

The Security Dimension of the Arctic region

A symposium at the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences

Introduction

by Bo Waldemarsson

Resumé

Uppföljningen av utvecklingen i Arktis har en tydlig säkerhetsdimension. Klimatförändringen öppnar bland annat nya möjligheter för den transoceana sjöfarten liksom utvinningen av strategiska råvaror ur havet. I denna region har Arktiska Rådet en betydelsefull roll som ett forum för konstruktiv dialog. Den militära utvecklingen i regionen behöver följas noggrant och inom detta område är det särskilt Ryssland som genomfört en konkret militär uppbyggnad. För Sverige är det uppenbart att utvecklingen i Arktis är av stort intresse.

TODAY'S SYMPOSIUM FORMS part of the ongoing analysis and discussion of issues important to Swedish defence and security.

As most of us are aware, a new Arctic is emerging. This is not a remote and theoretical possibility in some distant future. The change is happening now. Climate change drives ice-melt on land and at sea in the Arctic twice as fast as in the rest of the world. As a result a number of follow-on effects can be clearly observed. New opportunities present themselves. Among them are new transoceanic sea lanes, extraction of energy and mineral wealth and not least the chance to explore one of the least known parts of our planet. More human activity is to be expected, affecting living conditions for indigenous populations there and the sensitive natural environment.

The Arctic is attracting several state- and non-state actors. Major state actors in the region and outside it have different approaches and traditions in dealing with the Arctic. Will we see clash or cooperation when they meet in the Arctic?

The realization of the changing Arctic have in recent years spread around the world. The region is clearly on the agenda for policymakers. On the international level, inter-governmental cooperation to meet the changing Arctic has led to a strong development of the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council is now *The Club* to be a member of and where much, but by no means all, of the interaction over Arctic affairs takes place.

The issue of hard security has also presented itself. Assertion of sovereignty has come to the fore, and a smaller and thinner ice-sheet may in time affect nuclear strategic stability. New technologies such as the development of ballistic missile defence, might also contribute to a changing military-strategic role for the Arctic. These trends will not automatically lead to an increased risk of open conflict. The discussion on naval and military deployments and build-up in the Arctic has also lately become more intense. A build-up of resources, bases and capabilities can be clearly observed. To a large extent, the outcome of this process will

depend on events and developments outside of the region.

The only substantial military build-up in the Arctic today is undertaken by Russia. With Russian central strategic interests in the Barents Sea region and on the Kola Peninsula, this part of the Arctic will constitute a challenge for Arctic security in the years to come. Russian open aggression towards Ukraine, a general military build-up as well as attempts at ignoring international law and agreements entered into, present clear risks that this will affect cooperation adversely also in the Arctic. To what degree will cooperative efforts in recent years be damaged by this? What can be done to mitigate such damage?

With a number of new actors paying attention to the Arctic and the sheer number of factors changing, predicting the outcome with a reasonable degree of certainty will be a challenge. Moreover, all these factors develop at their own pace and according to their own inner logic. How will they interact? Will they cancel each other out or will

they reinforce each other in ways we cannot foresee? One thing is clear: we cannot discard these developments and their regional and global effects.

From a Swedish perspective, our northern neighborhood is changing. Driven by climate change, Greenland, Iceland, the North Atlantic, Northern Scandinavia including the Barents Sea region is affected. This is the main focus of today's symposium – in what way will this region change and what are the strategic implications?

A new Arctic is emerging and what role it will play in regional and global affairs is hard to predict. The new Arctic can no longer be seen in isolation from the rest of the world. So far the Arctic actors have largely played by the rulebook, but what happens in a crisis? It is the view of the Academy that it would not be prudent to overlook the risks in the dynamic we see now.

The author is Major General (Retd.) and Vice Chairman of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

Sverige går i bräschen

by Krister Bringéus

Resumé

Arktis utvecklas dynamiskt, dit människor drar sig för att arbeta eller turista. Vi ser hur den del av regionen som tillhör Sverige drar till sig ett brett spektrum av näringsverksamhet men också hur Arktis uppfattas lämpa sig för att testa olika vapensystem. Men det handlar inte bara om positivt expanderande näringsverksamhet. Miljöfrågorna representerar mångfacetterade utmaningar för att erhålla en hållbar utveckling och här satsar Sverige traditionellt stora resurser. Det är också utomordentligt betydelsefullt att Sverige går i bräschen för att regionen ska förbli ett lågspänningsområde genom samarbete och dialog som en bas för positiv samhällsutveckling bi regionen.

I AM HERE today to provide you with the Swedish view of the Arctic, and our national strategy with regards to this increasingly

important and prominent region. But first of all, I would like to seize the opportunity and present you with a few reflections

on the Arctic region found within Sweden's own borders. I find it quite remarkable that all the things that historically used to be considered negative – cold climate, darkness, and vast areas with few people – are now significant assets for Sweden. A sophisticated and successful mining and forestal industry aside, the Swedish Arctic has evolved into a dynamic and quickly developing region in many other aspects as well.

People are coming from all corners of the world to stay at the Ice Hotel, behold the northern lights, and experience the harsh but magnificent nature in the far north. The European car industry is winter testing new models and components on the frozen lakes in our northernmost counties. Space research and industry are since long present outside of Kiruna, because of vast uninhabited areas and the absence of light pollution. A number of European countries have found northern Sweden ideal for testing weapons systems.

A few years ago, Facebook chose to place a 28000-square meter server facility outside of the city of Luleå due to the cold climate, the excellent telecommunications, the green hydropower available in the region, and the secure geographic location. The Facebook representative, on his field trip to Luleå, is supposed to have stood on a quiet field outside of town and said that "this is exactly what we have been looking for. This is perfect." Two additional server facilities, powered solely by renewable energy, are being planned for.

These are just a few examples, and I believe that we have only witnessed the very beginning of development in the Swedish Arctic. Lord High Chancellor and founding father of the modern central administration in Sweden, Axel Oxenstierna, argued in the 17th century that Sweden had its own India

in the northern domains, if we only realized that we should be taking advantage of it. Perhaps we are finally starting to realize that now, nearly four hundred years later.

But positive development aside, reducing the Arctic to nothing more than a business concern would of course be both unjust and foolish. The environmental aspect has been imperative for Sweden since the very founding of the Arctic Council and the formalization of cooperation on the Arctic. As the effects of climate change and a receding ice cap creates new possibilities for everything from maritime shipping and commercial fishing to the extraction of natural resources, it is Sweden's determined and repeatedly outspoken ambition that these developments are governed by a shared and robust international legal framework.

First and foremost, this framework needs to be environmentally sustainable. As Sweden is one of the countries that will experience the impact of global warming to the greatest degree, we have an obvious national interest in making sure that the environmentally damaging footprints mankind leaves in the Arctic is kept at an absolute minimum.

It is no surprise to the people attending this symposium that the dramatic effects of climate change in the Arctic have become global issues, of great importance to all mankind. Therefore, cooperation between states, scientific and environmental organizations, indigenous peoples and a range of other actors with interests in the Arctic is the key to responsible long-term development in this unique and extremely sensitive region of the world.

Sweden might be a small country, but we have a rich and proud history of successful cooperation, negotiation, mediation and diplomacy on a global level. Our ambition is to use the capabilities we possess to raise awareness of environmental issues, safe-

guard sustainable development, strengthen the existing legal framework in international waters, and invest further in scientific research in the Arctic. With respect to current events in the Ukraine, it is also important that Sweden, as a militarily non-aligned country, does its utmost to facilitate dialogue and cooperation between East and West on Arctic issues.

