Swedish National Security
Challenges and Opportunities beyond 2014
by Sven-Christer Nilsson and Göran Larsbrink

A publication by The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences from its project Svensk säkerhet efter 2014 (Swedish National Security Beyond 2014).
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Foreword

Swedish national security – a study from the royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences

The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences was founded in 1796. The Academy’s mission is to follow and participate in matters related to our national security. It handles a broad spectrum of issues related to this task – e.g. the armed forces, civil defence, technological challenges, security policies and international law. The Academy has some 400 members, both Swedish and from abroad.

Our Swedish national security is facing great challenges in coming years. The positive trend from the end of the Cold War has been replaced by increasing international uncertainty. In our study we have come to the conclusion that Sweden lacks a balance between ends and means in our armed forces.

Following the development in international relations and our national defence, the Academy has made a broad study of related matters. The result is presented in a book published in mid-January 2013 with the title “För Sveriges Säkerhet” (Security for Sweden). Here we present in English a short version of that book.

The study has been headed by Academy members Sven Christer Nilsson and Göran Larsbrink. All six of the Academy’s departments have participated. The technological section has been prepared in cooperation with the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences.

The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences acknowledges with gratitude the generous contribution from the Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, which has enabled the Academy to perform this study and publish its results.

Vice Admiral (retd) Frank Rosenius
Director
**Introduction and Summary**

*Svensk säkerhet efter 2014* (Swedish national security beyond 2014) is a project initiated in early 2011 by The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences. This booklet is an effort by the Academy to introduce the project to the international reader, who will find a comprehensive summary in English of the recently published book *För Sveriges säkerhet* (To Swedish Security), which constitutes the complete project documentation.

By a parliamentary decision in 2009 the century old system of conscript servicemen and servicewomen was abandoned in favour of an army, navy and air force manned by contracted personnel. As part of the decision, the Armed Forces also received a planning directive to make international operations its main focus. This transformation is made under a host of uncertainties, risks and threats to the Swedish national security. The world around us has changed dramatically, the Soviet Union is no more and the European Union has 27 member states. The basis for Sweden’s defence and security policies is no longer the same as it once was during the Cold War.

The year 2014 is the original date for the new organisation to be ready for deployment. It is also the year the Government is expected to give new long-range planning directives for the Armed Forces. The Academy identified several not always compatible threads needed to be tied together for the successful implementation of the new set of policies: strategy analysis, financing, materiel upgrading, and recruiting for the Armed Forces, but also non-military issues such as energy supply, migration, social unrest and cyber threats influencing our civil society.

This was the basis for the project which the Academy organised in six subprojects. The reader will find a selection of essential conclusions and recommendations. The participants of each of the subprojects have assumed full responsibility for subject analysis, degree of external participation, and execution. The views expressed are their own and not necessarily those of the Academy. The final chapter is a concluding synthesis written by the project management with additional conclusions and recommendations.

**Method.** Throughout the project the authors have used a qualitative descriptive method based on their own research and on other available research in their areas of expertise. The subproject on non-military security has also used an interview method for verification of results. Expert seminars on selected topics was the method used by the technology subproject to expose relevant knowledge and discuss how this could be employed to increase the overall security of society.

**Why do we need a defence?** The Hon. Björn von Sydow, former Speaker of the Parliament, developed a model to characterise the nations of the world according to their expressed views on local, regional and global security and defence. From a consolidated view on the Baltic Sea, the Arctic and Nordic regions he then concluded that Sweden needs its Armed Forces to guarantee the sovereignty of its territory.
and to act as a stabilising force in the region.

Constitution and defence. We here get an overview of the relevant parts of the Swedish Constitution, *Regeringsformen*, with respect to warfare, starting, maintaining and ending war. The Constitution, however, gives no instructions as to how a defence should be designed, i.e. it is minimalistic compared to the EU code on the common defence and security policy and solidarity.

A strategic sea-change unfolding. The authors give us a comprehensive study of local, regional and global security environments. They introduce the concepts of maelstroms and ruptures to define slow underlying developments and unexpected, erupting courses of events, respectively. The chapter touches on the US refocusing its major security interest to Asia. Several EU members are reducing arms spending, specifically affecting expeditionary capabilities, which also reduces possible solidarity support to others, including Sweden (cf. the Swedish unilateral declaration of solidarity\(^2\)). Subsequently Russia, with re-armament spending, will seek to increase its influence in the Baltic and Northern Europe. To conclude, Sweden needs a territorial defence and a long-term deterrent defence force.

Technology for Sweden's defence. The technology subproject was realised in close and fruitful cooperation with the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences, IVA. By means of a series of expert seminars four R+D domains were identified and analysed in depth: cyber technology, power systems and their safety and security, nanotechnology, and life sciences with vaccines, agents and antidotes. These areas all show Swedish world-ranking competence and are of high importance to military defence as well as to the security of our society. Sweden is desperately in need of new high-tech areas in order to again become a viable partner for international exchange of security-related and defence-related systems and products in addition to our traditional airspace and underwater technologies. The authors conclude with a recommendation to ease the current COTS/MOTS policy in favour of domestic development and production in certain areas, which would even come at a reduced cost to taxpayers.

Are we able to defend ourselves? This extensive study begins with a presentation of the transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces from the Cold War role of deterring and preventing a large-scale invasion by land and sea to the present day organisation focused on international operations. The current policy directive also refers to the task of protecting the Realm, but with no funds allocated to this. The authors identify the lack of logic and the imbalance between assigned tasks and available resources. In this context they discuss various ways of securing sufficient capacities to meet the needs of a territorial defence, specifically in a deteriorating security environment. Without additional funding, being part of an alliance must be considered as one possible alternative. For decades the Swedish Armed Forces have been underfinanced and major deficiencies are identified as to areas and amounts, such as continued implementation of the ”2014 organisation”, overdue materiel renewals, the JAS 39E development and upgrade, next generation submarines and more.

What are the future threats to our society? An overview of the changing values in Swedish society introduces this chapter on non-military security. Modern threats to society naturally include identified tar-
gets such as power grids, communications, health care, cyberspace and many more. Such threats may simultaneously impact several government institutions, which stresses the need for well-defined cooperation. The authors show examples of successful cooperation between national and also international government authorities to counter threats such as very severe organised crime. A threat that is normally overlooked is social unrest and social exclusion.

National Security – can we manage the challenges? This concluding chapter is the result of analyses of the preceding presentations and a subsequent synthesis into a logical whole. The authors also discuss issues that can be regarded as extensions and additional views on what has been presented by authors of previous sections. The economy of the Armed Forces is one such topic, and others include the alliance issue, materiel supply policies and security, command and control of government authorities during crises and warfare, government technology procurement policies and more.

A question often asked during the full span of the project was if we, the Swedes, would be able to meet the challenges to our national security as presented. The answer to this question is not a clear-cut yes, which the reader will learn. However, with a perceptive mindset for change the answer might very well become a yes!

Stockholm, February 2012

Sven-Christer Nilsson Göran Larsbrink
Project Chairman Executive Project Secretary

Translation

Sven-Christer Nilsson together with John Åkermark

Notes

2. Reference to Defence in use (Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:48) and A useful defence (Ett användbart förvar, 2009/09:140).
A Swedish researcher has produced an astute analysis of how power should have been handled after the collapse of the European world of 1815: the “Concert of Europe” of the Vienna Congress was to be replaced. But with what? In his dissertation *Power and International Order. An analytical study of four schools of thought and their approaches to the war, the peace and a post-war system, 1914–1919*, Hans F. Petersson makes a contribution which in my opinion has had great relevance. It applies not only to the period around the First World War but also the period extending to the end of the Cold War around 1989–1991.

H. F. Petersson found that the empirical material in warring Europe could to advantage be organised into four schools of thought. This was born up by various actors, who could actually have been on different sides in the Great War. But their thinking and war goals could have common forms. Petersson groups the schools of thought in a continuum from Right to Left. The school furthest to the right he called the *authoritarian*: nationalistic groupings. What characterises these actors is their positive view of a concentration of power, both nationally and internationally, in the hands of a single decision-maker. For this both the national and the international scheme of things should have a hierarchically order, if necessary through a top-down revolution.

In a middle group he found conservative and right-liberal groups of actors and thinkers. Petersson terms them the *moderate* school of thought. The term seeks to stress the (continued) desire of this school for a balance of power. No one actor should dominate the others, but the decisive influence should nevertheless remain with an oligarchy. The international state they wished to see emphasised continuity but did not exclude changes so long as these did not take revolutionary forms.

The next school of thought in Petersson’s scheme is positioned clearly to the left. He calls it the *radical* school. Its endeavour was an evolutionary, penetrating reformation of the social system, including the international. The radical school was against any form of power concentration, against oligarchies. Its members wished to see a spread of power and broad popular participation. They were critical of the existing power structure but would not accept that the prevailing order should be overthrown with violence.

The furthest-left-radical school and group was the *revolutionary* one. It viewed positively a national and international concentration of power – on condition that the power was in its own hands. Members
were entirely against the prevailing social order since its power distribution was totally negative.

I shall use his schools of thought and his actor categories for our circumstances today.

The four schools of thought associated with H F Petersson’s analysis of the time around the First World War, but with relevance in today’s world and with a view to the future, could look like this:

**Authoritarian.** The authoritarian school of thought exists in Vladimir Putin’s Russia (the Russian Federation). There it is the dominant discourse: the heir to Soviet communism and tsarist-imperial Russia. Russian patriotism and nationalism are now, as before, a powerful motor. Under Putin the Russian form of government has become authoritarian. The major media have been brought under control and elections have been manipulated. No counterbalances to the “power vertical” in Moscow have been permitted. We may speak of a one-man system, strongly centralised. Yet the regime has enjoyed considerable support, also without these authoritarian features.

**Moderate.** In the moderate category of contemporary discourse we find chiefly great powers. They together constitute something of an oligarchy and some of them are governed internally by a pronounced oligarchy. Their first priority is to maintain political balance throughout the world. They do not rule out adjustments of borders and common institutions. What is crucial, however, is to prevent the emer-
gence of a hegemonic power. One category today is Brazil, India, China and South Africa. The more or less explicit political purpose in these countries is not to let the USA retain a world hegemony. But Brazil, India and South Africa certainly have no intention of accepting that China acquires a world hegemony (nor Russia). To this category of states we can add such as can become regional great powers in the longer term, for example Indonesia, Vietnam, Nigeria, Turkey and Iran.

