Swedish and French doctrines
Same challenge – different articulations

by Li Skaring

IT REMAINS FOR you to forget what you have learned, and for me to do the opposite of what I have taught you.[1] This is a conclusion made by the future Marshal of France; General Ferdinand Foch, to his staff after realizing that the doctrine used in the Great War was exactly the wrong doctrine for the French Army to employ in 1914, which nearly resulted in the death of France. Foch also called for synergy between education and doctrine, in order to learn from what had already been taught, tested, applied and criticized.[2]

A military doctrine constitutes a nation's official position and aims to clarify the interpretations made for its armed forces. The precise definition and content of a doctrine therefore differ between nations. The overall aim is however to present the basic principles that guide the armed forces when pursuing an objective.[3]

> By nature it is difficult to anticipate what our adversaries will do and even sometimes what our own politicians are likely to do, but a common doctrine makes it at least easier to guess what our own troops will do.[4]

The common ground for the today's warfare is the irregular battlefield and stability operations conducted around the world. In order to fight the new challenges of these battles, nations as well as international organizations (NATO, EU, UN, OSCE etc.) have to work together and use the rich doctrine heritage and very worthy knowhows of the expertise already existing. One should however avoid to transpose an idealized past onto a burning present. Meaning, that a doctrine is a living document as well as its content; it's however not laws and should be used with judgment.[5]

This article is a summary of my bachelor thesis written at École Militare Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan through the Tactical Officer's programme at the Military Academy Karlberg 2012. The background and purpose for the essay regards the fact that the Swedish armed forces' doctrinal documents are currently under review, where the Military strategic doctrine (MSD) was released last year and is still under development. The Doctrine for Land Forces (*Doktrin för Markperationer*- DmarkO) will together with the doctrines for Navy and Air Force be reissued into one common operative doctrine, in order to present a relevant doctrine that interacts with the MSD.

The MSD mentions doctrines by NATO, Great Britain, USA, Russia and the UN. France is a member of NATO and also has a long history of colonization and decades of irregular warfare, where French military strategists and their thoughts, lessons

learned and principles lie some of the foundation to today´s international doctrines. Whereas, what fundamentally differentiates stabilization from the pacification operations of the past, is the end state where the local authorities and population retake the ownership of their country.[6]

The research question is: *How can contemporary Swedish and French Doctrinal documents view on stabilization be characterized by the means of traditional military theory aspects?*

The result of the essay shows that the studied doctrines can be characterized in the overall level of a general consensus regarding the main principles of stabilization and stability operations: the initial control of environment, the support and assistance to the population and other actors, the reviving of the social and juridical structures, and the continuation towards peace where the forces can withdraw.

The French doctrines contain a significant higher level of details regarding the tactical methods and principles, such as the Oil spots, Quadrillage, Force and Influence ratio, and the measures for how the actual re-construction and re-building should take place. This compared to the Swedish doctrinal document that mainly involves the initial stages of intervention and laying the foundations for further development, where the gap between these phases and the desired end-state of peace is vaguely described.

French doctrines

The French Ministry of defense has presented a renewed tactical approach for actual conflicts, defined in four documents (FT-01 to FT-05) that represent the keystone of the French Army doctrine corpus. These four documents derive from the Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF), and are army doctrines for the operative and tactical levels.[7]

- *Winning the battle, building peace* (FT-01) concerns the role of land forces in today's warfare.[8]
- *General tactics* (FT-02) lays down the general framework for their use; it describes how to conduct operations and which tactics are to be used.[9]
- *The Fundaments of Combined Arms Operations* (FT-04) describes the basic and operational means of the land forces according to the different environments in today's international operations.[10]
- *The Tactical Commander's Guide to Command and Control in Operations* (FT-05) intends to provide the foundation for officers, particularly the youngest of them, when exercising command and control in operations.[11]

The FT-04 and FT-05 intends to specify the French approach to operational command in the light of the field manuals and handbooks that the French key allies have recently published on the same topic.[12]

The FT-01 deals with the stabilization approach, whereas FT-02 deals with counterinsurgency and the more tactical stability methods. The two doctrinal documents correspond to the operative and tactical level for corps and brigade.[13]