During the Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø in January, the report *Growth in the North*, a collaboration between Sweden, Norway and Finland, was presented. Its main purpose is to develop, and increase cooperation in, the Scandinavian Arctic. The report identifies four main drivers for growth; investments in liquified natural gas and renewable energy, green mining solutions, increased tourism and ice- and cold climate technologies.

These objectives are to be reached by harmonizing legal frameworks, pooling competence and manpower, adopting a long-term plan for transportation and infrastructure and coordinating our voices on Arctic issues. As ambassador, I welcome this initiative, and consider the report a valuable contribution to the future development of the Scandinavian Arctic. Like I argued before,

cooperation is the key to successful and sustainable stewardship of the very sensitive Arctic region.

Looking ahead, the Canadian chairmanship in the Arctic Council is coming to an end, and the United States assumes leadership in the closing days of April. With Sweden's environmental emphasis in mind, we are indeed happy and content that the United States' proposed chairmanship program considers the issues of climate change, pollution and renewable energy as seriously as it does. On a range of matters concerning the future of the Arctic, Sweden and the United States see eye to eye, and we hope that these most welcome developments are picked up by subsequent chairmen in the Arctic Council. Exactly how the development of the Arctic will unfold is still unknown to us, but for the good of our planet, we need to make sure that environmental sustainability triumphs over short-term economic interests. The future of the Arctic is a concern to all mankind, and its importance cannot be overestimated.

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Nordisk forsvarssamarbejde i Arktis

af Nils Wang

Résumé

The four Defence Ministers in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark recently published a joint cronicle in respective national newspapers, stating that Nordic Defence cooperation is required in lieu of the Ukraine crisis. In this article Rear Admiral Nils Wang, Commandant of the Royal Danish Defence College, analyses opportunities and limitations of Nordic Defence Cooperation. The article explains why Nordic Defence cooperation historically has been such a difficult endeavour. The maritime focus in the "Stoltenberg Report" is analysed against the back drop of the Ukraine crisis and the increased operational focus on the Arctic.

The article concludes that the Ukraine crisis offers a window of opportunity to establish a naval Nordic Task Group concept, moving operational Nordic Defence cooperation to a new and higher level.

UKRAINEKRISEN HAR ENDNU ikke røkket ved den stabile sikkerhedssituation i Arktis og dermed heller ikke ved det uforløste nordiske samarbejdspotentialer i regionen. Det nordiske samarbejde er dog i forvejen udfordret af geografiske og realpolitiske grundvilkår.

Nordisk forsvarssamarbejde ses igen af mange politikere som et stort uudnyttet samarbejdsområde, der har potentialer til at løse flere af tidens store forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitiske udfordringer. I Danmark fik ønsket om et øget nordisk samarbejde på forsvarsområdet plads i S-R-SF regeringsgrundlaget¹ i 2011, og i de øvrige nordiske lande er emnet også på den politiske agenda. Omdrejningspunktet for denne nordiske forsvarspolitiske renæssance er blevet den såkaldte ”Stoltenberg rapport”² fra 2009, der med den tidligere norske forsvars- og udenrigsminister Thorvald Stoltenberg som forfatter lister en række specifikke områder, hvor der efter hans opfattelse er muligheder for at øge samarbejdet.

Allerede i rapportens indledning anføres det, at det er en udbredt opfattelse, at Norden får en stadig større geopolitisk betydning som følge af de nordlige farvandes rolle som produktions- og transitområde for olie og gas samt udviklingen i Arktis, og at der alene på grund af det forsvarsrelaterede ressourcebehov er et øget behov for, at de nordiske lande samarbejder. Rapporten lister herefter en række konkrete forslag til samarbejdsinitiativer, der næsten alle er karakteriseret ved at bevæge sig inden for det, man kunne kalde den ”bløde ende” af konfliktspækket.

Eksempler fra dette katalog er overvågning, kapacitetsopbygning, stabiliseringsin-

dsatser, fælles øvelser, fælles materielindkøb o s v. I det halvfulde bægers optik er rapporten visionær og dejlig konkret med fokus på de ting, der rent faktisk burde ligge inden for det muliges kunst. Omvendt kan man også se den som et relativt uambitiøst katalog over samarbejdsområder, der næsten alle er så simple og åbenbart fornuftige, at de for længst burde have været implementeret, når man betænker de utallige nordiske møder på både politisk og militært niveau, som er afholdt gennem årene.

Når det ikke er sket tidligere, og når der skulle et statsmands-ikon som Thorvald Stoltenberg til at genoplive det politiske fokus på området, er det, fordi forsvarssamarbejde i en nordisk ramme traditionelt har haft vanskelige vilkår. Trådene kan trækkes helt tilbage til mellemkrigstiden og bestræbelserne på at få etableret Nordisk Forsvarsforbund samt de fundamentalt forskellige sikkerhedspolitiske rammevilkår, som de fem nordiske lande fik ved Europas deling efter anden verdenskrig. Danmark, Norge og Island valgte en sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitisk forankring i Nato, hvorimod Sverige og Finland valgte at fortsætte neutraliteten.

Skift efter Den Kolde Krig

Først efter den Kolde Krig har Sverige og Finland bevæget sig fra neutralitet til såkaldt alliancefrihed, hvor der er skabt mulighed for at samarbejde med både Nato og EU. Begge lande har dog indtil nu fortrinsvis lagt æggene i EU-forsvarskurven, hvor Norge og Island ikke er medlem, og hvor Danmark stadig har sit forsvarsforbehold. Lidt karikeret kunne man således med nogen ret hævde, at er der fem lande

her på jorden, der har tradition for at se verden gennem forskellige sikkerhedspolitiske prismer, så er det de nordiske. Selv Danmark og Norge har som Natomedlemmer set meget forskelligt på alliancens prioriteringer de seneste 10-15 år. Hvor Danmark har været advokat for, at Nato skal fokusere sin indsats ude i den store verden, har Norge på grund af naboskabet med Rusland i nord i samme periode været bekymret for, at det skete på bekostning af alliancens fokus på og evne til territorialforsvar. Det seneste års udvikling i Rusland har endog skærpet det norske syn.

Det betones ofte, at det nordiske samarbejdspotentialer er stort, fordi de fem lande ud over geografien deler værdier og menneskesyn – altså et værdifællesskab. Det er imidlertid den sikkerhedspolitiske perception, der for alvor dikterer, i hvilken grad et land kan og vil samarbejde militært med andre, fordi sikkerheden for en nation er forudsætningen for alt andet – altså et interessefællesskab. Krisen i Ukraine har mindet os om, at det forholder sig sådan, og den har desuden skabt et forandret trusselsbillede i hele den skandinaviske region. Spørgsmålet er, hvad det betyder for det nordiske forsvarssamarbejde, herunder ikke mindst, hvad det betyder for den del af samarbejdet, der ifølge Stoltenberg rapporten er så vigtig i det arktiske område.