In the moderate school I would also place the USA, at least partially. The “exceptionalism” feature is drifting in this direction. The universal norms may have US support but may not bind the USA itself. In military-political terms this may mean that the USA can bypass international law, for example as expressed in the UN Charter, in the form of preventive warfare. US security policy seeks to prevent the emergence of any other hegemonic state either at world level or regionally. Today this alternative power seems to be predominantly China.

Radical. The world’s democracies constitute half of all states, following several waves of democratisation: Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa; the most recent is the “Arab Spring”, a process of change not yet concluded. The democracies are growing, almost throughout, through non-violence internally. The democratic states are characterised by power-sharing and interaction between politics, the judiciary and markets. In many of the democracies, income distribution has tended to be more even through welfare policy but developments in recent years are not quite plain.

The system of inter-state organisations is also an expression of the contemporary radical discourse. Inter-state cooperation
can embrace both democracies and authoritarian states. This is the case with the UN, the WHO, WMO and so on. Other inter-state institutions have democracies or democratising countries as members. In Europe there are the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Nordic Council and so on. Many of the medium-sized and small states are active in these inter-state organisations which, moreover, can have clear supra-state features in certain of their functions. Sweden and the Nordic countries are among the most committed states in the radical discourse after the Second World War. But also in the USA there is a tradition of participation and becoming bound to institutionalised international cooperation.

Revolutionary. The communist ideology of the Lenin type has few supporters in the world today.

Are there any correspondences – an ideology of an entirely different world order? A total change of societal values. A use of violence on the basis of an almost military organisation which at the same time has a popular base?

Yes, my way of thinking points to present-day terrorism, based on religions. This is a revolutionary discourse, school of thought, and represents various actors. Thus I classify what occurred against the USA on 11 September 2001, together with the preceding and following terrorist attacks, as the venting of a revolutionary, religiously-based political school of thought. The regime in Afghanistan the years before 2001, together with the Al-Qaida network, may be counted among these, and the related religiously-based terrorist deeds in the Middle East, also between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. The revolutionary element lies in the desire to create a literal connection between religious belief and social order.

The religiously-motivated terrorists view themselves as involved in total war between good and evil, where all who do not share their view are on the side of evil. Thus only those fundamentalists who make use of violence: terrorist action or military violence, belong in a security-political revolutionary discourse.

The question I now place before us is how Sweden should judge the security-political consequences of the present four discourses on the world order? How shall we handle them?

The radical school of thought. Here the Sweden of today is in many ways a participating actor. The most pronounced core of actors with a radical framework is the European Union. Among the member states there is in principle no armament in a military sense: this achieved through the joint command structure in NATO and its complements so far in the EU. In the EU, therefore, Swedish security policy can only be directed towards détente. This may concern continued military integration. And if one considers only the situation between the EU member states, it should be possible to decrease defence expenditure. The development of judicial and police integration can also be deepened, in this way replacing the military dimension between the EU states.

In the Union’s external security policy there is space for soft to medium-hard security policy, civilian but also military; what are termed the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty of Lisbon. However, experience indicates that these need a military and political base in one of the EU great powers, Great Britain, France or Germany. Medium and small member states link themselves to these, as do states outside the Union. EU
initiatives are less likely where there is a risk of more extensive fighting, but probably as forces relieving NATO missions.

This means that Sweden’s close cooperation with NATO can involve operations of a harder kind. Examples are of course primarily the ISAF, i.e. NATO, cooperation in Afghanistan in parallel with the USA’s own initiative. Swedish civilian and military security policy with NATO cooperation can, as in Afghanistan since 2001 and Libya since 2011, be carried on under a UN Security Council mandate, but also as in Kosovo in 1999 as non-belligerent, since some permanent members of the Security Council had exercised their vetoes.

My conclusion is that Sweden for this part of her future security policy – in and vis-à-vis the radical school – can choose various different levels of ambition for her international operations. Fairly soft security policy under the auspices of the EU and the UN would appear wise in practically all situations. Among these I also count all foreseen military operations with UN mandates and the Petersberg Tasks under the EU Lisbon Treaty, Articles 42 and 43.

But Swedish security policy must also confront the power being exercised and legitimising itself in the moderate school of thought.

Even the European great powers have different agendas than merely the radical one. Great Britain and France are nuclear-weapon powers and guard their nuclear self-determination. They also have the veto in the Security Council. Sweden trims her security policy to these various great powers. Can we rely on their treating us according to the norms applying for the radical school? Yes, most often. But always? Can EU and NATO members such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania rely on Germany, France, Great Britain? Can Sweden? That they will stand for the common good of all. The Libya operation was a case where only some of NATO’s member states joined in. Germany abstained.

Do the great powers, who are in the moderate school, also consider the competition and conflicts among the great powers over the global balance of power? All the western great powers also have complex agendas with Russia. They need energy, control of the nuclear balance, checks on terrorism. The world is unstable: foreign domestic policy and domestic foreign policy.

The USA, Great Britain and France and Germany have all taken an interest in seeing the Swedish Armed Forces convert to an expeditionary force, prepared for international missions under NATO, the EU and in principle the UN auspices. The Swedish defence industry has an interest in the Western great powers.

But they certainly also see the need for a territorial defence in Sweden and the Nordic countries in relation to Russia. And if one takes in what one sees on a planning table and investigates which states, in the event of a limited (militarily speaking) armed conflict, would gain from a militarily defended Sweden, one probably finds all the great powers named. An active Swedish contribution in the name of solidarity can be very significant. A measure of conventional deterrence directed at Russia, however, is perhaps something one could live with.

The authoritarian school of thought. We are no longer living in the Cold War. Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact frontiers do not run west of Lübeck, or Skåne in Sweden for that matter. This should be the starting point for Swedish security policy after 2014, vis-à-vis the authoritarian school of thought in today’s Russia.
Russian nationalism and military doctrine have nothing negative to raise against today’s Sweden. West of Russia, it is NATO that is the problem – threat or danger. It may be the three Baltic states which are members of NATO and are at a very small distance from central Russia. The three Baltic countries’ membership of NATO is at the same time an important asset for Sweden’s security, too. The Putin period since 2000 has seen rearmament. Volumes are shrinking and the emphasis is on quality. Exercises are on the increase and exercise scenarios are partly antagonistic to NATO, as before 1989–91.

But the Russian policy of the authoritarian stamp can also be partly countered with measures of détente from Sweden. Any true incorporation of Russia in the international community can be important. But the thing is, to act so that Russian undertakings are really honoured. Here the Council of Europe and the EU are struggling with great problems. Sweden has every reason to support these demands, and also that Russia really follows the provisions and panel decisions in the WTO, now that the country has become a member.

But towards an authoritarian school of thought and its actors, deterrence is also needed, higher up the scale. It should be a matter of deterring from limited attacks or preventive-strike-like operations. Here the Swedish Armed Forces should have a task directed towards the authoritarian discourse in Russia. Today’s Swedish high-technological and mobile peripheral defence is well suited to this. We possess cyber defence, but some adjustments are needed. The purpose would be to give the Russian

A Toyota Land Cruiser from the Swedish ISAF contingent has been blown up by a road bomb. This time the driver suffered only slight injuries. Swedish overseas operations can also lead to terror attacks in Sweden. Photo: Swedish Armed Forces
powers-that-be and their staffs a clearer deterrent signal of enhanced Swedish endurance through a defensive strategic reserve. Should there be conflict around the Baltic states, Russia and the authoritarian school there could find, like the moderate school’s western great powers, that a clear Swedish military presence on the island of Gotland was an acceptable fact.

I wish to stress explicitly that if the democratic protests against the Putin regime lead to a genuine and lasting democratisation and damping-down of the Soviet-nostalgia in Russia, matters would be different. It could mean that the nationalism that exists in Russia would no longer be directed against neighbouring countries to the east and west who have become members of NATO. A discourse in Russia approaching the moderate school of thought, with certain genuine elements from the radical school, could lower the Swedish deterrent.

The revolutionary school of thought. Sweden has been grazed by some terrorist attacks – or have we? Down to the end of 2011 one event unmistakeably took place – the terrorist explosion in the city of Stockholm in December 2010. Some acquittals in western Sweden have meant that suspected terrorists have been freed.

The Swedish troops in Afghanistan have been subjected to continuous attacks from irregular opponents, as have all other elements in ISAF. The same goes for civilian sections of the international missions.

A first aspect has a military component. Sweden must weigh in the risks of terrorism in Afghanistan-type fields of operation if the decision is to participate in this type of operation. The risks of asymmetrical terrorism against Sweden itself must also be weighed in here. Ultimately, the government and the Parliament must be aware of these issues – that they can be linked together by more or less autonomous terrorists.

For ”home-Sweden” the major part of terrorist work should be done by those instances that administer justice. This implies an activity based in a community governed by the rule of law. An important element in the more detailed design of legislation, the exercise of authority, school and neighbourhood work, is to influence primarily young men away from acts of terror.

The conclusion for Swedish security after 2014 should be to weigh the risks of asymmetrical terrorism, specially if we are to participate in military operations in areas marked by terrorism. The risks should be weighed against showing international solidarity with the political objectives of, for example, detente and security for areas in which the UN Security Council urges us to become involved, through the EU, NATO or the UN direct. Experience of western military operations in the Muslim-dominated countries is very varied since, on the one hand, the Kuwait war against Iraq in 1991 and, on the other, the land operations in Iraq and Afghanistan after 11 September 2001. Sweden should in the future be very restrictive regarding land-based missions resembling those that have taken place since 2003 in Muslim countries, since war does not function as the extension of politics in the struggle against terrorism.

Conclusions

What we are meeting as challenges from the present schools of thought is a varied picture of when, where and how the Swedish Armed Forces could offer an answer to the question Why should we have a Swedish
defence within a Swedish security system after 2014?

As for myself, the reader will of course see that I believe and hope that affairs among us human beings will develop chiefly in the direction advocated by the radical school of thought. The moderate school can come a respectable second. But the challenges from the, for us, more dangerous authoritarian and revolutionary schools of thought show that things are not yet changing unequivocally for the better. This is why we must have a Swedish national defence.