Swedish doctrines

The Swedish Armed Forces have one main doctrine, *Militärstrategisk Doktrin*, which consists of several parts that are aligned to tactical regulations. As mentioned before, there is a gap in the Swedish doctrinal system due to that the operative directions

are currently under review and will be defined during 2013 in an operative doctrine. It is further stated in the *Reglemente för Markoperationer* that an additional chapter regarding land force's operations in stabilization is under development.[14]

The Swedish Armed Forces has chosen not to develop its own national doctrines in the areas of military interoperability, since they are stated in the MSD to already exist internationally, regarding; PKO, SO, CRO, PSO, COIN.[15]

> The Swedish Armed Forces does however need the knowledge and the ability to – together with other nations- fight irregular opponents and hybrid threats parallel with the ability to regular warfare.[16]

The Swedish doctrinal document *Reglemente för Markoperationer* (RMO) describes the tactical foundations for the land forces at brigade and higher.[17]

Analysis

The theoretical framework for the essay is doctrines, where the empirics consisted of Swedish and French doctrinal documents. In order to understand what is stated in the empirics, the method of qualitative analysis was used. Three aspects from traditional military theory were chosen in order to delimit and enable characterization of the descriptions in the doctrinal documents. The summary of each aspect from the empirics, have been used in a comparing analysis. This comparing analysis has had the approach to characterize what is stated in the doctrinal documents according to the aspects.

The Aspect Goals and aims

What do the doctrines express to be achieved and why should this be achieved?

The overall political goal and the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in order to let other actors work are similar. The FT-02 describes the final actions in stabilization, in the transition towards normalization, to be aiming at reviving political, administrative and economic life. The RMO refers to this as a comprehensive approach where military units work together with civilian actors, initially supporting and there after monitoring.

The FT-01 and FT-02 emphasize the need of environmental control in an early stage and throughout the stabilization. The aim is to intervene and thereafter secure the own area in order to stay and disturb the opponent. The control is dual, whereas it involves both the terrain, which should be dominated and where the force can stay untouched from the opponent, and the population, which should be influenced and understood in order to detect social unbalances/variations.

The focus on the population is similar, where in the RMO it is stated to be the main objective and not the battlefield. The document also describes the importance of operative control on the ground in an early stage, and that the environment needs to be controlled in order to gain the support of the population.

This support from the population is further stated to be vital in order to prevent the opponent's activities in all documents. The FT-02 describes the initial aim in security actions to be the control of the environment, where the purpose is to eliminate the opponent and thereby ensure the forces security and freedom of movement. The FT-01 also describes that in order to stabilize the environment the opponent needs to be defeated. The defeat of the opponent is also mentioned in the RMO, however not stated as a goal in stabilization.

The FT-01 describes that it is first after that the environment is controlled that there are actions to support the population and reconstruction. The re-establishment of basic services is mentioned to be a quite vital measure, since it will gain the legitimacy for the local authorities, the restoration of Rule of Law and eventually delimit the opponent's recruitment. The RMO also describes that re-establishing measures are required in order to achieve peace and development. These achievements are a common factor in the documents, whereas they all have clear statements that the overall aim is to achieve the political goal, where peace and development is described. The FT-02 does however state that the military aim itself is not the development of a nation but the elimination of the opponent that tries to disturb it. When this is achieved, the local authorities and humanitarian assistance can work in safety, whereas the forces can go home.

The FT-01 also mentions that in order to reach stability and allow confidence building possible, the primary cause to the conflict and destabilization must be addressed. A similar statement could not be found in the RMO.

The Aspect of the Opponent

How do the doctrines characterize the opponent and what is stated about the opponent's ambitions?

All documents state that stabilization is most likely to take place in an asymmetrical battlefield where the mission is of counterinsurgency character against an irregular opponent with guerilla methods.

The FT-01 states that the opponent's military and political goals often are unclear and affected by several outside actors, whereas the RMO states the similar. This is further mentioned in all documents as that the opponent has more flexibility than the international forces, since he works outside the Law of War and is therefore considered irrational.

The FT-01 states that the opponent is likely to fight through media in order to exploit the land forces and spread propaganda. The urban terrain is emphasized in this matter, where these areas contains the majority of the population, the opponent and therefore also the media. The RMO states the similar, but does not express the opponent's use of propaganda.

The FT-02 mentions subversion, religion, nationalism, narcotics and the rejection of western values as the opponent's motivators. Narcotics, in the context of child-soldiers, are stated to have a high impact on the land forces warfare. Similarities can be found in the RMO, whereas narcotics and the rejection of western values are not clearly mentioned. This could however be interpreted as such in the content of nationalistic and criminal networks.