Ressourcer og grænser

Mere end 95 procent af de enorme olie- og gasressourcer, som findes i det arktiske område, befinder sig inden for allerede etablerede og internationalt anerkendte ”eksklusive økonomiske zoner” (EEZ³).⁴ Det betyder, at stort set alle ressourcer af værdi i dette område allerede er fordelt mellem de retmæssige ejer-nationer, jævnfør FN’s Havretskonvention af 1982. Rusland har

ratificeret denne traktat og har på grund af sin enorme arktiske kystlinje allerede fået retten til en overordentlig stor del af disse ressourcer. Rusland har desuden så sent som i 2011 indgået en ny delelinjeaftale med Norge, der har bilagt en over 30 år gammel uenighed om grænsedragningen mellem de to landes eksklusive økonomiske zoner.

Det har Rusland og Norge gjort nu, fordi det giver de to lande mulighed for at kapitalisere de betydelige energiressourcer, der ligger under havbunden i dette område. Rusland har med andre ord store økonomiske fordele af, at den internationale lovgivning på området bliver overholdt. Så store, at de få grænsemæssige uoverensstemmelser, de har med andre nationer i Arktis, er ubetydelige i dette større perspektiv. Det gælder også spørgsmålet om grænsedragningen omkring den geografiske Nordpol, hvor Rusland og Danmark forventelig vil have overlappende krav.

Nordisk maritimt samarbejde

Udnyttelsen af disse energiressourcer og de store mineralforekomster, som befinder sig på land vil i sig selv skabe en forøget maritim trafik i området. Lægges hertil den transittrafik, som en fortsat reduktion af havisen i Polhavet vil afstedkomme, vil de polare kyststater være nødsaget til at forøge overvågningen og reguleringen af denne trafik betydeligt i forhold til i dag. Der vil ligeledes være behov for at styrke søredningskapacitet, havmiljøberedskab og andre kystvagsrelaterede foranstaltninger, som knytter sig til kystområder med skibstrafik.

De barske vejrforhold og de enorme afstande, der karakteriserer området betyder, at opbygningen af denne maritime infrastruktur bliver særdeles bekostelig, og der er

derfor god grund til at se sig om efter måder, hvor man kan få ressourcerne til at strække længere. Det er også grunden til, at der i Stoltenberg rapporten foreslås en fælles nordisk overvågningsindsats i området og en fælles maritim indsatsstyrke bestående af kystvagtsheder fra de nordiske lande. Det virker umiddelbart meget logisk, fornuftigt og let gennemførligt. Men begynder man at dissekere forslagene og holder bestanddele op imod virkeligheden, så opdager man nogle af de forhindringer, som gør, at forslagene ikke for længst er implementeret.

Interesser frem for værdier

Den første kendsgerning, man er nødt til at forholde sig til, er, at selvom alle fem nordiske lande er medlem af det efterhånden meget prestigefyldte Arktisk Råd, så har de fem nordiske lande også i Arktis vidt forskellige sikkerhedspolitiske prioriteringer og rammebetingelser. Danmark og Norge er begge kystlinjestater i Polhavet⁵ og tilhører således den del af medlemskredsen i Arktisk Råd, der går under betegnelsen ”De arktiske fem”, og som også består af USA, Rusland og Canada.

Med kystlinjerne følger også retten til alle ressourcer, der befinder sig inden for den eksklusive økonomiske zone og til de ressourcer, der befinder sig på eller under havbunden inden for den såkaldte ydre kontinentalsokkelgrænse, der i disse år er ved at blive fastlagt, jævnfør reglerne i FN Havretskonvention af 1982. Danmark og Norge har sammen med de øvrige tre arktiske kyststater skrevet under på Ilulissat Deklarationen, der i korthed går ud på, at de fem lande forpligter sig til at samarbejde og optræde som ansvarlige kyststater, men også at de påberåber sig de sø-territoriale rettigheder, som FN Havretskonvention giver dem. Og det er denne territoriale tilknytning til Polhavet, der

for Kongeriget Danmarks og Norges vedkommende gør Arktis til et spørgsmål om national suverænitet og dermed til en hård sikkerhedspolitisk prioritering baseret på interesser fremfor på værdier.

Rigsfællesskabets kontinentalsokkelkrav, den såkaldte ”submission”, som blev indgivet til FNs Kontinentalsokkelkommission den 14. december 2014 viser, at der for de arktiske kyststater er tale om meget konkrete territoriale rettigheder. Rigsfællesskabets krav strækker sig over hele Polhavet helt op til den russiske søgrænse og alle venter nu på, hvordan Rusland vil håndtere Danmarks relativt offensive krav. Den 17. december kunne man imidlertid læse i ”Barents Observer”, at Rusland har noteret sig det danske krav og at Rusland agter at indsende sin submission til Kontinentalsokkelkommissionen i marts 2015 og at eventuelle overlappende krav må håndteres mellem Rusland og Danmark.⁶ Hvis denne officielle udmelding følges, så tyder alt på, at Rusland har tænkt sig at følge FNs regler på området og dermed også Ilulissat Deklarationen.

Med en submission, som gør krav på det størst mulige del af havbunden under Polhavet er Rigsfællesskabet gået ”all in” i en international udenrigspolitisk proces, som ud over at have kostet de danske skatteydere mere end 300 mio. kr. kan vare længere end tyve år. Dermed er Danmarks og Grønlands afhængighed af hinanden blevet endnu større end den var i forvejen og det burde få al populistisk tale om, at vi blot kan vælge hinanden fra til at forstumme.

Ud over fastlæggelse af kontinentalsokkelgrænser er der for det danske Rigsfællesskabs vedkommende herudover den hårde sikkerhedspolitiske omstændighed, at USA har den strategisk vigtige Thule Base på Grønland og siden Anden Verdenskrig har betragtet Grønland som en integreret del af sin nære sikkerhedssfære.⁷

Trods beliggenhed og status som en kyststat i det arktiske område adskiller Island sig fra Danmark og Norge, idet Island ikke har kystlinje, der grænser op til Polhavet. Uagtet at Sverige og Finland er arktiske nationer og har store landområder, som befinder sig nord for Polarcirklen, så har ingen af disse to nationer kystlinje i det arktiske område, og de har dermed ikke de samme nationale sikkerhedspolitiske prioriteringer i det polare område. Omvendt har de heller ikke som underskriverne af Ilulissat Deklarationen nationale forpligtelser i relation til de førømtalte kystvagtsfunktioner i de polare farvande.

De store afstande

Her kommer vi så til den første udfordring i forhold til tankerne om en fælles Nordisk Maritim Kystvagtsstyrke i det Arktiske område, nemlig de økonomiske omkostninger holdt op imod de nationale prioriteringer. Kystvagsorganisationer er som udgangspunkt dimensioneret til de nationale behov inden for en nations søterritorium, og hvis de skal deployeres til andre landes områder, vil det ske på bekostning af den nationale opgaveløsning. Hvis et svensk eller et finsk kystvagtskib eksempelvis skal deployere fra sit normale operationsområde i den Botniske Bugt til Barentshavet eller til det nordøstlige hjørne af Grønland, så skal det sejle mellem 4.000 og 5.000 km. Hvis behovet skulle opstå i farvandet omkring Hansø mellem Grønland og Canada vil afstanden være godt 7.000 km, før svenske eller finske skibe vil kunne bidrage til opgaven. Det vil være afstandsmæssigt kortere og formentlig politisk højere prioriteret for disse to nordiske lande at lade deres kystvagsenheder deltage i FRONTEX⁸ operationer i Middelhavet.