It is a matter for the government and the Parliament and ultimately for a free people such as the Swedes to balance the challenges from the various schools of thought. It is the politicians’ task to make choices, set priorities. And hold themselves responsible.
The legislation governing Sweden’s constitutional policy and doctrine rests on four fundamental laws. They are the Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen), originally from 1974, the Act of Succession (Successionsordningen) 1810, the Freedom of the Press Act (Tryckfrihetsförordningen) 1949 and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen) 1991. In addition there is the Parliament Act (Riksdagsordningen), originally from 1974, which has a status between fundamental law and ‘ordinary’ law.

Matters are complicated by the European judicial system, among other things the undertakings and applications that Sweden makes through the EU treaties, the central one being the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009.

The Instrument of Government (RF) and the Parliament Act (RO) are based on a minimalist doctrine and concern chiefly “the rules of the game”. RF 1.2, which specifies the aims and direction of public powers, includes a whole series of information on ”basic objectives for public activity” but no reference to defence. Our membership of the major international organisations is stated in RF Ch.1, but there is no real active statement on our sovereignty, only that this in various respects can be combined/ joined/harmonised with that of other states; this is to be found in Ch.10, International Relations. There are, however, strong limitations as to how far this can go.

RF Ch.15 gives directions for war or threat of war. In the majority of sections, institutions and processes are regulated – the Parliament, the parliamentary war delegation, the head of State and the government. The purpose throughout is that “constitutional necessity” shall not be resorted to, but the nation shall be governed in a predictable manner.

The Parliament, the government and the head of State may not make decisions on occupied territory, RF 15.9.

But other public institutions in an occupied area must act in ways that are of best advantage to ”defence endeavours and resistance, together with protection of the civilian population and Swedish interests in general”. In this formulation, which thus primarily regulates remaining Swedish public authority in occupied territory, one can include the tasks of our defence systems as part of this.

The provisions preceding possible occupation of all or parts of the territory are in a way less substantial. RF 15.13 states that the government may commit the Armed Forces ”in accordance with international law to meet an armed attack on the territo-
ry or to prevent violation of the territory”. This applies in time of war, and a declaration of war can be issued, RF 15.14. But the Armed Forces can also be permitted to use force to prevent violation of the territory in peacetime or in war between foreign powers, RF 15.13, second section.

It is a paradox that there are no direct and substantial rules and regulations for the territorial defence except that mentioned above regarding what is to be done if the Parliament and the war delegation are not functioning, and the earlier provision linked to the remaining public authority during an occupation.

But can the powers that be, the government, the Parliament or the war delegation, after an armistice, conclude an agreement of a type that involves the realm giving up parts of its territory (or increasing it?)? This is a matter of interpretation.

We lack a real provision in our fundamental laws regarding the territorial extent of the realm and the meaning of Swedish public authority over this. But one can draw guiding assessments based on provisions in RF Chs.10 and 15 on what may not be abandoned through negotiation in bilateral treaties or international agreements.

My interpretation here is that these stipulations mean that Sweden’s government, or the Parliament, cannot constitutionally enter an agreement by which these objects are abandoned. An armistice can be concluded, but our constitution rules out a peace treaty if this should involve foreign
The RF grants that Swedish armed forces may be sent to other countries to fulfil international obligations approved by the Parliament, RF 15.16. On this point, too, the RF is minimalist.

Not so one of the actors of whom we are a part in this and other connections: the European Union. In the consolidated version of the EU Treaty, termed the Treaty of Lisbon, there are some 26 articles in the Treaty on the European Union; (in addition to about 17 articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) that regulate the Union’s external measures and special provisions on common foreign and security policy. These articles are a mixture of institutional, procedural and substantial undertakings and provisions.

Here I would stress the substantial elements. The Union must have evaluative principles for all its external action, such as democracy, solidarity, peacekeeping, maintenance of sustainable development, promotion of the integration of all countries in the world economy, aid to populations in disaster areas, etc, Art 21.

The Treaty of Lisbon also builds in much more of the regulations in security and defence policy sections, also. This originated in the member states’ reluctance to perform imprecise undertakings for the EU’s external foreign and security policy, even less with its military resources. Hence the comprehensive regulation, over and above the institutional and procedural rules.

My conclusion is that Articles 42. 2 and 7 and 222 express solidarity demands but do not give particularly precise directions for defence policy. On the other hand, defence-related parts of the Treaty on the European Union do this, particularly by noting appraisals and operational scenarios for military missions. The same applies to a certain extent to the institutional and procedural provisions in general.

**Conclusions**

The Swedish constitution grants major defence-political freedom at present, but our territorial defence must clearly aim at maintaining Swedish territory and our basic social structure. However, the Instrument of Government gives no directions as to how this defence is to be designed.

The EU solidarity articles are all the clearer for EU member states.

Swedish domestic regulation of our defence is based on a sense of national community on which our fundamental laws re-
Regarding the realm, democracy and sovereignty are unexpressed. Such regulation can tolerate freedom of action and hence minimalism.

The European Union regulation is based on a commonality expressed in the treaties regarding states, democracy and mixed sovereignty. But it cannot tolerate such a large degree of freedom of action, hence not minimalism either.

In the EU we are reminded continually of the state of things through the institutions and processes, which are regulatory. Our country is influenced and influences. But for that portion of defence policy that is based on our Swedish RF, the type of special regulatory process regarding defence policy does not exist. It must be managed like other Swedish affairs of State in compliance with our constitution.
In the slipstream of globalisation we are also witnessing continuous strategic changes with global ramifications. These naturally affect Sweden, as well. We perceive this as a maelstrom – a swirl of events sucking in states and other actors. While its course may be stealthy, the protagonists’ objectives, risk propensity and their choices of means tend to be in continuous flux.

But we have also learnt that surprises happen. We call them ruptures, whose occurrence makes the world look altered. It may be enough here to recall Nine-Eleven or the Arab Spring. Ruptures have almost become routine, or so it seems.

This is not the place for a deep analysis of globalisation. Suffice it to say that the economy is, in many ways but not all, the catalyst of development. Factors such as financial flows, energy supply, trade, raw-material assets, climate, demography, migration and religious-ideological antagonisms, and also the IT revolution, are intertwined and produce knock-on effects hard to predict.

Our present purpose is foremost to seek to analyse the consequences of global developments for Sweden and its international neighbourhood. Before that, however, a few words on global trends of major significance for the analysis.

**Energy:** Energy is of exceptional significance both for the economy and for security policy in general. Some important circumstances:

The United States has already become far less dependent on imported fossil fuels. This is because of the extraction of shale gas through what is termed fracking. This will reasonably affect the US global interests and action.

Russia is under strong pressure to liberalise her energy export, and to adapt it better to the market, and thus making it harder to use as a security-political instrument. President Putin is fighting this tooth and nail.

The United States remains the greatest military power globally, but no longer appears the unassailable Hegemon. The economy is compelling America’s fighting forces to be cut back. At the same time, war weariness is widespread.

America’s relations with China are attracting increased attention. We can discern increasing power-political tension between the countries. At the same time, economic ties are almost symbiotic. Early in 2012 the USA launched a new strategy with increased focus on the Pacific area – read China – and reduced emphasis on Europe.
In turn, one can note that NATO in Europe seems to be trying to get by on the back-burner, while centrifugal forces—across the whole spectrum from politics to economics—within the EU are obvious. Germany is increasingly emerging as the leading European power, though not militarily. The majority of western European countries are cutting down their defence budgets. Both the United Kingdom and France will reduce those military units with expeditionary capability. Within NATO and the EU alike, there seem to be tendencies towards limited-scope cooperation between certain like-minded states on various issues.

China: The relationship between America and China is ambivalent. During 2012 a number of events have shown that the image of unity and harmony Peking seeks to project contains deep fissures. This applies to the political leadership as well as the military. Nationalism and corruption are rampant.

China’s history and geopolitical location cause the country to perceive itself as surrounded by distrustful neighbours who, in turn, are seeking reassurance in Washington, which, of course, has made its interest in the region clear with its strategic pivot.

China is investing major resources to develop state-of-the-art armed forces. The handling of the conflict in the South China Sea is an example of strategic patience. China wishes to solve the conflict politically and bilaterally; littoral neighbours and their allies juridically in a multilateral framework. But the risk of rupture–type conflicts is evident.

Russia: Russia has major problems: rife corruption, a shrinking and unhealthy population, crumbling infrastructure and extreme dependence on high energy prices, to name only a few. Putin appears to be governed by ”KGB-reflexes” and it is clear that he wishes to safeguard Russia’s influence in the

World shale gas reserves – a factor that influences American and Russian politics alike. Source: EIA Report World Shale Gas Resources
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and as far as possible in the former Soviet empire – but also to be able to play a significant role in global affairs.

The 2008 Georgia war revealed that the Russian Armed Forces have great problems. To set them right they are being reorganised into a leaner, more mobile and flexible brigade structure. At the same time, the pattern of military manoeuvres has grown more intensive, as well as more offensive in character.

It is clear that Russian military capabilities will have increased by 2020. At the same time the country is facing great economic challenges, even in the case that energy prices remain high. Promises made of higher pensions, improved education and so on, as well as major investment needs are competing for available economic resources. Failure to keep these promises risks causing popular unrest. There is much to indicate that the grand military plans cannot be fully realised, but nevertheless the net-result will probably be a considerably increased military capability.

To this must be added the trouble spots in the Middle East/North Africa, Central and Southern Asia and elsewhere.

**Consequences for Sweden’s international neighbourhood**

Geopolitically, Sweden is located on the fringe of Europe. The Baltic Sea area and the Arctic are both of major political significance for Russia.

With increasing military muscle Russia’s political ”weight” will increase, even if there is no direct desire to resort to weapons. This applies especially to adjacent states with weak leadership and poor economies.

The cutbacks in Europe are reducing America’s leeway for intervention in the event of heightened tension in Europe.
There is, however, scarcely any reason to expect any kind of large-scale armed conflict in our part of the world. Yet it is reasonable to predict that the recent and increasingly tense relations between America and Russia will persist under Putin.

We can in all probability expect political crises between Russia and her neighbouring countries, where the neighbouring countries might count on support in the form of temporary, probably mainly symbolic, stationing of troops. Who is to provide these? The United States will continue to be able to intervene, but on a lesser scale than hitherto. And even with major transport capacity to move units from bases in America, the political threshold has probably been raised.

