The Battle of Lemgo, 17 October 1638

An Empirical Reevaluation

by Steve Murdoch och Kathrin Zickermann

Victorious arms repel the Palatine and the Swedes
Here where the Werra mingles itself with the waters of the Weser.
That is the same place where, in the past, Charlemagne
Waged savage wars with his ferocious enemy.
The untrustworthiness which forced the victor to retreat at that time
Has now commanded the conquered to halt on the river bank.[1]

THE POEM ABOVE, penned in 1638, is a tribute to the Imperial general, Melchior von Hatzfeldt, and his victory over a combined alliance of Swedish and British-Palatine forces at the Battle of Lemgo (17 October 1638). There is no doubt that Hatzfeldt's forces won the encounter, but the poem is indicative not only of a misrepresentation of events but also of the scale of the victory that has come to dominate historical interpretations ever since.

The Battle of Lemgo, also known as Vlotho Bridge, pertains to a military engagement more famous for the capture of some high-ranking officers and noblemen than for the actual military build-up to, significance of, and aftermath of the event. Problematically for the scholar of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the capture and incarceration of Prince Rupert of the Rhine (younger brother of Count Palatine Karl Ludwig) has overshadowed the other events of the day, subsequently often skewed out of all historical context by biographers of Rupert, in particular, and later written accounts. For example, Patrick Morrah states, when discussing the battle and the two Palatine princes:

> [Karl Ludwig's] military capacity was slight, and in the climax to the brief campaign events took their disastrous course uninfluenced by him. Rupert on the other hand, was in his element, and a reconnaissance gave him an early opportunity to distinguish himself.[2]

Over the next four pages, Morrah goes to great length to blame everyone but the prince himself for Rupert's capture. Citing exclusively from early biographies of Rupert Morrah exonerates his hero from all responsibility. Alternative perspectives appear unimportant and thus his volume contributes to an orthodoxy which repeats by rote similar, if somewhat partisan, versions of events. As early as 1938, C.V. Wedgwood rather curtly exclaimed:

> In October 1638 the army he [Karl Ludwig] had raised with the help of English money had been destroyed at Vlotho, his younger brother taken prisoner, and he himself barely escaped with his life.[3]

This is the extent of the commentary of the Battle of Lemgo in one of the best books written in English regarding the Thirty Years' War. In another classic volume, the aftermath of the battle is simply described thus:

> [Lieutenant General] James King reached Minden with just five companions. Karl Ludwig tried to escape (rather unheroically) in his coach but it sank in the Weser, drowning the horses and driver. He survived by clutching a willow branch and hauling himself ashore. He hid in Minden for two months before he eventually returned to his Dutch exile.[4]

Neither Wedgwood nor Wilson give any references to sources making the veracity of their claims hard to verify, but the implications are clear: James King was clearly incompetent and Karl Ludwig an inept coward who abandoned his brother Rupert to years of incarceration – judgements stated by Morrah directly.[5] When contemporary accounts are scrutinised we find the source of the orthodox understanding of events is based on Hatzfeldt's report of the battle (or sources derived from it);

> After fighting for one hour, the enemy left on the battlefield all cannons, ammunition, baggage and carriages, standards, all infantry and most of the cavalry, who were not able to reach the banks on the other side of the river due to the high water in the Weser and Werra rivers. Hatzfeldt had taken more than 1000 prisoners, among them Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal Ferentz, six colonels and five lieutenant colonels. Lieutenant Fieldmarshal King and the Count Palatinate [Karl Ludwig] swam to the other side and are alive, but probably wounded.[6]

There are a number of points to note about this report, not least that Hatzfeldt only took about 1000 prisoners leaving some 4000 men unaccounted for from the combined Swedish-Palatinate forces. Moreover, the report's veracity is seriously undermined when tested against other contemporary Swedish, German or English language accounts. From those, a very different picture of events emerges, raising questions about what happened before, during and after the engagement at Lemgo on 17 October 1638.

The Swedish and Palatine Allies, 1638: A Recap

As early as 1636, Field Marshal Alexander Leslie declared that the Army of the Weser, which he commanded, would be delivered to the service of Prince Karl Ludwig of the Palatinate should the Swedes come to a peace with the Holy Roman Empire.[7] By 1638, while Leslie was otherwise engaged in planning the military aspects of the Covenanting Revolution in his native Scotland, command of the Army of the Weser temporarily fell to Lieutenant General James King.[8] King had been based in Minden for over a year and knew the territory well and was thus well informed with regard to the surrounding topography. With Leslie abroad, responsibility for disseminating the plans for the forthcoming operations fell to King. These included information regarding a proposed international alliance between Sweden, France, Great Britain and the Dutch Republic.[9] Additionally, Duke Bernhard of Saxe Weimar had recently been making some progress militarily and was expecting more forces to join him soon. In the meantime, King instructed Major General John Ruthven to join Duke Bernhard as soon as he could to bolster the duke's forces.[10] Elsewhere, a major push was made to create a British-Palatine Army with the intention of joining the grand coalition. As a small contribution to enabling this, Alexander Leslie offered the prince the city of Osnabrück as a base and, according

to Tryntje Helfferlich, offered to command the Hessian troops himself.[11] Karl Ludwig also sought to lead the Hessian forces, although Amalia Elisabeth believed this would violate her husband's wishes for their use.[12] Nevertheless, the later correspondence of James King states emphatically that he had Hessian troops with him at the battle of Lemgo, though whether this was a contingent of the main army of Hessen-Kassel, or voluntaries, awaits clarification.[13]