Netop de kolossale afstande i det Arktiske område er en af de helt store udfordringer for en hensigtsmæssig og dækkende myndighedsudøvelse. ”Pooling”, ”Sharing” og ”Smart Defence” er nogle af de begreber, der trækkes frem – også i Stoltenberg rapporten – når ressourcerne er knappe og behovet for effektivitet er stort. Og naturligvis er der meget at hente gennem fælles nordisk forsvarssamarbejde som fælles satellit- og radarovervågning, fælles flytransport, fælles materielstandarder, fælles indkøb og fælles øvelsesvirksomhed, herunder ikke mindst evnen til at skabe tyngde ved større ulykker eller katastrofer. Men det giver ikke flere enheder, og dermed øger det ikke evnen til at være flere steder på en gang.

Nationale ansvar

Kystvagsfunktionernes nationale karakter⁹ samt de store afstande og ansvarsområder i Arktis gør, at den enkelte nation er nødsaget til selv at sikre, at eget område er tilstrækkeligt dækket. Det er der nemlig ikke andre, der gør! Norge og Danmark har dimensioneret tilstedeværelse og suverænitetsbevarelse,¹⁰ så der er den kystvagsmæssige dækning, som skønnes nødvendig inden for de to landes respektive ansvarsområder i Arktis.¹¹ Sverige og Finland, hvis kystvagsorganisationer i øvrigt ikke er organiseret under forsvaret, har en kapacitet, som alene dækker deres respektive kyststatsforpligtelser i Østersøområdet.

Valg af operative samarbejdspartnere er først og fremmest dikteret af, hvem man deler område og interesser med. Kun et mindre område af den danske del af Arktis grænser op til den norske.¹² Resten grænser op til Island og Canada. I et arktisk pooling/sharing perspektiv er lande som Rusland, Canada og USA således helt afgørende for både Norge, Danmark og Island, og sam-

arbejdsaftaler med disse lande er formentlig i praksis langt mere effektive i tid og rum, når uheldet er ude, end tilsvarende aftaler med Sverige og Finland.

Kommerciel kamp

Som nævnt er ressourcerne stort set fordelt, og de væsentlige grænselinjer er på plads og generelt accepteret. Forudsætningen for at de enkelte arktiske kyststater kan kapitalisere deres ressourcer er, at de kan tiltrække de store langsigtede infrastrukturinvesteringer, som er nødvendige. Det gælder også for Rusland. Det kan de kun, hvis den sikkerhedspolitiske situation i området er stabil, og derfor har alle, både de som ejer ressourcerne – ikke mindst Rusland – og de som gerne vil købe dem – ikke mindst Kina – en interesse i at bevare et stabilt Arktis. Alt tyder således på, at kampen om ressourcerne i Arktis bliver en kommerciel kamp og ikke en militær kamp. Der er dermed også begrundet håb om, at Ruslands udfordring af Europa forbliver i Europa, og ikke bringes til at omfatte Arktis. Med stadfæstelsen af de internationale spilleregler gennem underskrivelsen af Ilulissat Deklarationen og den efterfølgende optagelse af bl a Kina og Indien som permanente observatører i Arktisk Råd¹³ er der skabt det, man kan kalde en skrøbelig, men stabil regional ligevægtssituation.

Når man alligevel bliver nødt til at forholde sig til, at udviklingen kan gå i den forkerte retning, så skyldes det, at regionen er genstand for meget stor international interesse, herunder fra Kina, og at den omfatter to af de helt store internationale aktører, USA og Rusland. Dermed er området ogsåudsat for en potentiel ”spill-over” effekt, hvis forholdet mellem disse stormagter udvikler sig dårligt i andre regioner, eller hvis der opstår stormagtpolitiske kriser andre steder, som

fjerner grundlaget for dialog og samarbejde i Arktis og dermed ændrer den nuværende stabile ligevægtstilstand.

Krisen i Ukraine og det deraf affødte ansædte politiske klima mellem Rusland og den vestlige verden har næppe potentiale til at udgøre en sådan ”game changer” med mindre den i endnu højere grad udvikler sig til en direkte konfrontation mellem Rusland og Nato. Tværtimod kunne man hævde, at udsigten til en vigende europæisk lyst til at være energimæssigt afhængig af et utilregneligt Rusland på lang sigt, gør det endnu mere vigtigt for Rusland at kunne sælge arktisk olie og gas til fjernøstlige markeder via russisk-arktisk infrastruktur. Krisen er imidlertid en påmindelse om, at Arktis ikke udvikler sig i isolation, men hænger sammen med udviklingen i resten af verden, og alle de gode hensigter kan blive spoleret af alvorlige hændelser og strategiske chok andre steder på kloden.

Nato i Arktis

Sker det, at Arktis udvikler sig til et område præget af konflikt, er det naturligvis ikke længere nok at se behovet for tilstedeværelse i et kystvagtsperspektiv. Det vil med overvejende sandsynlighed føre til en militarisering af området, og afhængig af isens udbredelse vil den være mere eller mindre konventionel. Kina vil formentlig, inden for de næste 10 år være i stand til at operere med atombevæbnede ubåde under isen i Polhavet, så et koldkrigs-lignende scenarium krydret med kinesisk deltagelse kan i givet fald ikke udelukkes. Hvis det er den udvikling, vi kommer til at se, så sker der formentlig også det, at Nato vil engagere sig, da det arktiske område jo er dækket af Nato artikel 5 forpligtelse, og fire af de fem arktiske kyststater er medlemmer af Nato. Det vil givet udløse Nato tilstedeværelse i

Barentshavet og langs den russiske grænse i Nordnorge, som vi kendte det under den kolde krig, og det vil forventeligt betyde, at Nato generelt vil prioritere sit territoriale forsvar, også i Østersøregionen. I et sådant scenarie er vi således langt forbi det punkt, hvor det giver mening at tale om et nordisk forsvarssamarbejde med mindre Sverige og Finland i mellemtiden er blevet medlem af Nato.

Krisen i Ukraine har medført, at debatten om medlemskab af Nato er blusset op i både Sverige og Finland. Bevægelsen fra neutralitet til alliancefrihed og den mere operative tilnærmelse mod Nato gennem Partnerskab for Fred initiativet¹⁴ har således også åbnet op for en debat, som ville have været utænkelig for 10 år siden. Fortsætter denne bevægelse – måske oven i købet katalyseret af de meget aggressive verbale reaktioner fra Rusland¹⁵ – så kan det ikke udelukkes, at de to lande på lang sigt vil blive medlemmer af Alliancen og dermed skabe det perfekte grundlag for et fuldt integreret nordisk forsvarssamarbejde. På kort sigt kan en endnu tættere operativ tilknytning til Nato være en vej, som både vil være en styrkelse af de to landes evne til at samarbejde med Nato og et stærkt, men ikke unødigt provokerende signal til Rusland i den nuværende situation.

En fælles nordisk indsats

Med Ruslands pres og Sveriges og Finlands Natotilnærmelse som afsæt kunne man argumentere for, at det ændrede trusselsbillede i Østersøregionen og den potentielle mulighed for, at der på sigt kan opstå en ”spill-over” effekt i den norsk/russiske del af Arktis, lægger op til nye samarbejdsmuligheder. Tager man udgangspunkt i Stoltenberg rapportens maritime fokus, så kunne man med inspiration fra rapportens

forslag om opbygning af en fælles nordisk maritim kystvagsstyrke – som ikke har noget Natoperspektiv – i stedet etablere en fælles nordisk sømilitær indsatsstyrke. Med Norge og Danmark som lokomotiv kunne man sikre, at styrken kan fungere som integrationsplatform til Nato for den svenske og finske flåde.

