:
Isaac B. Kardon
PUBLISHERS:
Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2023

From the air, the author approaches the newly built Subi naval base with a lagoon large enough to accommodate Pearl Harbor. Recently a reef, at high tide washed over by ocean waves. Now the biggest example of China's intention and ability to make use of two seas, the South China Sea and the East China Sea. There are another four smaller outposts on the Spratly Islands. That the Chinese do what they want has not been news to the world for a decade. This book attempts to answer how far the challenge extends.

What is it that the 1994 Global Convention on the Law of the Sea actually disrupts? It was supposed to be a comprehensive set of rules covering the oceans with its dispute settlement mechanism, its seemingly well-developed answers to questions about the extent of the continental shelf, the rights of coastal states – their self-evident ones, thus not self-conscious about the freedom of the seas.

China's intention to protect its maritime rights and interests could theoretically have a place in the agreed Law of the Sea. But what it wants, by virtue of its size and exceptional role in an era of more uncertain American hegemony, is something else: a maritime law of its own, backed by others, as obstinate as the tyranny of its Communist Party.

TITLE:
Everything is a conspiracy. A journey through wonderland
AUTHOR:
Kent Werne
PUBLISHERS:
Ordfront, Stockholm 2018

For the Americans, the ideas perhaps began to take off with the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and then gained new momentum with 9/11. In Sweden, Hårsfjärden probably provided similar nourishment, followed by the assassination of Olof Palme. Are we facing the phenomenon of modern times, reinforced by the lightning spread of the Internet? Far from it! Fantasies have ancient origins; long before the beginning of our era, the appeal of conspiracies seems to be linked to storytelling itself.

Kent Werne's thought-provoking, not to say eerie, review contains ample material from the history of belief in the 16th-century secret society of power, the illuminati, and a little later the Free Masons, the elements of anti-Semitic traditions from the 1860s, and onwards to the postwar period wartime notions of the Bilderberg Group as a closed-door gathering of the world's real capitalist powers. Reckless CIA actions provide extra fodder for rumour mongers.

But the author has also sought out rows of those who today support the often squabbling brotherhood of conspiracy thinking. He has had in-depth conversations with what appear to be pure lunatics who believe in creatures from outer space and lizards controlling our lives. If five per cent of people are mentally ill, he seems to have met a far greater proportion. Unfortunately, anything

goes in politics too – listen to Trump and the Sweden Democrats.

TITLE:
Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine
AUTHOR:
Lawrence Freedman
PUBLISHERS:
Allen Lane, Great Britain 2022

Military operational decisions are not simple examples of a superior giving orders and the subordinate carrying them out. We need to recognise the importance of what has happened in the course of technological development, but above all we need to understand the inevitable political nature of key decisions. To help us do this, there is the case study-rich book written by Sir Lawrence Freedman, a distinguished member of our Academy, on the conditions of the manager during the isolation of the COVID-19 pandemic.

At the top are those who, when giving their directives, are expected to consider 'the big picture'; further down we find them faced with making sense of the order, obeying or not. In the US military's most widely read book, *Once an Eagle,* they are represented by two generals, long-distance traveller Sam Damon and careerist Courtney Schuyler Massengale. The sympathies lie entirely with the former. The other is Wesley Clark, SACEUR, when he tried to lead the Kosovo war in 1999. Interestingly, the scholar is not as easily dismissed today because of his basis for decision-making.

We find other examples of conflict patterns, where dictators without military advisors make misjudgements, while democracies learn from their mistakes. Imaginative enforcers may go against what they perceive as illegal decisions against core values or being unreasonable, at the risk of being perceived and distrusted as disloyal themselves. Many are included here. Not least the model: Sharon.

TITLE:
The outside world: Sweden and the war 1943-1945
AUTHOR:
Henrik Berggren
PUBLISHER:
Norstedts, Livonia Print Ltd, Latvia 2023

Henrik Berggren's third and final book in his trilogy on Sweden during the Second World War has been appreciated by reviewers at least as much as its predecessors. Judgements about "great works", that the series will be "a Swedish classic", are nevertheless somewhat remarkable considering that the material is not among the most dramatic of the war. It was a country that got away with most of it by means of gas rationing and coupons, adapted to the realities of violence, and simply managed to stay out of it.

According to the author, this part was the most difficult to write because the harvest of letters and eyewitness accounts in the final phase 1943-1935 is more meagre than the previous year when people wondered what would be the fate of encircled Sweden. In the third year, when Hitler and his Japanese friends are being pushed backwards, they "know", perhaps somewhat hastily, that the country is out of danger and wonder why a satisfied Per Albin still does not want to take a few turns at the expense of the defeated Germans.