Seen against this background the security of the Baltic states will reasonably remain fragile. What genuine value NATO membership has in an acute crisis situation with military connotations can be discussed.

Europe will to a greater extent be compelled to rely more on her own resources. The United Kingdom and France are cutting back their defence appropriations and many European countries are following suit. The result is that the military resources of “Western Europe” are shrinking. The capability to come to the rescue with effective and mobile units in a crisis situation, as foreseen in, for example, the unilateral Swedish Declaration of Solidarity of 2009, shrinks dramatically when mobile forces are lacking.

It is fairly easy to see that the equation cannot be solved. Reduced military resources in the United States, France and the United Kingdom and a raised political threshold for intervention, can tempt Moscow to strive to increase its influence and somewhat compensate for what Putin has called the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century, namely the break-up of the Soviet Union. That his ambitions are moving in that direction is quite clear.

There is a risk that certain EU states can come into a situation in relation to Moscow that brings to mind the second Treaty of Rapallo of 1922, a delicate and intractable situation. Russia will be able to use a more threatening tone than formerly against states and their political measures of which she disapproves, without necessarily resorting to open conflict.

On the whole this means that we can see a situation with a stronger Russia and a weaker ”West”. In the area bordering Russia this implicates a shift in the strategic centre of gravity that may have security-political ramifications in possible crises or other friction.

The military drawdown on the western side will in this regard be significant since the number of units with expeditionary capability, i.e. those that can be committed over fairly large distances, will be reduced. This means in plain language that the military resources for solidarity actions will be fewer. It is reasonable to suppose that this will affect also the political resolve when considering such actions.

This is a significant warning signal to Sweden, which in her unilateral Declaration of Solidarity has stated that Sweden is willing to support threatened Nordic neighbours as well as EU countries, also with military means; but also that Sweden expects corresponding support in a crisis.

This reliance on mutual support has been mortgaged very highly in Swedish security policy in recent years.

However, there is every indication that our resources for solidarity actions with military means will be extremely meagre.
Troops from the 82nd Airborne Division, one of the American units that have expeditionary capability. How do reduced American resources affect Nato’s credibility? Photo: US Army

This will reasonably also affect our political resolve to carry out such interventions. For Swedes, the conclusion must be that we, to a greater degree than we earlier hoped, must rely on our own military resources for our own security, and also for being able to play a stabilising role in the neighbourhood around us. This requires our Armed Forces to have such strength, strategic and tactical mobility and readiness that they can handle even serious conflict situations.

Note

1. The translation from Swedish into English in this chapter has been made by Johan Tunberger in co-operation with Tim Crosfield and John Åkermark.
Sweden is where Sweden is. Geopolitics is constant. But every age must exploit its own national security policy, which results in the fact that every age has its own defence-political solution too. The Cold War is over. For now Sweden is in a favourable position, but what lies in the future no one knows. So it is vital that the defence organisation to be formed in the 2015 Defence Review can meet future changes. The only thing we can be sure of is that such changes will occur. The notion of an era starting in which the lion shall lie down with the lamb belongs for ever in the world of saga. The awakening can be brutal and painful.

Thus it must be the task of politics to create a defence system that enables us practically and technologically to maintain, over time, a capability – albeit of varying strength and preparedness – able to give us a credible possibility to meet the varying demands of our national security policy.

When our politicians, using the results from the Defence Commission, deliberate on the future for our military defence, account will no doubt be taken of global security-oriented developments and the more definite developments connected to Sweden and our neighbouring countries.

The most serious challenge here is to test the perceptions that govern today’s outlook. Such tests of perceptions have seldom emerged during toilsome debate and have thus a protective wall around them that is not easy to penetrate. Yet it is important to test prevailing notions now and then; otherwise we will be surprised when events take a different turn from what was predicted.

In the 2009 Defence Review, Swedish politicians placed considerable weight on concepts such as international crisis management and solidarity. These had then connotations that by and large harmonised with prevailing strategic assumptions. Today, however, and primarily in consideration of trends in global security, there is every reason to wonder what value these concepts have for the future development of our national defence.

In this chapter we seek to make clear the state and development of Sweden’s national defence. The background is that we are in a position where serious problems are seen after 2014. This applies to both personnel and materiel for our defence forces, chiefly linked with the economy. The security-political situation is also in flux. These problems prompt us to consider alternative solutions for our national defence.

In an analytical scrutiny it is easy to end up with all sorts of problems and to problematise them to a great extent. So it should be, but only up to a point. In fairness we
should acknowledge that the changes made in our national defence organisation during the past two decades have mainly been correct and that today’s national defence shows a number of positive aspects.

Swedish national security and defence policy has changed dramatically in recent years. From being a country between two great-power blocs, where neutrality and non-alignment were the guiding stars, we now have a disintegrated Eastern bloc where we as members of the EU wish to create security together with others. This has meant that we have both reoriented and drastically reduced our military resources while at the same time the tasks of our armed forces have been expanded. That this change was necessary is clear from both security-policy and military-technological events. Now, within the UN and EU framework, our security is based on promoting the peaceful development of the world together with others. Expressions of this include the solidarity clause in the Treaty of Lisbon, plus the unilateral declaration of solidarity by our Parliament.

Our overseas missions have functioned well. They have given us a capability to operate together with other countries and have created a respect and credibility for our armed forces that is not to be underrated. Our efforts in Afghanistan have shown that we have servicemen, servicewomen and officers well able to perform, under very adverse conditions, the duties entrusted to them. The naval mission in the Bay of Aden has shown that we can both command and act together with foreign combat forces in a naval operation. Our commitment in Libya has shown that we have functioning combat aircraft that stand up well in competition with other countries. In terms of personnel and materiel, all our fighting forces in various missions have demonstrated good quality. At present we have competent personnel and high-quality materiel.

Despite this positive picture it is doubtful whether our defence has the future means to meet the demands, unless special measures are taken. This chiefly concerns our national defence in a worsening security-political situation.

Structurally, the extent of our disarmament since the Cold War is one of the problems. This has meant that Sweden today in all her fighting forces has too few units to mount a defence on her own, even against a limited attack. This can be demonstrated with very simple arguments, without complicated threat-scenario reasoning. In simple terms, our national defence capability is based on support from other countries, a support we are neither planning for, preparing for, nor have ensured through firm undertakings.

Our two army battle groups – brigade-size – have limited support functions, which severely limits their utilization. The number of naval units is too small and can only meet an opponent from one direction. Even our combat aircraft are too few to counter an attack and defend our airspace for more than a few days. The lack of a long-range anti-aircraft and air defence system is evident both for the army and the navy. The few combat forces we possess today require forward-based and flexible logistic units to be deployable with any staying power throughout Sweden and elsewhere in the world, a requirement which today cannot be met. Perhaps even more serious than these quantitative shortcomings is that the professionalism of our officer corps risks being gradually and irremediably eroded when it comes to planning, preparing commanding sizeable military operations.
Our ground combat forces are in a state where several heavy materiel systems need upgrading or replacing in the near future. This applies to tanks, personnel transport vehicles and several other systems. Our manoeuvre battalions lack sophisticated battalion artillery, and also bridging systems for crossing ditches and watercourses. To date, the majority of units have not exercised sufficiently at battalion and brigade levels and appear not to be going to do so for several years. Exceptions have been the exercises under the auspices of the Nordic Battle Group, but these have involved only a fairly small part of the organisation. The majority of our servicemen/servicewomen and units nowadays exercise only at platoon/company level.

For our naval combat forces, the replacement of submarines and corvettes involve systems that must be implemented in the near future. Our anti-submarine capability is also a problem. With planned new anti-submarine equipped helicopters it might be possible to correct part of the problem. The lack of air defence missiles aboard our combat vessels limits our ability to protect naval surface movements. The shortage of mobile maintenance resources in the form of support vessels limits long-term deployment of these units.

Our air combat forces are in a position where the JAS combat aircraft system is facing upgrading or replacement. Here, the Armed Forces and the government have already made their decision by stating that a

*Planned but cancelled battalion artillery project: SSG 120, 120 mm self-propelled mortar. Photo: Swedish Armed Forces*
new version of JAS39 Gripen should be developed and procured during the next 20 years. Apart from this, it is time to replace the Hawk system with a new air defence system, a measure not currently in the pipeline. Our air combat forces also suffer from having too few base units, which is troublesome in terms of defence and limits their flexible deployment. The endurance of the command and control system is also limited.

For all combat forces the fact is that they have not for a long time exercised in sizeable units and in an operational context in the defence of our own country.

A precondition for the ability to operate in our country together with units from other countries is that we have functioning territorial leadership. From this angle it is good that four regional commands were established in 2013. However, it is disquieting that these commands do not appear to be intended for coordinating domestic and foreign units with civilian resources in a crisis. Moreover, they are all-too-sparingly staffed to provide support in unanticipated situations.

Regarding personnel, the new system of voluntarily recruited servicemen and service-women has been introduced but not...
implemented. Despite good recruitment there are reservations as to whether the system can ensure up-to-strength units with the required personnel quality. For these fears to remain unrealised it is necessary that personnel continue to be equipped with appropriate materiel and that they undergo exercises continually or are employed in various operations. Our service-men’s and servicewomen’s economic conditions likewise need to be improved. For the system to have the intended effect in the future, further funding of the order of thousands of millions is required. In addition, the new system also limits how many units we can organise in peacetime, plus our possibilities for augmenting the organisation.

As stated above, in the next 20 years we will need to replace a number of heavy materiel systems. Not only will it be economically burdensome, there is uncertainty regarding the country’s defence industry. Here we stand between realising the idea of purchasing materiel in open competition and safeguarding our technological know-how and jobs within the country. The question is, in which direction is politics going to go?

Structurally we still have a training and exercise infrastructure created for the old conscript defence forces. Even though the Armed Forces have for many years attempted to rationalise this structure, no major change has occurred. Restrictions here have been imposed by the government. In connection with the funding of the new JAS combat aircraft such rationalisations are being raised as an opportunity by various political parties. It must however be stated that the closing down of a few training locations represents a saving of tens of millions while the development of JAS involves thousands of millions annually.