To garrison the city and conduct his operations, Karl Ludwig assembled a military force composed of veteran soldiers and fresh voluntaries drawn from across the British Isles and various German duchies. Among the more notable officers were Karl's younger brother, Prince Rupert, and veteran English soldiers, such as colonels William Lord Craven and Colonel William Vavasour. Of these voluntaries, Craven had personally committed 30,000 sterling towards raising the Palatine Army in 1637 while King Charles I had also contributed financially.[14] Scots embedded in the Swedish army also sought to help strengthen the British-Palatine army. In August 1638, Major General John Ruthven, egged on by William Gunn, had ambitions to return to Scotland to raise 1,200 infantry, four troops of cavalry and four troops of dragoons for Karl Ludwig.[15] Some Dutch scholars claimed that these British auxiliaries did not materialise due to the outbreak of the Covenanting Revolution in Scotland, although that insurrection did not occur until 1639.[16] In any case, as we shall see below, there were certainly recruits from Britain arriving throughout the remainder of 1638, including significant numbers both before and after 17 October.

Karl Ludwig, in his own writings, clarified how important British troops where to him. This should not be surprising given that he was by birth half-Scottish (his mother was born in Fife) as well as being a naturalised Englishman.[17] The Prince Elector declared that he would not leave Arnhem without these soldiers, and indeed numerous cohorts arrived throughout August and September.[18] Historians generally agree that Karl Ludwig recruited some 4000 men with the intention to bolster the army of the late Wilhelm of Hessen-Kassel and the first of the British volunteers were specifically recruited in 1638 for the purpose.[19] Recent scholarship, however, is emphatic that authority over the Hessians was still being disputed two years later, with Amalia Elisabeth steadfastly maintaining control of the main Hessian army until at least 1640.[20] Questions also remain as to when the British and other German volunteers arrived in Palatine service as they certainly did not do so in one group, and nor had all arrived before the Battle of Lemgo. Moreover, uncertainty as to who commanded these troops on the day of the battle or those still in the field in its aftermath raises interesting questions that challenge the existing historical narrative.

On more than one occasion between June and September, during ongoing negotiations involving the Swedes and the Prince Elector, Lieutenant General James King received orders from Axel Oxenstierna with instructions regarding the conjoining of Swedish and Palatine forces. If they were to fall under King's command that was acceptable, otherwise they were not to be given Swedish quarters and any alliance between King and Karl Ludwig was to remain loose.[21] By early October, the Prince Elector had both purchased Meppen from the Swedes and lost it to Imperial troops thereafter. Nevertheless, the two forces did come together, with the numbers of Swedes usually cited as comprising a contingent of 1000 men.[22] These numbers are hard to verify albeit contemporary sources are clear that the armies combined:

> The Prince Elector Palatine with his and the Swedish troupes lies now before Lemgow, which he fiercely batters, and hath brought before it foure Morter pieces, and it is thought that the city will not be able to hold out long.[23]

James King's own reports on his actions, on 2 [12] October, reveal that he set out to try to capture Bielefeld with 3000 men on a reconnaissance expedition. Once there, they engaged the Nassau regiment, killing the colonel and taking the major, numerous officers and 100 common soldiers as prisoner.[24] King's force then pursued the enemy, but could not find them. Instead, on 6 [16] October, he heard that Field Marshal Hatzfeldt was expected in the area with at least 5,800 troops, resulting in King's order to march towards Vlotho.[25] Upon arrival, on 7 [17] October, King heard that the Imperialists had taken an alternative route from Hewart through the mountains in order to cut the Weser troops off from their garrison. According to King's report of 9 [19] October, he put his troops in battle formation and engaged the enemy estimated as standing at around 8000 men.[26] King believed the enemy to have the advantage of both terrain and numbers, which he put at 20 regiments (5000 men) of cavalry and 3000 infantry. Conceding that the enemy had the advantage numerically, King believed that with the advantages afforded by some hedgerows, his own forces had done well in the beginning, inflicting casualties, including the killing of Generalwachtmeister Petter Graf von Götz.[27] Particulars of King's account are verified in newssheets emanating out of Germany within days of the battle. In one detailed report it was noted that:

> His Highnesse, the Prince Elector Palatine, and his brother Prince *Robert,* being joyned with the Swedish Generall Major *King,* they brought together an Army of 5000. men, and came before the City of [p.51] *Lemgow* the Metropolitane of the Earledome of *Lippe,* but after they had straitly continued the Siege for certaine dayes together, the Imperiall Generall *Hatzfeld* drew together an Army of 6000 men and went to relieve it, wherupon the said Prince Elector Palatine thought it best to leave the siege and sent before him all his Baggage towards *Vlota* in the Earldome of *Ravensperg* to be transported thence towards *Minden.* The Imperiall Generall *Hatzfeld* having received intelligence of it by some prisoners, marched in all haste to cut off the passage from them, and overtook the said Prince Elector about 2 of the clocke in the afternoon neere *Valdorp.* The Palatine and *Swedish* troopes fought in the beginning most valiantly, and put the Imperialists to flight, and with their horsemen pursued close after them, whereupon the Duke of *Luneburg* who had not shewed the least hostility against them heretofore, came with 1000 horse, and 1000 foot betwixt the *Swedish* and Palatine horse and foot, and separated them that they could not get together againe, and immediately thereupon the Imperialists turned again and assaulted the Prince Elector and *Swedes* horse, and the Duke of *Luneburg* the foot, and so kept them off that they could not succour the horse, insomuch that the horse being entrapped were at last totally routed, and many of them slaine and taken prisoners, and many of the foot were chased into the River of *Weser* and drowned, [p.52] and the Imperialists obtained 8 pieces of Ordinance, 2 mortering pieces, 20 ensignes, and 4 Standards. The certaine number of those that were slain and taken prisoners, is not yet known; the report goes of fifteene hundred that were both slaine and drowned, and about 800 taken prisoners. Among the chiefest of the prisoners these are known namely Prince *Robert,* Lieutenant Generall *Ferars,* the Lord *Craven,* Colonell *Boy,* Lieutenant Colonell *Berovo* of *Wenge,* Colonell *Busaid,* Colonell *Mulard,* Lieutenant Colonell *Loke,*

