On Coups d'Etat with Military Force

Abstract of Kjell Nerpin's article in RSAWSPJ no 1 2001.

Coups d'état performed with military force seem to have a very bad reputation when reported in the media. The military are then often seen as a threat to public law and order. Generals, in particular, are often supposed to be inclined to seize power using their right to command when, from their point of view, things seem to go wrong. But is this really a fair description of reality? Surprisingly little seems to have been written on this important subject. The purpose of this article is to stimulate serious research which can give valuable results concerning leadership on a high level, both in civil administration and in the Armed Forces.

The following hypothesis is put forward: a military coup d'état is staged only as a last resort when civil administration can no longer meet necessary demands.

Such a situation is characterized by:

• an inability to keep law and order leading to uncontrolled violence
• a mismanaged economy which threatens elementary supply of food and other necessities
• an inability to make decisions owing to competing special interests

If the hypothesis is correct it ought to show that:

• the coup does not come as a surprise - on the contrary, it is expected, even if the moment and the methods come as a surprise
• the coup is welcomed or at least accepted by the majority of the population; only a minority is against it.

The hypothesis can be said to have been tested in the following cases:

• Spain in 1936, when General Franco seized power.
• Greece in 1967, when Colonel Papadopoulos seized power.
• Chile in 1973, when General Pinochet seized power.
• Portugal in 1929 and 1974.
• Turkey in 1960, 1971, and 1980.

Even if every coup is unique, the present study shows that the hypothesis is well justified. That is especially the case with Chile and Turkey, where the coups were planned and staged by the high command in their respective countries. In the other cases, it was juntas that acted: in Spain it was the generals, in Greece the colonels, and in Portugal the captains. Even a lawful administration, founded on a democratic constitution can decline to such an extent that the nation will lose patience and then anything might happen. In such a situation it seems that the Armed Forces are seen as a last resource that can intervene and seize power, thus bringing a precarious situation to a conclusion and making a new start possible. What happens thereafter is not the subject of this study. We are likely to see military coups d'état even in the future. Therefore it should also be of interest to study different ways how to go back to lawful civil rule after a military intervention.

An important conclusion is that the Armed Forces can never be said to constitute a threat to a democratic and lawfully elected regime that enjoys the people's support, not so even in heavy crises. It is only in such exceptional situations as shown in the present study that an intervention can be considered an alternative.