The opponent's use of technology attempts to vary, is stated in the RMO. Here the FT-01 describes the battlefield to have become much more complex and various due to the fact that the opponent might use the same equipment and means as the forces. In the context of a global war, where there are differences between the opponent that tries to affect the political will of the armed forces, and those that use pure violence, the documents are similar.

The RMO states that the opponent is likely to use complex terrain in order to escape the full force of the land forces. In the FT-01, it is stated that the opponent will try to blend into the environment, refuse to hold ground and/or to act as an objective. This kind of guerilla tactics is similarly mentioned in the documents.

The Aspect of Methods and measures

What methods and measures are principally described to be used in order to achieve identified goals and aims?

The RMO states that a comprehensive approach in stabilization is vital to achieve the overall goal, where military and civilian operations are closely coordinated. The FT-02 states the similar, whereas the FT-01 states that the military commitment is comprehensively described according to a continuum of operations: intervention, stabilization and normalization.

In the context of the international theatre of stabilization, all documents mention that measures for success are interoperability in the multinational operations, and a mutual respect and understanding for other actor's culture and capacity. Measures that involve a common ground for equipment, technology, language skills and training are also mentioned in similar ways in all documents.

The emphasis on an understanding of the Rules of Engagements during the stabilization is a vital measure according to all documents, where the legitimacy is a returning keyword.

The FT-01 mentions the French land force´s three-fold operational posture, which means that the land forces are able to simultaneously execute actions of force, security and assistance. The document further states that the stabilization phase involves three overall actions: Security actions, Actions to support the population, and Reviving actions. These are conducted with the support of four operational stages: Acting, Controlling, Adapting and Mentoring, which involves several conditions for conduct. In the FT-02 the mentioned actions are describes as tactical methods of security and assistance operations, which are achieved by the generic courses of actions and different missions.

Stabilization includes six stability methods in the RMO, which are described as: Power projection, Support, Monitoring, Police enforcement, Training and Protection.

The RMO states that the operative concept of stabilization includes measures of gaining the support of the population and controlling the environment, which is achieved by initially influencing the part of the population that is against the opponent, where thereafter the part of the population that remains hostile will be isolated and easier to oppose. These measures can be linked to the operative control on the ground. Similar measures are concretized as quadrillage and oils spots in the FT-02, where force ratio and influence ratio are two additional principles described. It is s further mentioned, in the FT-02, that during security operations, the need to dominate the environment requires a more constraining force ratio, whereas the influence ratio must be assessed in a comprehensive manner. Figures based on lessons learned from history and recent operations recommend an influence ratio of 1 to 50 inhabitants, and against an armed insurgency a local force ratio of 3 to 1, where the influence ratio required to launch this type of action is 20 friendly troops to 1 insurgent. No similar statement could be found in the RMO.

In the operational stage of control, the FT-01 mentions that the development of crowd control techniques and of reduced lethality weapons and ammunitions are likely to reinforce the operational capability of troops operating among civilian populations. It is further stated in the FT-02 that the evacuation of a threatened popu-

INTERVENTION	**STABILIZATION**	**NORMALIZATION**

Stabilization is a decisive phase to achieve the strategic objective. It entails various types of actions in keeping with the land force´s three-fold operational posture.

Security op:
Aim to control the environment

Support actions:
Support population, DDR, rebuilding

Reviving Actions:
Political, Admin, economic life

Conducting operations (FT -01)

ACTING

CONTROLLING

ADAPTING

MENTORING

The conditions to enable the operations

Combined arms
Joint Framework
Multinationality

Managing the use of Force
Controlling Technology
Controlling Time
Controlling Violence

Setting conditions for peace
Facing asymmetry

Disarming the Combatants
Training Local Forces
Support Nation Building

FT-02 Tactical Methods

Generic courses of Action (Corps) and Missions (Brigade)

QUADRILLAGE
OIL SPOTS

SECURITY OP

ASSISTANCE OP

Tactical principles

(| **Offensive op** | **Defensive op** |)

Preparation/Gaining the advantage
Effort
Consolidation
Crowd control/Evacuation of threatened population

Support the nation's reconstruction
Aid to the population
Humanitarian assistance