> the younger *King,* and others. The Prince Elector Palatine himselfe, and Generall Major *King* escaped and fled into *Minden.* On the Imperiall side is slaine the Generall Serjant Major Count Peter *Goetz,* Colonell *Tyrelly,* and others. Prince *Robert* is shrewdly wounded, and the Lord *Craven* hath received 5 wounds. [28]

Other reports also noted prisoners taken, although focussing in on the high-ranking ones and where they were taken after capture:

> The Palatine and Swedish Officers which were taken Prisoners, in the last Battell are brought into Han, Munster, Warendorp, and other places. Prince *Robert,* the Lieutenant Generall *Ferentz,* and two English Lords are at Warendorp. Prince *Robert* is within few dayes to be carried to Vienna.[29]

Combining the information from all battle reports it becomes clear that the following identifiable senior officers were certainly captured during the battle, while others, whose identity can either not be established or presence confirmed, are named in several sources.[30]

Senior Prisoners captured by the Imperial Army at Lemgo

Count Palatinate, Prince Rupert of the Rhine
Lieutenant General Thomas von Ferenz
William Lord Craven
Colonel Jacob von Boy
Colonel Pierre de Brossard (died of wounds within days)
Colonel William Vavasour
Lieutenant Colonel James King
Lieutenant Colonel John Kinnemond
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Lumsden

Nevertheless, uncertainty remains regarding the degree of impact of these losses on the Swedish element of the army rather than the Palatine force, on which most historians usually focus, not least due to the capture of Prince Rupert. Indeed, the whole scale of the Palatine army is called into question by broadening the search for reports on the battle. From the various reports cited above it seems clear that the Palatine Army could not have been above 2000 men (some Swedish scholars say not above 1,700) while the Swedish force stood at 3000.[31] Of these, King certainly withdrew the cavalry, and admitted he had lost two small cannon and two mortars; and the baggage train fell into the enemy's hands. He noted too that most of the infantry found their way back to Minden within two days of the battle.[32] Importantly, early battle reports quickly contradicted the Imperial claims of high casualties, with one correspondent in Osnabrück noting soon after the battle that:

> The dispersed Palatine Cavallarie sallieth againe about this Citie, and at Minden, and there are not so many missed as it was thought. The Prince Elector Palatine himselfe, Generall Major *King,* and the Officers are at Minden, onely Generall Major *King* is hurt in his shoulder, and one of his cheeks, but not dangerously.[33]

Could such reports be true given they are consistently overlooked in modern interpretations of the battle? Wilson states that Hatzfeldt suffered only 79 casualties and followed up his success by capturing Vechta in November.[34] However, that is only one view of events of the aftermath, and it is quite clear that the Imperials did not have their own way after Lemgo. Scrutiny of a number of contemporary sources reveal quite a different version of events, not least the military actions conducted by King and Karl Ludwig immediately after the battle.

The Aftermath

With the regrouped combined army already taking action themselves, they would soon be in a better position go after the Imperial forces still in the vicinity. Several thousand fresh soldiers were reported to have arrived for Palatine service in late October. The following account is certainly dated after the battle according to both Julian and Gregorian calendars.

> The Hatzfieldish troops lay yet still in the Bishopricke of Osnabrugge, and refresh themselves. Generall Major King hath commanded abroad, 1000 horse to destroy them, which lighted upon foure Imperiall Companies, totally routed and dispersed them, and tooke from them two Standards. In the Bishopricke of Bremen have been taken up 2000 souldiers for the Prince Elector Palatine, which are already marching towards Minden.[35]

Other contemporary reports give credence to the above report. On 23 October 1638, Christian IV of Denmark-Norway noted the arrival of 'eight or nine' ships on the Weser full of English soldiers which the English noble, William, Lord Craven, had organised for the Palatine cause.[36] As Denmark-Norway still used the Julian calendar, this report also places fresh levies arriving for Karl Ludwig after the Battle of Lemgo had taken place. Additional reports from Bremen, also written after the battle, corroborate the additional 2000 number from the first report:

> The Prince Elector Palatine, together with Generall Major *King,* is yet at Minden, and drawes together his Troopes from all places. Heere are passed by this Citie seven hundred new levyed souldiers for the sayd Prince Elector, all foot, which are marching towards their Randevouz; fifteene hundred more are daily to follow them with certaine peeces of Ordnance, a certaine summe of Money, and great store of Ammunition.[37]

Some of these fresh levies tried to reach the Prince Elector via the Bishopric of Bremen, but without victuals their passage was hard. For reasons unspecified (perhaps looting for survival) it was decreed by the local authorities not to permit any more English, Scots or other nations heading for Palatine service to transit their territory.