Ved en hensigtsmæssig sammensætning af styrkens ledelse, kan man sørge for, at styrken kan udsendes med eller uden svensk/finsk deltagelse, så den om nødvendigt også kan indgå som et rent Nato styrkebidrag. Samlet vil de nordiske landes flåder råde over næsten alle sømilitære kapaciteter. Med Skagerrak/Østersøen som fælles øvelsesområde med ubådsdykkefelter og adgang til betydelig flystøtte, vil der kunne skabes operativ volumen til at øve alle former for sømilitær krigsførelse i nærområdet, hvilket også vil tiltrække flådeenheder fra andre Nato lande.

Uden for Østersøregionen vil Island qua sin geografiske placering kunne bidrage med øvelsesvilkår under arktiske forhold, uden at det ”militariserer” Arktis, fordi Island ikke er en del af de fem arktiske kyststater. Dermed vil man opnå et øvelsesmæssigt supplement til de øvelser under arktiske forhold, som rutinemæssig finder sted i Nordnorge. En sådan øvelsesaktivitet vil også tiltrække flådeenheder fra andre Nato-lande og således samtidigt være en kærkommen hjælp til Islands maritime suverænitethåndhævelse, som i lighed med den fælles nordiske/Nato luftrumsovervågning vil have stor betydning for Island som nation.

Initiativet kan stort set etableres umiddelbart og kunne startes op på baggrund af de allerede eksisterende organisatoriske flådedeledelsesstrukturer i Norge og Danmark. Hvis man opnår de ønskede resultater med initiativet, kan det senere formaliseres, ek-

sempelvis med fælles permanent etableret ledelsesstruktur/hovedkvarter.

Nordisk samarbejde også med substans

Sat lidt på spidsen kan man hævde, at nordisk forsvarssamarbejde har det bedst i fredstid og inden for områder, der ikke berører de ”hårde” sikkerhedspolitiske prioriteringer eller interesser. Det er der forklarlige historiske og geopolitiske årsager til, og et dybt og fuldt integreret nordisk forsvarssamarbejde vil således først kunne etableres, når/hvis alle fem lande bliver medlemmer af den forsvarsalliance, som Norge, Danmark og Island har forpligtet sig til. Ukraine-krisen har endnu ikke et omfang, som gør, at den kan rokke ved den stabile sikkerhedssituation i Arktis og dermed heller ikke ved det nordiske

samarbejds-potentiale i denne region, der dog allerede i udgangspunktet er udfordret af de geografiske og realpolitiske grundvilkår.

Krisen kan imidlertid have skabt et politisk momentum i Sverige og Finland, der på kort sigt muliggør en yderligere militær Nato-integration, og på lang sigt tegner konturerne af et egentligt Nato medlemskab. Stoltenberg rapporten er også et godt fundament for en sådan udvikling, men hvis en tilnærmelse til Nato skal være sigtet, så bør det maritime fokus i Stoltenberg rapporten understøttes af et egentligt flådesamarbejde, som, hvis det etableres hensigtsmæssigt, kan slå mange fluer med et smæk, herunder bringe nordisk forsvarssamarbejde op i et nyt gear.

Författaren är konteramiral och chef för den danska Försvarsakademin.

Noter

1. Regeringsgrundlag ”Et Danmark der står sammen”, oktober 2011, p. 40
2. Rapporten kan downloades på: <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/nordisk-rapport.pdf>
3. Exclusive Economic Zones
4. Denne zone strækker sig fra kystlinjen/basislinjen og 200 sømil ud i havet.
5. Kongeriget Danmark har kystlinje i Polhavet pga. Rigsfællesskabet med Grønland.
6. Pettersen, Trude: ”Russia to follow Denmark with Arctic shelf claim in March 2015”. Barents Observer, 2014-12-17. <http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2014/12/russia-follow-denmark-arctic...> (2015-01-28).
7. Faktisk var det netop USA’s prioritering af Grønland, der i sin tid fik statsminister Hans Hedtoft til at trække Danmark ud af forhandlingerne om et nordisk forsvarsforbund.
8. FRONTEX er betegnelsen for Det Europæiske Agentur for Forvaltning af det Operative Samarbejde ved EU’s Ydre Grænser.
9. Kystvagter er normalt underlagt deres egen nationale lovgivning.
10. I Danmark løses de fleste kystvagtsopgaver af det danske søværn.
11. Der pågår i skrivende stund et større udredningsarbejde under Forsvarsministeriet mhp at styrke det danske forsvars opgaveløsning i Arktis. Analysen forventes færdig med udgangen af 2014.
12. Området mellem Grønland, Svalbart og Jan Mayen.
13. Arktisk Råd besluttede på topmødet i Kiruna i maj 2013 at optage Kina, Indien, Sydkorea, Japan, Singapore og Italien som permanente observatører i Rådet.
14. Partnerskab for Fred (engelsk: Partnership for Peace, PFP) er et Nato outreach-projekt, hvis formål det er at skabe tillid mellem Nato og andre stater i Europa og det tidligere Sovjetunionen. Der er 21 stater med i partnerskabet. Partnerskabet blev startet i 1994, kort efter østblokkens sammenbrud. Ti stater der startede som medlemmer i PFP (Bulgarien,

Tjekkiet, Estland, Ungarn, Letland, Litauen, Polen, Rumænien, Slovakiet og Slovenien) er senere blevet optaget i Nato.

15. Putin's politiske rådgiver Sergei Markov har under et interview om svensk og finsk Natomedlemskab udtalt følgende: "Finland should think of the consequences, if it pon-

ders joining Nato. It must ask could joining start World War III? Anti-Semitism started World War II. Russophobia can start a third world war. Finland is one of the most Russophobic countries in Europe, after Sweden, Poland and the Baltic countries." (kilde: defencenews.com 2014-06-12)

Arctic Security – Today and Tomorrow

by Rolf Tamnes

Resumé

Arktis vil trolig forbli stabilt og fredelig. Det skyldes at det ikke er grunn til å regne med noe ressurskappløp, her er mange felles interesser som forener, og det finnes mange institusjoner og regimer som binder stater sammen og bidrar til omforente løsninger. Noen utfordringer finnes likevel: Kontinentalsokkelens utstrekning inn i Polhavet er ikke avklart, det er uenighet om Svalbards folkerettslige posisjon, og tradisjonell sikkerhet er igjen blitt et sentralt anliggende også i nord: Russland rustet opp og er kommet i et motsetningsforhold til Vesten. Norges langsiktige interesse er å reetablere et nærmere samarbeid med Russland, men også å styrke samarbeidet med Vestmaktene for å unngå maktpolitisk asymmetri. Hvor går Arktis på lang sikt? Her er mange spørsmål som må stilles: Hva skjer med Russland, den største aktøren i nord? Kan fornybar energi undergrave forutsetningene for lønnsom produksjon av olje og naturgass i Arktis? Kina går i retning av å bli en supermakt. Hvordan vil det agere i nord?