Result

This part summarizes the analysis to an answer to the research question: *How can contemporary Swedish and French Doctrinal documents' view on stability operations be characterized by the means of traditional military theory aspects?*

ASPECT	QUESTION	ANSWER		
		FT-01	FT-02	RMO
Goals and aims	What do the doctrine express to be achieved and why should this be achieved?	Re-establish a safe and secure environment, governmental services, infrastructure and humanitarian relief in order to establish the conditions for the achievements of the strategic objective and thereby a return to peace.	Domination of the environment and the revival of the political, administrative and economic life to enable the normalization phase.	To let other actors operate in a stable environment, where the overall goal is to achieve the political end-state of peace and development.
The Opponent	How do the doctrine characterize the opponent and what is stated about the opponent's ambitions?	Irregular, fights through media with the ambitions to undermine the legitimacy of the land force's presence and Influence the exit strategy	Irregular, uses religion, nationalism, narcotics and the rejection of western values as his motivators in order to legitimize his cause and make the forces and/or the government the common enemy.	The opponent is irregular with ambitions to affect the present social system with violence.
Methods and Measures	What methods and measures are principally described to be used in order to achieve identified goals and aims?	The stabilization phase involves three overall actions (Security actions, Actions to support the population, and reviving actions) these are conducted with the support of four operational stages (Acting, Controlling, Adapting and Mentoring) which involves several conditions for conduct.	The principles of quadrillage and oil spots are used in order to control the environment, where the tactical methods of security and assistance operations are achieved by the generic courses of actions and different missions.	The operative control of the ground enables the six stability methods (Power projection, Support, Monitoring, Police enforcement, Training and Protection) to reach the operative concept of stabilization.

lation or crowd control requires identical tactical action. The crowd control is mentioned similarly in the context of police enforcement in the RMO, but the evacuation of a threatened population or the examples of identification of the population could not be found.

The FT-01 states that the combination of intelligence, technology and systemic analysis are vital elements in all operations, where the land forces have to be aware of the opponent's means and measures for propaganda, as well as being able to conduct offensive and defensive information operations themselves. The external information is further mentioned in the FT-02 to be a vital instrument when the military action is applied to the population. Similar measures as mentioned in the RMO as information operations. In this phase of the operation, the FT-02 mentioned that assistance is a way to win over the neutrality of the assisted populations as well as the public opinion, and hopefully their cooperation. A similar statement could not be found in the RMO.

The turnaround of local warlords or armed gangs, are further mentioned in the FT-01 as a method aimed at cutting off the insurgents' supplies and intelligence sources. A similar statement could not be found in the RMO.

To monitor the re-/construction of civil institutions, juridical systems and the police force, are stated in the RMO as measures to maintain and achieve stability. The FT-01 describes the similar measures in the mentoring stage, where the disarmament of the combatants, training of the local forces and the support of nation building are further mentioned. The FT-02 describes these measures in the context of assistance operations. The support is partly described in the RMO as that the military units should

not be considered the first hand choice regarding support operations, furthermore as an additional asset with the ability to force. The RMO also states that the training of the local security forces, can in some cases be complemented with support in the form of military equipment. In the context of training the local security forces the FT-01 states that the training or refreshing of local defense and security forces is vital for the re-establishment of the rule-of-law in a country, since without them the forces cannot be relived and expand/continue the stabilization.

Goals and Aims

The French doctrines' descriptions of goals and aims in stability operations are characterized by a high level of details and an offensive approach towards the actors. The Swedish doctrinal document's descriptions are characterized by a strong strategic-political end-state, where the detail level on the operative and tactical level is low, and a segregation of humanitarian and military actors can be noticed.

The opponent

The French doctrines' descriptions of the opponent in stability operations are characterized by a high level of details where the effect of propaganda and the public opinion is emphasized. The Swedish doctrinal document's description of the opponent is characterized by high level of details where the irrationality and flexibility of the opponent is emphasized.

Methods and Measures

The French doctrines' descriptions of methods and measures in stability operations are characterized by a high level of details

regarding the conduct of operation where different stages, methods and tactical principles are described, where the isolation of the opponent is emphasized. The Swedish doctrinal document's description of the methods and measures is characterized by vaguely described stability methods where the vitality of interoperability is emphasized.