> 700 Souldiers, English, Scots, and of other Nations, taken up by Colonell *Valkener* for the Prince Elector Palatine, thought to have marched through the City of *Bremen,* but the Magistrate would not suffer them, yet he granted them passage below the City over the *Wesar.* Our Bishop understanding it, charged his subjects to let no man passe, who thereupon took up Armes and beat them backe to the gates of *Bremen,* where they lay two dayes without victuals, and at the last were faine to runne away, and shift for themselves. And now both the Bishop, and the Magistrate, require the Princes Colonels to bring no more forces that way, and to Countermand such as be upon the way.[38]

Regardless of the treatment of the contingent of infantry by the Bremen authorities, it is clear that within just over two weeks of the Battle of Lemgo, the Palatine forces were actually greater in number than before it. Moreover, moving beyond the partisan Imperialist broadsheets, the Army of the Weser appears to have suffered far less damage than Hatzfeldt claimed: nearly all the cavalry and most of the infantry had retired safely to Minden. Once there, they regrouped and reinforced, they had no intention of simply sitting there awaiting the next move from Hatzfeldt. One Hamburg report observed both James King and Karl Ludwig were in Minden and plotting their

revenge against the Imperials.[39] The reports out of Minden detailed more specific actions being taken:

> The Prince Elector Palatine is here still, and by all appearance will winter here. Lieutenant Generall *King* hath rallyed his troops, and put them into Garison to refresh themselves, with order to give no rest to the Enemy. Colonell *Coningsmark*, hath done something already, He hath assaulted, and defeated the Imperiall Reare-ward, taken divers officers, and common men, which he hath brought into this City, with some Enfignes: other parties are abroad, which so fill our prisons with Imperialists, that it is thought they will not be able to abide long amongst our Garrisons.[40]

Another report observed "In the Circle lyes two Swedish Regiments, which straggle continually abroad, and bring in daily many Imperiall Souldiers which they take prisoners."[41] It is clear from numerous reports emanating that these assaults on Hatzfeldt's forces were conducted in combination by the soldiers of both General King and the Prince Elector:

> The Swedish & Palatine troops that lay at Minden & Osnabrug straggle very strong up and downe, and have take prisoner Colonel *Otto Christopher* of Spar who should have beene Generall Sergeant Major of the Hatzfeldish Army, and tooke from him 14. Standards & Ensignes, which the Imperiallists had taken from the Swedes in Gartz and Wolgast.[42]

This caused King some concern as even in November he was unsure how he should deal with Karl Ludwig, and specifically the Prince Elector's troops (along with Hessians) which he had under his command.[43] Numerous reports show that he prosecuted actions against the Imperialists with them, but he wanted to be sure that in so doing he did not breach any protocols agreed between the Swedish state and Karl Ludwig as agreed by Ambassador Herman Wolff in Hamburg.

Conclusion

There is more to empirical methodology in historical analysis than simply looking in archives for documents concerning a specific event. As we have shown the empiricist should also test the veracity of the claims made by scholars who seek to relate a particular historical incident. One should question their choice of sources, ask where myth or bias has been introduced, and only then review the documentation used or omitted. Moreover, we should interrogate the sources themselves to try to establish their authors' motives; do they relate the authors' perceptions of the truth or are they wilfully deceitful? By testing secondary and primary sources in this way some interesting conclusions can be drawn from this empirical evaluation of the Battle of Lemgo and its aftermath. First and foremost is the fact that Hatzfeldt grossly exaggerated the scale of his victory over the Swedish-Palatine forces. In so doing, generations of scholars have slavishly followed his narrative without checking the veracity of his claims. The myths of a cowardly rout of a handful of survivors is simply untrue. Another striking conclusion is that the number of Palatine soldiers present at the battle have been conflated with the numbers of levies Karl Ludwig and his allies had permission to raise in England. It is true that up to 4000 were intended, but it is demonstrable the vast majority did not arrive in time for the battle. This means that the Swedish contingent, with Hessian and other German allies, formed the largest component of the combined Swedish-Palatine army and not the other way round. Of the prisoners taken, the majority were Palatine officers and men which, while certainly

destroying the core of the Palatine Army, had very little impact on the Swedish contingent. Indeed, in James King's account of the battle, there is very little that seemed to concern him other than the regrouping of his own troops. The fact that he retreated in the face of unfavourable odds was of little consequence to the Swedish commanders. It appears that there may even have been relief among some of the Swedish military establishment as the engagement removed the problem of an untrained army whose commanders had very different objectives to the Swedish government.[44] That said, tensions remained within the Swedish military hierarchy itself, and Lemgo enabled the use of a pretext to settle old scores.

Immediately following the Battle of Lemgo, numerous actors sought to lay blame for the capture of Prince Rupert and the noblemen who sponsored him. Longstanding envies also resurfaced. Johan Banér took the opportunity of this defeat to impugn the reputation of James King whom he accused of favouring the Palatine cause over that of Sweden.[45] King was asked to subordinate his command to that of Banér and was summoned to Sweden to explain his actions.[46] By March the following year, Banér held *de jure* command over all the forces left in Northwest Germany, including the Army of the Weser, leading to a total restructuring of forces and the departure of entire cohorts of officers, predominantly to return to Scotland to serve in Alexander Leslie's revolutionary Army of the Covenant.[47] However, with Banér ensconced in Bohemia, the Army of the Weser still functioned independently for the following months.[48] At the end of June 1639 King, along with a number of decommissioned officers, relocated to Hamburg where he sought to source arms for the cause of Charles I.[49] On the very same day that King penned his report on his arms deal, Sir Thomas Roe (in the same city) sent a final report on the actions of the Army of the Weser and allied Palatine soldiers to Samuel Hartlib in England. The timing of this report by the British resident in the city is suggestive of hearing it from James King personally, and in it Roe observed:

> In Westphalia Lieutenant James King's troopes, with the remaynes of the Prince Electors at Duderstadt, have beaten a great party of the enemye, and taken prisoners Colonell Epp, two leiut: Collon:, 5 routmasters, 10 Lieutenants, 3 Cornetts, and 373 Horsemen: and the Horse of the Suedes in Pomeran haue likewise beaten the Horse of the Elector of Brandenburgh, and take[n] Colonel Bursdorff, many officers, and 500 Horse prisoners.[50]

Indeed, from the period following the Battle of Lemgo until June 1639, the troops of James King and the Elector Palatine had inflicted so much damage, and taken so many prisoners from the Imperial forces, that the majority of high-ranking prisoners taken in October 1638 had either been exchanged or allowed to ransom themselves for their freedom. Lower ranking officers and soldiers had likewise been exchanged. Only Prince Rupert and Lieutenant General Thomas von Ferenz remained in captivity from the Swedish-Palatine alliance.

Senior Prisoners Released by Spring 1639

Lord William Craven – Ransomed
Colonel Jacob von Boy – Exchanged
Colonel William Vavasour – Exchanged
Lieutenant Colonel James King – Exchanged
Lieutenant Colonel John Kinnemond – Ransomed (along with his servant George Hay)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Lumsden – Exchanged

Therein lies one of the problems with researching this and other conflicts. There is a tendency for some scholars to focus on high profile figures in history. This cult of personality can lead to erroneous conclusions being drawn as both scholarly and popular attention favour overly mythologised figures rather than the lesser-known actors. In this case it has shifted the focus on this encounter away from the larger Swedish allied force and onto the smaller Palatine one. Focus has been diverted onto an individual who, at this stage in his career, was of only marginal significance in the military rather than social hierarchy. It has become popular to demonise those who biographers believe "must" have been responsible for Prince Rupert's capture rather than highlight the military incompetence of the man himself. This is something James King alluded to when the two generals again served in the same army at Marston Moor in England in 1644. When James King reviewed Rupert's battle plan he allegedly stated:

> By God, Sir, it is very fine in the paper, but there is no such thing in the field […] Sir, your forwardness lost us the day in Germany, where you yourself were taken prisoner.[51]

King's release from Swedish service and route into Royalist service in the British Civil Wars had been granted in September 1639. He left with his reputation intact and a yearly pension granted to him.[52] As noted above he relocated to Hamburg, accompanied by a number of decommissioned officers, and he continued to source arms for the Royalist cause before finally crossing the North Sea to serve in the armies of Charles I.[53] Among these soldiers was his relative and namesake, Lieutenant Colonel James King whose release he had previously secured.

Not only should greater attention be applied when scrutinising the military actions following the Battle of Lemgo, but Lemgo was, as is now apparent, far from being the "last flicker of an independent Palatine cause" as often claimed. In 1639, at the conclusion of the First Bishops' War between the Scottish Covenanters and the Royalist Army of Charles I, Field Marshal Alexander Leslie offered a compromise of taking his army into the service of Karl Ludwig in exchange for King Charles conceding to the demands of the Scottish provisional government:

> To prove his devotion the Scottish General Leslie has expressed to his Majesty his readiness to take his force to the service of the Palatine, and he asks for not assistance but the maintenance of his men until they have crossed to Holland. When there he has no doubt about obtaining what is necessary from the enemy's country, while he can also serve the King's nephew.[54]

Karl Ludwig himself personally visited Scotland in 1641 (his mother's homeland) at the conclusion of the Second Bishops' War. There, in the company of his uncle King Charles, he gained an agreement from the Scottish Parliament to supply at least 10,000 Scottish Covenanter veterans in 1641 – a plan only scuppered by the Irish Uprising of that same year.[55] With these two offers it seems rather that King Charles I's troubles in the British Isles had far more to do with the ending of Karl Ludwig's military ambitions than the actions of Melchior von Hatzfeldt in the Holy Roman Empire in October 1638.

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Appendix 1.

James King's Account of the Battle of Lemgo, freely translated from the original German by Dr Kathrin Zickermann

Source: Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Oxenstiernska samlingen. Axel Oxenstierna af Södermore. E636, unfoliated. "Extract aff Gen:lieut. Kings bref till H. Excell. H. Rixcantzleren uthur Minden aff den 9 [19] October [1638]".

On 24th September I advanced before Lemgo, in order to reoccupy this place as best as possible. Since [the Imperial commander] Herr Generalwachtmeister Westerholt aimed to relieve the town with 2000 horse on the second of this month, I sent 3000 horse towards Bielefeld to reconnoitre.[56] These met the enemy at this place, and beat the courassier of the Nassau regiment and several commanded cavalry units, so that the colonel and many others died. The major and other officers, as well as over 100 common soldiers were captured and taken to the camp.

The following day, in the early evening, I left with a strong party of cavalry and dragoons to search for the enemy behind Bielefeld, but he had already departed towards Rettberg where, it was said, Fieldmarshall Hatzfeld was expected with several troops. On the 6th of this month I learned from parties and other messages, that the said Fieldmarshall Hatzfeldt and several troops from the river Rhine and those who were withdrawn from the garrisons in Munster, were advancing. I therefore ordered the baggage train to march towards

Vlotho the same evening. The following morning, on the 7th of this month, I followed with the troops so that we arrived at Vlotho around midday. Since I learned during this march that the enemy had taken a different route from Herwardt through the mountains in order to cut off the pass to our garrisons, I was forced to place our troops in a battle formation who then engaged with the enemy for three hours. Hedges and bushes helped the enemy to gain their advantage until finally, with all of his might [being] 20 regiments on horse and 3000 infantry, estimated by themselves at 8000 men, they overwhelmed our troops. The cavalry had to save itself, therefore several infantry units and two small pieces, as well as two fire mortars which I had with me, as well as all of the baggage, which could not be moved due to the narrow pass and the mountains, fell into the enemy's hands.