That our economy today is not in balance with the intentions of the 2009 Defence Review is beyond doubt. This is shown unambiguously in our report “Can We Defend Ourselves?”. We are in a position where we must either grant the Armed Forces more resources or reduce our ambitions by removing operational capabilities. The latter is probably not on the cards since it inevitably leads to poorer equipment and less intensity of exercises and missions, which in turn certainly undermines a system based on contracted servicemen and servicewomen.

If there, during the Cold War, was a logic in the Swedish national defence system, stretching from the security-political environment, our neutrality and non-alignment to our conscription and a domestic defence industry, we can note that the corresponding logic does not exist in today’s defence system. Reliance on being able to conduct military missions in a war situation without making a strategic analysis as to what capabilities we need; without ensuring this through, for example, an alliance; without a pattern of exercises and logistics for this; without maintaining an industrial capability – all these factors demonstrate weaknesses in our logic.

On the basis of the situation reported, the following areas are important for solving existing problems:

1. The balance between operational capabilities.
2. Recruitment.
3. Level of investment and actual price development for defence-specific materiel.
4. The alliance issue.
A crucial point is the balance between combat forces originating from the size of the defence appropriation. If our defence is not granted considerable resources, the Armed Forces will be in a situation where they will have to reduce ambitions to such an extent that their credibility is seriously put into question.

In this situation we have elected not to make any priorities for solving the problems. Rather, we have been content with putting forward some alternative developments. The reasons are many. One of these is that a proper strategic analysis is needed, which means a number of sub-investigations that will take time. Among other things, the Armed Forces must be given time for this analysis, in which different operational ideas will be tested against our security-political objectives. The result may be a different balance within combat units or between short-term and long-term readiness. Another reason is that we in the War Sciences Academy neither have nor can have the knowledge required to produce an economically well-founded plan.

Another area of significance is our transformation into our all-voluntarily force. There is no reason to return to some form of conscription. The system is newly-introduced and it does not yet appear to be fully developed in the absence of adequate legal regulations. Experience and hence far-reaching conclusions from the system do not yet exist. But it should be noted that the reliability of the system presupposes a number of steps to maintain good recruitment and to keep those who are recruited for the number of years they are contracted for. Briefly, more economic resourc-
es are required than what today are allocated for pay and other contractual benefits and, not least, for exercise and utilisation of units.

When should an evaluation of the present personnel system be available? By about 2018 there may be enough material. If it then proves that the system does not match up to expectations, there should be an option to discuss other systems, for example returning to the dormant conscript service. While there is today no reason to alter course there is reason to consider alternative systems. This is for being able to grow in a worsened security-political situation.

Defence allocations is naturally a central issue under the present circumstances. To continue at the 2012 investment level of about SEK nine billion, at the same time as there is to be an upgrading of the JAS 39 Gripen, and when several other heavy systems need replacing, is without exaggeration untenable. As to JAS it must be said that, operationally, an upgrade is both desirable and warranted if today’s air defence capability is to be retained on a par with international developments. If we are to have a new manned combat aircraft it is just as warranted to choose a JAS39, version E/F. Choosing a foreign alternative would probably be both more expensive and operationally a poorer choice.

The question is how is this to be financed without stopping other developments in the Armed Forces. One way can be to choose a different defence principle and limit the number of aircraft to the 60-80 the Armed Forces have specified. Another is to find new funding methods. It is not entirely wrong to assert that the political interest does not have its sights only on military needs. Jobs and access to high-tech competence within the country cannot be excluded as reasons. There is much to indicate that the development and construction of defence materiel have spinoff effects for our society. Our assumption is that it should not be hard to finance part of advanced defence materiel separately from the defence budget.

To this should be added that the actual price development of defence-specific materiel is an area where there are hardly any alternatives. Either one has a price compensation mechanism or one does not. The level of price compensation can be discussed but it should probably be around 2-4% above normal price development. That the need exists is shown by, among other things, the fact that we had such a mechanism earlier, namely in 1958–1968 and 1992–1997. It was not by chance that the mechanism was introduced for economic reasons, nor was it chance that it was abolished for political reasons. Now we are nevertheless in a position where price compensation for defence materiel should be reintroduced in some way. The alternative is clear: if nothing is done and the problem is not dealt with, our defence materiel will decline in numbers and/or quality.

When one ponders what operational capabilities are needed and whether we shall give up one or another it is impossible to avoid the question of a military alliance. At present a good analysis of operational capabilities is being inhibited by the political resistance to membership of NATO. This resistance can be described briefly as follows. Statements such as that our military non-alignment has served us well, or that the people of Sweden cannot accept membership of NATO, or that there must be broad political support for us even to be able to analyse the issue often buzz round in the debate like wasps in a jar with the lid on.
What do these arguments represent? In fact, NATO today is not the NATO that was established just over 60 years ago. It is the only security organisation available to command military missions around the world to prevent/manage crises. To the question of how remaining outside military alliances has served us well, there is no answer. The only thing we know is that we have been outside important decision-making processes even when we have taken part under the NATO flag. As to the rhetoric on popular and broad political support, one can only note that the question appears too difficult for our politicians. If they inform themselves on the matter and gather knowledge of what our defence is capable of and its needs, they ought to be able to inform the people of Sweden and influence them positively on the alliance issue. This is the least one ought to be able to expect, not only of defence politicians but also of politicians in general since this is fundamentally an existential question.

Apart from sharing operational capabilities, an alliance should not be underestimated in the opportunity it affords of making operational preparations on the home front. In an alliance, war planning can take on an entirely new dimension, multinational exercises can be conducted in the country, and infrastructure and collaboration with the civilian community can also be developed, all in an entirely new way.

On many occasions the question has been raised of whether Nordic defence cooperation, a Nordic defence alliance, would be a way of sharing the burden of operational capabilities. This question has since failed because Denmark and Norway consider NATO to be the only security guarantee. What has not yet been tried is a Swedish membership of NATO, which would definitely ease Nordic cooperation in the operational area. If we join, Finland would probably come too. An alliance would probably also be a safer card than a general declaration of solidarity. The conclusion for our part is clear: now it is time for Sweden’s politicians to examine the alliance question seriously.

Lastly, it must be concluded that our defence forces, the police and the judiciary represent the state’s core tasks. They are bearers of society’s monopoly on violence. They are the foundation of the night-watchman state. Their tasks are fundamentally simple and self-evident. Keep external enemies out and lock internal enemies in. Safeguard the nation’s liberty and people’s security so that we can form the good society. It’s no harder than that.
This study, and part of the project, has addressed the interaction between technology and technological development and the security and defence of a small nation such as Sweden. The study has come up with an analysis, certain conclusions and also proposals for action.

The study was carried out by an independent working group set up jointly by the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences (KKrVA) and the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA), chaired by Staffan Näsström and under the direction of Bengt A Mölleryd. With support from the public authorities and organisations concerned with security and defence in Sweden and through seminars with the Academies’ extended networks of experts, a number of areas and issues have been identified as emerging and critical threats for counteraction and mitigation but also as prospects for further development and business. A broad subject characterised by many uncertainties has had to be covered within a short time frame.

The study has had its focus on national security and defence, but has also surveyed the international scene for comparison and inspiration. An international symposium was conducted on attitudes and approaches of leading countries towards technology and technological development for security and defence. This supported evidences for the fundamental role played by technology and technological development for a nation’s security and defence. Indigenous competitiveness and development capability combined with extensive international collaboration and exchange was considered as essential for maintaining and improving security and defence. A prerequisite found was also that a small nation must invest solidly in technology and technological development for national prosperity and for security and defence, as well as for being an attractive partner for collaboration and respected for her technological strength and competiveness.

Technology and security and defence

Progress and change in our increasingly complex and globalised society runs parallel with vulnerability for disturbances – external or generated within our own systems. Disturbances may come from the environment, from competition, from hostilities, or from technical failures. Technology is continuously growing more important both in terms of how these disturbances affect social functions as well as in terms of the robustness and resilience of the systems to function without interruption.
To keep up with global competition and to increase security Sweden must consequently maintain and further support her technical qualifications. Technology – and almost any aspect that affects security and defence – is developing rapidly and forcefully, propelled by international commerce and interaction. A small country cannot master all technological fields; many have to become developed in collaboration with others through cooperation in global networks based on systems technology. Development at a qualified level is hardly obtained directly from the standard commercial shelf but more often in addressing, at an advanced level, urgent needs and being able to offer specialised solutions. Industrial collaboration and interest from potential partners presupposes contribution of own excellence in selected areas, military and civilian. Competence in areas significant for security and defence, moreover, has favourable effects on the country’s ability to assert herself in global competition.

Sweden actually has a history and tradition of technology as a lever for security and defence. Sweden’s basic resources in terms of population and international alliances imply limitations that only technology can compensate. Lessons learned imply that exploiting technology opportunities
for security, correctly managed, will also become a profitable business prospect and an industry for our society at large!

Technology that affects security and defence is developing less as either purely military or purely civilian; the dual-use dimension is becoming increasingly important. The development for security and defence cannot in the future be dealt with piecemeal, isolated in a narrow “defence industry” or even in a broader “security industry”. Both the tangible contents and the forms for international technological and industrial collaboration and participation in system-technological networks must be developed purposefully with obvious effects for security and defence as well as for the national economy, which, well managed, will become significantly positive.

Areas to invest in

The study has identified a number of critical areas and issues of social infrastructures, industrial branches, technologies and activities, which are all of some significance for Sweden’s security and defence in the intermediate and in the longer term. Examples of the critical areas and issues are described below to be given due place and concern in the framework of the country’s investment in R&D and innovation.

In the militarily and technologically oriented field, some ten areas and issues were identified in order to justify further action and commitment from Sweden. One example was the exploitation of nanotechnologies, an area in which Sweden has considerable potential for both business and security and defence applications. A technological vision may be ‘lossless war-fighting’ (a zero-loss vision).

With today’s intense communications and globalisation, infections and epidemics are diffusing at increasing speeds throughout the world. There is an increasing need to provide early detection and protection against the spreading of imminent epidemics and pandemics or biological aggression. The development of vaccines and antidotes, along with methods and databases for early diagnosis to enable the rapid countering of epidemics and biological aggression, may mean greater security for our society and growth opportunities for the Swedish health care and medical industries.

One sensitive area for an advanced society is to secure energy and power supply. The dependence on electricity in today’s society plays a fundamental role for security through its widespread use and its critical

importance for all and any functions of our society. Continued investment in intelligent electrical networks (smart grids) that balance production, transmission and use of electricity at different locations and times is, apart from substantial additions to Sweden’s advancing industrial development and growing competitiveness, making a considerable contribution to a safer workaday Sweden.