Differences could be found in following matters; The French doctrine's clearly stated transition of phases: intervention, stabilization and normalization, the different tactical principles of environmental control: characterized as oil spots, quadrillage, influence and force ratio, the emphasize on the opponent's propaganda: the vital need of offensive information operations and spreading of one's own propaganda to maintain a stable public opinion, the more offensive approach towards the population and opponent; these are both seen as actors that need to be controlled and influenced. And furthermost the content of the descriptions where stability operations are given a clearly larger space compared to the Swedish, whereas the FT-01 describes the stabilization phase and the FT-02 describes the stability methods in COIN.

Answer to the research question:

The French and Swedish doctrines' descriptions of stability operations can be characterized by a large degree of uniformity regarding articulations of goals in general.

Differences in descriptions can be characterized with a French high level of tactical details and an offensive approach towards the opponents, where the effect of propaganda is emphasized. Swedish doctrinal descriptions can however be characterized as vague descriptions of stability methods where segregation between humanitarian and military actors can be noticed, and interoperability in a multinational context is emphasized.

Summary and discussion

The purpose with the essay has been a possible facilitation of the work with the new Swedish operative doctrine by analyzing another nation's doctrinal descriptions and knowledge summarized in doctrines. A nation situated in the same present international operations with more experience from earlier colonization and pacification.

The main empirics used in this research are two French doctrines (FT-01, FT-02) and one Swedish doctrinal document (RMO). The documents statements are based on the countries' traditions and contemporary military thoughts according to its abilities and strategic relations. The framework and range of these doctrines may therefore be limited. The comparison and the result can be criticized to be unfair or irrelevant due to the delimitation of Swedish empirics used. A more relevant comparison might have been the Swedish operative doctrine, but since this does not exist yet, guidelines of the work in progress of it was given from the Swedish Military Headquarters (where Goals, Methods, Means were stated). A strict observation of the positions in a doctrine of a certain level must be linked to what might be said of some sister doctrine of higher or lower level. The extent of this research has delimited the use of empirics, however, it has not been written out but indirect understanding of such higher sister doctrines has influenced (The Swedish *Militärstrategisk doktrin (MSD)* as well as the French *Le Livre, Blanche, JD-01 CDEAF(2011), JC(FR)-3.4.9 STAB* have been read)

In order to reach a high level of validity and reliability of the essay, theoretical definition and operational indicators from traditional military theory were used. Furthermore, a thorough and approved systematization of the French doctrinal organization was made in order to exclude systematical errors. Contacts with Swedish and French officers working with the different doctrines have been made, in order to get an overall understanding and guidelines of how to interpret the doctrinal documents. The validity of the research is therefore assessed as satisfactory in its context.

The theory and operational indicators, or aspects, are not specific for stabilization, whereas the *Goals and aims*, *The Opponent* and *Methods and Measures* can be seen as basic concepts in the military context. The aspects were used to support and not delimit the analysis of the empirics, where the theory of doctrines has been the essay's framework. The issue has not been about validity in the form of measurable truths, more about how well the results can be said to connect to the statements described in stabilization.

It is the opinion of the author that the French and Swedish forces would probably conduct stabilization similarly in an operation. The framework and foundations of the stabilization is highly corresponding: the comprehensive approach, the Rule of Law, ROE, legitimacy, control of the environment, supporting the population, assisting and enabling other actors and humanitarian relief.

The two nations would probably also reach a high level of cooperation and coherence in operations, due to the similar descriptions of an *understanding* for interoperability, similar technology, training and competence. These aspect have however just been analyzed with the nation's doctrinal documents, whereas the actual impact, implementation and the influence of different military culture has not been measured.

The *understanding* itself can be said to contain several levels, whereas coherent descriptions in doctrinal documents are a progress towards interoperability. The actual understanding between different actors, in the conduct of the operation, can however be highly affected by the different military cultures.

One example can be the fact that the RMO express that the opponent should be isolated and then opposed in the context of environmental control, where the FT-01 and FT-02 states defeat. This can be interpreted as a more offensive approach from the French Armed Forces.

The strategic and political goal is coherent within the international mission, as well the descriptions of the opponent and similar approaches regarding methods and measures for stability. The French doctrines clearly states different phases that depend on a continuous transition between them, where the first phase, *initial intervention* on the crisis area of operations, the armed forces deploys and neutralizes the enemy forces. The second phase, *stabilization*, aims to stabilize the area in order to restore the social situation. The third phase, *normalization*, aims to restore the political balance. This could be related to the French experience of colonization and pacification from the past, where the success of the mission depends on early intervention where the forces to lie the foundation for domination of the environment, and thereby allow further transition and development.