However, the cavalry is completely saved. The infantry assembled bit by bit and in arge part has returned. At the beginning the enemy's side received considerable damage from our troops, and [Generalwachtmeister] Peter Götts died, some compensation for the loss of the special baggage which was left behind.[57]

Notes

1. Kindly translated from Latin by Dr Peter Maxwell-Stuart, University of St Andrews. The original can be found in München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Res/4 Eur. 364,25. *Continuation und Eigentlichere Erzehlung…d. Schwed. vorgegangenen Schlacht*, p. 3. October 1638.
2. Morrah, Patrick: *Prince Rupert of the Rhine*, Constable, London 1976, p. 49.
3. Wedgwood, C. V.: *The Thirty Years' War*, The Folio Society, London 1999 edition, p. 374. Similarly, Akkerman, Nadine: *Elizabeth Stuart: Queen of Hearts*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2021, p. 318. "Charles Louis escaped by the skin of his teeth, but he and his men had fought ferociously".
4. Wilson, Peter: *Europe's Tragedy: A New History of the Thirty Years War*, Penguin Books, 2010, p. 595.
5. Op. cit., Morrah, Patrick, see note 2, p. 52. Here Karl Ludwig, Lieutenant James King and Colonel Königsmark all come in for harsh criticism based on "*The History of Prince Rupert* (Landsdown MSS)", a Restoration era retrospective on the life of Rupert of the Rhine, so not contemporary and certainly not objective. See op. cit., Morrah, Patrick, see note 2, p. 429, notes for chapter 2, specifically note 7. For a discussion on the use of later retrospective sources and the problems they bring to our understanding of historical events see the discussion on the Battle of Marston Moor (1644) in Murdoch, Steve and Grosjean, Alexia: *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648*, Pickering & Chatto, London 2014, pp. 126-134.
6. Badura, Bohumil et al. (eds.): *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale Illustrantia Tomus VI: De große Kampfe um die Vormacht in Europa: Die Rolle Schwedens und Frankreichs. Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges 1635–1643*, Praha Academia, Prague 1978, pp. 265. Letter 705. M. v. Hatzfeldt to M. Gallas, Salzuflen, 20 October 1638. Summary translated for this article by Dr Kathrin Zickermann.
7. Murdoch, Steve: "Marital Problems: Stuart Alliances, Scottish Politics and the Protestant North, 1603–1641" in Caldari, Valentina and Wolfson, Sara J. (eds.): *Stuart Marriage Diplomacy: Dynastic Politics in their European Context, 1604–1630*, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge 2018, p. 169.
8. Op. cit., Murdoch, Steve and Grosjean, Alexia, see note 5, p. 89.
9. Negotiations were still ongoing up until the eve of the battle of Lemgo. See variously Riksarkivet, Diplomatica Anglica VII: 532. Negotiations and propositions between the legates in Hamburg, 17 July and 15/25 October 1638.
10. The recipient of this letter has been mis catalogued in the Swedish archives as Patrick Ruthven. It was, in fact, his nephew John who received the instructions. See Riksarkivet, Stockholm. Arkivfragment, "General Patrick Ruthven". A fragment of a letter from Lt General James King to Major General John Ruthven, Minden, 2 March 1638. Oxenstierna's confirmation and response to King's propositions are found in Backhaus, Helmut (ed.): *Rikskanslern Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brevväxling: Förra Avdelningen, Sextonde bandet: Brev 1636–1642 Del 1*, Kung. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, Stockholm 2009, 16:1, pp. 151-152. Axel Oxenstierna to James King, Stockholm, 2 May 1638. Queen Christina's instructions giving details of the alliance are found in the same volume, pp. 175-181. Queen Christina's Instructions to Johan Adles Salvius, Stockholm, 30 June 1638. We thank Dr Backhaus for confirming our identification of the recipient of the letter as John Ruthven.
11. Akkerman, Nadine (ed.): *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia, vol. II, 1632–1642*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, p. 670, Elizabeth to Thomas Roe, The Hague, 12 April 1638 and note 7; op. cit., Akkerman, Nadine, see note 3, p. 317; Helfferich, Tryntje: *The Iron Princess: Amalia Elisabeth and the Thirty Years War*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 2013, p. 69.
12. Op. cit., Helfferich, Tryntje, see note 11, p. 50.
13. Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Oxenstiernska samlingen. Axel Oxenstierna af Södermore. E636, unfoliated James King Memorial [?] November 1638. Reprinted in *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas*

Skrift er och Brefvexling: *Senare Afdelningen*, Norstedt, Stockholm 1898, IX, p. 937.

