

# Egypt between True Democracy and Anarchy

## A Strategic Perspective Analysis Using the Complexity Theory

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### Resumé

De politiska förändringarna som har skett den sista tiden i Mellan Östern och Nordafrika, ”den arabiska våren”, har orsakats av en stadig försämring av den ekonomiska och politiska situationen i regionen under decennier. Egypten som är ett av de länder som har påverkats av detta, vill bekräfta sin centrala roll i området. Denna ska rimligen vara baserad på demokrati, humanism och den mänskliga värdigheten. I denna artikel analyseras Egyptens strategiska alternativ i relation till folkopinionen. I processen diskuteras hur Egypten kan etablera en demokrati. I min analys har jag funnit att en gradvis socio-politisk förändring i ett demokratiskt sammanhang är den optimala modellen. Med denna strategi kan man nå de mål som är satta av det egyptiska folkets mål från revolution i januari 2011. För att modellen ska lyckas måste alla politiska grupper i samhället inkluderas. Den bör följas av resten av de arabiska länderna för en hållbar social och ekonomisk utveckling.

RECENT POLITICAL SHIFTS in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, referred to in the press as the “Arab Spring” was caused by the steady economic, political and social decline of the region. Egypt is in need to re-assess its central role in the region, but based on the universal values of true democracy, humanism and human dignity. In this work I analysis the strategic options that Egypt have, in relation to the potential of its people. In the process we discuss how the current period would need to be handled in order for the country to establish itself as a new democracy. Based on this analysis we propose an optimal path to achieve that goal. In my analysis,

I found that a gradual socio-political shift within a democratic context is the optimal policy model. This approach is able to achieve the objectives set by the Egyptian people in their January revolution of 2011.

For the model to succeed it calls for a true inclusive engagement of all political components of the Egyptian society. It is also the same model that should be pursued by the rest of the Arab countries to obtain sustainable social and economic progress. The people’s revolt across the Arab World, including Egypt, during the spring of 2011 was a protest against human indignation and tyranny.<sup>1</sup>

In the last decades, there has been clear effort of the Arab regimes to suppress any true political reforms using both shear force as well as cunning.<sup>2</sup>

Central to the democratic development of nations is the respect of the country justice system.<sup>3</sup> These systems originate from inherited codes, such as the Justinian codes in Europe<sup>4</sup> and when these codes are forced on other, such as the case of the

Arab nation,<sup>5</sup> the result only is bringing anarchy.<sup>6</sup>

In the case of the Arab world, the western powers have only succeeded in starting a deadly struggle between these elite Arab liberals and traditional Islamists. There has been a raging discussion among scholars as whether the Arab World is able to develop viable democracy.<sup>7</sup> In regard to the role of Islam in promoting or hindering democracy, many scholars reject the notion that Islam is anti-democratic.<sup>8</sup>

The first section of this article is a general introduction. In section (2) I discuss the Arab World today including a short introduction about the history of Egypt and the economic situation in the country. In section (3) I discuss democracy in the Arab world where even its relation to state structure and law is touched upon. In section (4) I display the usage of the complexity theory in analysing political arenas. In section (5) I use the theory in analyzing Egypt political situation both prior and after the revolution of 25 January 2011 and incorporating the latest development of the situation in Egypt. In section (6) I draw my conclusions and discuss some policy implications of this work.

## The Arab world today

### Background

The Arab World economy is very tied to the oil prices.<sup>9</sup> Although Middle Eastern oil producing countries hold more than 60 % of the proved oil world reserve<sup>10</sup> four countries with the highest proved reserves, including Saudi Arabia, will reach their peak production capacities around 2040<sup>11</sup> while two countries, Iran and Iraq, will reach that peak by 2050.<sup>12</sup> Even non-oil Arab economies are relying on exporting other raw material (phosphate in Morocco

and Jordan and Arabic gum and cotton in Sudan.<sup>13</sup>

This deemed any democratization demands to be obsolete since the power relationship is totally unbalanced between the state and the people,<sup>14</sup> as typical in rentier economies. Some researchers divided the Arab countries out of innovation and entrepreneurial perspectives.<sup>15</sup> That classification placed the GCC as strong financially, while it put the densely-populated countries, like Egypt, within the group that have strength in their human capital

