The month of October promises to be a geopolitically hot month. Among other things, there is pre-winter war developments in Ukraine, and there is the balance in the Middle East between limited war and broadening regional war, and then, of course there is the final stage of the incredibly consequential US presidential (and congressional) elections, threatening to be a process of instability should the election outcomes prove to be unclear and/or contested. Simultaneously, a European Union, faced with unprecedented challenges overall, is going through a process of post-election institutional establishment both at the Commission, Council and Parliament levels. Election outcomes in member states, such as Germany, France and now Austria, add further challenges.
In the midst of this exceptionally complicated environment, globally and regionally, important testing events are approaching in two key countries, Moldova and Georgia, events that are bound to provide evidence and measurements as regards real trends in the struggle between pro-European forces and their adversaries in these countries, in the shadow of Russia’s war in neighboring Ukraine, also an official EU candidate country. Thus a test of the EU’s current phase of enlargement as it faces the interplay between foreign and domestic politics and policies.
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Let us take the case of Moldova first. On October 20 there will be two separate but interconnected electoral events, presidential election on whether to grant incumbent pro-Western president Maia Sandu a second mandate, and a referendum where Moldovans are invited to say yes or no to the referendum question âAre you in favor of the Republic of MoldovaÂŽs accession to the European Union?â â a yes majority implying Moldova’s first successful referendum on constitutional change and a formally binding, irreversible step towards the country’s EU membership. These two October events will then be followed up by parliamentary elections in July next year. Obviously, all three are connected, and crucial.
Moldova’s struggle of and for identity and direction in recent years has been turbulent, in view of some 55% Moldovans clearly supporting the country’s EU accession (while NATO accession is a different, and constitutionally hindered, story) whereas some 41% of the population say in polls they favor an alliance with Russia and 1/3 say they identify themselves as strongly pro-Russian. This obviously reflects not only the division of the country since the early 90’s between Moldova âproperâ and the pro-Russian âexclaveâ Transnistria on the opposite side of the Dnjestr river (where some 1500 Russian troops are still stationed) but also opposition voices raised by politicians (Evghenia Gutul et al) in the autonomous region of Gagauzia closer to the Black Sea. Given these elements of instability and the stakes involved, it was perhaps only to be expected that Russia would be directing strong hybrid attacks aimed, presumably, at destabilization and hence preventing Moldova’s European path, exploiting the country’s inherent weaknesses, including its hitherto energy dependence on (Transnistria and) Russia. The list of hybrid acts since 2002 includes bomb threats, airspace violations and fabricated political protests.
For in March 2022 the Republic of Moldova formally applied for EU membership, and in June that year Moldova was granted EU candidate status together with nine reform areas for the Moldovan government to implement. And in December 2023, after the EU Commission commented favorably on the Moldovan authoritiesÂŽdegree of implementation of these reform requirements â or conditionalities -, the EU Council formally decided to open accession talks, followed in March this year by the Commission presenting a draft framework for accession negotiations â an amazingly speedy accession process, in any comparison.
So now the task for the EU-minded Moldovan government and president Maia Sandu, riding on this wave of EU accession momentum, and in continued defiance of accelerating Russian and Russian-inspired attempts at roll-back, is to carry the Moldovan people, or at least a democratically necessary majority of them, on the ride towards and across the finish line of this existential process. And for this, firstly, Maia Sandu must prevail in the presidential elections and, even more importantly, a majority must say yes in the simultaneous referendum, both a prerequisite for a confirming vote in the July 2025 parliamentary election. The task is for the pro-European democratic bloc to defeat the âVictoryâ political bloc, launched in April this year by the pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor.
It follows that the next few weeks (and beyond) in and around Moldova connotes huge significance, both for Moldova and for the EU â and for Russia, apparently. Serious turbulence cannot avoid being expected.
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And then there is Georgia, Georgia on the European Union’s mind, Georgia approaching a defining moment in its long and thorny journey towards Europe and the EU, ârump-Georgiaâ after the 2008 loss to Russia of its two regions, South Ossetia and Abkhasia, Georgia the âenhanced opportunitiesâ associate member of NATO. But also, in spite of all this, Georgia with its notoriously complicated politics which always tend to raise new hindrances and reservations as regards its EU accession. Thus, in spite of a vast majority in favor of EU membership, and a government paying at least lip service to that same ultimate goal, Georgia’s status as EU candidate (granted in December 2023) has now come under severe question marks as the divided country approaches its defining, existential parliamentary election, also in October, a week after Moldova, October 26.
Everything would now, at long last, be seen to be set for Georgiaâs final accession process to the EU if it wasnÂŽt for the country’s strongman-cum-billionaire, Bidzina Ivanishvili, leader of the party Georgian Dream, in power in Georgia for more than a decade. In a rather sudden shift compared to earlier pre-elections pledges to bring Georgia to the EU and Abkhasia and South Ossetia back to the mother country, Ivanishvili in late April this year accused the US and the EU of meddling in Georgia’s internal affairs and pledged to reintroduce a law on âforeign agentsâ which would illegalize all NGOs receiving more than 20% of their funding from abroad (i.e. the West). And then, in mid-August, the Georgian Dream campaign has hinted that should it maintain the parliament majority in the October 26 elections, 113 or mor of the 150 total seats, the regime would ban all pro-Western opposition groups, including the main opposition party, the formerly leading United National Movement (UNM), then led by Mikheil Saakashvili. And in Ivanishvili’s and the Georgian Dream’s pre-election rhetoric, the tone has now become distinctly pro-Russian.
It appears, therefore, that the Georgian opposition, while representing a huge pro-European popular majority, risks facing a situation where they are, in practice, left with no â or few â other options than massive street demonstrations. Rather unsurprisingly, as a consequence of these developments, overall relations between the EU and Tbilisi have taken on a drastic downturn, with serious concern looming in Brussels at the fate of Georgia, and at the Union’s formal commitment to steer Georgia towards membership, in spite of the mounting threats to Georgia as a Western democracy and a partner in the struggle against Russian aggression.
It follows from the above that for the EU, and the West generally, the immediate and most pressing challenges already in October may in fact arise from the defining moments in the two countries that together with Ukraine are key to the policy of enlargement, Moldova and Georgia, and their turbulent (but existentially important) elections in late October. Time for the emerging ânewâ EU to buckle up.