The French doctrines clearly emphasize the effect of the opponent's propaganda, where the vital need of offensive infor-

mation operations and spreading of one's own propaganda to maintain a stable public opinion is mentioned. This can be related to the effect that the FLN had in Algeria on the French population. The Swedish Armed Forces does not have the same experience, whereas the lack of more emphasis on this matter in the doctrinal document could be explained.[18]

The major differences that can be said to characterize the doctrinal documents are partly the level of details and statements of historical examples and lessons learned in the French doctrines. The practical knowledge can be noticed in the in the context of the different tactical principles of environmental control characterized in the French doctrines: oil spots, quadrillage, influence- and force ratio. Whereas, they mention actual relationship on number of troops needed per inhabitant and insurgents in different operations, which clearly shows the result of pragmatism in the doctrines. These descriptions are based on historical experiences from Madagascar (Gallieni), Marocko (Lyautey), Algeria (General Raoul Salan), Indochina (Trinquier, mostly Algeria as well) e.g.

These principles are partly described in the RMO, whereas the statements regarding COIN and stabilization can be assumed to be partly based on knowledge from the previously mentioned French tactics. The two countries have completely different pragmatic knowledge from historical conflicts, they have however been operating in the same areas of conflict during the late 20th and early 21th century (Kosovo, Congo, Tchad, Afghanistan e.g.).

The differences described can be said to be depending on the two nations' completely different extent of strategic, operative and tactical experiences of stabili-

ty operations and COIN, and furthermost means for operations.

The examples mentioned could however be irrelevant to the Swedish Forces, since a doctrine is normative for the nation itself and its armed forces. However, it is stated that the Swedish Armed Forces does need the knowledge and the ability to, in cooperation with other nations, fight irregular opponents. If the variation of the descriptions of tactics in stabilization is as vague as indicated in the essay, it can speak for the need for more hands-on Swedish approaches for effective staff-work, practice planning, joint production and above all effort. This argues in part against the position of the MSD that states that Sweden does not need to develop own national doctrines in the areas of military interoperability, since they already exist internationally.

One should not either forget that the doctrines used are official documents, whereas one can question who they are really written for. Can a guiding document for the armed forces really be used as a regulation when it has to be approved by as well the public opinion, the media and the politicians? Even the opponent can read and understand how the forces will act and are regulated. At least, two conclusions can be made; a doctrine can be used as a deterring measure for the opponent, as well as, by the public theatre, as an approved document that regulates the Armed Forces.

Reflection

A doctrine makes it at easier to guess what our own troops will do, as stated in the introduction. Whereas, since the French doctrines contains a higher level of details and show clear signs of pragmatism, it is likely that the French officers have a clearer view

of what they are supposed to do in stability operations. Vaguely described documents leave room for initiative and a decentralized commando, but also potential for confusion and misunderstandings in the conduct of operations.

As mentioned throughout this essay, the French Armed Forces have a background of colonization and participation of several COIN missions from past and present conflicts. The Swedish Armed Forces have been non-aligned, with a background of Peace Supporting operations with little experience of COIN. The focus of this essay has not been the practical use of doctrines or how they are implemented in the armed forces. An interesting question/hypotheses would however be, Why there are such large differences in the doctrinal documents. The subject has been mentioned in the essay, the extent of the research has however delimited the focus/discussions on these matters.

In order to understand doctrines one has to understand the context they are in. All Armed Forces have different ways of presenting their doctrines, as well as means to develop them. It is therefore hard, not so say almost impossible, to make a straight comparison/implementation of them even in a completely theoretical approach. This does not however exclude the possibility to use others lessons learned and wisdoms in order to facilitate your own work and guiding regulations, whereas a doctrine can be as well a tool for education, change or command.

The authors lessons-learned from writing the essay can be as just stated; it is hard to understand doctrines due to their complex relationship to its Armed Forces, it is further complex to understand them in the military culture they are in, since one have to understand their background as well as how they are "related" to its Armed Forces. A more practical research would have been interesting to conduct, since the question "Why" is constantly returning in this sort of strictly theoretical, military, research. However, it is first now after the research is finished that this question has become obvious and its necessity is understood.