### *The European colonization of Egypt*

The involvement of western powers in Egyptian politics started in the closing years of the eighteenth century when Napoleon Bonaparte landed in Egypt in 1798.<sup>16</sup> He defeated the Mameluke Turks in “the Battle of the Pyramids”, and in 1882 Britain occupied Egypt after defeating the French (ibid). Egypt emerged from British rule as a constitutional monarchy.<sup>17</sup> The British dominance of the country came to an end when in 1952 King Farouk was forced to abdicate by the Egyptian army. In 1953 Naguib was replaced and Gamel Abdel Nasser emerged as the new strong leader.<sup>18</sup> After Nassers death in 1970, his vice president, Anwar Al-Sadat, became Egypt’s president.<sup>19</sup> Sadat was assassinated by militant Islamists in 1981 during the October victory celebrations and his deputy, Hosni Mubarak Mubarak, took over the presidency.<sup>20</sup>

During Mubarak era, a form of multiparty system continued, which was designed to grant the National Democratic Party (NDP) a majority in the parliament and the presidency to Mubarak and even his sons.<sup>21</sup> Over years the regime faced mounted chal-

enges including radical Islamic violence, periodically erupting labor unrest and judicial criticism of electoral irregularities.<sup>22</sup> The major political opposition force in Egypt, in the last sixty years, has been the Muslim Brotherhood,<sup>23</sup> although the communists and leftist groups, and recently the liberal parties, have tried to play that role without real success.

### *Economic situation in Egypt*

In Egypt, the shift to free market economy, which started in 1970, only created corrupt elite which was unwilling to re-direct any power to the people.<sup>24</sup> Market economy has its own inherited deficiencies as for example rate depreciations. Egyptian macro-economic in the period 1970 to 1990, policies made the automatic long term adjustment of real exchange rates (against US dollar) almost impossible<sup>25</sup> and it came with high costs and put the burden on the poorer segment of the population.<sup>26</sup>

Another issue which has been impacting the Egyptian economy is the growth of unaccounted-for economic activities (the so called Hidden Economy). Hidden economy in Egypt was born in the late 1960 and early 1970s as Egyptians started to migrate to oil-producing countries of the Gulf region and Iraq.<sup>27</sup> Remittances from the Egyptian migrants created a high flow of capital which was not accounted for.<sup>28</sup> One of the major components of the Egyptian hidden economy is secret economy crated through the military engagement in national economic activities,<sup>29</sup> an issue of great sensitivity to the Egyptian authority. Part of the economic activities of the Egyptian armed force fall within what is acceptable and practice by other armed forces in the west.<sup>30</sup> However, the Egyptian armed forc-

es are engaged also in purely non-strategic activities.<sup>31</sup>

Another important topic, in relation to the Egyptian revolution, is the workers' strikes. Strikes have played an important role in social and political change since the industrial revolution.<sup>32</sup> Scholars argued that the *theory of moral economy*, explains better labor strikes in Egypt.<sup>33</sup> The theory postulates that workers' strikes come as a response to violation of the expected norm of behavior toward the workers and not to seek elevated improvement in their rights.