Internet-based communications systems are playing an increasing part in linking and binding society’s different areas across borders. At the same time, they are opening up for new threats in the form of penetration and manipulation of activities in infrastructural systems for services such as energy, water, public transports, the media and information, financial transactions; as well as sneaking and stealing into intellectual property of businesses and organisations. The need to effectively coordinate and reinforce Sweden’s cyber-security and cyber-defence, including the potential to pre-empt and counter attacks, is acute and has strategic importance for Swedish security.

Doctrine and strategy for technology for Sweden’s security and defence

Sweden enjoys a reasonable potential for understanding and appraising technology and technological development. This also applies to security and defence, and, conversely, for exploiting technology and technological advancements for countering emerging or future threats. An overall technology doctrine for increased security that is easy to communicate and understandable to everyone, and conducted from and with a user/utility perspective, is here of major importance.

Technical education and competence (almost regardless of area) is a fundamental, and in the long term, a decisive factor for Sweden’s security at large.

The study has identified fragmentation in the decision and implementation processes when procuring secure systems of any sort as being one of the most troublesome problem regarding Sweden’s long-term security. The need for sustainable and secure solutions is great in many areas, but the demand and customer organisations are too often dispersed, sectored or non-existent. Competent and risk-willing customers and purchasers of future systems for security and defence in the various areas must therefore be identified and properly established. Principles of responsibility must be supplemented with authorisation to procure, build and operate the security systems of the future. Private-public collaboration must be developed by and through innovation procurement by purchasing technological systems for security and defence as are presented for a number of areas in the study.
What Will Threaten our Security in the Future?

by Christer Ekberg, Bo Richard Lundgren et al.

This chapter is an excerpt from a part of a report from the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences overall project Swedish Security after 2014. It deals with the non-military security dimension. The report covers three areas of study, all of great relevance for how non-military security is developing in Sweden.

The first area concerns how non-military security may be viewed in relation to military security. Here we describe how threats to national security can be considered from a theoretical and overall perspective. We also discuss how threat scenarios arise and are debated. The second area concerns actors and crisis-management capability, concentrating on national and international cooperation. Examples have been taken from the Police, the Customs and the Coast Guard. The third area concerns a specific threat scenario, i.e. social unrest and isolation. Below follows a brief summary of the conclusions.

Part 1 of the full report gives an account of how several non-military threats are today viewed as potential threats to national security. This implies that military threats are now “competing” with non-military threats for political attention, interest and resource allocation. Threats such as climate changes, social unrest and isolation, terrorism, serious organised crime and cyber disturbances are now permanently on the political agenda. Here we also elucidate the phenomenon of ”securitisation”.

The heading of this report is ‘What will threaten our security in the future?’ Obviously it is impossible to give any well-founded answer to this question: the uncertainty is too great. We consider it impossible to predict what events are most probable in the short term or the long term. Nor is it possible today to have any idea of what will be the changes in our surrounding area. A reasonable ambition, however, is to have an idea of what development or event could be the most serious from a national-security perspective.

In our view, negative changes in the population’s fundamental values are the most serious. We believe there are two strong reasons for emphasising this complex problem. One is that democratic values do not appear particularly important to young Swedes today. If such an attitude should gain ground in a future generation it could gradually ruin the basis of our political system and the confidence in it. Safeguarding and maintaining the ability to uphold democratic values are two of the most important government issues. It is therefore extremely important for the Government to use all available resources, among other reasons to combat and limit
social isolation and to stop anti-democratic currents from gaining a foothold among the population.

Furthermore, we wish to stress how important it is for the politicians to carefully follow the developments in each of the relevant areas of society and in the security sectors we have dealt with. Security inputs in these areas strongly affect one another, and shortcomings and vulnerability in one area can have serious consequences for another.

The government must consider the whole picture and make authorities cooperate better and make investments where they are most needed. National security work must be coordinated at the political level to a considerably greater extent than at present.

In today’s security-political climate, authorities and countries must deal with threats, risks and other challenges in mutual understanding.

Part 2 of the full report gives examples of both national and international patterns of cooperation. The examples are taken from the area of combating crime. The report describes how, at national level, ten Swedish authorities supported by the Government, started working together to handle increasing serious organised crime.

Without claiming to be complete, we describe, at an international level, various patterns of cooperation that have emerged and which include the Police, the Customs and the Coast Guard. A summarising conclusion is that national cooperation works well and is under development. In our judgement there are two strong success factors for this kind of national cooperation between authorities to make it work efficiently. One is that there is strong support – even pressure – from the political level for cooperation to come about.

The other success factor seems to be that the cooperating authorities have acquired a joint perception of the situation. It is important for the authorities to have the same knowledge of the character and extent of the problem, and that they strive for
the same goal. This model of cooperation could, in our view, also serve as a pattern for other areas of society requiring cooperation between authorities. One such area could be social unrest and exclusion.

Internationally there exist comprehensive and ambitious endeavours to cooperate. More and more patterns of cooperation are becoming bound by treaty or supported by agreements between the countries involved. For the cooperation to function in practice, however, staff education and joint exercises are necessary. Exchange visits and establishing of personal networks and contacts – particularly at a high level – also raise joint capability.

In part 3 of the full report the overall question has been whether social unrest and isolation represent a threat to national security. In addition, we have sought to reach an assessment of how capable Sweden is to counter threats in this area in the short term and the long term.

Phenomena such as political and religious radicalisation, white power environment, crime and terrorism that threaten the system breed, to a large extent, in social isolation. It is therefore reasonable to consider widespread social isolation as a threat to national security. Such phenomena, as pointed out above, tend to increase and spread. We consider Sweden’s ability to prevent this spread unsatisfactory.

Thus the government needs to pay more attention and make greater efforts partly to increase our ability to prevent the spread of these problems as well as to reinforce our preparedness to handle the consequences. The cooperation among authorities initiated for serious organised crime could, in our view, act as a model for how authorities can develop their cooperation in this area as well.
Conclusions and proposals from the full report, greatly condensed:

– Military threats compete with non-military for political attention, interest and resource allocation.

– Changes in the population’s fundamental values in an undemocratic direction are the most serious threat to national security.

– The government must commit all available resources to stem social unrest and isolation.

– The cooperation among authorities established to counteract and handle serious organised crime is successful, and can serve as a model for cooperation in other areas.

– International cooperation for the protection of society and preparedness considerably raise our crisis management capability. Joint training programmes and exercises are the key to success.

– An academic programme should be established in order to develop and deepen our knowledge of social unrest and isolation.

– The voluntary defence organisations should receive special state support to develop their involvement in vulnerable metropolitan areas for the purpose of reducing isolation.

– A commission should be appointed to investigate and clarify what resources the Police should be able to call on from the Armed Forces to create security during extraordinary events involving riots, violence and damage, together with recurrent serious disturbances of the public order and security.
The authors of previous chapters have discussed the development of the regions to which Sweden belongs and of the world at large as to assumptions for our defence and security. They also treated challenges and opportunities tied to technology development, defence and the need for security of the civil society. This concluding chapter is intended to give the reader a synthesis of important areas with implications for Sweden’s defence and security beyond 2014. We will emphasize essential findings and recommendations from earlier chapters, and further, as a consequence, identify and bring forward other issues that are deemed important for the overall picture. Thus, we aim at the presentation of a representative selection of conclusions and recommendations forming a connecting thought.

A changing world with implications for defence and security of the society.

In the wake of globalization the development of the world around us is changing fast and it is marked by unexpected and surprising events – as for example in the Middle East – which may rapidly evolve into crises and in the worst case end in war. The balance between the United States and China will be setting the tone of international relations. The United States will reduce its military presence in Europe and, notwithstanding the budget cuts on defence spending, redirect its focus towards the Pacific.

Also, several NATO and EU member states are reducing their defence spending due to fiscal reasons. Subsequently, the expeditionary capacity and the willingness to engage in solidarity actions under NATO, EU or UN command are rapidly eroding. Many multilateral cooperation projects in Europe are becoming bilateral with an express national focus. The Arctic or Barents region is attracting increasing and important attention in global security policies, while the European interest in the Nordic and Baltic region continue to decline.

Central Asia and the CIS nations are largely considered to be at the centre of Russian security policy. At the same time, an increasingly authoritarian Russia will get considerable opportunities to influence the development in Northern Europe backed as it is by its large strategic energy resources and increasing military power. Specifically the Baltic and the Arctic region are of great strategic importance to the Russians. The country, however, is suffering from great domestic problems, which
makes it necessary to follow its further development closely and continuously.

To summarize, to a much greater extent than before Sweden must rely on its own national resources for the security of the country and to serve as a stabilizing factor in the immediate region. It further needs to be stated what really is the country’s hard security focus, and hopefully it will be the Nordic region and particularly the Baltic Sea area. This ought to be clarified by the Swedish Parliament.

**Current security policy objectives**

Today’s security policy objectives are:

- to safeguard the life and health of the Swedish people,
- to safeguard the functionality of society,
- to safeguard our ability to maintain basic values such as democracy, law and order, and human rights.

These objectives cover expectations of a defence of the realm as well as of a defence of our society. A defence of the society as a modern replacement of Sweden’s Cold War “total defence” is not further defined in this booklet, although the need is deemed great.

**A credible defence – a choice between a national defence force and/or alliance with others**

Previous chapters present clear-cut conclusions that Sweden needs a defence, and to a greater extent than before it must rely on its own resources for its security and to be able to serve as a stabilizing factor in the immediate region, i.e. we need a national defence force. Basically, today’s defence is an expeditionary force set up for international collaboration and missions. Lessons learned from the 2008 Georgia conflict led to the armed forces being assigned also a national dimension, however without the allocation of any additional resources.

In the light of the fast-changing geopolitical picture and of current uncertainties the Swedish defence must be designed for the unforeseen and the unexpected both in the short and long perspective, which makes demands on long-term and stable planning processes. Our defence needs a highly deterring capability over time. The most compelling threats and the greatest risks combined with existing uncertainties ought to be made concrete and can form the basis for design and dimensioning. Ultimately, the defence capacity is a question of the nation’s existence and freedom, and subsequently the defence field must not be characterized by wishful thinking or by short-term fluctuations of security or budgetary policies.

