While the world struggles with the task of coming to grips with the dominant, all-consuming crises over Ukraine and in the Middle East, the Sudan crisis, or crises, have been allowed, tragically, to be largely neglected, as if the international community is too overwhelmed by crisis load to spare relevant capacities, energy and imagination to deal with the massive human suffering in, and dangerous geo-political implications of, what happens in Sudan.
Or both Sudans, for we must not forget that South Sudan, too, continues to struggle on its brink of disaster after its separation from (northern) Sudan and the subsequent years of destructive socio-political and economic strife, reflecting the quasi-eternal competition for power between the president with the black hat, Salva Kiir, and his constant rival, former war lord Riek Machar. South Sudan, a main headache for the UNs peace-keeping operations, has now been further burdened in various ways by the impact of its northern Sudanese neighbor’s crisis, notably by the inflow of refugees from the north adding to the number of IDPs and by the disruption of the economically vital flow of oil from south to north, the outlet in Port Sudan. So interdependence between the two, praised internationally for its potential at the time of the separation in 2011, now relates to crisis and problems rather than to peace and prosperity, sadly, in view of post-independence Sudan’s long history of devastating civil war.
But the acute crisis, in dire need of world attention, is now – and since April last year – in and over (northern) Sudan and its civil war as a result, essentially, of the conflict between its chief rivals, the leader of the SAF (Sudan’s Armed Forces), Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and the leader of the RSF (Rapid Support Force) militia Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, the latter with roots in the imfamous Janjaweed militias at the time when Darfur attracted a concerned world attention. It is an irony of sorts that in both components of the former combined Sudan, a protracted conflict between two men should have had such devastating consequences, should have essentially caused so much suffering
This author has written (and podcast) before on the theme of the Sudan disaster, with an account of the background, the fall of long-term dictator Bashir as a result of popular resistance with elementary military backing from a split and ambivalent set of generals, the perception of these events in the international sphere as one more arm of the Arab spring, the creation subsequently of a mixed civilian-military transitional government, the “coup” against this government by the lead military figures in shady cooperation, Al-Burhan and Dagalo, an agreement between these for the separate military RSF (formed in 2013 by the then ruler Bashir) to be absorbed into a comprehensive, national SAF under Al-Burhan’s leadership, subsequently rejected by Dagalo who made an attempt (April 2023) to seize power for himself, a failed attempt, and the resulting civil war has confirmed the experience that wars are typically easier to start than to finish.
Hence the deeply troubling fact that the global scene now faces three protracted, simultaneous, humanly devastating wars, in addition to the host of other challenges; war in Ukraine since February 2022, war in Sudan since April 2023 and war in the Middle East (Gaza, Lebanon and beyond) for more than a full year, all without a visible end in the tunnel. Repeated attempts to arrive at cease-fires have proven to be elusive. Combined, the human toll is enormous. But among these, Sudan’s war stands out as the internationally forgotten, or neglected, one, neglected by world media as well as actors of the international community for lack of sufficient, relevant prioritization – in the dire crisis competition.
However, there is every reason to take the Sudan crisis internationally seriously, given a host of geopolitical implications as a result of Sudan’s geographic location and inherent proliferation risks.
It suffices to enumerate Sudan’s neighboring countries, each with its own domestic and foreign policy challenges: Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan (see above), Central African Republic (CAR), Tchad and Libya, Sudan and its territory (and crisis) providing the bridge between these and hence a stake in matters of stability versus fragility in Sudan and hence in the wider region. Thus Sudan cannot avoid being affected by crises inside Ethiopia and between Ethiopia and Eritrea, by crises in the wider Horn of Africa and between the littoral states of the Red Sea, and hence the aftermath of the Yemen civil war and hence the current Gaza crisis, and by all the potential implications of the crisis in and over the divided Libya and its significance for the flows of oil, refugees and arms, the latter contributing to shaping al-Sisi’s Egypt’s strong interest in stability in its southern neighbor Sudan.
The list is much longer, but it serves to remind of all the interests, neighborly as well as from further away, US, Russia, Turkey, Israel and others, that tend to offer competition for influence in a destabilized Sudan with uncertain prospects, in addition to a notorious mix of arms dealers, refugee smugglers, gold exploiters, mercenaries that tend to gather in a crisis area like bees around a honey pot. Interestingly, when RSF leader Dagalo recently complained at the alleged participation, on the SAF side, of US-supported Egyptian military assets, he also criticized Iranian interference and then enumerated categories of foreign mercenaries said to be present and active in Sudan’s civil war environment: Tigrayan, Eritrean, Azeri and Ukrainian (sic!).
His mention here, in this illustrious gathering, of Ukrainian mercenaries, would seem like a confirmation of sorts of some vague reporting from earlier this year that there is indeed a certain amount of Ukrainian military presence in (far-away) Sudan, presumably in some kind of response to the earlier presence – in support of the RSF side given Russia’s need for Sudanese gold – of the Wagner group. Pending any confirmation of this particular peculiarity, the presence and activities of various groups of mercenaries, clandestinely serving the purposes of the various involved competitive state actors, indicate that a protracted Sudanese civil war turns it into an arena of regional and global power competition in a very sensitive and hence vulnerable theatre, tending to further protract the conflict.
Seeing and fearing these dangers, lead actors in the international community, notably the US and other Western lead countries, with or without a notoriously divided UN Security Council, are now likely to step up efforts, after a year and a half of neglect and in spite of the crisis competition from Ukraine and the Middle East, to try to impose stabilization measures, a permanent cease-fire to start with. But this can hardly be achieved by mere mediation. A cease-fire now, given current trends in the ongoing civil war with the SAF now seriously pushing back and the RSF pulling back, in Khartoum and elsewhere, would be welcomed only by the retreating side, Dagalo’s RSF. This leaves the US and its allies with the only option (for stabilization) of more decidedly and openly offering support for the side in the conflict that has emerged internationally as the legitimate representative of the Sudanese state, Al-Burhan and his regular army, the SAF. And leaves Dagalo, having checked what real support he can now count on from Russia, UAE and Hafter’s Libya (et al), to consider whether to seek at long last compromise with his antagonist, or whether to fight on.
Meanwhile, millions of Sudanese are suffering, at home somewhere or in exile in Tchad, South Sudan or elsewhere. The immediate humanitarian and political crisis is over the capital of North Darfur, Al-Fashir. Should that crowded key city fall, to besieging RSF forces, all hell is bound to break loose. One might speculate here that perhaps Dagalo, should he seek compromise, can be expected to use his grip on Al.Fashir as a bargaining chip in future talks with his antagonist over the future of Sudan.
Regardless, for the international community, in spite of the dire competition, the Sudan crisis is not going anywhere and cannot avoid having long-term and far-reaching regional consequences.