## **Democracy in the Arab World**

### *State and law and the connection to democracy*

Elitism's connection to state and law is a central issue and has been addressed by the German writer Friedrich A. Hayek in his master work *Theory of Origin of Law*.<sup>34</sup> Hayek saw the law development as taking place in unplanned evolutionary manner in most of societies (the legal centralists' school),<sup>35</sup> while the legal peripheralists have the view that formal legalized laws simply codify existing formal norms.<sup>36</sup> State-level societies are different than tribal societies as the state becomes the law enforcer.<sup>37</sup> One should recall that the transition from the tribal-level law to state-imposed law is very recent in the Arab World.<sup>38</sup> In Europe, Christianity played a central role in law development before European states came into existence and replaced the tribal laws,<sup>39</sup> while in the Arab world the state was created as a result of the emergence of Islam in the seventh century.<sup>40</sup> This fact motivated researchers, like,<sup>41</sup> to warn that typical western ideologies alone would not be able to carry out a true social and economic development in the Arab World

Democracy finds its first roots in Greek city states and more precisely in the city of Athens during the sixth century B.C. at the hands of Solon of Athens.<sup>42</sup>

The modern version of democracy has its roots in the French revolution (1789 AD) and its aftermath.<sup>43</sup> The French revolution introduced two different understandings of modern democracy.<sup>44</sup> The first version associated democracy with the liberal traditions and emphasized the political representation of the people and the free election approach to achieve it.<sup>45</sup> That approach was reflected in enlightenment thinkers like John Locke (1632–1704) and Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755).<sup>46</sup> Out of that developed most of the modern liberal democracies in the west including USA and Western Europe.<sup>47</sup>

The other line of thinking which merged from the French revolution was of the popular or direct democracy where people power is practiced in a direct way not through representation. The ideas around direct democracy were elaborated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778).<sup>48</sup> This later approach for democracy manifested itself in the Russian revolution of 1917 AD<sup>49</sup> and the type of one-party political systems that ruled Eastern Europe until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990s. The said is important in our understanding of the alternatives available for the Arab spring countries and the directions that can lead to in the future.

### *The west and the democratization of the Arab World*

Many Islamic thinkers have been trying expressing their true convection and belief in the democratic process and system<sup>50</sup> despite deep suspicion especially among Arab liberals. The said dilemma is very apparent

in the Egyptian case. There are three major factors behind the recent resurgence of political Islam and the march of the Islamic political parties. The first is the failure of the Pan-Arab project.<sup>51</sup> The second reason is the failure of the socio-economic plans of development in the individual Arab countries.<sup>52</sup> The third issue is the collapse of the respect and abiding by the law due to the existence of high level of elitism combined with an extreme level of corruption.<sup>53</sup>

During the Kingdom time in modern Egypt prior to the 1952 revolution, the level of freedom allowed for political free participation even for the Islamic movements.<sup>54</sup> However when military took power in Egypt, during the 1950s, the situation changed. In response to this oppression for the Islamists an intellectual effort was initiated in 1950s and 1960s at the hands of radical ideologists such as Sayyed Qutb<sup>55</sup> and others. However, one should remember that even Christianity has witnessed a clear radicalization during the last decades.<sup>56</sup>

The modern era has seen a number of political failures as the Western powers went to try to reshape the MENA region.<sup>57</sup> Basically there are two types of view in regard to democratization of the Arab World. I shall call the first democratization strategy, *stability-focused approach* and the second as *empowering-focused approach*. In relation to the first strategy, stability in relation to the Arab region, need to be observing the principals of freedom, justice and human dignity.<sup>58</sup>

Contrary to what is required, evidence indicates that both economic stagnation and preservation of the prevailing condition is what preferred by Arab regimes.<sup>59</sup> American political planers had the conviction that what happened in East Europe during 1990s can be repeated in the Arab

World.<sup>60</sup> However, that proved to be a dreadful misjudgment because the Arab rulings elite in the Arab World are the obstacle to democratic change. To understand this, one needs to examine the nature of the Arab economies<sup>61</sup> and the how rentier states function.<sup>62</sup>

In rentier economies, the state depends on export of raw material to generate its revenues while non-rentier economies rely on other mechanism, including: taxation (in different forms) to achieve that.<sup>63</sup> Because of that in states with rentier economies, like the Arab states including Egypt, political legitimacy is gained through economic rewarding of the elite<sup>64</sup> while that legitimacy is gained through true representation of the people and their aspirations and views in states with non-rentier economies.<sup>65</sup>