THE ARCTIC REGION is being affected more rapidly by climate change than other parts of the globe. Driven by global warming and rapid ice melting that would open up Arctic waterways and also by the huge oil and gas resource potential of the north, shortly after the turn of the century new evidence suggested that the north was about to transform. In 2005, the Norwegian government declared the High North as Norway's most important strategic priority in the years ahead. We were at the doorstep of a major shift, according to the government: "In the years to come the High North will be one of the most important strategic areas in the world".

A key part of the narrative was the euphoric vision of working with a reform-oriented

Russia on petroleum matters, especially on the exploitation of the Shtokman natural gas field. LNG export from Norway to the United States, in the first place from Snow White which came on stream in 2007, would add a new dimension to the very important bilateral relationship across the Atlantic.

No scramble for the Arctic

Our reading of the Arctic today is a very different one. First, Russia under President Vladimir Putin has moved in a more authoritarian, anti-liberal and anti-western direction. To quote a Carnegie Moscow report, in times of trouble and uncertainty for the regime, the Kremlin has always returned to the model of Russia as the "besieged fortress".

Second, today's energy map is different from what most of us expected some years ago. The Arctic could contain as much as 6.5 percent of the world's conventional oil resources and 24 percent of the world's conventional natural gas resources. However, the risks and costs pertaining to production are very high, and global energy markets have changed dramatically with the revolution in unconventional oil and gas in the United States and with strong demand in Asia. Third, Russia has been very eager to keep the Arctic isolated from geopolitical tensions arising from the Ukraine crisis, but it has not succeeded altogether. International sanctions against the Russian finances and energy sectors, including a wide range of oil industry technology, have linked the West's crisis response with the Arctic. Offshore exploration has become very modest. For all these reasons, the Arctic does not stand out as an energy region of strategic importance in a global perspective.

For much of the same reasons, the narrative of a "cold rush" is false. The Arctic has been described as the last frontier for the claiming of new resources and strategic access. It has been maintained that we might face conflicts over resources and boundaries. However, as I mentioned, the energy in the north is not very competitive. Most of the minerals and petroleum reserves are in areas of undisputed national jurisdiction. There are a few remaining boundary disputes between the eight Arctic states, but very few of them are considered particularly threatening to bilateral relations or regional order. There is no scramble for the Arctic. In fact, it is one of the least troubled and most peaceful and stable parts of the world, and there is every reason to assume that peace and stability will last. I am tempted to quote Dr Brooke Smith-Winsor,

who said that it is time to stop "sexing up" Arctic security issues.

Interests, institutions and regimes

Peace and stability in the north serves the national and material interests of the states. Furthermore, the existence of a fabric of institutions and regimes helps to prevent disagreements from emerging. Institutions and regimes are important meeting places and instruments to engage the actors within a common cooperative structure. Institutions and regimes also define the rules concerning the use of Arctic resources and sea lanes. This is evidenced in the fact that the Arctic states have committed themselves to respect the law of the sea, manifested in the Ilulissat declaration of 2008 and in the maritime delimitation agreement of 2011 between Russia and Norway, which underlines the primacy of peaceful negotiations based on international law. Institutions and regimes may also insulate specific issues from other issues where the actors might disagree. The best illustration is the successful story of the effective and sustainable fishery management in the Barents Sea. Illegal fishing has been almost eradicated thanks to excellent cooperation between stakeholders in and outside the region.

In general, governance works well for the north, which is interesting to note at a time when globalization and geopolitical shifts make cooperation more important but at the same time more difficult. Many institutions and regimes play a role in shaping the future of the north. One of them is the Arctic Council which has been given a more prominent role in recent years. It is not very efficient, but a workable bridge between the nations in and outside the north.

The Council has to thread a difficult line between the desires of the Arctic states to guard their rights to stewardship of the region, and the wider claims of the global community. The Council cooperation has also been affected by the Ukraine crisis. One peculiar aspect of the question is that EU's application for permanent observer status will be delayed, no longer because of Canada's objections, but because of Russia's anger of Western sanctions.

The growing soft security challenges encourage cooperation and underscore peace and stability in the north. Oil spills, crime and ship accidents are some of the problems the nations might face, and which is illustrated by a near-catastrophe in June 1989, when the Russian cruise liner Maxim Gorky hit solid ice near Svalbard and started taking in water. Fortunately for the more than 1000 passengers and crew, the weather was good and a Norwegian Coast Guard vessel was close by. The outcome could have been far more dramatic had the accident taken place under less fortunate circumstances.

The Arctic states have negotiated two legally binding multilateral agreements under the auspices of the Arctic Council, on search and rescue in 2011 and oil pollution preparedness and response in 2013. Within the framework of the International Maritime Organisation an agreement has been reached on new mandatory standards for polar shipping, known as the polar code, safety measures and pollution prevention measures.

Major gaps remain in the regulation of the most damaging human activities in the Arctic, but the scope of challenges is less daunting than in many other areas. The economic and technological means exist to develop the capabilities we need, and we have time to adapt to new circumstances. Russia and Norway in particular give high priority to managing such challenges. That being

said, we will have to live with risk – in the north as in other places.

In sum, shared interests, pragmatic approaches to disputed issues, and regional and global institutions all contribute to Arctic cooperation, peace and stability.

Three challenges

While the situation in the north is rather benign in a broader perspective, there are foreign policy and security challenges. One of them concerns the extension of the continental shelf into the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic coastal states are engaged in a quest to extend sovereign rights over portions of the seabed. Russia will have a major share of it irrespective of the detailed outcome. It will abide by the rules, according to the Russian government. If so, there should be no reason to expect major conflict over the question.

Another challenge concerns the legal status of the waters and the continental shelf around the Svalbard archipelago. Under the Norwegian position, the Svalbard treaty provisions, including the principle of equal rights and limits on taxation, do not apply beyond the territorial waters, and Norway therefore has full jurisdiction in maritime areas beyond the territorial waters. This view is contested by a number of countries, with Russia being the most difficult one – as a forceful neighbour and great power outside the western security community. Svalbard is a hard nut, and disagreements could ignite serious disputes, but hardly a major conflict unless Russia should take a tougher position or unless the issue should be linked to conflicts outside the Arctic itself.

A third challenge, and the key one, concerns hard security or traditional security. Russia's violation of national sovereignty and international law in Ukraine substantiates that "the deep peace" in Europe has come

to an end. This will reduce the scope of cooperation with Russia also in the Arctic. Of equal importance, Russia is rebuilding and modernising its armed forces in all dimensions, its nuclear, conventional and unconventional capabilities, and in readiness and mobility. Its great and steadily growing arsenal of long-range cruise and ballistic missiles with high-accuracy will have strong impact on Europe's defence.

To Russia, the north remains an important arena to sustain its status as a great power, both because it contains abundant natural resources and because it remains a crucial factor in Russia's nuclear strategy. Russia's strategic submarine fleet is about to be modernised. The first submarines of the new class, *Yury Dolgoruky*, have joined the Navy. Since 2007–2008, submarines as well as bomber aircraft have resumed regular training and patrolling in the north. Norway is heavily affected by the basing and employment of Russian military power in the north, notably by its "bastion" defence to protect the strategic submarines in their "bastion" in Arctic waters against hostile torpedoes and missiles. Russian military force and priorities in the north underscores the bilateral relationship as asymmetric, between a small state and a great power.