One may reflect on why the defence and security issues are so low in political ranking. It is all about our national existence and freedom after all, as just mentioned, and about maintaining our democratic society. All of this could be characterized as ”the national home insurance”. We can probably answer the question by referring to the solid confidence both politicians and citizens have for the government to resolve all arising ”problems”, and thus it will be regarded a non-issue and given a low priority. Furthermore, defence issues are long-term by nature and therefore not as interesting from a priority or time-line point of view compared to all the daily short-term questions our politicians have to deal with. Another approach must be applied: first secure the freedom to be our own master, then establish domestic security, i.e. the ba-
sis for the type of society we live in. This is the core of the government’s mission and must always come first.

How do defence issues differ from issues dealing with the security of society at large? Both must be managed. The defence is there for the protection against external threats to the nation’s existence, which in its turn has an effect on the rest of the society. The security of our society means protection of the life and health of the people, securing the functioning of the society and safeguarding our democratic values. Subsequently, both are mutually dependent on each other, and military threats must never be put in opposition to non-military threats. Both dimensions are needed and both must get the attention and the resources required. It is obvious that future threats will very much call for holistic views and collaboration.

Alliance and solidarity. Sweden is not aligned with any military alliance, nor do we have any binding military agreements with any other nation, so our policy of non-alignment prevails. It is a paradox, however, that we are deeply involved in both NATO and EU military cooperation, indicating a lack of logic. We participate and we contribute, but we have no guarantees. Our Declaration of Solidarity is also unilateral and carries no obligations. To further underline this complex we refer to the very clear response given by NATO Secretary-General Fogh-Rasmussen to a TV reporter’s question, if NATO would save Sweden if we were attacked by a foreign power. The answer was: ”it is a hypothetical question, but no, Sweden cannot count on that. We protect our member nations”.

During a number of years the the defence has transformed itself from Cold War necessities into an expeditionary ”here and now” force. It is now time for our politicians, irrespective of party colour, to get up from their trenches and consider the alliance issue unbiased and on today’s conditions, leaving behind the mental hang-ups we have nurtured since the peak of the Cold War.

We need to be reminded, however, that with respect to the Lisbon solidarity clause the expeditionary capacities of both NATO and the EU are gradually being reduced as then probably also the willingness to aid ‘friends in need’. Thus, joining an alliance would not reduce the needs for a comprehensive defence force, even though several nations can share the burden. To enter into an alliance at the expense of a national defence for our very existence will, accordingly, be pointless.

Challenges for the defence forces. As previously stated, today’s defence and the defence we will have in the next few years must resolve a number of problems:

– The balance between army, navy and air force fighting capacities. This depends on the two decisive factors of having a national defence and/or becoming a member of an alliance. Assuming that Sweden’s non-alignment policy prevails will require the design of a national defence capability aimed at our very existence, and which will have all the resources necessary. A ”two-thirds” defence force as of the Supreme Commander’s initiative in the summer of 2012 can never come into question. Without all-round and adequate capabilities neither capacity nor trustworthiness can be achieved. However, in an alliance we have the option to reduce some capacities which instead can be provided by partners.
Military recruitment. Since 2010, the 100-year-old compulsory military service has been replaced by a system of contracted servicemen and servicewomen. Compulsory service may be reestablished in wartime by a parliamentary decision. Very much remains to be done before the reform is implemented, however, and the effects are not deemed possible to evaluate in full until around 2018.

Defence economics is a perpetual issue. The financial conditions are as follows:

- the defence budget share of the GNP is in a continuous slide, from 2.5 % in 1988 to 1.2 % in 2012, and this will probably be the trend also for the coming years. The share of GNP is sometimes regarded as a less relevant indicator, although this is what is currently used by SIPRI and other institutions. Another measure, if considered, ought to be equally as transparent and reliable for indicating positions and trends over time and also being suitable for international comparisons. This, however, is for the politicians to resolve.

- The recruiting of servicemen and servicewomen raises concerns, and it is highly probable that additional appropriations will be necessary, specifically if an increase in numbers is required at any time.5

- Defence materiel appropriations are gravely neglected. There is an identified need for renewals over time to replace obsolete and worn-out materiel. The accumulated renewals gap mentioned amounts to about SEK 2.5 billion.

- Subsequent to the reduction of the defence budget’s share of the GNP, the materiel appropriations’ share of total defence appropriations is reduced from 41 % in 2001 to 13 % in 2011. From experience – and by international comparison – you need to keep a materiel investment rate of 25 to 30 % in order to maintain the renewals necessary.6 Someone referred to what is now going on as “eating the seeds at the expense of next year’s crops”.

- In January of this year the Government made the decision to let the Armed Forces procure 60 multi-role aircraft of the new generation of JAS39 Gripen provided that Switzerland will acquire an additional 22 aircraft. The order to Saab includes the development and production of these aircraft. All in all, the additional costs that shall be taken within the current appropriation framework are likely to be between SEK 35 and 45 billion. It is, however, not deemed reasonable that the Armed Forces alone shall bear the whole burden of this national industrial project.

- In reality, price development of defence-specific materiel is substantially steeper than both the ordinary consumer and producer price indices. Since 1998, the price compensation system does not consider this component, thus reducing the real purchasing power of the Armed Forces by roughly 3.5 % every year.7 Given a reasonable materiel share 25 % of a total annual appropriation of SEK 40 billion, the Armed Forces will find a purchasing power deficit amounting to about SEK 10 billion over the years 2012-2042.
rent system will lead to a situation where the long-term procurement power, and with that the defence capacity of the Armed Forces, asymptotically will approach zero, even if today’s defence economy is prolonged.

From this we can conclude that the challenges are big and numerous with respect to the economy of the Swedish defence. It is obvious that using the defence as the budget-balancing tool has come to the end of the road. In order for the Armed Forces to manage all these deficiencies additional funds need to be allocated. Leading finance and defence politicians in Government and Parliament as a rule employ a very high threshold for increasing defence allocations. In the light of the underfinancing described here there are expectations that Government and the Parliament are both prepared to accept reality and take necessary action, specifically if the result of the Armed Forces’ report to Government in March 2013 would confirm the financial position stated here.

Expenditures and the public good. There is an imminent need for a change in the public view of defence economics solely as a cost. Nobody wants high costs, they should always be reduced or, rather, be eliminated. This view is human, but it does not hold for one of the basic tasks of the state. We need a different way to act and to measure – from a utility perspective. Are there only red items in the nation’s ledger, are there no positive entries at all? Freedom, employment, taxes, technology with spin-offs such as international standing, cooperation and influence, and national pride etc., etc. – we may call it national utility and everything cannot be measured in “kronor”.

Control and management of the Defence. According to the Swedish Constitution the political level shall control the Defence overall and in the long term with regard to WHAT shall be accomplished. The various authorities, like the Armed Forces and the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), are then responsible for the HOW perspective, i.e. how the superordinate goals are to be realized. The process must be characterized by a clear separation of roles and responsibilities based on trust between the parties. Politically, an ever increasing near-term focus and managing in detail are inherent to all government control of specifically the Armed Forces, and an illustrative example can be found in the report of the Swedish National Audit Office (NAO) regarding the so-called Group for Executive Action, a Government task force, and its handling of reductions in the materiel supply plan. Should today’s reality become the management standard and differ from what it ought to be, maybe it would be worth considering to include the Armed Forces Supreme Command in the Ministry of Defence as is already the case in Norway and some other countries in our vicinity. With such an organization tasks and responsibilities would be made clear.

The Working Committee on Defence (“Försvarsberedningen”) was inaugurated in September 2012 with the planned completion of its work in good time for the anticipated parliamentary defence review effective in 2015. We sincerely hope that sufficient time and resources will be allocated to the Committee for the inquiries and analyses needed, for example an in-depth strategic analysis to form the basis for the work, the alliance issue, industrial issues including a technology strategy, and also the necessary qualifications for the new personnel supply system and its outcome to
date. It is further deemed important to the Committee to have sufficient time set aside for a possibly transparent and public communication of its deliberations and conclusions. One would rather have a thoroughly worked out defence review in 2016 than a premature and forced one in 2015.

The Need for a Defence of our Society

Controlling and managing the security of our society. By defence of our society we mean being prepared for and having the capacity to prevent various crises and emergencies, all from a civil perspective. In this context, the military defence is not a part of the defence of our society. The Swedish so-called Total Defence concept was abandoned quite some time ago without being replaced by anything else. The bipolar threat of the Cold War has been substituted by a multi-polar security threat partly overlapping the military threats. Naturally, we have resources in the form of various government agencies and other organizations able to handle threats against our society. What we are lacking, however, are national superordinate objectives and, subsequently, adequate operating structures for governing the defence of a society in crisis and at war.

The governing principle today for our government agencies in crises and at war is fundamentally that each organization is to do what it usually does but cooperate with others when need be. We have reason to question this modus operandi, if it will be sufficient enough in the future of uncertainties we know is coming. Who takes command, for example, if Sweden were to be hit by a severe and total cyber attack similar to those Russia delivered to Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008, respectively? In this situation each government agency will have enough business of their own and cannot be expected to put in too much time and effort in cooperation with maybe 20-40 peer agencies in the security field. Specifically, to be appointed to coordinate (not lead!) this group of agencies and organizations must be regarded as an all but impossible task, even with previous training. An embryo and a role model for joint operations could be, however, the current and successful organization by ten agencies under a common command, which since 2008 has been deployed for the fight against the most severe international organized crime. Maybe it is also time to study how neighbouring countries and other countries in our vicinity have resolved the issue of operational command in crises and at war with a clear-cut chain of command, which is also subject to change over time should the character of the crisis change. Perhaps the once rejected proposal of a so-called Crisis-Management Agency should be looked at again.

Invest in technology for security of our society. The technology subproject covered a number of new areas where Sweden is at the forefront of both science and technology, and which could add to the security of our society. Engineering and the development of technology are instrumental to Sweden’s security and defence, and international cooperation is necessary in order to achieve the results required. Domestic development is a must for maintaining the status of an attractive partner on the international arena. Today, technical development is a must for maintaining the status of an attractive partner on the international arena. Today, technical development seldom is purely military or civil in its character, and results can often satisfy demands both from the armed forces, industry and other parts of society. Cyber technology, nano technology, vaccines and antidotes, and power systems/power sys-
tems security are some of the areas identified by the subproject, and they all have a wide bearing on the security of society.