## Methodology: The Complexity Theory

Complexity is defined as “the study of changing patterns of order, self-organization or constrained diversity”.<sup>66</sup> Complexity has several components with focus on the interconnectedness between the individual components of the system while taking in consideration the environment.<sup>67</sup> Complexity can be described either as cognitive complexity or relational complexity.<sup>68</sup> Relational complexity is concerned with the connection between the various agents within a system or among diverse systems.<sup>69</sup> In my opinion and based on what has been said, one can describe the type of complexity related to the issue of the democratization in the Arab World as relational complexity.

In order for researchers to utilize the complexity theory they need to look at three major issues: complex system com-

ponents; concepts related to complex systems; and applications and methods for complexity analysis.<sup>70</sup> Based on that one can see the complexity theory is an inquiry into the influences, connections, and decisions made by the actors in the system and how that influences their behavior and conduct.<sup>71</sup> To understand complexity three issues are of great significance: *self-organizing*, *feedback* and *emergent behavior*.<sup>72</sup> In complexity analysis approach one stimulates a generalized observable pattern using the fewest number of plausible decisions rules and reflects upon them.<sup>73</sup>

## Egyptian political arena

### Prior to the revolution of 25 January, 2011

The seeds of the current American policy were implanted in the context of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.<sup>74</sup> As a result of these events, Western governments did not protest against violation of people rights by Arab regimes.<sup>75</sup> That led to the increase of the influence of the Islamist parties in the region.<sup>76</sup> Many western scholars<sup>77</sup> have warned that the alternative for moderate Islamic movements, when suppressing them, is social unrest and anarchy.<sup>78</sup> During the last century, the confidence in re-experiencing the historical glory of Islam was expressed in classic texts of prominent writers such as Abu A'la Mawdudi and Abul Hassan Ali Nadwi<sup>79</sup> in India and Sayyed Qutb in Egypt.<sup>80</sup> The ideas in these writings seemed to catch the imagination of new generation of Arab youth and when coupled to the deterioration of the socio-economic situation across the Middle East, they played (and still do that) a vital role in the events of 1970s and 1980s.<sup>81</sup> Egypt in particular was a text book case.

## After the revolution of 25 January, 2011

During 2010–2013, the revolt propagated through the Arab World and this is still going in some places although it became more violent and militarized in all Arab Spring countries, except for Tunisia and Morocco. That popular move revealed the horrendous and embracing failure of the international community in assessing and understanding the needs of the MENA region.<sup>82</sup> In January 2011 Egypt erupted with anger against the ruling western-backed elite<sup>83</sup> as the Egyptians were impacted and inspired by the Tunisian example. One institution (the military), which kept silent against this corruption and decay of the Egyptian society and the stagnation of the political life in that otherwise great country, were brought to the scenery when Mubarak on eleventh of February 2011 transferred his powers to the military (Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF)) headed by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi.

Beside the Muslim Brothers, which was the strongest and most effective opposition, in the Egyptian society, the Army played a central role in Egypt politics. The Egyptian army stepped in the Egyptian political seen when in 1952 it took over the country, expelling King Farouk. In Mubarak's era the army started to play even a more decisive control over the Egyptian society through its new economic role leading to its entanglement in the Egyptian politics becoming very direct and deep.<sup>84</sup>

In the first context of the new political temporary openings, the Islamists won, in November 2011 and February 2012, the largest majority conforming them to be the most politically organized groups.<sup>85</sup> The sound evidence of the Islamist dominant would-be role in the coming democracy in

Egypt was the election of Mohamed Morsi. An academician, he became the first ever democratically-elected president of Egypt through all its history,<sup>86</sup> something of great significance and an occurrence which could make the political struggle in Egypt far lengthier and unfortunately bloodier than what people wished. In 3rd July 2013 the Army finished Mursi's presidency through direct intervention and took command of the country under General Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi. Although a civilian president was put in the post (Adlie Mansour) on temporary bases everybody knew that it is the military which ran the country. Since then, the tension between the Muslim brotherhood, which went back to its traditional role as an opposition, and the new order has to lead bloodshed. The Salafists played again their passive role in accepting the status quo.