Norwegian foreign and security policy

That brings us to Norwegian foreign and security policy in the north. The essence of the policy has been the same for decades. The High North has high priority, economically and strategically, and it should be kept as an area of peace, stability, predictability and low tension. More specifically, Norway's strategy for the north can be summarised in four key components: 1) To develop and build the north in order to

underline Norwegian sovereignty and interests. Norway spends much resources in the north for military and non-military purposes. 2) To underscore the importance of strong international law as the first line of protecting rights and interests, with the UN Law of the Sea Convention as a solid basis. 3) To engage Russia, based on the idea of two neighbours sharing a common destiny and the need for cooperating closely about the environment, management of fisheries and energy resources, and soft security. 4) To engage the West with a view to making the north a multinational arena and to balance Russia. NATO involvement is crucial.

After years of neglect, NATO engagement is about to be revitalised. In 2008, Norway launched its Core Area Initiative which emphasised the need for a stronger focus on Article 5, for revamping contingency planning and for connecting national headquarters closer to NATO. In 2018, Norway will host a so-called High visibility NATO Article 5 exercise. Still, it is a long way to go to make NATO's guarantee fully credible and to adjust Norwegian armed forces to traditional scenarios, including the need for capabilities that can respond on short notice.

Long-term perspective

What will be the future of the Arctic in the long-term? The prospects depend in large part upon situations and changes elsewhere in the world. The north cannot be seen in isolation from global politics. Geopolitical instability elsewhere may impact upon the degree to which the Arctic is viewed by external players as an attractive space for the use of power and further development. Will the Arctic Ocean become a new important waterway between Asia, America and Europe? That is not unlikely

– in a very distant future. The potential for development of Arctic routes may increase if the availability of routes elsewhere in the globe is restricted. How attractive will the offshore petroleum resources in the Arctic be? We should expect a significant demand from the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, alternative and renewable energy will become an important part of the energy mix and probably undermine high cost production in the Arctic. Where will Russia go from here? That is a wild card. Its policy and conduct might turn in a more positive direction, but it might also take new turns to the worse, economically and politically.

What can we expect from Asia? The great power China will leave significant footprints

in the Arctic in fields such as research, exploitation of natural resources and commercial shipping. As a future global power its military outreach will probably include some interest and presence in the Arctic. Japan's interest is driven by China's interest. A number of countries will engage in research in particular. Any prediction beyond such broad assessments is hardly constructive because of the great potential for long-term surprises and shocks.

The author is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and a fellow of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

Russian Militarization of the Arctic: What Should We Make of It?

by Sam Gardiner

Resumé

Ryssland bygger ut sitt arktiska bassystem i syfte att möjliggöra en ökad militär närvaro i regionen. Den etablerade försvarszonen korresponderar med den ekonomiska zonen. Två arktiska brigader organiseras. En ny radarkedja, förstärkningar av luftförsvaret, marin närvaro liksom ökad övningsverksamhet, signalerar ett att regionens militärstrategiska betydelse för Ryssland ökar. Denna bild innefattar också den nukleära dimensionen. Den ökade ryska militära närvaron i Arktis handlar inte om skydd av naturresurserna utan mera om ett upplevt hot från Nato och USA.


ASKED ABOUT MILITARIZATION: "Russia is doing reasonable things because of the increase of the maritime traffic that's going through the North Sea Route..." (U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic, Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., *TASS*, 11 March 2015)

"Once again I stress that we are not going to engage in the militarization of the Arctic. Our actions in the region are measured and

reasonably moderate, and they are absolutely necessary to ensure Russian defense capabilities..." (Russian President Vladimir Putin, *Sputnik*, 19 December 2014)

The picture resembles jewels on a crown. The plan for a string of new and upgraded air bases across the Russian Arctic stretches from Murmansk to Anadyr. The ten to twelve new facilities the Russians have an-

nounced represent upgrading existing bases, refurbishing former Cold War bases and establishing new ones. The plans are extensive. Interestingly, Russia has made an unusual effort to announce its moves in advance. We are still left with the question, “What should we make of the Russian program for the Arctic?”




The Details

In some cases, the Russian moves are supported and applauded by the international community. The establishing of a search and rescue network certainly fits in that category. This is the kind of presence the Arctic Council supports for the Arctic. On the other hand, many of the Russian moves appear to have a darker side and go beyond the cover line that they are to protect Russian interests in the Arctic. Russia has announced a 200 nautical mile defense zone that corresponds to its declared economic zone. In its defense zone, Russia wants to observe and defend in space, the atmosphere, on the surface and in the sub-surface.¹ The Arctic along with Crimea and Kaliningrad has been categorized in

the topic three areas for military emphasis. What should we make of the Russian Arctic program?

Russia announced and has begun forming two Arctic brigades. The units, to consist of approximately 6,000 troops, have been getting special equipment and have already conducted exercises, and from reports, they will be high readiness units manned not with draftees but heavy with contract personnel.

Although Russians say their Arctic interests are currently supported by radar coverage, they have announced that ten additional radars will be installed in the region. Although the details have not been included in the press announcements, it appears as if much of the radar coverage is about strategic missile attack warning. The move may be driven in part by gaps in their satellite coverage of the U.S. missile fields.



The Mig-31 will be a major part of force increases in the Arctic. Again, we see the pattern of a force that extends the full length of the Russia Arctic. Along with these air defense fighters, Russia is deploying a network of S-400 air and missile defense sys-

tems. At altitude, the S-400 can range up to 400km. To protect the S-400, they will deploy the close-in air defense system, the Panstir S-1 system.

In terms of expansion of naval forces in the Arctic, Russia has established a port that will be home to the new Yasen class attack submarines. Construction on the fifth of these submarines has recently started. In total, the Russians have told us they plan to have 8 of these stationed in the Arctic. Russia will build 10 to 12 Borey Class strategic nuclear missile submarines. It has been announced that half of these will be stationed in the Arctic. To support these submarines, Russia has built a new nuclear missile storage facility at Severomorsk. The *Barents Observer* reported that Russia has recently moved over 200 strategic nuclear weapons to the Arctic.²

After the fighting in Georgia, the Russian military concluded that it was behind in unmanned aerial vehicles. The fighting in the Ukraine shows that considerable progress has been made. That progress is being taken to the Arctic. Anadyr, in the far eastern part of the Arctic, will be the home station for an Arctic reconnaissance unit, using the Orlan-10 unmanned aerial vehicle. Since the drone does not require an air base, this capability has a significant strategic reach.

Because of the lack of satellite coverage, navigation and communications have been a problem in the Arctic. Russia has a plan to take care of this deficiency, a plan matched by no other country. The plan calls for an "Artika" satellite system with radar, optical and communications satellites. Although we don't know details about the full constellation, Russia's space launch schedule provides for one satellite launch in 2015 and one in 2017.

Asked about militarization:

"Russia is doing reasonable things because of the increase of the maritime traffic that's going through the North Sea Route..."

(U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic, Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr. TASS, 11 March 2015.)

And, to work toward unified effort of its military assets in the North, Russia is in the process of creating a Joint Strategic Arctic Command. There is a pattern. Russia is replacing the historic military district structure with a more strategic framework for command. This command arrangement also reflects a growing strategic appreciation, seeing its capability to influence in a broader sense.