14. For Charles I's financial support of this army see op. cit., Akkerman, Nadine (ed.), see note 11, pp. 670-677, 733, 751-4, 756-7. Lord Craven's financial contribution is noted in Bricka, C. F. and Frederica, J. A. et al. (eds.): *Kong Christian den Fjerdes egenhændige Breve* 8 vols., Rudolph Klein Forlag, Copenhagen 1878–1947, VIII, p.121, note 2; op. cit., Morrah, Patrick, see note 2, p. 49.
15. Op. cit., Akermann, Nadine (ed.), see note 11, pp. 693 and 695. Charles Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, Arnhem, 2 August 1638 and Elizabeth to Thomas Roe, Rhenen, 3 August 1638; op. cit., Murdoch, Steve and Grosjean, Alexia, see note 5, p. 89.
16. Ten Raa, F. J. G. and De Bas, F. (eds): *Het Staatsche Leger, deel IV, van de dood van Maurits, prins van Oranje, graaf Nassau, tot het sluiten van den vrede te Munster [1625–1648]*, Koninklijke Militaire Academie, Breda 1918, p.103.
17. Marks, Adam: "Recognising Friends from Foes: Stuart Politics, English Military Networks and Alliances with Denmark and the Palatinate" in Caldari, Valentina and Wolfson, Sara J. (eds): *Stuart Marriage Diplomacy*, p. 180.
18. Op. cit., Akermann, Nadine (ed.), see note 11, p. 693. Karl Ludwig to Elizabeth, Arnhem, 2 August 1638.
19. Op. cit., Wilson, Peter, see note 4, pp. 594-595.
20. Op. cit., Helfferich, Tryntje, see note 11, pp. 43, 50, 129-130.
21. Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Det odelade kansliet Riksregistraturet, vol.196, fols. 176 and 257. Axel Oxenstierna to James King, Stockholm, 16 June and 8 September 1638. These are printed in op. cit., Backhaus, Helmut (ed.), see note 10, pp.173-174 (complete) and 189 (summary only).
22. This number is usually cited by scholars of general histories of the Thirty Years' War, as are the 1 000 soldiers "loaned by Baner" and commanded by James King. See op. cit., Wilson, Peter, see note 4, pp. 594-595: Harrison, Dick: *Ett stort lidande har kommit över oss: Historien från Trettioåriga kriget*, Ordfront, Stockholm 2014, p. 386. Adam Marks puts the total number of Palatine and Swedes at 5 000 men combined but does not directly break down the numbers of each allied army. See Marks, Adam: *England and the Thirty Years' War*, Leiden, Brill 2023, p. 167.
23. *An Abstract of Some Speciall Forreigne Occurences, brought down to the weekly Newes, of the 20 of December OR The severall passages and novels which have happened in Germany, France, Spaine, Italy, and other places some few moneths since*, Printed for Nathaniel Butter and Nicholas Bourne, By permission; London 1638, p. 33. Lower Saxony, 3/13 October 1638. NB. Both Julian and Gregorian dates are given throughout this source, but in different formats. We have standardised the format throughout this article to the one given here.
24. Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Oxenstiernska samlingen. Axel Oxenstierna af Södermore. E636, unfoliated. "Extract aff Gen:lieut. Kings bref till H. Excell. H. Rixcantzleren uthur Minden aff den 9 [19] October [1638]". NB. The dates in square brackets are not in the original document. The "19" represents the Julian date and the "1638" has been added by an archivist at a later date. Reprinted in op. cit., *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrift er och Brefvexling*: *Senare Afdelningen*, see note 13, pp. 933-934. We add here the original reference as the printed version differs in presentation and adds two lines of unnecessary dots before the body of the text implying there is some omitted text in the manuscript. There is not. We have appended an English translation of this document from the original German at the end of this article (Appendix 1).
25. Op. cit., Wilson, Peter, see note 4, p. 595. It was on this date that, according to Patrick Morrah, King took command of the combined forces. Op. cit., Morrah, Patrick, see note 2, p. 50.
26. The 8 000 number is given credence to in contemporary reports other than King's, with Hatzfeldt being accredited with 6 000 and Lüneburg's forces adding an additional 2 000. See op. cit., *An Abstract of Some Speciall Forreigne Occurences*, see note 23, pp. 50-51. A Relation of the Battell betwixt the Prince Elector Palatine, and the Imperiall Generall *Hatzfeld*, fought the 7/17 October 1638 neere *Vlota* on the River of *Weser*.
27. Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Oxenstiernska samlingen. Axel Oxenstierna af Södermore. E636, unfoliated. "Extract aff Gen:lieut. Kings bref

till H. Excell. H. Rixcantzleren uthur Minden aff den 9 [19] October [1638]". For the identification of Götz and other German officers who participated in the battle we have consulted the Thirty Years' War biographical database by Dr Bernd Warlich, "Volkach", *https://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/*.