## Democracy or anarchy

The outcome of the presidential election of 2014, which saw General Sisi becoming the new president of Egypt, was almost certain and everybody felt that Egypt is on its way to recreate the same kind of political system that prevailed since the 1952 revolution. Analysis of the actors of the Egyptian society prior to January 2011 revolution is presented in Appendices A through E. One can see that the major actors on the Egyptian arena have not changed. In that analysis, I described in short the objectives of these actors, how much they are organized and how they behave in relation to their openness toward society and the level of disclosure to the public arena and as a whole. The opposition to the new order in Egypt covers the entire spectrum from Islamists, traditionalists up to liberals and revolutionaries. That leads any sincere re-

searcher examining the topic, in depth, to doubt any claim of the military being genuinely interested developing democracy in Egypt.

One however has also to be fair to the topic and stress that under the short period of Mursi presidency, the Muslim Brothers and their Salafist political partners (Al Nur Party) and Islamists in general, have shown an amazing, political immaturity, by not trying to build a wide political unity among the various political wings of the Egyptian society to safeguard the revolution and protect it from the elements which were bound to try to regain their lost privileges. Equally guilty are the non-Islamic and secular elements of the opposition. Engulfed in their hate and despise for the Islamists, they were not willing to support or cooperate with the emerging democratic system because they were certain that they would not be able to compete politically, at least within the short-term, with the long-experienced and more popular Islamic parties. They saw their political competitors (i.e. the Islamic parties) as more evil than the system they revolted against and for various reasons.

These conditions provided the pretext for the military violent re-intrusion into the Egyptian political life for the second time in less than seventy years. At the end all the Egyptians, being Islamists, liberals, socialists and nationalists, who sought a true democratic era for Egypt for the coming decades and centuries, have failed and lost a dear dream to their heart regardless of the honey talking about the awaiting bright future.

## Conclusion

In this work, I tried to answer the question embedded in the title as whether Egypt, af-

ter the revolution of 25 January 2011 and the events that followed, is heading toward a true viable democracy or toward a destructive anarchy. I used complexity theory analysis approach to look at the rule played by the different agents at the Egyptian arena. From the analysis I concluded that the two most significant organized powers in the Egyptian society since the twenties of the last century have been Egyptian military on one side and the Islamists (with the Muslim Brothers as the most effective and politically aware among them) on the other side.

The analysis showed that these two sides have engaged, historically, in a bitter struggle and they are heading into being engulfed in a null-existence equation with one of them (the Military) is determined and actively seeking to eliminate the other party as politically-active player in the Egyptian society, though it does not mind engaging it in non-political rule of welfare and social dimension. This plan, though trying to legitimize itself under the banner of democratization of the Egypt, has it seeds of failure within its core. Islamists, including Muslim Brothers, and their affiliations, other moderate Islamic parties, as well as non-traditional Salafists are the most viable and able elements of the Egyptian society to mount a true political, non-violent opposition to the Military and its dominance of the Egyptian society, as clearly evident from the above discussion. Liberals, at least within the coming decades, are unable to be a true substitution for the political Islamic parties.<sup>87</sup>

If democracy is to thrive in Egypt, Islamic parties have to work hard to endorse more open policies and attitudes towards the other parties and ideas in society even though these may represent other ideologies and thinking systems. On the other hand

Muslim brothers cannot claim monopoly on the representation of political Islam and it is feasible that, other Islamic parties would develop to take their role in Egypt if they did not learn from the events of the last four years. Most important the attitude of Islamic parties (including Muslim brothers and their affiliates) in relation to the commitment toward regional as well as international peace and co-existence need to be asserted and deepened so that the neighbouring nations of Egypt, including Israel and the region as a whole shall feel assured. On the opposite side of the equation, any illusion in the minds of the Egyptian Elite as for their ability to eliminate Islam from the political arena and trusting that such a scheme can be pursued and would succeed is a very dangerous and a naive self-deception that have never been achieved through the last fourteen centuries of history of the Arab World.