Exercises have become an important part of Russian developments of the Arctic. The pattern of post-Cold War air defense exercise emerged over ten years ago.³

These early exercises seem to have been aimed at testing concepts for employment in the Arctic. For example, the S-400 air defense system was exercised in 2010 on Kildin Island, an island north of Murmansk in the Barents Sea. In 2014, the S-400 began to appear in other Arctic locations.



In the Fall 2014, in a major eastern exercise, Vostok 2014, units were employed in the Arctic. Particularly noteworthy was the

activity on Wrangel Island that is located at the far east of the Arctic passage. Russia test fired an Iskander missile from the island.

As with other activities, this one deserves a “why.” Who could be the possible target of a conventional or nuclear Iskander strike from Wangel? Looking at the map, Alaska stands out as an answer. Russia has complained since the Cold War that it was threatened by NATO’s tactical nuclear systems, but the United States never has been. Iskander on Wrangel changes the equation.⁴

The 10-year pattern of expanding exercise is clear. At first individual capabilities were exercised. Exercises then expanded to include units and special mission performance. Early in 2015, Russia conducted an unprecedented snap combat readiness exercise of the full range of Arctic forces.

Analysis

Since a major element of the Russian militarization involves Mig-31 air defense fighters, a first order issue is what mission will these aircraft perform? Although these aircraft have a 900-kilometer operating radius, it would almost be silly to say that they would be there to protect Russian Arctic interests. Is a soft skinned U.S. aircraft carrier going to brave the ice to make an Arctic passage? How about a Chinese aircraft carrier? The answer is “no” to both.

The Russians are preparing themselves by their deployments and exercises to tackle an over-the-Pole attack by U.S. strategic bombers with cruise missiles. The Mig-31 is an effective weapon against both.⁵ In addition, the Russians have a growing concern about an attack from the future U.S. Prompt Global Strike capability, the new stealth bomber.

The S-400’s are about the United States and not the Arctic. This air defense system can be used to attack bombers has some degree of capability against missiles.

“Once again I stress that we are not going to engage in the militarization of the Arctic. Our actions in the region are measured and reasonably moderate, and they are absolutely necessary to ensure Russian defense capabilities...”

(Russian President Vladimir Putin. Sputnik, 19 December 2014.)

The new radars in the Arctic are mostly about the United States and giving Russia warning of a strategic attack.

The two brigades being added to Arctic capability are interesting. If one examines the potential, it is difficult to find direct military value of having ground troops in the Arctic. Is Russia going to invade Iceland? That’s not likely. Would the Americans invade Wrangel Island? That’s not likely. The fighting in the Ukraine sheds some light on this issue.

One of the lessons the Russians drew from the invasion of Georgia was that its troops, aside from the airborne units, were not particularly strategically deployable. This became an area of concentration, a problem to be fixed.

We have seen numerous reports that elements of the Arctic units have been involved in the Russian operations in the Ukraine. The Russian pattern has been to source battalion task groups from all over Russia. In other words, creating combat ready units in the Arctic does not mean they are only meant for employment in the Arctic. The brigades will be in the Arctic but not necessarily for the Arctic.

Some of the Russian activity could be about the threat from NATO. There is no direct evidence of this as a motivation, but

the movement of some air and ground units from the St. Petersburg area north to the Murmansk area could come from a change in view of what is the important northern flank of NATO. Rather than seeing NATO's flank as being the Baltic, Russia could now see the flank as the Arctic.

A dominant theme of what we see in the Arctic involves the strategic nuclear equation. Russia is working hard to reduce vulnerability of its submarine-based nuclear strike capability, and Russia is working hard to protect itself against nuclear strike capabilities of the United States.

The Future

It is often said that with the price of oil and gas going down so dramatically the situation in the Arctic is likely to change. That is most likely true of exploration; it is unlikely to be true of the introduction of military capabilities. Regardless of the price of oil, what is pushing Russia in the Arctic will continue.

Russia has put considerable effort into the development of multi-spectrum radar that can detect stealth aircraft. The most developed capability is the Nebo-M Radar. Because of Russia's concern about over-the-Pole attacks, it is likely we will see this radar deployed in a network across the Russian Arctic. As the U.S. work on a new stealth bomber and a new long-range cruise missile unfolds, the pressures to create the network will increase.

Although the S-400 is the initial long-range air and missile defense weapon deployed in the Arctic, it most likely will be replaced by the S-500 that will have greater capability against missiles and an announced capability to engage nuclear warheads. The S-500 is said to be in serial production, evidence of a concern to fill the anti-missile gap.⁶

Certainly, Russia will continue Arctic exercises. Exercises in which units practice intercepting over-the-Pole attacks will continue. We will probably see more concentration on the protection of strategic nuclear submarines. The melting ice cap means this important element of nuclear deterrence becomes easier to locate and if necessary target by the United States.

In what would to become an activity with high strategic significance, we are likely to see more efforts to demonstrate Russia's capability to threaten Alaska in new ways. The question the Russian General Staff is probably asking itself is becoming clearer. If United States territory were threatened by a conventional or even tactical nuclear strike, will Washington think twice about confronting Russia during a Baltic crisis?

If the pattern of the S-400 is followed, exercise-then-deploy, the 2014 test could be the initial step in permanently stationing the Iskander missile on Wrangel Island. The Iskander-M can range to 700 kilometers. The cruise missile Iskander-K could range 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers and would cover all of Alaska.

What should we make of the Russian Arctic program? Putin has repeatedly said he has no plans to militarize the Arctic.⁷ Clearly, that is not true. The U.S. Representative for the Arctic said Russia is doing reasonable things given the increase in maritime traffic in the Arctic. Clearly, that misstates the facts.

The Russian moves in the Arctic are not about protecting oil and natural gas resources and are not about protecting a new strategic passage. The plans may be about NATO. What is significant, however, is that much of what is unfolding in the Arctic is about the strategic threat to Russia from the United States. To be most accurate, we should probably say we are seeing heavy militarization

in the Arctic and not so much militarization of the Arctic.

The United States is about to begin its period as Chairman of the Arctic Council. As Chairman of this body, the United States wants to hold climate change as a major issue to be addressed. The Atlantic Council does not have security issues as part of its charter. From the almost total silence by the U.S. to

Russian moves in the Arctic, one gets the impression that the United States does not have security issues as any part of Arctic agenda. The issue of militarization of the North, however, is not going away. As Russian plans materialize, it is very likely to rise to a high place on the agenda of issues.

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Notes

1. The *Moscow Times* describes this objective. See: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-navy-is-planning-summer-expeditions-to-contested-arctic-region/500642.html>
2. See: <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2014/10/04/russia-added-243-nukes-to-northern-fleet-during-last-year/>
3. An example of these limited exercises was one in 2009; at Vorkuta, a four-day air defense “above the Arctic Circle” exercises was conducted.
4. The last time the United States was threatened by a nuclear-capable medium range ballistic missile was during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
5. The Mig-31’s that are being sent to the Arctic have been upgraded and do now have an air-to-ground capability, but that is a very secondary mission. The Mig-31 is an air defense fighter.
6. Among the reported capabilities of the S-500 is that it can destroy warheads of medium range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. This is somewhat puzzling since NATO does not have an MRBM. The Russians may have had the Chinese missiles in mind, but it is hard to understand what valuable point targets would be defended.
7. Putin most recently was reported to have made this statement in a meeting with senior military officials in December. <http://sputnik-news.com/military/20141219/1016043432.html>