28. Op. cit., *An Abstract of Some Speciall Forreigne Occurences*, see note 23, pp. 50-51. A Relation of the Battell betwixt the Prince Elector Palatine, and the Imperiall Generall *Hatzfeld,* fought the 7/17 October neere *Vlota* on the River of *Wesar.* Akkerman believes that along with Prince Rupert, three colonels were captured, including Craven. See op. cit., Akkerman, Nadine, see note 3, p. 318.
29. Op. cit., *An Abstract of Some Speciall Forreigne Occurrences,* see note 23, p. 73. Osnabrück, 27 October / 6 November 1638.
30. For example, Lieutenant Colonell *Berovo* of *Wenge,* Colonell *Busaid,* Colonell *Mulard,* Lieutenant Colonell *Loke* are yet to be identified but are all mentioned in op. cit., *An Abstract of Some Speciall Forreigne Occurences*, see note 23, pp. 50-51. A Relation of the Battell betwixt the Prince Elector Palatine, and the Imperiall Generall *Hatzfeld,* fought the 7/17 October neere *Vlota* on the River of *Wesar*. Moreover, it is yet to be established that Spencer Compton, 2nd Earl of Northampton was actually present at the battle despite his support for the Palatine army and cause. His name does not appear in the documents scrutinised for this article. His participation is noted in op. cit., Akkerman, Nadine (ed.), see note 11, II, p.767, note 1 (citing the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*).
31. Tingsten, Lars: *Fältmarskalkarna Johan Banér och Lennart Torstensson såsom härförare*, Militärlitteraturföreningens förlag, Stockholm 1932, p. 96.
32. Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Oxenstiernska samlingen. Axel Oxenstierna af Södermore. E636, unfoliated. "Extract aff Gen:lieut. Kings bref till H. Excell. H. Rixcantzleren uthur Minden aff den 9 [19] October [1638]".
33. Op. cit., *An Abstract of Some Speciall Forreigne Occurrences,* see note 23, p. 73. Osnabrück, 27 October /6 November 1638. Adam Marks is one of the few historians of the Thirty Years' War to have observed this. See op. cit., Marks, Adam, see note 22, p. 168.
34. Op. cit., Wilson, Peter, see note 4, p. 595.
35. Op. cit., *An Abstract of Some Speciall Forreigne Occurrences,* see note 23, p.46. Collen, 25 October /4 November 1638.
36. Op. cit., Bricka, C. F. and Frederica, J. A. et al. (eds.), see note 14, VIII, p. 121. Christian IV to Korfitz Ulfeldt, Glyckxborrig [Glückstadt], 23 October 1638.
37. Op. cit., *An Abstract of Some Speciall Forreigne Occurrences,* see note 23, pp.77-68. Bremen, 1/11 November 1638.
38. Ibid., pp. 62-63. Bishopric of Bremen. 10/20 November 1638; op. cit., Marks, Adam, see note 22, p. 168 citing the same source.
39. Op. cit., *An Abstract of Some Speciall Forreigne Occurrences,* see note 23, p. 61. Hamburg, 30 October / 9 November 1638.
40. Ibid., p. 64. Minden, 11/21 November 1638 and repeated almost word for word and on the same date, p. 87.
41. Ibid., p. 73. Osnabrück, 27 October / 6 November 1638.
42. Ibid., p. 46. Erfurt, 10/20 November 1638.
43. Op. cit., *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling*: *Senare Afdelningen*, see note 13, pp. 934-938. James King's Memorial to the Swedish Government [?] November 1638 (two documents, esp. enclosure point six).
44. The diplomatic outfall, and expansive record base relating to it, will form the basis of a separate article by Kathrin Zickermann in the journal *Legatio; The Journal for Renaissance and Early Modern Diplomatic Studies*. The focus here remains on the military dimension only.
45. Op. cit., Tingsten, Lars, see note 31, pp. 95-96.
46. Kullberg, N. A. et al., (eds.): *Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll,* 18 vols., P.A. Norstedt & Söner, Stockholm 1878–1959, VII, pp. 345 and 363. Riksråd minutes, 27 October and 30 November 1638; op. cit., Backhaus, Helmut (ed.), see note 10, pp. 221-222. Axel Oxenstierna to Herman Wolff, Stockholm, 8 December 1638. Sir Thomas Roe's version of events is more critical. See op. cit., Akkerman, Nadine (ed.), see note 11, II, p. 746. Thomas Roe to Elizabeth of Bohemia, Hamburg, 24 December 1638.
47. The best work on this remains Grosjean, Alexia: *An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden, 1569–1654*, Brill, Leiden 2003, pp. 168-175.
48. From his own correspondence we know that Banér was operating around Litoměřice in

Bohemia in May and June 1639. See Sondén, Per (ed.): *Rikskanslern Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefväxling: Senare Avdelningen: Sjette Bandet, Johan Baners Bref 1624–1641*, P. A. Nordstedt & Söner, Stockholm 1893, pp. 616-628. Johan Banér to Axel Oxenstierna, Litoměřice, 30 May, 1639.

49. The National Archives (London), SP 81/47, f.102, 'Certificate of General King upon arms sent to England', 28 June 1639. This document was countersigned by Lieutenant General James King and Colonel James King among others.
50. Sheffield University Library, Samuel Hartlib Papers, Folio 14/4/60A-61B. Thomas Roe to Samuel Hartlib, Hamburg, 28 June 1639.
51. Quoted in various forms in Ridsdill Smith, Geoffrey; Toynbee, Margaret and Young, Peter: *Leaders of the Civil Wars, 1642–1648*, Roundwood Press, Kineton 1977, p. 55; Stroud, Angus: *Stuart England*, Routledge, London 1999, p. 101; Almost verbatim in Hattersley, Roy: *The Devonshires: The Story of a Family and a Nation*, Chatto & Windus, London 2013, p. 126.
52. The final decommissioning was not granted until September 1639. See op. cit., Akkerman, Nadine (ed.), see note 11, II, p. 840. Thomas Roe to Elizabeth of Bohemia, Hamburg, 25 October 1639.
53. The National Archives (London), SP 81/47, f.102, 'Certificate of General King upon arms sent to England', 28 June 1639. This document was countersigned by Lieutenant General James King, Colonel James King and Lieutenant Colonel James King among others.
54. Cited in op. cit., Murdoch, Steve and Grosjean, Alexia, see note 5, p. 102. The offer was declined leading to the Second Bishops' War in 1640.
55. Op. cit., Murdoch, Steve and Grosjean, Alexia, see note 5, p. 118. An original source for this is found in The National Archives (London), SP81/52, f.221, The Scottish Parliament on the troops for the Palatinate, 20 November 1641.
56. The Imperial General also known as Bernhard Hackfort Westerholt zu Lembeck (1595–18 November 1638).
57. The German literally reads "dass gegentheill sich meines besondern profijts alss der hinerlassenen pagage von zu erfreuen haben" – [the opposite of enjoying my special profit] which here clearly denotes that King saw Götz's death as a compensation for the loss of the baggage.