The Arab World is in need of a true viable democracy where Islam would play a positive and constructive political rule in solving the old-aged problems of the region and face and deal effectively with the economic and social challenges facing the Arab people. It is only free and dignified people who can make peace with others and it is only a free and dignified people who can build strong economies and contribute to the progress of humanity.

The results from the above analysis call for a new strategy for Egypt democratiza-

tion, away from the short-sighted and ill-fated stability concern. This strategy can be conducted based on the following elements:

- The Egyptian military should not get involved in the political governance of Egypt and should respect the means and tools of the liberal democratic processes.
- The only type of democracy which is viable to survive in Egypt and the Arab World is an inclusive one where all the segments of the national political system are represented being liberals, socialists, traditionalists and Islamists.
- Political Islam is a very vital component, and will always be, in the life of the Egyptian people (and the Arab World in general) and the democratic development of the Muslim and Arab countries.
- Stability and security of any nation or society can be only achieved through respect of the human rights of the population, appreciating their human dignity and working for the economic and social equality among its citizens.

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<b>Appendix (A)</b>		
<b>The players in the Egyptian political systems and an analysis of their role based on the complexity theory – Governmental and non-governmental institutions</b>		
<b>Actor/actors: Military and arm forces</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preserving the economic privileges obtained through sixty years of military ruling in the country.</li> <li>• Securing the internal overall security of the country.</li> <li>• Persevering the external security of the country including abiding with the signed agreements with other states (Israel, USA, Arab Countries)</li> </ul>	Very high	Very low
<b>Actor/actors: Security forces</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preserving the economic privileges obtained through the close ties with the state and the military.</li> <li>• Defending the status quo by oppressing the opposition and undermining its capacity to organize and become effective.</li> <li>• Assuring calm and stability of the country.</li> </ul>	Very high	Very low
<b>Actor/actors: The state bureaucracy</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Powerful elite seeking economic advantages.</li> <li>• Huge apparatus which is oversized.</li> <li>• Used to absorb the surplus workforce coming from universities and education institutions.</li> <li>• Ineffective and often a hinder for economic and social development</li> </ul>	Low	Very low
<b>Actor/actors Capitalists and the top-layer business people</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Keeping the status of stagnation which gave these actors advantages of monopoly and economic rewarding.</li> <li>• Mainly corrupted elite with least attachment to national goals.</li> <li>• Anti-democratic and anti-opposition (whether coming from liberals or Islamists).</li> <li>• Very tightly coupled to military, security forces and government bureaucracy.</li> </ul>	High	Very low

<b>Appendix (B)</b>		
<b>The players in the Egyptian political systems and an analysis of their role based on the complexity theory – political parties</b>		
<b>Actor/actors: Traditional non-Islamic parties including (Socialists, Al Waffad and Nasserist parties)</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have some degree of opposition but not going too far to a collision.</li> <li>• Mostly desiring for accommodation with the military political ambition.</li> <li>• After the revolution of 2011, had the objective of being in power.</li> <li>• Did not put a real effort to build a strong popular base in the country.</li> <li>• Very dependent on their history than having strong attachment to the realities of today.</li> </ul>	Medium-Low	Medium-Low (depending on their historical heritage)
<b>Actor/actors: Liberal new parties</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have been established in recent years through the effort of Egypt democratization by USA and EU.</li> <li>• Do not have a true attachment to the general Egyptian masses.</li> <li>• Have been easy to manipulate by the military as events showed.</li> <li>• Not original in their thinking and lack the understanding of the specific context when applying socio-economic and 'political theories and ideas to the Egyptian case.</li> <li>• Seeks to copy the liberal democracy models in USA and Europe and in doing that they sometimes loose touch with reality.</li> <li>• Probably will be always at the margin unless they put a real effort to understand what is needed, first at the theoretical level and then in application.</li> </ul>	Low	High
<b>Remnants of the Egyptian national party</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• They are the subject of anger because of their role in supporting Mubarak during his long regime in power.</li> <li>• Belonging to the party was based on loyalty to the person of the president and his power structure and often not to the country.</li> <li>• Have been gaining power again since the military intervention under General Sisi.</li> </ul>	High-Medium	Low