Internet-based communications systems connect organizations and corporations in all areas of society, but pose severe threats in case of malicious intrusions, hacker attacks and manipulation of critical infrastructures such as power, water, transportation, media and the financial system. The country’s cyber security must be strengthened by efficient counter-measures, which is of immediate urgency. What instils hope, however, is that Sweden has a world-leading competence in this field.

Infections and epidemics spread over the globe at an ever increasing speed. There is a great need for protection against epidemics, pandemics, and biological weaponry. The authors suggest the development of vaccines, but above all of diagnostics and the identification of agents, as a strategically important area.

Electric power dependency and the nationwide power supply system are just two strategically important elements of our national security system. A continuing investment in, among other things, intelligent power grids will be important for the national security but also for future Swedish industrial development and competitiveness.

Establish a national defence of the civic society. The recommendation from the authors of the chapter on the societal aspects of our national defence is for the responsible political authorities to analyse the conditions of and then implement the necessary structure for a national defence of our society, all in order to protect:

- the life and health of the citizens and security of property,
- the continued functionality of our society,
- our ability to maintain our basic values such as democracy, law and order, and human rights.

This defence of our society shall be effective in crises as well as when the nation is at war.

Social unrest and exclusion. One conclusion that needs to be seriously considered is the risks of social unrest and exclusion, which pose a national security threat from inside with citizens changing values in an undemocratic direction and subsequently dissolving the cement that keeps us together as a nation, i.e. our democracy. Suggested actions are:

- the Government must allocate immediate resources sufficient to stem social unrest and isolation.
- Academic courses, both at undergraduate and graduate levels, shall be established in order to develop in-depth societal knowledge about social unrest and exclusion.
- The voluntary defence organizations and other society-oriented organizations should receive government subsidies to involve themselves in developing programmes to reduce exclusion in unrest-prone metropolitan districts.
- It ought to be analysed how and when the police could call on the armed forces’ support to handle extraordinary events like widespread disturbances of public order and safety, riots, severe damage to public and private property and other serious crime.
Technical development – needs and opportunities

Sweden’s doctrine of non-alignment in peacetime aiming at neutrality in wartime served the country very well during the Cold War. Technology and related opportunities played a substantial and important role for the respect Sweden enjoyed with its politics and defence during these years. Non-alignment led the defence materiel supply in the direction of domestic design and the development and manufacturing of strategic equipment for our defence against invasion.

The process developed by FMV, the Defence Materiel Administration, for materiel supply was far ahead of its time and would today be called concurrent engineering, i.e. a parallel development of both components and large subsystems. With the process, both manufacturing costs and operational costs, the so-called life cycle costs, were kept on a very low level in an international comparison. Procurement through competitive bidding was, and still is, the common procedure for FMV, but exceptions from this rule were not unusual. Direct procurement from industry in lieu of competitive bidding was often used for complicated systems platforms and weapons systems like fighters and submarines. However, in these cases subsystems and components were to a great extent subject to competitive bidding, the basic principle.

Altogether, this modus operandi created a pay-back to society, which was often greater than the incurred cost. You could consider the development of technology for Sweden’s security and defence not only as a cost but also as a revenue from a utility perspective. We strongly believe it to be of the utmost importance that today’s approach of looking at our defence as a cost only has to change, and that policy methods for a new utilitarian view are developed. However, a strategic mindset and a long-term perspective will be required by the responsible politicians to do this.

We have not seen much of new and advanced knowledge relating to security and defence coming out of academia, government and industry in Sweden during the past twenty years causing the nation to be of less interest to potential cooperation partners in this field. To a great extent this is the result of the extensive transformation of the armed forces with a reduced organization and fewer advanced systems. What has also limited domestic research and development, R+D, is the current materiel supply policy, by which Commercial Off The Shelf, COTS, or Military Off The Shelf, MOTS, with few exceptions is the only accepted procurement alternative. The technology subproject evaluated the importance of technology and development of technology against leading nations with respect to security and defence. The result showed that technology was a pivoting factor and that international cooperation was imperative for maintaining an acceptable national level. We must have development of our own in order to become an attractive and respected partner in the international defence-industry cooperation – with nothing to offer, we get nothing in return. Own domestic development in selected competence areas can give us lower costs for defence and society compared to the policy of always buying off the shelf.

Invest in advanced competence. In order for Sweden to regain its position as a respected cooperation partner, we should also invest in advanced competence in new fields complementary to the traditional airspace and underwater technologies. As already mentioned above in the section on
security of society, Sweden enjoys such advanced knowledge in several disciplines, for instance in cyber technologies and nano science, in vaccines and antidotes, and in electricity dependence and power-systems security. These areas cover both civil and military use and will benefit the security of the society as a whole.

A strategy for technology and a technology doctrine. A technology strategy and a technology doctrine are two significant parts of a new national materiel supply strategy for the defence and security area. A long-term perspective, predictability and a stable international cooperation arena with mutual R+D commitments are basic elements in a cost-efficient materiel supply plan. A number of research projects and investigations by, for example, the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA), the Federation of Technology Enterprises, and the Ministry of Enterprise, have all stressed the need for so-called innovation procurement as an important factor for Swedish competitiveness. A so-called technology procurement will then be an efficient follow-on of a previous innovation procurement.

Innovation procurement and Technology procurement. The government should be able to include in security and defence-related development similar programmes for innovation and technology procurement, which does not necessarily oppose buying "from the shelf". COTS or MOTS is the best alternative when there is a variety of products and sources in the market place, meeting all the relevant requirements. The market for qualified systems in the defence arena is, however, the least perfect market one can possibly find, and an international buyer will get yesterday's product at today's cost. With a development of our own of selected, important systems and components together with international cooperation on materiel development and supply we can get access to advanced products we would otherwise be denied and also get such products at a lower cost compared to full domestic development and production.

For more than 125 years the Swedish Government has shown an excellent ability to define requirements for infrastructure and other important products and systems for public use, and, by subsequent investing, it has been a significant driving force for the development of a globally competitive Swedish industry. It has further contributed to the industrial base that still to this day is the foundation of our prosperity and paying for our welfare system. An investment in security and defence-related technology will also today be an investment for new non-military applications in Swedish industry.

We are all in the same boat. To conclude, it is obvious that we have a need for a national Swedish rally on the defence and security issue. Media reports and debates are marked by defence being a policy area in a continuing economic crisis, with a continuing decline in available resources, and with a continuing discord about who to blame, not to mention the prestige involved. The public view is very often "we do not any longer have a defence worthy of its name" and "the defence capacity now is so low that we might as well scrap it all". We must all realize that we collectively have a problem in common, which has to be resolved without playing a blame game. This ought to be a non-partisan issue and a resolution must prevail beyond the next elections.
Conclusions and recommendations in brief

The conclusions and recommendations below are listed in the order of appearance in this chapter.

- Swedish national security shows signs of severe deficiencies both in the defence area and in the security of our society.
- There is a need for a new and higher priority for the politics of defence and security, being core to the true mission of the state as they are. We must secure our freedom first, then comes everything else.
- The focus of Sweden’s security policies needs to be firmly established. Is it the Nordic countries and the Baltics, or is it international missions? Or something else?
- Sweden needs to invest in its national defence, i.e. the defence of the Realm. Today’s armed forces are not designed for this task.
- Sweden has to choose a path: either having a national existential defence or seeking an alliance.
- Government and Parliament have to examine the alliance issue in depth from the current security situation.
- Our defence policies must not be marked by wishful thinking and short-term decisions.
- Our defence must not be seen as being opposite to the security of our society, we need both.
- We need a defence force with all capacities, broad and deep, or else we need an alliance. There are severe deficiencies in today’s armed forces.
- Defence finance shows severe imbalances, and increased appropriations are necessary. Systemic errors need to be remedied.
- Stop looking at the defence as a cost only. Develop new measurement and accounting methods that also consider total societal benefits.
- There is a need for a new political planning and decision process based on a comprehensive strategic analysis.
- The Government ought to analyse the conditions for and establish a national civic defence of our society.
- Sweden may see a growing internal security threat from social unrest and exclusion, which must be taken seriously.
- Sweden enjoys several new research areas with advanced competence, which can add to the security of our society: cyber technology, nano technology, vaccines, antidotes and agents, and also electricity dependence and power-systems security.
- A national technology strategy needs to be established as a basis for a revised strategy for our materiel supply. One should return to an innovation and technology procurement policy for strategically important domains.
- It is necessary with a national rally for the security and defence arena – we all have a common issue to resolve.
Notes

1. CIS, the Commonwealth of Independent States, was formed in 1991 by Russia and the former Soviet republics, except the Baltic states, during the break-up of the USSR.


6. Ibid., pp. 77-79.

7. Försvarsmaktens budget – Tid för långsiktighet, Officersförbundets rapport, Nov. 1, 2012. (Report by the Officers’ Professional Union regarding the armed forces’ budget). FOI, the Defence Research Agency, means the figure is 3.5 % for Sweden.


9. The Total Defence included all aspects of society in crisis and at war, like securing the supply of oil, critical components for industry, transport and communications, etc., and providing bomb shelters, health care and similar aspects.

10. Utformningen av ett system med en krisledande myndighet, Dir. 2006:81. A Crisis-Management Agency was intended to be in command over other govt’ agencies if deemed necessary in crisis and at war. Agencies could differ depending on the type of crisis.

11. World Values Survey, study from June 2011 indicating that about 25 % of Swedish young adults thought it would be ”good or very good if Sweden was undemocratic and was governed by a strong leader, who did not have to depend on a parliament or on elections”.

12. FMV is a civil government agency responsible for the procurement of equipment and supplies for the armed forces. During the Cold War it had substantial design and development resources of its own, for instance in aerospace and submarine technologies. Today FMV is focused on procurement.

13. Stefan Fölster, Svenska Dagbladet, Brännpunkt, Dec. 19, 1991; Gunnar Eliasson, Synliga kostnader, osynliga vinster. Offentlig upphandling som industripolitik, SNS Förlag, 2010. Similar results on yields from defence systems investments can be found in reports from other countries, e.g. the United States.

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Swedish National Security

Challenges and Opportunities beyond 2014

by Sven-Christer Nilsson and Göran Larsbrink

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