It is further the author's suggestion that the Swedish National Defense College (FHS) and the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters (HKV), recommends areas of research that is of interest/would facilitate the work of their publications to the students/cadets at the different War science departments.

The author is second lieutenant and serves at the Life Guard.

Notes

1. Sanders, Charles W, Jr: *No other law: the French doctrine of the offensive,* the RAND corporation, Santa Monica 1987, p. 31.
2. Ibid, p. 4;
   Bezacier, Gérard: *Synergy between doctrine, training and military education*, *Doctrine General Military review,* Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces, CDEF, 2004, p. 3.
3. *Militärstrategisk doktrin med doktrinära grunder, MSD 12,* Försvarsmakten, Stockholm 2011, p. 8.
4. Høiback, Harald: "What is Doctrine?", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Norweigan Defence University College, Oslo, Norway 2011, p. 14.
5. Op. cit., Bezacier, Gérard, see note 2.
6. *JC(FR) – 3.4.9 STAB*, Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations', CICDE, 2011, p. 15;
   Op. cit., *MSD 12*, see note 3, p. 125;
   1830> French use political and economic means to achieve some sort of success in Algeria under Bugeaud.
   1850 – 1860 attempts to use political and economic means to win population or subvert rebellion by Faibhead in "West and Central Africa", talks about protectorates instead of colonies and cooperating with local rulers. Gallieni wrote about development in counterinsurgency in 1902, during correspondence with Lyautey, who wrote the article "On the army's colonial rule" in 1900 (Becket, Ian E. W.: *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, Routledge, Oxon 2001, p.40). Combination of military pressure and political means used in Morocco between 1924 – 1926, victory achieved through joint action with Spanish (Ibid., Becket Ian E. W., p.41). French counterinsurgency developed in colonial wars since somewhere around 19th century. The French colonies were lost through three larger conflicts, the Second World War, the war in Indochina and the war in Algeria. Indochina was lost to the Japanese during the Second World War, attempts to reinstate French rule was resisted by the Viet Minh (*http://www.ne.se/frankrike/historia/fj%C3%A4rde-republiken-1946-58*). After the peace in Geneva 1954 France gave up all claims to their colonies in Indo-China, today consisting of the countries Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In Africa, France sacrificed the control over Morocco and Tunisia to gain advantages in Algeria, which was later lost due to international pressure. Morocco and Tunisia received independence in 1958, as a stage in this (same link). E.g. modern conflicts; Somalia (1991-1992), Kosovo (1999- present) The Ivory Coast (2003-present), Afghanistan (2001-present).
   E.g. Gallieni, Lyautey, Trinquer, Galula.
7. *General Tactics*, Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces, CDEF, Paris 2010, p. 3.
8. Ibid.
9. *Winning the battle Building peace*, CDEF, Paris 2010, p. 5.
10. *Les fondamentaux de la manœuvre interarmes*, CDEF, Paris 2011, p. 3.
11. *The Tactical Commander's Guide to Command and Control in Operations*, CDEF, Paris 2011, p. 3.
12. Ibid.
13. Op. cit., *General tactics*, see note 7, p. 70.
14. *Reglemente för Markoperationer,* Försvarsmakten, Stockholm 2010, p. 3, 11.
15. PKO – Peacekeeping Operations, SO – Stability Operations, CRO – Crisis Respond Operations, PSO – Peace Support Operations, COIN – Counterinsurgency.
16. Op. cit., *MSD 12*, see note 3, p. 105.
17. Where *Reglemente* can be translated to *Regulation*, it is however stated in the RMO, page 158, that in the commanding system, the *Reglemente* is equivalent to doctrines.;
    Op. cit., *Reglemente för Markoperationer,* see note 14, p. 9.
18. The use of propaganda inside Algeria, with focused efforts on indoctrination in schools and terror directed against schools that could not be controlled (Op. cit., Becket, Ian E. W., see note 6, pp. 400-404). The attempts to internationalize the conflict, where FNL uses the media's attention after the Battle of Algiers, and make contacts in the U.S. and the UN. This is the way they eventually win (Ibid., Becket Ian E. W., pp. 244-245). The propaganda impact of population movements, where the result is unbalanced negatively linked to the actual achievements (Sutton, Keith: *Army administration tensions over Algeria's Centres de regroupement,* 1954–1962, p.253).