<b>Appendix (C)</b>		
<b>The players in the Egyptian political systems and an analysis of their role based on the complexity theory – The Islamic political parties</b>		
<b>Actor/actors: The Muslim brothers</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seeking political power in Egypt</li> <li>• Have been historically the strongest opposition party since its establishment in the 1920s.</li> <li>• The long term objective is to govern society through Islamic values and legal system but through the free choice of the people.</li> <li>• See their role as part of the Muslim nation and as thus politically tied with other Islamic parties in the region.</li> <li>• Nonviolent in their means, at least in the last decades, and do not believe in using violence to reach power in Egypt.</li> <li>• There is a danger that the movement may be radicalized again due to the failure of the democratic experiment in Egypt.</li> <li>• Less antagonistic and more tolerant to Christians in Egypt.</li> </ul>	Very high	High-medium (before July 2013) Medium-low (after July, 2013)
<b>Actor/actors: The Salafist</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Traditional in their understanding of Islamic texts.</li> <li>• Politically passive and only been interested in politics after the success of the January revolution in Egypt.</li> <li>• Very antagonistic toward Egyptian Christians and Shia population.</li> <li>• Have withdrawn to the back seats after the military took over the country again in July 2013.</li> <li>• Have strong ties with the Saudi Wahhabi scholars.</li> </ul>	Very-high to high	Medium-low
<b>Actor/actors: The Sufis</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Basically focused on self-improvement and peaceful in their nature.</li> <li>• Always trying to be in good term with the existing political power.</li> <li>• They do not have an effective or apparent political role and they kept always themselves in the background of events,</li> </ul>	Very high	High-medium

<b>Appendix (D)</b>		
<b>The players in the Egyptian political systems and an analysis of their role based on the complexity theory – official religious institutions</b>		
<b>Actor/actors: Islamic religious institutions (Al-Azhar)</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Islamic representative of the state religion</li> <li>• Aligned with the state political power</li> <li>• Well-respect among traditional Muslims and less popular among educated youth</li> <li>• Accused of supporting the oppression of the Egyptian leaders, especially during the last 60 years.</li> <li>• Antagonistic toward Islamic political activities</li> <li>• Want to establish a monopoly on the explanation of Islam</li> <li>• Historically have been one of the strong grantees for face tyranny but became in recent years part of the elite</li> </ul>	Very high	Medium-low
<b>Christian religious institutions: The Coptic Church</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Official representatives of Christianity in Egypt</li> <li>• Have been close to the state</li> <li>• Feel insecure in relation to political Islam</li> <li>• Traditional supporter of the Egyptian military forces</li> <li>• Facing challenges as young Christian youth is becoming critical for its role in the support of anti-democratic tendencies in Egypt after July 2013</li> </ul>	Very high	Medium-low

<b>Appendix (E)</b>		
<b>The players in the Egyptian political systems and an analysis of their role based on the complexity theory – official religious institutions</b>		
<i>Feedback / Main objectives</i>	<i>Self-organization</i>	<i>Openness/disclosure</i>
<b>Actor/actors: Jihadists (different groups)</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• They are non-political and actually-anti-political.</li> <li>• They believe only in military and violent means to achieve their goals.</li> <li>• Antagonistic toward other Islamic parties who call for political participation</li> </ul>	Very high	Extremely low (secretive groups)

## Notes

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