Berggren compensates for the lack of domestic material with descriptions of the final phase of the war that show him to be a not

unworthy military historian. The fact that the whole of Europe, indeed the world, is involved and gets its share does not deprive us of the home front's worries about maids, strikes, foreign trade and entertainment. The story keeps us in touch with Karl Gerhard and the films: Casablanca and Hets. We are not spoilt by books like this, we can only give and receive thanks.

TITLE:
Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare From 1945 to Ukraine
AUTHORS:
David Petraeus, Andrew Roberts
PUBLISHERS:
William Collins, Great Britain 2023

Only the dead have seen the end of wars (Plato). So we may be making a virtue of the necessity of facing a future as bad as the one we hoped to have seen enough of to find ourselves in the middle of it again, in Europe. Future wars, as we have been seeing for a year and a half, may not be short and brutal at all, despite what they might require in terms of human and material losses and ammunition consumption. They are likely to be of a hybrid nature, distorted by false information, nuclear threats, fought with satellites and soldiers with mobiles and in cyberspace, sensors, electronic gadgets and of course drones, ranging from swarms to heavyweights.

Those with such fears may find them confirmed by General David Petraeus, known for military successes and embarrassing setbacks, and his book partner, British historian Andrew Roberts. Their analysis culminates in a picture of Putin's war in Ukraine that details how close a Russian raid on Kiev came to reaching Zelenskyj in the early hours of the war, but otherwise connects with what we have already learnt about Russian incapacity and Ukrainian capability.

Nor are new revelations made about all the wars the world has experienced since 1945, except perhaps for details of the fighting in Iraq in 2003 after the reporters had gone home. But the history of war is perhaps, for many, the main attraction of the book, rather than the attempts to predict what lies ahead.

TITLE:
Strategy in Crisis
AUTHOR:
John T. Kuehn
PUBLISHERS:
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, USA 2023

Against the US, Japan didn't stand a chance. In retrospect, this is an oft-repeated truism in a number of books. But in 1937, its armed forces were among the best in the world. By 1941, its troops, with their strong self-confidence, had proved it. Synchronised on the ground, on the sea and in the air, no one had achieved such indescribable success over such a vast area, from Pearl Harbor to the Pacific island world, the Philippines and Indonesia to Indochina, and so quickly, a 'blitzkrieg'.

In 170 pages, the textbook author cannot show anything directly new, but he does provide a global framework. With the post-Moscow Germans making a new push for the oil wells in the south, Rommel advancing in North Africa and U-boat sinkings in the Atlantic, the picture was not bright, and one realises the psychological importance of battles like Midway and Guadalcanal. And after the Allied counterattacks of May 1942, by February 1943 Japan had effectively lost the war. The United States' powerful industrial, logistical and intelligence resources

came into play. Faced with its capacity for joint operations, the offensive in the air, on and under the oceans, over beaches, through mountains and jungles, forced the Japanese further and further back towards new lines of retreat.

'Island hopping', the US finally had Japan in range for a firebomb attack. After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima/Nagasaki, Japan – the aggressor – surrendered. A fate to remember.

TITLE:
The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History
AUTHOR:
Serhii Plokhy
PUBLISHERS:
W. W. Norton& Company, USA 2023

Historians are the worst interpreters of current events – except for everyone else! The author of this book is a Ukrainian historian, specialising in the Cold War, knows his Churchill quotes and does not hesitate in the slightest to place the Putin-ravaged Ukraine in its historical context as a war between a declining empire and a national liberation movement. In 1991, when the Soviet Union gave up, the Ukrainians were not ready to think about the defence of their freedom; in 2014, with weapons in hand, they refused to accept the loss of Crimea and the Donbas; in 2022, they mobilised in a way that no one really expected. The price of stopping a genocide is high.

Moscow should have learnt that Ukraine cherished its independence. The signs had been many, ever since Mazepa's Cossack society. Ukraine, the Soviet Union's forge, had never been the submissive region that had endured Stalin's 1932/33 Holodomir and, with its Polish and Austro-Austrian heritage, had kept a low profile. Still, it was a matter of hours before Putin's aerial attack on the airfields around Kiev succeeded and commando forces rushed through the streets of the capital to assassinate President Zelensky. A few stopped him.

An attack from seven sides meant an impossible Russian power split. Ukraine has received military assistance, and now we see "a 19th century war with 20th century tactics and 21st century weapons" without end.

Books reviewed by Olof Santesson.



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